

A MANUAL OF  
CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

VOLUME II

THE FALL

REDEMPTION

GRACE

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS

THE LAST THINGS



A MANUAL OF  
CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

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AND  
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VOLUME II  
THE FALL  
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THE LAST THINGS



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*Dozenal* numeration is a system of thinking of numbers in twelves, rather than tens. Twelve is much more versatile, having four even divisors—2, 3, 4, and 6—as opposed to only two for ten. This means that such hatefulness as “0.333 . . .” for  $\frac{1}{3}$  and “0.1666 . . .” for  $\frac{1}{6}$  are things of the past, replaced by easy “0;4” (four twelfths) and “0;2” (two twelfths).

In dozenal, counting goes “one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, elv, dozen; dozen one, dozen two, dozen three, dozen four, dozen five, dozen six, dozen seven, dozen eight, dozen nine, dozen ten, dozen elv, two dozen, two dozen one . . .” It’s written as such: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, ɿ, ɺ, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 1ɿ, 1ɺ, 20, 21 . . .

Dozenal counting is at once much more efficient and much easier than decimal counting, and takes only a little bit of time to get used to. Further information can be had from the dozenal societies (<http://www.dozenal.org>), as well as in many other places on the Internet.

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BOOK IV

THE FALL



**T**HE SUPERNATURAL DIGNITY of adoptive sonship conferred by the Creator upon His creatures was lost to a portion of the angels by their revolt, and to the whole of mankind by Adam's disobedience. We shall therefore divide this book into three chapters: **I**, Sin; **II**, The Fall of the Angels; **III**, The Fall of Man.

Alex. of Hales, *Summa*, p. ii. q. 94 sq.; St. Bonav. In ii. *Sent.*; St. Thom. 1<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>e</sup>, qq. 71–89 and *2<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>e</sup>. Dissp. De Malo*, with the commentaries of Suarez, Tanner, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, and Gotti; Bellarmine, *Controrv. De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati*; Kilber, *De Peccatis*; Kleutgen, vol. ii; Scheeben, book iv.

## CHAPTER I

### SIN

#### § 106 GENERAL NOTIONS OF EVIL AND SIN

I. 1. Every substance is in itself good; it becomes bad only when it is itself deprived of some perfection or when it deprives another substance of some perfection. Hence evil is the privation of some good, or a corruption of good. It is nothing positive, but the negation of a positive perfection. However, evil mostly consists of some positive disposition opposed to the perfection of the subject, which disposition is then evil in as far as it implies the negatives of perfection. As evil is only an accident, it must exist in a substance as its subject. Again, since it connotes a deficiency in perfection, it can only exist in finite and changeable beings. In these, however, the possibility of evil is connatural with the changeableness consequent upon their origin out of nothing; as no definite grade of perfection is essential to them, so the amount they actually receive is capable of decrease or increase. In the case of man, his composition of mind and matter necessarily exposes him to certain evils or imperfections.

2. The cause of evil is not something evil in itself. On the contrary, evil can only be produced accidentally by a cause which is itself good, and aims at some good object. In bodily evils this is manifest; the causes which inflict bodily suffering do so in the exercise of forces which are good in themselves, but which come into conflict with other forces. The evils arising from free actions are due to a good but misapplied principle. Sin, in particular, is possible only because it appears to the sinner as a subjective good. Hence the axiom: Evil is caused by good (*causa mali bonum*). Evil has, however, no efficient but rather a deficient cause; it owes its existence either to the defective action of a positive cause or to defective resistance to opposing influences.

3. From a theological point of view, evils may be divided into two classes: Voluntary evils (Sins) and Involuntary evils (Pain and Suffering). The evils of the first class are really "the" evil, that is, objects to be avoided and hated. They are also the greatest evils, because they injure at the same time their own author and the Author of nature. God cannot cause, but only permit and oppose them. The evils of the second class are only evils of the subject which naturally abhors them, yet they are not so detestable as to be avoided in all cases. God may cause them and use them as means to His ends; notably, as a penalty for sin. In the original order established by Him, there was no room for evils of this class. They came into the world with sin. As a matter of fact, then, all evils existing in this world spring from sin, the greatest and original evil. Hence the above division is equivalent to another which distinguishes "Evils

of Guilt” and “Evils of Penalty” (*mala culpa, mala poena*). Many evils may, however, be at the same time a guilt and a penalty.

II. Sin, in its theological and proper sense, consists in the conscious and voluntary transgression, lesion, or denial of the moral order imposed upon the creature by Divine Law. The philosophical notion of sin does not contain the element of Divine command. What to the theologian is a voluntary transgression of the law of God is looked upon by the philosopher as a transgression of the rational and natural order. Yet even in sound philosophy the notion of sin ought not to be dissociated from disobedience to the Lawgiver, for sin is always an action against the dictates of conscience, and these are but the commanding voice of God (Rom. ii. 14–16).

1. Hence the essence of sin consists in the more or less express opposition of the human will against the Divine Will, an opposition which implies a certain neglect or contempt of the Divine Will itself. This contempt involves an “aversion from God as the ultimate End,” that is, a refusal of the submission and love which are His due. Sin averts or turns away the creature from God as the Highest Good in Himself, and from God as the Highest Good of the creature itself, in Whom alone it can find perfect beatitude. It seeks outside God a satisfaction or pleasure incompatible with the possession and fruition of God. On God’s side, the contempt of His will by the creature constitutes an offence and an insult, according to the saying, “The lawbreaker offends the lawmaker.” And this offence always includes an “injury;” that is, it injures or damages the external glory of God. For this reason, Holy Scripture describes sin as injustice and iniquity. Again, sin being always committed under the very eyes or in the face of God, it must needs excite His displeasure, abhorrence, indignation, and anger. These affections in God are not accompanied by the same feelings as in man (§ 55), yet they exist in Him eminently; and it is not the defect of malice in sin, but God’s own immutability, which prevents Him from being affected with infinite pain by the sinner. In sins against the theological virtues, and against the virtue of religion, the aversion and offence assume a direct character, because God is the immediate object of these virtues.

2. Sin is clearly the greatest of evils—and an absolute evil, because it deprives the Greatest and Absolute Good of the honour due to Him. It is, however, infinite only in a restricted sense, viz. inasmuch as being directed against the Infinite Good, it deserves to be detested with a hatred as great as the love due to God; and inasmuch as it surpasses in greatness any quantity of other evils, and cannot be fully compensated for by any number of finite good works.

3. Sin acquires a special theological character, from its being a violation of the order of grace which establishes between God and His creatures relations essentially higher than any natural relations. In the order of grace, God reveals Himself to man as his supernatural end, and offers him supernatural means for arriving at his supernatural destination. The sinful action which destroys these relations is therefore far more wicked than a sin against the natural order; it is no longer the disobedience of a servant, but the revolt of a son against his Father, the infidelity of the bride to the Bridegroom, an insult to the Holy Ghost, Who is the bond of union between the Creator and His sanctified creature, an attack upon the sanctity of the soul. This special theological character exists subjectively only when the sinner knows his supernatural vocation, as in the case of the fallen angels, of our first parents, and of Christians generally. Sins committed before Baptism are free from this particular malice, unless sanctifying grace has been infused by God in one of the two ways which supply

temporarily the actual administration of the sacrament. See St. Thomas, 1 qq. 48, 49; 1<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>e</sup>, q. 71.

## § 110 MORTAL SIN AND VENIAL SIN

I. Some sins cause the loss of eternal life, and so entail eternal punishment; they are immediately followed by the loss of grace and by positive *dis*grace, and thus cause the spiritual death of the soul. Others do not entail these consequences; they can coexist with grace and with the supernatural life of holiness and justice, of which grace is the principle. The former are called mortal, because they deprive the soul of supernatural life; the latter are called venial, because of their comparatively trivial character, and because they are more easily pardoned.

The existence of mortal sins is manifest from the dogma of eternal punishment. The existence of venial sins was defined in the Second Council of Milevis, can. 8, 9, and again in the Council of Trent (Sess. vii, chap. 11, and can. 23, 25). These definitions are founded upon 1 John i. 8, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves;" and James iii. 2, "In many things we all offend," which texts are certainly to be applied to the just. The text Prov. xxiv. 16 ("A just man shall fall seven times, and shall rise again"), so often quoted in support of this doctrine, does not refer to falls into sin, but into temporal misfortunes, as St. Augustine has noted. See the classical text 1 Cor. iii. 8, sqq., with the commentary of St. Thomas, 1<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>e</sup>, q. 89, a. 2.

II. The difference between mortal and venial sin is not merely accidental or external, but affects their very essence, and determines the great difference in their punishment. Speaking generally, it consists in this: mortal sin is a fully voluntary transgression of a Divine command gravely binding; whereas, if the act is not fully voluntary, or if the command only lightly binds, the sin is venial. A command is said to be gravely binding (that is, binding under heavy penalties) when its transgression carries with it the loss of Divine friendship and of the delinquent's claim on eternal life. This is the case when the object of the command is the attainment of an important end or the securing of an important good, which, by the Will of God, must be attained or secured as necessary means of salvation. A commandment is said to be lightly binding when it binds indeed, but not in so stringent a manner. The difference between heavy and light obligations, although apparently only one of degree, is, in fact, an essential difference. The opposition against the Divine Will manifested in the breaking of a grave obligation shows in the sinner a malice of disposition essentially different from that shown by disobedience in light matters. In mortal sin, the opposition to God is formal disrespect, and contempt of His Sovereignty and Supreme Goodness; whereas in venial sin the opposition to God amounts merely to neglect, the Divine attributes being not so much despised as insufficiently acknowledged. In mortal sin the creature turns away from God as its last end, and seeks felicity in another end; whereas in venial sin the creature only loses sight of God, the last end; it walks outside the road, but not in an opposite direction. In other words: in mortal sin, the sinner prefers himself or some creature to God, because, for the love of a creature, he despises the Majesty of the Divine Lawgiver, and sacrifices the felicity of possessing God; he acts as if he, and not God, were the Highest Good. In venial sin the sinner does not prefer himself or any created good to God; he has no wish entirely to despise the rights of God as Lawgiver and as Highest Good of the creature; his disposition is such that, if God prohibited the disorderly action under grave penalties, he would not commit

it. Holy Scripture always represents sins of the first class as hostility between man and God; whereas venial sin is never so described.

Again, just as all sins have in common that they are opposed to the great Law of Charity, so also the two classes of sins draw their essential difference from their different degree of opposition to the same law. Mortal sin turns the heart of the sinner away from God towards the creature; venial sin coexists with the love of God, but falls short of the perfect compliance with it. Since grave sin and charity are incompatible metaphysically, as soon as sin enters the soul, charity and its principle, grace, must quit it; the supernatural beauty of the soul is extinguished by “mortal” sin, and the creature cannot of himself recall the spiritual life thus lost. St. Thomas, 1<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>æ</sup>, q. 72, a. 5; qq. 88, 89.

### § III THE EFFECTS OF SIN ON THE SINNER

I. The first effect of sin on the soul is to inflict upon it a stain, in the same manner as contact with unclean things defiles the body. Another effect is to make the sinner guilty and liable to punishment (*reatus culpæ et pænæ*). These effects are inseparable. Holy Scripture describes them as unrighteousness or injustice. They entail, as a consequence, that the sinner becomes, in the eyes of God, an object of displeasure and disgust; an object of hatred, at least in the sense of being unworthy of God’s continued benevolence; an object of anger, which Divine justice must visit with punishment.

The stain and guilt of sin, with the concomitant Divine displeasure, hatred, and anger, may fitly be considered as the first punishment of sin, for they are incurred against the will of the sinner, and make themselves felt as uneasiness, shame, and remorse. “Thou hast decreed it, and so it comes to pass, that every disordered soul shall be to itself its own punishment”<sup>1</sup> (St. Aug., *Confess.* i. 12). They belong to mortal sin in their entirety; venial sin produces them only in a very partial sense.

II. Sin leaves behind it certain real and permanent effects which are commonly designated as “an impairing of natural goodness” (*diminutio, corruptio, vitiatio boni nature*). Sin cannot destroy either the substance or the faculties of the soul in themselves; its baneful influence only affects the perfection of their exercise and their supernatural endowment. An effect common to mortal and venial sin, in the natural and supernatural order, is the production of an inclination of the will towards evil. The frequent repetition of sinful acts bends the will in a wrong direction, and hampers it in avoiding evil and doing good. From the will the difficulty extends to the intellect, inclining it to judge falsely of things moral; and in man it even affects the sensitive appetites. The perversity thus engendered may render the difficulty of doing good insuperable, and may, for all practical purposes, extinguish free will. Such blinding or hardening (Isa. vi. 9; Acts xxviii. 26; Rom. xi. 8; Matt. xiii. 14, etc.) is seldom, if ever, absolute in man; usually it extends only to certain kinds of actions, and even as to these, the freedom of the will is not radically extinct. Considered in relation to grace, which is the normal life of the soul, the incapacity for good becomes an inaptitude for receiving the effective operation of grace, or a diminution of the natural receptivity for the action of grace, together with a difficulty in cooperating with it.

III. In the supernatural order, mortal sin causes the loss of all the supernatural goodness of the soul, and extinguishes its supernatural life (§ 110). The withdrawal of supernatural grace

<sup>1</sup>“*Jussisti, Domine, et sic est, ut omnis iniquus animus sibi ipsi sit pænâ.*”



is a punishment inflicted by God on the sinner; it is also a direct and logical consequence of sin itself. Sin unfits the soul for the indwelling of grace, just as disorganization unfits the body for the indwelling of the soul. The exclusion of grace is due to, and co-extensive with, its formal opposition to sin—grace being love, and sin contempt, of God. Hence all mortal sins cause the immediate loss of charity and of sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*), whereas faith and hope are only excluded by the sins directly opposed to them. Yet every mortal sin deserves the loss of all supernatural virtues and of all gifts of grace, because the sinner renders himself unworthy of Divine favours, and because all such favours are connected with sanctifying grace. If sins be not cancelled, this punishment is sure to follow in time—at least at the day of judgment. It need not follow immediately; wherefore, if it pleases God to allow the sinner still to tend towards his supernatural end, He does not withdraw the necessary graces except when the sinner makes himself not only unworthy but also unfit for them.

IV. Theologians generally hold that venial sin does not diminish sanctifying grace or infused virtues. These gifts participate in the incorruptibility of spiritual substances; they are not imperishable, yet they are beyond the reach of corrupting created action. Unlike acquired virtues, they are incapable of decrease or increase by the exertions of the subject. Hence venial sin could only cause their loss by completely destroying them; but from its nature venial sin is compatible with grace. Nor can it be said that each venial sin is punished by the withdrawal of a certain degree of grace; because this would entail the loss of a corresponding degree of eternal glory, and so inflict eternal punishment for an offence whose commensurate punishment is merely the keeping back of certain special favours and the postponement of the final rewards. Venial sin only impairs the natural disposition for good, while mortal sin destroys the temple of the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. vi. 19), and changes man from spiritual into animal (1 Cor. ii. 14); it infects the whole nature, and thus becomes the cause of new sins or of acts deficient in goodness. The absence of sanctifying grace makes further meritorious acts impossible, and weakens the sinner for future temptations.

V. The moral effects of an act are those which the act causes another person to produce; hence the moral effects of a sinful act are the pains and penalties which it causes God to inflict upon the sinner. The object of these penalties is manifold. The chief object is to avenge the injury done to God's dignity and holiness by afflicting the sinner with evils affecting his own dignity and well-being. Other penalties aim at the atonement or satisfaction for the sins committed, and others again are purely medicinal. The Schoolmen call these several penalties, *pœna vindicativa, satisfactoria, medicinalis*.

1. Each sin, without exception, has affixed to it a proportionate penalty; or, in other words, each sin makes its author liable to commensurate punishment. The liability lasts as long as the sin.

2. Only sin properly so called can deserve punishment; or, at least, the liability to punishment varies exactly in the same degree as the guilt of sin. Hence one person can only be punished for the sins of another if, and in as far as, he participates in the other person's guilt.

3. To the penalties of sin belong first the stain and guilt of sin and the liability to punishment (*reatus culpa et pœna*) contracted by the sinner. The punishment itself consists in the withdrawal or keeping back of gifts which, but for his sin, were destined to the sinner. Thus, in mortal sin, sanctifying grace and eternal life are lost; in venial sin the grant of the final reward is delayed for a time, and the superabundant communication of actual graces is reduced to those necessary for the increase of merit and the avoidance of sin. Other penalties

are the withdrawal of temporal goods and the infliction of temporal evils, intended to punish the selfishness and pride which lie at the bottom of every sin.

4. The penalty attaching to mortal sin is infinite inasmuch as it deprives the sinner of an infinite good; the beatific vision of God for all eternity. This penalty is exactly commensurate to the greatness of the sin, which consists in the contempt of that same infinite and eternal good, and deprives the sinner of the power to make good his loss. See St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent. Dist.* 35; St. Thomas, 1<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>æ</sup>, qq. 85, 87.

## § 112 HABITUAL SIN; ITS IRREPARABILITY AND PERPETUITY

I. The stain and guilt of sin and the sinner's liability to punishment remain after the sinful act itself has ended, and constitute "the state of sin," or "habitual sin." It is most important to have an exact conception of habitual sin, because of its bearing on the doctrine of justification. We should note that habitual sin is not here used in the sense of sin into which one habitually falls.

1. Habitual sin, being a real sin, must contain the elements of guilt and imputability, and as these can only be conceived in connection with a free act of the will, habitual sin implies, necessarily, a relation to the free act by which sin was first committed. This act influences the sinful state in the same manner as the seed influences the whole growth of the plant. The derangement caused by sin in the sinner himself and in the permanent order by God established, is an evil which the sinner is bound not only to prevent, but also to repair when committed. It is this very obligation "to remove the disorder of sin" which connects the free sinful act with the subsequent state of habitual sin; as long as the sinner does not comply with the obligation, and is not otherwise dispensed from it, he must be considered as still freely adhering to his sin. Thus, from a passing act, results a permanent guilt. The connection cannot be severed by retraction of the former will, because such retraction, by itself, cannot destroy the effects of sin. Nor is the permanence of guilt prevented by the fact that the sinner is unable, at least to a certain extent, to comply with the obligation of removing the evil; for the guilt of habitual sin depends not on the present, but on the past use of free will, and the inability in question is itself an effect of the first sinful act.

2. Habitual sin, then, in its totality, contains two elements: the disorder (stain, guilt, hatefulness) in the soul of the sinner, which is the material element; and the imputability of this disorder to the sinner by reason of the unfulfilled obligation to remove it, and this is the formal element of habitual sin.

II. 1. The habitual state of grievous or mortal sin is, from its nature, everlasting, because it can only be taken away by a special merciful interference on the part of God. The injury done to God remains, even if the sinner repents of it. In the supernatural order, another cause of irreparability exists, viz. mortal sin extinguishes the principle of supernatural life, that is grace, which the sinner cannot gain back, as it is a free gift of God. Again, in this case, not even a proportionate retraction or penance is possible, because sanctifying grace, the ordinary principle of supernatural acts, is lost, and the sinner has made himself unworthy of actual grace which could act as extraordinary principle.

2. The formal effects of habitual sin are, of course, likewise everlasting. For this reason, the punishment is also eternal, albeit another reason for the eternity of punishment is found in the intrinsic greatness of the guilt.

3. Venial sin, at least when not coexisting with mortal sin in the same subject, is from its nature only temporary; it is not the death of the soul, but a temporary disease, which can be removed by acts of charity on the part of the sinner. A time must necessarily come when the venial sinner is moved efficaciously to retract his sin, and so to obtain remission; otherwise he would never be able to enter eternal life. Where venial sin coexists with mortal sin, the subject being incapable of acts of supernatural charity, the separation of venial faults is made impossible, and its guilt remains as long as that of mortal sin, but these effects are due to the mortal sin.

III. The perpetuity of habitual sin does not necessarily imply a continuation of actual sin, or even the impossibility of a conversion of some kind. Yet, if such conversion be wanting, a continuation of actual sin is naturally to be expected, and, with it, a stronger inclination towards sin and a greater unworthiness of Divine grace, until a stage may be reached in which conversion is all but impossible, except by miracle. Such is particularly the case with “sins against the Holy Ghost,” *i.e.* direct and formal contempt of God’s truth and grace, which blind the sinner’s intellect and harden his heart. See St. Thomas, 1<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>æ</sup>, q. 86, a. 2; q. 89, a. 1.

### § 113 POSSIBILITY AND PERMISSION OF SIN

I. Sin is possible to creatures only, and its possibility arises from the necessary imperfection of finite free will. This is such that the creatures do not necessarily will even their own good as pointed out by reason; much less are they under physical necessity to will the good of God as prescribed by Divine Law. A creature naturally impeccable is just as much an impossibility as a creature naturally possessing supernatural grace. By supernatural means, the possibility is, as a matter of fact, excluded from the Blessed in heaven. By the special grace, called “confirmation in grace,” it can be so paralyzed and subdued that its passing into acts is completely prevented. Sanctifying grace alone, however, leaves the power of sinning intact, because it merely gives to free will a higher power without disabling its natural powers.

II. The possibility of sin is attributable to God only inasmuch as He has not destroyed free will, or made good the deficiencies naturally arising from its finiteness. God is not the direct cause; He directly wills neither sin nor its possibility, but He “permits” both. Human nature is so constituted that desires are often excited in man which cannot be satisfied without sin. Yet this inclination to sin is not a direct and positive tendency like the inclination to good; we can only will evil under the false appearance of good. Hence the evil inclination does not make the Author of nature to be also the author of sin. As a matter of fact, He suppressed the evil inclination in the angels and the first man in a supernatural manner, leaving only the bare possibility of sin with fullest liberty to avoid it. The inclination now existing is a penalty of the first sin committed with absolute liberty. God cannot positively lead His creatures into sin as He leads them into good works; to do so would be against His Holiness (*supra*, § 75; cf. §§ 71, 98; James i. 13).

When God permits sin, this permission is an act of Divine Sovereignty, and consequently entirely different from a similar permission given by creatures. The Sovereign of the Universe is not bound to prevent every sin, because He can make every sin subservient to the general order of the Universe; yet, although not so bound, He could prevent sin if He so willed, and hence no sin happens without His permission. He may permit new sins as a punishment for previous ones, or particular sins as contributing to the realization of certain ends. And, lastly,

the rebellious will of the sinner can be so turned to account as to become a means towards the wise ends of His Sovereign Master.

The creature is the first and principal cause of sin as such—for God in no wise moves the creature to sin—and by committing sin the creature turns itself away from the law of God and from the Divine influence for good. Between the sins actually committed by the “second causes assuming the right of the First Cause,” there exists a most remarkable concatenation. The sins of man all originate in the sin of the first man; the sin of the first man originated in the sin of the angels, and this again in the sin of one superior angel. Wherefore, in order fully to fathom the sins of this world, it is necessary to ascend to the very beginning and to the very summit of creation. This “first cause of evil,” establishing a realm against the realm of the All-good God, is at the bottom of the heathen fiction of Ahriman, the principle of Evil, and of the *summum malum* of the Manichæans. See Stapleton, *De Justificatione*, lib. xi; Bellarmine, *De Amissione Gratia*, lib. ii.; St. Thomas, 1<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>æ</sup>. q. 79.

## CHAPTER II

### THE FALL OF THE ANGELS

#### § 114 THE SIN OF THE ANGELS

I. The teaching of the Church and of Holy Scripture leaves no possible doubt as to the existence of a great number of wicked or unclean spirits, hardened in sin and waging war against God and men, under the command of Satan or the Devil (Matt. xii. 24; John xii. 31; 1 Cor. ii. 6–8; Eph. ii. 2, and vi. 12; 1 John iii. 13–44, etc.). “The great dragon was cast out, the old serpent who is called the devil and satan, who seduceth the whole world . . . the accuser (ὁ κατήγγορος) of our brethren who accused them before God day and night” (Apoc. xii. 9, 10).

II. Although the devil and his demons are the very personification of sin, they were originally good angels. “The devil and other demons were created by God good by nature, but they became bad through their own behaviour”; cf. John viii. 44, and Jude v. 6 (Fourth Council of Lateran, Cap. *Firmiter*). The fall of the angels probably happened soon after they were created; certainly before the fall of man.

III. From the fact that Holy Scripture describes Satan as the chief and representative of all wicked spirits, it may be inferred that the sin of the angels originated in one of them, and passed on to the remainder by example or inducement. If this be so, we must further admit that, before the fall, Satan was by nature and grace exalted high above all those angels who followed his example or his bidding. Hints are not wanting in Scripture as to Satan having been the highest of all angels, so that sin would have originated at the very summit of creation. Such hints are found in the picture of the pride and fall of earthly kings, which the Fathers mystically apply to the pride and fall of the prince of heaven (Isaiax xiv. 12; Ezech. xxviii. 1 sq., and xxxi. 3 sq.). The temptation of pride may certainly have been very great in a creature of such perfection.

IV. The Church has never defined the kind of sin committed by the angels, and the early Fathers are not quite agreed upon the point. Yet following up the hints given in Scripture and the common doctrine of later Fathers and of all theologians, it must be held as theologically certain that pride was the cause of their fall. The contemplation of their natural excellence

and their great likeness to God gave rise to presumption and ambition, which are but forms of pride. Most likely these angels wanted to be independent of God, and to receive honours due to God alone. St. Thomas (1, q. 63, a. 3) thinks they refused the tribute of absolutely unselfish love required by God in the supernatural order; Suarez (*De Angelis*, lib. vii.) is of opinion that they refused to acknowledge and to adore the Son of God in His human nature. Cf. *Ecclus.* x. 15; *Tobias* iv. 14; *Luke* x. 18, and the above-quoted texts from *Isaias* and *Ezechias* with the interpretation of the Fathers.

V. From the nature of things, as well as from the teaching of the Fathers, the sin of the fallen angels is manifestly sin in its worst form. It proceeded from pure malice; not, as in the case of man, from ignorance and weakness. It is a direct insult to God and an open contempt of the order of grace, and hence it has the character of sin against the Holy Ghost. It is an open rebellion against God, carried out and unrelentingly persisted in with all the energy of which a pure spirit is capable. It is, lastly, an uninterrupted sin, a perpetual act, thanks to the spiritual and ever vigilant nature of the angels. For all these reasons, the pride of the angels was a sin unto death—far more than mortal sin in man, more even than final impenitence in man.

VI. The great sin of the angels was immediately punished with eternal damnation. God granted them neither the time nor the means of repentance. Holy Writ and the formulated teaching of the Church do not directly express this doctrine; they only state the fact that at present the fallen angels are in a state of damnation, and without hope of salvation. But from 2 *Pet.* ii. 4, and *Jude* 6, we understand that all the angels who prevaricated were damned; and, on the other hand, the redemption by Christ is available to man only; whence theologians rightly conclude that no hope of salvation was ever held out to these spirits, and, consequently, no time for repentance allowed them. The reason why God showed to the angels none of that mercy which He so abundantly dispenses to man must be sought in the grievous nature of their sin.

VII. The sin of the angels was immediately followed by the complete depravation and corruption of their spiritual life. The demons' depravity consists in the obscuration of their intellect and the hardening of their will, so that mendacity and wickedness become their second nature; they are "powers of darkness and spirits of wickedness." Their intellect is darkened by the withdrawal of all supernatural light as principle of supernatural knowledge, albeit they retain the bare knowledge of the truths revealed to them before their fall, or which they may learn by some external revelation. Then the perversity of their will influences their judgment, so as to make evil appear to them as good. The hardening of the will of the evil spirits consists in this, that the hatred of God is the impelling motive of all their actions. As the good spirits do all they do for the love of God, so the evil spirits are moved in all their actions by hatred of Him. This hatred is partly the result of the original perversity of their will, partly an effect of their resenting the punishment inflicted upon them.

VIII. Together with complete depravity, the demons received at once afflictive punishment. They were cast down into the place of torments, delivered into the chains of hell, to be reserved unto judgment (2 *Pet.* ii. 4). The nature of this punishment will be discussed in the treatise on the Last Things. Here we only point out its two stages, viz. the ejection from heaven and the reservation for the general judgment at the end of the world. The difference between the two stages lies in this, that before the last judgment the external movements and operations of the demons are not completely impeded; just as the souls of damned men are

not tied to their bodies until the day of judgment. Thus the demons still are free to find some satisfaction in the carrying out of their wicked plans against God and man, although even for this their punishment will be increased on the last day. Again: before the final judgment they are not confined to “the place of torments,” wherever that may be, but they are at liberty to move about among men on earth, or, as Scripture says in view of their spiritual nature, in the air above the earth (cf. 1 Pet. v. 8; Eph. vi. 12; ii. 2). Yet, wherever they are, they suffer the same torments.

IX. Revelation teaches us that God has allowed the evil spirits to carry on against Himself and His elect a war of hatred, lasting as long as the present state of the world. As God Himself and the Blessed in heaven are unassailable, man is the only object on which the demons may wreak their vengeance, by destroying in him the image and likeness of God. This war has been permitted by God in order that man may prove his fidelity to his Maker, and that the devil, overcome by weaker creatures, may be covered with greater shame. The victory of man is rendered possible and easy since he is incorporated in the mystical body of God-made-Man.

The first man was able to sin without the instigation of the devil; yet, as a matter of fact, it was to the seduction of the enemy that he gave way. Hence the sin of man is the “seed of the devil” sown in lies, and sinful men are “the sons of the devil, who is the father of lies.” With the devil as their head, all sinners constitute one moral body. The power he has over them is chiefly due to their wilful submission to his influence. On man, in the original state, the devil had but very limited power; he could only tempt man, and even that temptation was limited to external suggestions. See Suarez, *De Angelis*, ll. vii., viii.; St. Thomas, i. qq. 63, 64; *Contra Gentes*, iii. 107–109.

## CHAPTER III THE FALL OF MAN

### § 115 THE SIN OF ADAM AND EVE

I. The tempter, called serpent in the history of the fall (Gen. iii.), was not that reptile itself, but the devil speaking through its mouth, although the narrative does not expressly say so. The devil is so often spoken of as the tempter of our first parents, that it might almost be doubted whether the serpent was not an assumed form, rather than the real animal (Wisd. ii. 24; John viii. 44).

II. The temptation was directed to Eve as the weaker party, and against the law of probation, as the most momentous. The tempter begins with a question of double meaning: Is there such a commandment, and why should it be given? (Gen. iii. 1), and goes on denying the punishment threatened by God, and promising likeness to gods as a reward for the evil deed. Almost every word of the devil’s speech is ambiguous, admitting of a true and of a false interpretation, a circumstance entirely in keeping with the character of the tempter. From Gen. iii. 6, some superficial minds have inferred that Eve was seduced by the goodness and beauty of the fruit, forgetting that, before the fall, she had perfect control over all the motions of her senses. No more did she believe in the serpent’s words: such blindness was incompatible with the state of original perfection. Fathers and Theologians commonly teach that Eve was misled by pride, according to Eccles. x. 15: “Pride is the beginning of all sin” (also

Tobias iv. 14). Movements of pride and vainglory could be excited without a formal belief in the serpent's words; on the contrary, such belief could only spring from a heart infected with pride. Eve, then, moved by pride, saw "that the tree was good to eat," and, flattering herself that she would not die, but be made like unto God, "took of the fruit and did eat," thus committing a formal disobedience to the Divine command.

III. The sin of Adam also had its root in pride, as we may safely infer from the above quoted texts, and still more from the ironical words of God, "Behold, Adam is become like one of us, knowing good and evil" (Gen. iii. 22). Adam's connivance with Eve was but an effect of his sympathy with her own pride. The terms of the Divine judgment seem to indicate that Adam believed the suggestions of Eve, and thus sinned through disbelief of God's word. Yet, if this be admitted, the reason of his disbelief cannot be laid to the utterances of the serpent, but may be attributed to the fact that Eve had not died after eating the forbidden fruit. "Adam was not seduced; but the woman, being seduced, was in the transgression" (1 Tim. ii. 14; cf. 2 Cor. xi. 3).

IV. Objectively, the sin of our first parents was formal disobedience to God and to the law of probation. The sins of pride, curiosity, sensuality, disbelief, and diffidence were subjective factors, all subordinate to that disobedience in which they terminated, and helping to make it a most grievous sin, notwithstanding the apparent slightness of its subject-matter. Other aggravating circumstances were the great facility of avoiding it, as in Adam there was neither ignorance nor concupiscence; the black ingratitude it implies; and the terrible consequences it was to have upon the whole of mankind.

Albeit, the sin of man, like that of the angels, was a formal aversion from God; it was, nevertheless, not so decisive and obstinate. Immediately after the sin, a salutary sense of shame and fear came over its authors, and God mitigated His sentence of condemnation. The serpent alone was condemned without mercy; Adam and Eve, according to Scripture and tradition, made good use of the time allotted them for penance, and are both saved (cf. Wisd x. 1 sqq).

V. The first sin was fraught with peculiar consequences, by reason of the singularly privileged state of its authors. The Second Council of Orange, can. 1, and the Council of Trent have defined these consequences. "The first man Adam, having transgressed the mandate of God in Paradise, at once lost the sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted; and incurred, through the offence of his prevarication, the anger and indignation of God, and, therefore, the death with which God had previously threatened him, and together with death, captivity under the power of him who thenceforth had the empire of death, that is of the devil; Adam, through the offence of that prevarication, underwent a complete change for the worse in body and soul" (Council of Trent, sess. v. can. 1). In a word: Adam lost all his absolute and relative supernatural endowments. He became subject to the power of the devil, inasmuch as, having been overcome and despoiled of his strength and of his claim on heaven, he was henceforth at the mercy of his conqueror.

Although the complete deterioration of man was brought about by the loss of supernatural endowments, it must not be conceived as a merely external change, such *e.g.* as would arise from the loss of a garment. The loss of sanctifying grace and of all the privileges of original integrity affects the inmost powers of the soul, intellect, and will, and the command of the soul over the body, and leaves man in a state of languor and disease. Not only is man disabled for salutary works; his higher aims are taken away from him, and his natural inclination for

selfish pleasures is allowed free play.

VI. The corruption consequent upon Adam's sin had a twofold bearing, viz. upon his person and upon his nature. His personal deterioration immediately affected only his will; it was caused by the will, and its permanence was more or less dependent upon the disposition of the will. The corruption of his nature, on the contrary, affected all the faculties rooted in the substance of the soul, and the will itself, in as far as the will is part of human nature. Again, the personal corruption attacks the mind (or soul) only in itself, whereas the corruption of nature attacks the mind in its relations to the body, and leaves no part of the whole compound unharmed. It appears, however, most strikingly in the insubordination of the generative appetite, which is the means of its transmission to all mankind.

VII. Holy Scripture applies the significant name "reign of death" to nature corrupted by sin (Rom. v. 14). The supernatural life and glory of "the image of God" being lost through the envy of the devil, human nature remained naked, disfigured, and disabled; the soul was spiritually dead, and the body doomed to death. In that state, the soul, like a corpse, was prone to further corruption, and liable to become every day more unfit for the reception of new life.

VIII. We need not insist upon the penal character of the corruption of nature, which is self-evident; but it is important to fix its guiltiness. Original justice, with all its privileges, was not a gift without a concomitant obligation. Man was not at liberty to accept or to refuse it, or, having accepted it, to cast it off at his own pleasure. It was a gift entrusted to the keeping of man, and man's perfection in the eyes of God was made dependent upon its possession. Hence, when by his own free will Adam cast off the trust held under such obligation, that is when he despoiled himself of his supernatural glory, he was answerable for, and guilty of, the consequent deterioration of his nature.

A difficulty here presents itself: "Culpability results from a personal act; but the withdrawal of the supernatural gifts was not a personal act of Adam, hence their loss cannot be imputed to him." As regards the loss of sanctity, the answer has been given already, viz. mortal sin makes the soul unfit for sanctifying grace, so that the author of mortal sin excludes and expels grace from his soul by his own act. As regards the loss of integrity another explanation is required. St. Thomas and his disciples say that sanctity and integrity formed one solidary whole, wherefore Adam, by willingly excluding sanctity, also willingly expelled integrity. The early Franciscan school views this matter in another light: the possession of both sanctity and integrity depended upon the keeping of the Divine mandate; wherefore Adam, by transgressing this, voluntarily forfeited both. These two views do not exclude one another. The Thomistic conception accounts better for the loss of justice as a personal fault of Adam; the other shows better why the fault and guilt of Adam can be inherited by his posterity. See for this and the following sections, St. Thomas, 1<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>æ</sup>, qq. 81–83; Stapleton, *De Justif.*; ll. i.–iii.; Bellarmine, *De Amiss. Gratia*, ll. iv.–vi.

## § 116 ORIGINAL SIN

I. The transmission of the sin of Adam and its deteriorating effects on all mankind is a fundamental dogma, because on it is founded the necessity of redemption for all men. The early Church defended and defined it against the Pelagians (Council of Orange, ii. can. 2); the Council of Trent formulated it anew and made it the basis of its doctrine of justification. The



words of the definition are: "If any one assert that the prevarication of Adam was hurtful to himself only, and not to his progeny; and that he lost for himself only, and not also for us, the sanctity and justice received from God; or that, being himself defiled by the sin of disobedience, he transmitted to all mankind only death and the sufferings (*poenas*) of the body, but not the sin which is the death of the soul, let him be anathema, for he contradicts the apostle who says, "Through one man sin entered the world," etc. (Sess. vi can. 2).

II. That the loss of original integrity, the deterioration of nature and the evils connected therewith, passed from Adam to his progeny is distinctly revealed in Scripture. Death and suffering entered the world as a punishment of the first sin (Gen. iii. 15–20); concupiscence, in its present form, has the same origin (Gen. iii. 7). The state of unredeemed man is often represented in Holy Writ as one of spiritual death, necessitating a new birth in holiness and justice (John iii. 5, etc.). No reason for such degradation can be given other than the transmission of the first sin to the whole progeny of the first sinner. The classical text is Rom. v. 12, of which later.

III. All individual members of the human race are descended from Adam; his nature contained the seed and the root from which mankind grows. But Adam vitiated his nature in all its constituent parts, down to the parts specially intended for its propagation; hence the fruit of propagation can but be a vitiated human nature. The standard of Divine Likeness which God had set up for all men was lowered by the first sin; the progeny of Adam are born less like God than God originally willed them to be. Yet the "personal" sin of our first parents could not be propagated, because it would involve personal acts which cannot be transmitted by generation. But for the element of sinfulness which stains the souls of Adam's progeny, we might compare his fall and its universal consequences to a spiritual bankruptcy, involving the impoverishment in things spiritual of all mankind. As, however, that spiritual poverty is described in Scripture and Tradition as sin and injustice, and as a punishment for sin, which it would not be if merely the consequence of spiritual bankruptcy, another element must be introduced, viz. the progeny's "share" in the progenitor's guilt.

St. Paul teaches this doctrine in the famous text, Rom. v. 12–19. For the sake of clearness, we quote the Apostle's words in their logical order. His proposition is, "As by one man (*δι' ἑνός*) sin entered into this world, and by sin (*διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*) death (v. 12); . . . as by the offence of one (the judgment came) unto all men to condemnation (v. 18); . . . as by the disobedience of one man the many (*οἱ πολλοί*) were made sinners (v. 19), even so by the justice of one (*δι' ἑνός δικαιοματός*) (the free gift came) unto all men to justification of life (v. 18); even so, by the obedience of one, shall the many be made just" (v. 19). In the latter part of v. 12, and vv. 13, 14, the extension of Adam's sin to all men is proved from the universality of the reign of death: "Death passed upon all men in whom (*ἐφ' ᾧ*) all have sinned: for until the law, sin was in the world; but sin was not imputed when the law was not. But death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them who have not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression, who is a figure of Him who was to come." In other words: The pain of death was not first inflicted for sin by the law of Moses; before Moses men died, although not in punishment of their "personal" sins, for, there being no law, personal sins were not imputed; and even they died who had not committed personal sin like Adam, whence to them death was the pain for their participation in the first sin. In vv. 15–17, the Apostle shows that Christ had greater power for good than Adam for evil; and then, in v. 18, he continues the comparison begun in v. 12, and concludes it in v. 19.

IV. The universal deterioration of human nature in its material aspect may be sufficiently accounted for by considering the sin of Adam only as a personal act of the physical author of our nature. Not so its formal depravity, viz. the guilt which makes the progeny of Adam sinful and liable to punishment. Guilt supposes a voluntary act of the guilty person. And, in fact, St. Paul says, "that all have sinned in the first man," and all are guilty of disobedience. This means that the one act of disobedience of the first man is morally not only his own personal act, but a solidary act of all mankind, for which all are answerable. The dogmatic bearing of the words, Rom. v. 12 ( $\epsilon\phi' \omega$ , *in quo omnes peccaverunt*), is quite independent of the meaning attached to  $\epsilon\phi' \omega$ . Whether it be translated "seeing that," "for that," "inasmuch as," "because," all have sinned, or "in whom" all have sinned, the context and the parallelism between Christ and Adam, evidently give the sense that all men participated in the sin of disobedience committed by the first parent (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22). Technically speaking, Adam acted as the juridical and moral representative of mankind, or as head of the whole human race existing in him in germ, and he transgressed a law binding mankind as a whole. His sin, therefore, was the sin of all mankind, because and in as far as the actions and the will of the head are the actions and the will of the whole body. The physical existence of the whole race in its head affords a basis for its moral existence in the same, that is, for its being made answerable for the sins of the head. We have then to consider but one will and one act, the will and the act of Adam, which, by a positive disposition of God, were made at the same time will and act of the whole human race.

V. From this point of view it is easy to determine how far the sin of Adam was universal, that is, the sin of all mankind. The transgression was the act of the whole race precisely and only in as far as it was a culpable violation of the duty to fulfil the condition set by God for the maintenance of supernatural justice, and thus represented a wanton destruction of that justice. The personal motives of pride and the other motives which induced Adam to break the covenant, are not imputed to his descendants, but only the objective breach of the Law of Probation, upon which the covenant rested. Thus, when a king transgresses the clauses of a treaty made with another king, it is not his personal motives, but the objective breach of the treaty which is imputed to the nation whose head he is, and the whole nation is made to bear the consequences of the broken treaty.

VI. The universal or original sin has some characters peculiar to itself, which we shall here merely indicate. 1. It is the only sin which passes from the perpetrator to his progeny, because no other sin is or can be committed under the same circumstances. 2. It is of faith (Rom. v. 13, and 1 Cor. xv. 21) that the sin of Adam only, not also that of Eve, was a universal act. Adam, not Eve, represented mankind. If Eve alone had sinned, the sin would not have been transmitted. 3. No other sin of Adam would have had the same universal bearing, because the covenant or bond of God with man was founded on the observance of one clearly determined precept.

VII. Adam's repentance was of no avail to his progeny. A special Divine grace was required to make it salutary even to himself. By God's ordination Adam was empowered to act for all mankind to the effect of preserving supernatural justice; but he did not enter into the Divine ordination for repairing its loss. Although he obtained his personal pardon, still "the sin of mankind" and its effects were not affected thereby.

## § 117 SIN OF ADAM IN HIS DESCENDENTS

I. An adequate, positive definition of original sin has not been given by the Church. The definitions, however, concerning the existence of original sin, and the necessity efficacy of Baptism, give the theologian sufficient elements for determining the real nature of original sin in fallen man. We quote the Council of Trent (sess. v. can. 5): “If any one deny that through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is given in baptism, the guilt (*reatus*) of original sin is remitted; or if he assert that not all that is taken away which has the true and proper nature (*rationem*) of sin, but that it is only erased or not imputed, let him be anathema. For in the regenerated there is nothing hateful to God: . . . That, however, in the baptized there remains concupiscence or the *fomes*, is the sense of this Holy Synod. Concupiscence is left for our warfare (*ad agonem*); it cannot injure those who do not consent to it. . . . This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the Holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church never understood it to be called sin as being a true and properly so-called sin in the regenerated, but as being caused by sin and as inclining to sin. If any one holdeth the contrary, let him be anathema.”

II. The many erroneous notions of the nature of inherited sin arise, in general, from not giving due attention to the organic unity of its two elements, viz. the guilt contracted by the whole race in Adam, and the internal disorder of our nature which is the subject-matter of that guilt. By separating the formal from the material element, or by giving undue prominence to either of them, many notions of original sin have been formed, some quite heretical, some doubtful, some reconcilable with Catholic teaching. The space at our disposal only allows us to sketch out what appears to us the deepest, most complete, and most Catholic theory. We follow, in the main, St. Thomas (1<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>e</sup>, q. 82).

III. The mean between the two extreme theories conceives original sin so that its subject-matter is the internal disorder arising in the soul from the privation of due sanctity and justice, and its formal element the guilt or culpability contracted by man in Adam, for which man is still held responsible. Thus we can define original sin as “the culpable privation of original justice.” This definition distinguishes it from every other habitual sin, and points out, in its subject-matter, that element which accounts for all internal disorders consequent upon it. All theologians are bound to admit, with the Church, that the loss of sanctifying grace, or the death of the soul, is a constituent element of original sin; yet, as this loss of grace is an effect common to all mortal sins, it cannot be the “specific” subject-matter of original sin; something more must be added in order to distinguish this sin from all other sins. At this point theologians cease to agree. They shape their opinions in accordance with their notions of original justice.

IV. The Thomistic theory starts from the patristic view that sanctifying grace is the essential element of original (or hereditary) justice, and the root of the integrity of natural, as well as of supernatural, life. Hence (1) the radical element of injustice in original sin is to be sought in the essence of the soul, viz. in the culpable privation of sanctifying grace as root of the whole justice required of man by God. (2) In the second place, and effectively (with regard to its effects), the element of injustice appears in all the faculties of the soul bearing upon morality, as privation of the order willed and originally instituted by God. Hence original injustice, as opposed to original justice, comprises the absence of sanctity from the superior will, the want of subordination of the inferior will and sensuality to the superior will or reason. These, again,

entail in the superior will an absolute impossibility to serve God supernaturally; a moral impossibility of observing even natural law in its entirety and permanently, and lastly another absolute impossibility of preventing all unholy God-displeasing motions. (3) Comparing original with actual sin, we find the “aversion from God” in the want of sanctity, especially of charity, and the “conversion to the creature” in the motions of concupiscence caused by the loss of original integrity. There is, however, a difference: in original sin the aversion from God is not, as in actual sin, essentially connected with the conversion to the creature. (4) Lastly, compared to a fully formed and developed actual sin in man, original sin consists in a tendency to inordinate motions, extending from the highest faculties of the soul to the organism of the body; all such motions participating in the character of formal sin as being the consequence of a culpable disorder in the innermost part of nature.

V. Original sin is exactly the same in all men, though the effects arising out of it, especially the infirmity of reason and the fervour of concupiscence, vary greatly in different individuals on account of the diversity of individual organization. Original sin in Adam’s posterity essentially differs from Adam’s own sin, because it does not include the same personal responsibility for an actual offence and contempt of God. Hence its peculiar position midway between mortal and venial sin. As it includes no personal act of free will it is, subjectively, the least of all sins, smaller even than semi-voluntary venial sins; but, objectively, or as regards its subject-matter, and especially the evils caused by it, it is a greater sin than most mortal sins. Again, original sin is free from that continued contempt or neglect of God which keeps the guilt of actual sin alive in the soul, and therefore, in this respect also, it is less than the least personal venial sin. These differences are summed up in the formula: “Original sin does not, like personal sins, imply an aversion from God as man’s natural end, but only an aversion from God as man’s supernatural end.”

VI. As all the individual members of the human race descend from Adam by way of generation, it is also by way of generation that they contract original sin. Christ, not being “born of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man” (John i. 12), even had He not been the Son of God, would not have been stained by original sin. The act of generation, however, is only instrumental in propagating sin. The principal cause is “the originating sin of Adam.” The act of generation prepares and determines the subject upon which the sin of nature exercises its deteriorating influence, and its connection with the transmission of original sin extends no farther. The personal sanctity of the parent does not prevent his offspring from contracting the stain of sin: for it is nature as corrupted in Adam that he propagates, and not his own nature as modified by his personal acts. The dispensation under which personal justice was hereditary came to an end in Adam himself; in the present dispensation, Christ alone possesses grace and the power of communicating it.

VII. Many Theologians explain the transmission of original sin by generation without taking into account the present inner condition of the parent. They establish between parent and offspring a merely moral and juridical relation, so that the progeny contracts certain obligations and liabilities of the progenitor by the fact of being born of him; in their system the transmission bears no inner analogy to the natural transmission of physical evils. St. Augustine, however, and the earlier Schoolmen, constantly make use of physical analogies to explain the propagation of original sin, and expressly describe it as caused by an imperfection (*vitiū*) in the act of generation and in the progenitor, viz. the “ardour of concupiscence.” The explanation given by the best Schoolmen may be summarized as follows: the progenitor,

according to the original Divine dispensation, ought to possess the power of generating a nature endowed with sanctity and justice. The absence of this power constitutes an imperfection of, or vitiates, the generative principles. Further, in the original state, the power to generate, in co-operation with the Holy Ghost, a perfect child of God, was specially bound up with the integrity of human nature; the perfect subjection of the members to the mind gave to the generative organism a purity fitting it for the co-operation of the Holy Ghost. Hence, *e converso*, the incapacity of generating a perfect child of God is likewise bound up with the loss of integrity, and more especially with the insubordination of the generative appetite, the Holy Ghost not having, since the Fall, co-operated with the generative act to the extent of remitting original sin in the offspring. Thus the imperfection (*vitium*) of the power and act of generation is not accidental or external, but internal, and in a certain sense natural; and it can be said with truth that “the concupiscence of the progenitor causes the progeny to be deprived of sanctity and justice.” The concupiscence in question is habitual concupiscence, of which the actual disorders accompanying the act of generation are but a sign. And habitual concupiscence itself produces original sin as a “deficient” rather than as an “efficient” cause, much in the same way as free will causes sin, through the “deficiency” of its intention.

VIII. To complete the theory on the propagation of original sin by generation, we must show how the soul, though directly created by God, becomes infected with sin. St. Augustine hesitates between two explanations: either, he says, both body and soul are produced in a vitiated condition by the progenitor, or the soul is vitiated by its conjunction with a vitiated body (*Contra Jul.*, l. v. c. iv.). Since Creationism (cf. § 79) is now generally held, the first of these alternatives must be rejected. The second, if rightly understood, explains the difficulty in a way which is neither too grossly physical nor too superficially moral. The body inflicts no physical damage on the soul, but merely entangles it in the guiltiness of the seed of Adam. The flesh, disordered by the loss of original justice, being the recipient of the soul, the soul is received in a disordered manner, and becomes guilty by implication or infection. The corruption or aggravation of the soul by the body, on which St. Augustine and others so often insist, must be reduced to signify “that the union of body and soul into one nature makes the quality of the soul dependent on the quality of the body.” As shown in Book III, § 91, the soul, without a counteracting Divine influence, is subject to be impeded in its spiritual operations by the influence of the animal life of the body. But that Divine influence is now excluded from the beginning, because, as explained above, in the act of generation the Holy Ghost does not cooperate to the remission of original sin. Hence the soul, through its conjunction with the body, is deprived of a perfection, viz. the free development of its spiritual energy, which it would enjoy if it existed separately, or in the state of original integrity; in other words, it is “corrupted and weighed down” by the body. Let us here point out the different progress of corruption in Adam and in his posterity. In Adam the person corrupted the nature; first he lost sanctifying grace; then this loss entailed the loss of integrity, and infected his whole nature. In his descendants, on the contrary, nature infects the person; the corruption begins with the act of generation, reaches the privileges of integrity, and ends in depriving the soul of sanctifying grace.

Another and more direct solution of the same difficulty may be based upon “the relation of principle between the soul of the progenitor and the soul of the progeny” (Book III, § 79, III.), which consists in this, that the father determines the production of the son as an image

of himself in an organism derived from his own. This metaphysical relation of soul to soul is the foundation of all juridical and moral relations between father and son; and as a relation of soul to soul, it is particularly well adapted to serve as a foundation for the transmission of supernatural life, or of the nobility of adoptive sonship. Having forfeited his nobility, Adam could procreate only an ignoble image of himself—a child deprived of sanctifying grace and integrity, and the prey of concupiscence. The Council of Trent seems to hint at this notion when it makes the loss of sanctity the fundamental element of the loss of due justice not only in Adam, but also in his progeny (Sess. vi can. 2).

IX. The Pelagians used to urge that either God or the parents, or both, commit a sin if they give existence to a sinful soul. But the creative act of God, and the procreative act of the parents, directly intend the production of a new person, which is a good object, although the new being is accidentally subject to sin. Generation would be unlawful, indeed, if sin consisted in an inclination to evil, or if the inclination was irresistible; but such is not the case, especially since God has provided sufficient means of resistance.

## § 118 PENALTIES OF ORIGINAL SIN

I. Penalties are measured out according to the degree of imputability, and to the gravity of subject-matter of sin. Original sin being a real sin, deserves punishment; its peculiar character, however, requires a peculiar punishment, different from that meted out to actual sin.

II. 1. Original sin deserves the loss of the beatific vision, that is, of the inheritance of the sons of God or the happiness of eternal life. On this proposition rests the whole doctrine concerning original sin. Scripture and Tradition always connect the remission of sin, and the acquisition of eternal life, as the joint object of the redemption by Christ.

2. It is neither of faith, nor even probable that, over and above the eternal pain of loss, original sin is punished with eternal pain of the senses, viz. the fire of hell. This proposition results from the almost unanimous consent of the Schoolmen, notably since Innocent III formulated the axiom that “the pain of original sin is privation (*caerentia*) of the vision of God; the pain of actual sin is the torment of perpetual hell” (cap. *Majores de bapt.*; Denzinger, *Enchir.*, li.). It stands to reason that a sin which involves no personal contempt of God, cannot justly be visited by vindictive or reactive punishment, except such punishment be at the same time propitiatory or medicinal, two qualities incompatible with eternal punishment. The sentence passed by Christ (Matt. xxv.) on the last day, which mentions no intermediate punishment between heaven and hell, applies only to personal sinners, nay, speaking strictly, only to those who had the opportunity of knowing Christ in His Church. We shall deal with this subject in Book VIII.

3. It is highly probable that those who die guilty of original sin only, are free from pain and sorrow, and even enjoy a certain inward peace and happiness, so that they attain at least a minimum of that felicity which would have been their natural end if human nature had not been elevated to a supernatural order. This proposition is not so commonly admitted as the preceding. The reasons which support it are very forcible. If, in the soul stained with original sin, no evil disposition is evolved either before or after its separation from the body, and if, after death, when there is no stage of probation, its natural tendencies towards good evolve themselves unhindered, no sorrow need arise from the loss of the beatific vision, because nature does not of its own account desire it, and as it has been lost without personal fault

the loss will not be felt by a well-ordained will. Nor can any suffering be inflicted by the withholding of goods necessary to the natural peace and satisfaction of a rational creature, because this would be equal to inflicting the *pœna sensus*. If no satisfaction was afforded to the natural tendencies of these souls, that is, if they did not in a certain sense attain their natural end, God would have created beings without any attainable end.

III. The penalties of original sin here on earth are the incapacity of performing salutary works, and the loss of all the privileges of original integrity. This incapacity for salutary works and the disordered tendencies which incline man to new sins, hold him in the bondage of sin and death.

## § 119 THE POWER OF THE DEVIL FOUNDED UPON SIN

I. The Council of Trent points out that original sin brought man under the power of the devil; earlier decisions, and the Fathers, find a strong argument for original sin in the “exorcisms” used in the administration of Baptism, and Holy Scripture in many places represents redemption from the captivity of the devil, and destruction of his empire as the special object of Christ’s Redemption (cf. *Epist. Cælestini*, cap. xii.). The chief texts bearing on this doctrine, are: “Who (God) hath delivered us from the power of darkness (= the prince of darkness), and, hath translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love” (Col. i. 13; see also ii. 14, 15; John xii. 31, and xiv. 30, “. . . that through death He might destroy him who had the empire of death, that is to say, the devil,” Heb. ii. 14).

II. Satan has no just right to the empire of death: he is a tyrant in title as well as in fact. His title is entirely on the side of man, who for his sin deserved to be abandoned by God (Whom he had forsaken) to the devil by whom he allowed himself to be seduced. St. Peter, in his Second Epistle (ii. 19), quotes the ancient law of war, “by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is a slave,” as illustrating the relation of the sinner to Satan. St. Paul says, “Know you not that to whom you yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants you are whom you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto justice?” (Rom. vi, 16.) From this text, it is clear that man’s slavery to Satan is the result of man’s voluntary adhesion to his tyrant.

III. The evils which follow sin were introduced into the world by the malice of the devil, and they are, besides, part of his own punishment. Hence, Satan, by involving man in sin, made him a captive and slave in his empire—a captive, because the sinner is deprived of the power freely to move towards his perfection; a slave, because he is, to a great extent, compelled to serve the devil in his war against God, and to satisfy his hatred of God and man. Of course, the empire, or power, of Satan is not the same over all sinners alike. It attains its highest degree in the hardened sinner; is less in the sinner guilty of mortal sin, but not a hardened sinner; and least in those guilty of original sin only. The formula of exorcism in the rite of Baptism addresses the devil as dwelling in the infant after the manner of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the saints. This satanic indwelling, however, is not a substantial indwelling in the body, much less in the soul, of the child, but only a relation of dependence and influence, such as exists between men—strengthened, maybe, by the permanent company of a wicked spirit. The very analogy with the influence of the Holy Ghost shows that the devil does not and cannot force his victim to commit sin; for as the Holy Ghost leaves to the soul its power for evil, so does the devil leave to it the power for good.

The empire of sin and death may be considered either as a continuation of the material part of sin, or as a continuation of sin itself and of its guilt. From this point of view, it is conceivable that even the justified may be exposed to a considerable extent to the influences of the devil, and may even be bodily possessed by him; in the same manner as concupiscence remains after justification, that is, as a continuation of the material part of sin. Such persecution, however, does not imply any captivity or slavery of the just under the devil, because the devil has no longer any "right" against those who belong to God, and because he can only influence them after the manner of natural concupiscence; his obsession is merely a trial of the sanctity of the children of God.

IV. The devil is called by St. Paul "the god of this world" (2 Cor. iv. 4). "This world" is here taken as the world such as it became through the fall of Adam, in opposition to what it will be when the Redemption of Christ will have had its full effect. Yet these and similar expressions, and the expressions used by the Church in the blessings of so many material things, indicate that the power of Satan extends over the whole visible world, in as far as it comes into immediate contact with man, or is at man's service. This is but a consequence of the loss by Adam of his dominion over material creation. It is among the spoils which his conqueror has carried off. In direct antagonism with the life-giving influences from above, the king of death wages his war against God from below; through the visible things of this world he tempts the lower appetites of man, and strives to ascend until he reaches the root of the soul where the work of God commences.

V. Satan exercises, or manifests, his power in a twofold manner: he tempts man to sin, and inflicts on him other evils, yet always with the object of leading him into sin. The first point is clearly laid down in Scripture: "Be sober and watch, because your adversary, the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour; whom resist ye, strong in faith" (1 Pet. v. 8, 9; see also Eph vi. 11). The only open question is whether the devil is the author of "all" temptations. It is certain that the flesh and the world, viz. man's own concupiscence and inducements from without, in many cases sufficiently account for temptation, without the intervention of Satan. Still, it is very probable that Satan does not remain idle when those agencies of his are at work; nay, it seems most likely that he never, or, at most, very seldom, assails the soul except by means of "the flesh and the world." Nor is it unlikely that the "ape of God" deposes wicked spirits to counteract the part of the Guardian Angels. As to the infliction of physical evils, we have proof for its existence in the formulæ of the various blessings given by the Church to material things. These formulæ, however, lay especial stress on the spiritual damage to be feared from the devil, whence we infer that whatever use the wicked one makes of material evils against man, it is always with intent to damage his soul.

VI. The "god of the world" carries out his government on much the same lines as the God Whose Empire he seeks to destroy. His religion is in every particular a caricature of Divine Religion. According to 1 Cor. x. 18-19, idolatry was, and still is, a working of devils in which almost every human vice and degrading practice has been elevated to the rank of virtues and sacrifices. When Christianity has destroyed idolatry, the religion of Satan embodies itself in a diabolical hatred of the religion of Christ, and especially of Catholicism, without, however, even giving up attempts to set up a positive diabolical cultus. Such attempts are attested by the whole religious history of mankind, from the earliest idolaters to the modern "spiritualists." False wonders and prophecies are resorted to with the object of deterring men from God, and enlisting them in the service of the devil. The superior power and knowledge of Satan enable



him to perform works above the power of man, and to predict future contingent events with a greater chance of success. Scripture and Tradition attest the fact that Satan uses his power and knowledge for his wicked purposes (see Matt. xxiv. 24, and compare 2 Thess. ii, 7–9). In imitation of God's prophets and priests, the devil has his "mediums," that is, persons chosen and accepted as channels of communication between him and the world. Antichrist will be such a medium, and the girl of Philippi "having a pythical spirit, who brought to her masters much gain by divining," was another (Acts xvi. 16 sq.). The possibility of sorcery, witchcraft, necromancy, and the like, is evident *à priori*; their actual existence is dogmatically and historically certain. When, however, the practical question has to be decided whether some extraordinary performance is the work of the devil or not, the same care and precautions must be taken as in deciding whether or not an extraordinary occurrence is the work of God. Magical "art," in the sense of practices and manipulations governed by set rules, and producing constant diabolical effects, is an imitation of the Sacraments and Sacramentals of the Church. It must nevertheless be granted that the imitation is but very imperfect, for the devil can only operate with the permission of God; his power and knowledge, though great, are yet limited, and his deceitfulness prevents him from keeping his promises even to his adherents.

Thus the belief in preternatural diabolical influences is no superstition, but sound faith. Satan's most daring attempt at aping his Divine Master appears in "possession of men by the devil." It is an attempt at imitating the indwelling of the Holy Ghost and the Hypostatic Union. Demoniacal possession was most frequent during Christ's stay on earth, and for a certain time afterwards, as if Satan wished to manifest the height of his power in the face of his Antagonist. The casting out of the devils afforded also one of the most striking proofs of Christ's power. Real possession ought to be carefully distinguished from the sinner's voluntary surrender to the devil, as recorded of Judas (John xiii. 27), and likewise from "obsession," viz. from that state of siege in which the devil holds persons inaccessible to his ordinary seductions. In real possession the devil disputes man's control over his body, and, for a length of time, acts as if he were the soul, or if the body were his own. The soul itself he cannot possess in the same way; but, in this state, he acts on it through the lower faculties of human nature, especially through the imagination. The Scriptural name *ἐνεργούμενοι* describes accurately the state of possession as "worked by the devil." A person possessed by the evil spirit is violently and despotically turned into a tool or instrument of the devil. Possession, as a fact, is so clearly maintained in Holy Writ and in Tradition, that, without heresy, its existence cannot be denied. See the Commentaries on the Sentences, II. *Dist.* 8; Perrone, *De Virtute Religionis*.

## CHAPTER IV

### COROLLARY AND CONCLUSION: THE MYSTERY OF INIQUITY AND THE MYSTERY OF GRACE

I. In the present order of the Universe, sin is as much a mystery of faith as the supernatural order of grace and sanctity of which it is the counterpart. Its full malice and bearing can only be appreciated in the light of the mystery of grace. The mysterious character of sin is found

especially in original sin; with our experimental knowledge alone, and in the hypothesis of a merely natural order, the existence of original sin could not be proved, and its nature would be absolutely inconceivable. But in the light of revelation and in connection with the mystery of grace, original sin presents no insuperable difficulty to the mind, and in its turn, it throws almost all the light obtainable on the existence of evil in the world.

II. Holy Scripture speaks on the mystery of iniquity but once, “The mystery of iniquity already worketh” (τὸ μυστήριον τῆς ἀνομίας, 2 Thess. ii. 7). The Apostle here seems to oppose the mystery of iniquity to the mystery of God: the work of Anti-christ to the work of Christ. Christ’s work is the mysterious operation of grace for the salvation of mankind; the work of His adversary is the operation of sin for the destruction of souls.

BOOK V  
REDEMPTION



**T**HE UNIVERSAL RUIN BROUGHT on mankind by sin was not suffered by Almighty God to be permanent. His goodness and mercy provided an equally universal remedy whereby man might be freed (redeemed) from the slavery of sin, and whereby the Supernatural Order which had been destroyed might be restored in a new and more perfect form. This restoration forms the subject of the succeeding portion of Dogmatic Theology.

First we have to treat of the Person and work of Him Who was the means of bringing about this new order of things. We shall divide the present book into four parts: **I.** The Preparation for the Redeemer; **II.** The Person of the Redeemer (Christology); **III.** His Work; **IV.** His Mother.

The Fathers treat expressly of the Person of Christ rather than of His work; but they do so always with reference to that work. St. Athanasius, St. Leo, and St. John Damascene should be especially consulted. It was St. Anselm, in his treatise, *Cur Deus Homo*, and Hugh of St. Victor (*De Sacram. Christi. Fidei*), who laid the foundation of the systematic teaching on Redemption. The Master of the Sentences deals with Christology in lib. iii., dist. i–xxii, of which the best commentators are St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Denis the Carthusian, Franciscus a Christo, and Estius. St. Thomas has given Christology its most perfect form. See his commentary on the Master of Sentences; also, *2<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>a</sup> Dispp. De Unione Verbi Incarnati; De Scientia Christi*, and *De Gratia Christi; Opusc. III<sup>m</sup> Contra Græcos, Armenos*, etc.; *Compend. Theol.* cc. 199–241; *Summa Contra Gentes*, l. iv, and *Summa Theol.*, 3, qq. 1–51. Commentaries on St. Thomas: Medina, Sylvius, Gonet, and especially the Salmanticenses; the Jesuits Valentia, Tanner, Vasquez, Lugo, Ragusa, and especially Suarez. For the Scotist views see Frassen, De Rada, Henno. Also the important works of Petavius, Thomassin, and Theophilus Reynaud, in the seventeenth century; the magnificent treatise of Cardinal Bérulle, *Des Grandeurs de Jésus-Christ*. Of modern authors: Munier and Holzklau (Wirceburgenses), Legrand (Migne Theol., tom. ix); Franzelin (*De Verbo Incarnato*), Kleutgen. vol. iii; Newman's *St. Athanasius, Arians of the Fourth Century*, and *Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical*; Scheeben, book v; Billet, *De Verbo Incarnato*; Card. Satolli, *De Incarnatione*.

## PART I

### PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS AND PREPARATION FOR REDEMPTION

#### CHAPTER I

#### THE CONDITIONS OF REDEMPTION

##### § 117 POSSIBILITY AND CONGRUENCY OF REDEMPTION

I. The restoration of fallen man is called, in the language of Scripture, Salvation and Redemption: salvation from death through the restitution of grace which is the root of life; redemption from the captivity of sin and death under Satan, through the restitution of the freedom of the sons of God. Such salvation and redemption mean something more than

mere remission of sin: they include the restoration of the sinner to supernatural friendship with God. As man, by his own power, is unable to raise himself to the supernatural state, it follows that his salvation is entirely the work of God (Council of Trent, sessi vi, c. 1)

II. Though man is unworthy of Redemption, yet his unworthiness is not so great as that of the fallen angels, because his natural receptivity for grace has not been impaired to the same degree as theirs. The very perfection of their nature increased the enormity of their sins: they did not repent, they turned away from God in open rebellion, and were guilty, each of them, of a personal sin. Man, on the contrary, felt ashamed of his sin; and even now he has as great a desire for Redemption as he has an inclination for new sins, and his guilt is personal only in Adam.

III. Man, then, being less unworthy of Redemption than the fallen angels, it was fitting that the Divine mercy should redeem him in preference to them. So much more was this the case, as the Lord of the Universe owed it to His honour and glory, not to allow the whole species of creatures which are in a unique manner His image and likeness to miss the end for which He created them. Had the whole human race remained unredeemed, Satan could have boasted of the conquest of the best part of creation, and set up a kingdom, not over stray individuals, but over a distinct portion of God's creatures. It was the Divine anger against the infernal tyrant, and the Divine mercy for his victims, that combined to make Redemption "fitting." We say fitting, not necessary. The gratuitousness of grace and the manifold testimony of Scripture are opposed to all notion of necessity arising from any duty on the part of God towards the sinner, or from any restriction of His right to leave the sinner unredeemed. The congruency of Redemption arising from what God owes to Himself is neither restrictive of His freedom, nor does it support the assertion that the present fallen race ought to have been redeemed: for God might have attained the same object by creating a new human race.

IV. As a matter of fact, Redemption was accomplished by the Incarnation of God the Son, and by no other means (Acts iv. 12). But, speaking absolutely, it was possible for God to redeem mankind otherwise: for His infinite wisdom, power, and goodness, cannot be restricted to the choice of any one means to His ends. When the Fathers speak of the Incarnation as the sole means of Redemption, what they mean is that, as a matter of fact, it is the only means, and that it is the only one by which God obtains full satisfaction, without renouncing any of His rights on the sinner. His justice does not prevent God from pardoning the sinner without claiming any satisfaction. The Divine Justice has a twofold object: the safeguarding of the Divine right injured by the sinner, and the safeguarding of the moral order. If the sinner by repentance acknowledges the Divine right, and is willing to comply with all its claims as far as in him lies, God certainly is not "bound" to exact more, though He is entitled to more, viz. to full reparation. The moral order is sufficiently safeguarded against the sinner's contempt, if God, when forgiving the sin, does not also remit all the penalties due to it. The preservation of the moral order certainly does not require that no sin be forgiven except on full satisfaction; for this object is attained rather by the pain felt by the sinner than by the objective value of the punishment. It is still more evident that God, out of pure mercy, can give the sinner the means necessary to penance, and in the case of original sin, remit it out of pure grace without penance.

V. In the hypothesis that God claimed complete satisfaction for the injury done to Him by sin, the Incarnation of a Divine Person was necessary.

1. Grievous sin, being contempt of the infinite God, inflicts an injury objectively infinite (see Book. VI, §§ 106, 110), the full reparation for which requires the rendering to God of an honour of infinite value. But only a person of infinite dignity, and therefore of Divine nature, can render such an honour.

2. Mortal sin, by destroying the supernatural sanctity of the living temple of God, inflicts on God an external injury which is, in its way, likewise infinite, and which, in our hypothesis, requires full reparation. Now, injury is repaired either by full restoration or by adequate compensation. But, considering the supernatural character and nature of sanctity, compensation for its destruction by adequate meritorious satisfaction, or restoration of it by proper intrinsic power, can only be accomplished by an agent of Divine dignity and power.

3. If the Redemption has to be as universal as sin and its attendant evils, it must counter-balance original sin, considered as sin of the whole human race, and all other actual sins, and also the loss of original integrity; that is to say, it must be infinite in extension or equivalent to all possible sins of all possible children of Adam; hence, again, the principle of Redemption must possess infinite power and dignity.

VI. If the Incarnation is only necessary in the hypothesis of God claiming full satisfaction, the ground for its actually taking place must be sought not in that hypothetical necessity, but rather in its congruency or appropriateness as means to that end. The Incarnation attains the object of Redemption not only adequately but superabundantly (Rom. v. 17), and therein consists its appropriateness. The superabundance of Redemption by the Incarnation is manifest: to God it gives the greatest glory, as most perfect manifestation of His wisdom, mercy, and justice combined; to man it offers the means of obtaining the most complete remission of sin and restoration of lost grace, and at the same time, it exercises on him the most effective "pedagogic" influence, by giving him in Christ a perfect teacher in word and deed (cf. Thomassin, l. i.). Again, the superabundance of Redemption through the Incarnation appears in this, that it not only restores, but completes and perfects the original order, and thus founds a new and higher order. The union with God, as established by the Incarnation, is higher and more intimate than that of the original state; the dignity of mankind is raised; grace, instead of being a simple free gift, is acquired by the merits of the new Adam, and settled on mankind as a permanent possession; and worship is raised to infinite value and dignity.

However appropriate a means of Redemption the Incarnation may be, God would not have adopted it but for the exaltedness of the ends to which it leads. Remission of sins alone, or the moral education of natural man, would certainly not be objects proportionate to such a means. The real object of that Divine abasement is the elevation of man to Divine life; the supernatural and infinite glory which God wishes to obtain through the supernatural glorification of the creature is alone sufficient to account for the Incarnation. "Christ became man that we might be made gods (Αὐτὸς ἐνηθρώπησεν ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν)" (St. Athanasius, *De Incarn.*, n. 54). And it accounts so completely for this, that even in the hypothesis of the original order not having been disturbed by sin, the Incarnation would still be justified as its complement and final perfection. It would even be justified if the God-Man were not the means of bringing mankind so near to God, for in Himself He is of such perfection that in Him God is infinitely more pleased than in all the rest of Creation.

VII. Although human reason may comprehend the appropriateness of Redemption through the Incarnation of a Divine Person, yet human reason, left to itself, could neither

suspect nor expect its realization. It is the freest act of Divine Love and the greatest wonder of Divine Power and Wisdom, and therefore the mystery “unsearchable . . . which hath been hidden from eternity in God” (Eph. iii. 8–12). It can only be shown negatively that, as presented to our acceptance in Revelation, the great mystery contains no evident contradictions.

## CHAPTER II

### THE PREPARATION FOR REDEMPTION

#### § II C THE PERSON AND WORK OF THE REDEEMER PORTRAYED IN THE PROPHECIES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

I. The Redemption of fallen man, decreed from all eternity, was announced immediately after the Fall, but its execution was delayed for a long time, during which its fruits were applied by anticipation to those who deserved it. The delay may be taken as a punishment for the pride of man, inasmuch as it brought home to him his utter helplessness and entire dependence on God. It thus served as a stage of preparation for the coming Redeemer. God, Who distributes His grace according to His own Will, selected the Jewish nation for special preparation; before the advent of the Saviour, the Jews stood out in the eyes of the rest of the world as a living prophecy of Him; and in their subsequent dispersion they are a living monument of the reality of His coming.

II. During the period of preparation, the Redemption was announced in prophecies gradually increasing in distinctness and precision. According to time and subject-matter, they comprise seven groups: (1) the *Proto-evangelium*, or the prophecy of Paradise; (2) the prophecies made to the Patriarchs; (3) to Moses; (4) to David; prophecies made by the Prophets (5) before, (6) during, and (7) after the Exile.

1. The first and fundamental promise of a Redeemer was made to our first parents immediately after their fall: “I will put enmities between thee (the serpent) and the woman, and thy seed and her seed; she shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for her heel” (Gen. iii. 15). The liberation from the tyranny of Satan, founded on his victory over Adam, is to be accomplished by the crushing of the head of the serpent by a woman and her Son. The Hebrew text, in its present form, uses the same word (רָשַׁע) for “crushing” and “lying in wait.” As, however, the object of God’s curse on the serpent is to inflict a punishment on it, it must be admitted that the “crushing of the head” implies a final victory over the enemy, and the “crushing of, or lying in wait for, the heel” implies but an unsuccessful resistance; the devil’s power was destroyed when death befell the human body of the Saviour. Again, the present Hebrew text, instead of “she” (shall crush thy head) has “he,” or “it,” thus pointing out the seed of the woman as Redeemer. Yet, as the enmity to the serpent is common to Mother and Son, so also the victory must be common. A woman will be instrumental in the defeat of Satan, just as a woman was instrumental in the defeat of Adam. The “seed of the woman” is to be understood of “one man,” as by analogy we gather from Gal. iii. 16. (Cf. Pius IX, Bull *Ineffabilis Deus* [defining the Immaculate Conception].)

2. The original promise takes a concrete form in the age of the Patriarchs. The “seed of the woman” is here determined as the seed of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; his action is described as the blessing of all the nations of the earth, that is, as removing the curse of sin



from all mankind. The last of the Patriarchs, Jacob, points out his son Juda (and his seed) as the lion-like bearer of dominion and victory, until the advent of the Conqueror, who is the expectation of nations. The time of the coming is thus also indicated. See Gen. xii. 3; xxii. 18. Jacob's prophecy to Juda is as follows: "Juda, thee shall thy brethren praise; thy hands shall be on the necks of thy enemies; the sons of thy father shall bow down to thee. Juda is a lion's whelp . . . the sceptre shall not be taken away from Juda, nor a ruler from his thigh, till He come that is to be sent, and He shall be the expectation of nations" (Gen. xlix. 8-10; cf. Apoc. v. 5).

3. When Moses, as prophet of God, gave to the children of Israel the constitution and the legal institutions becoming the chosen people of God, God made this promise: "I will raise them up a prophet out of the midst of their brethren, like to thee (Moses), and I will put My words in His mouth, and He shall speak to them all I shall command Him, and he that will not hear His words which He shall speak in My Name, I will be the avenger" (Deut. xviii. 18, 19). Here the Redeemer is promised as a mediator of the testament between God and man, but a better mediator than Moses (Heb. iii. 3). At the same time, when the chosen people was making its first appearance among the nations, the voice of Balaam is heard to this effect: "The hearer of the words of God hath said, who knoweth the doctrine of the Highest, and seeth the visions of the Almighty, who falling hath his eyes opened. I shall see Him, but not now; I shall behold Him, but not near. A star shall rise out of Jacob, and a sceptre shall spring up from Israel, and shall strike the chiefs of Moab, and shall waste all the children of Seth" (Num. xxiv. 16, 17). This prophecy in the first instance probably refers to David, but its solemnity, the fourfold blessing which precedes it, the mention of the last days and of the star, extend its bearing beyond the kingdom of David.

4. The Messianic prophecies acquire greater distinctness in the time of King David. The Messiah, the Anointed of the Lord, as He is henceforth called, will be of the family of David; the glory of the kingdom of David and Solomon is the germ and the type of His future universal kingdom; His nature, His origin, His functions, and the events of His life, are portrayed in outline. The Anointed appears as the Son of God by generation, and as God; as a priest-king after the manner of Melchisedech, Who will offer Himself in sacrifice, but shall not see corruption, and Who after His passion will gather all nations unto God, and be Himself the object of their adoration (2 Kings vii. 11-16 [Nathan's prophecy]; the Messianic Psalms, lxxxviii and cxxxi; lxxi, ii, and cix; xlv.).

5. The prophets between the time of David and the Captivity add new touches to the portrait of the Messiah drawn in the Psalms. When the local and earthly glory of David's empire was dwindling away, they announced the future rise of a nobler and a universal kingdom; they foretold the deliverance from the impending captivity through Cyrus, sent by God as an omen and a type of the coming spiritual deliverance from the captivity of sin and hell through God's Anointed; they represent the promise of the Messiah as a pledge and guarantee for the perpetuity of the house of David, and for the liberation of his people from temporal captivity. The principal bearer of these prophecies is Isaias (ישעיה, Jehova's salvation), the Evangelist among the Prophets. In many passages of the first part, and in the whole of the second part of his Book, he describes expressly and in order the heavenly origin of the "Bud of the Lord," or the "Orient;" the Divine nature and exalted attributes of the Anointed; His teaching, His vicarious suffering as just servant of God, and the glory of His universal kingdom, the Church (ii. 2, 3, and iv. 2, with parallel Mich. v. 2; also Jeremias xxiii.

5 sqq. and xxxiii. 15 sqq. "I will raise up to David a just branch . . . the name that they shall call Him is: The Lord [Jehovah] our just one;" Zacharias iii. 8, and vi. 12; Isa. xlv. 8). The origin and nature of the Bud of God are characterized in xiv. 7, ix. 3-7, xi. 7 sqq.; and in the second part *passim*, esp. xlix-lxvi.

6. The Prophets of the Captivity, with the exception of Daniel, add but little to the description of the Anointed given by their predecessors. Jeremiah and Ezechiel lay stress upon the spiritual kingdom of Christ, teaching expressly that the earthly throne of David will not be filled again (Jer. xx. 23; Ezech, xxi. 25-27). Jeremiah, in the most important Messianic parts of his prophecy (xxiii., xxxi., and xxxiii.), in contrast with the prevailing injustice and guiltiness of the Chosen People, and with the external destruction of the Old Covenant, introduces the Messiah as the bud, or branch (הַצֶּמֶח), whose name is "Jehovah our just one," and promises the institution of a new and eternal Testament (xxxi. 31 sqq. and xxxii. 39). Ezechiel, on the other hand, treats the Messiah, whom he calls "God's servant David" (xxxiv. 23-31, and xxxvii. 21-28), as Shepherd and Prince. Baruch (iii. 36-38) represents the apparition of the Eternal Wisdom on earth and His dwelling among men, as the completion of the education of Israel by God. Lastly, Daniel announces, in a more concrete form than any other prophet, the historical events which prepared the coming of Christ; His solemn taking possession of His universal and eternal sovereignty; the exact time of His appearance; the institution of a new alliance, and the destruction of the old: and thus his prophecy is the sealing and fulfilment of all preceding prophecies (Dan. vii. 13, 14; ix. 24-27). The best Catholic commentary on this last prophecy is by Rohling, *The Book of the Prophet Daniel* (in German).

7. After the return from the Captivity, the Prophets speak of the Messiah in connection with the second temple, as God and as Priest. Aggeus calls him "the Desired of all nations," Who will glorify the temple with His presence, and announce therein the peace of God. Zacharias announces Him to the first High Priest of the new temple as the Orient Who taketh away the sins of the world, and the High Priest himself is set down as a type of the Messiah' royal priesthood. The "Orient" is here the foundation stone and the builder of the new spiritual temple, uniting in Himself the functions of king and priest. When He is again spoken of as Shepherd, He becomes "the man that cleaveth to God," and who is violently put to death. In fine, Malachias prophesies the founder of a new and universal sacrificial worship, and the rising sun of justice (Aggeus ii. 7-10; Zach. iii. 8; vi. 11-13; ix. 9; xiii. 7. Malachias i. 11; iii. 1; iv. 2, 5, 6). The natural sequel to this latter prophecy (announcing the Precursor of Christ) is the message of the Angel Gabriel to Zachary, the father of the Baptist (Luke i. 16, 17).

III. Side by side with the verbal prophecies of the Old Testament run the types or figures of the Messiah, which are a kind of real or substantial prophecy. Repeated assertions of Christ and the Apostles place the existence of such types beyond all doubt. The Fathers and Theologians, however, considering as types whatever bears a similarity to Christ, point out a great number of types which are not positively mentioned as such in the New Testament. It must be conceded that, before the Gospel shed its light upon them, the typical character of many true figures or types was not easy to recognize. Many others, on the other hand, were brought out by the Prophets themselves in connection with verbal prophecies, e.g. Moses, Melchisedech, David, Solomon, Cyrus. The typical character of others, e.g. religious sacrifices and ceremonies, is self-evident. In dogmatic theology a twofold use is made of those ancient types: they furnish a proof that Jesus is really the Messiah prepared from the beginning, and

they offer useful illustrations, by analogy, of many points revealed in the New Testament. The Gospels use them chiefly as proofs; St. Paul, in his Epistles, more as illustrations. To obtain a comprehensive grasp of all the types of Christ, it is best to group them according to epochs, as we did the prophecies: to each group of prophecies corresponds a group of types, and they help to explain one another. As examples we refer the reader to the following: in group i, Adam (Rom. v. 14) and Eve (Eph. v.); in group ii, Melchisedech (Psalm cx., Heb. vii.), Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph. Thus Moses was sent by God as Prophet, endowed with miraculous powers, as Shepherd and Legislator, as Founder of a new form of worship, and a new alliance between God and His people, etc. Again the Paschal Lamb, the Manna (John vi. 30, 48), the water from the rock (1 Cor. x. 4), the Brazen Serpent (John iii. 14, and xii. 32, etc.). With the more important figures we shall deal extensively when we come to treat of the corresponding antitypes.

## PART II

### THE REDEEMER

**W**E SHALL HERE ADOPT the same division as in the treatise on the Holy Trinity (Book II, Part II). We shall first lay down the fundamental lines of the dogma according to Scripture and Tradition; and afterwards explain the dogma according to the principles of theological science.

### CHAPTER I

#### THE DOGMA

##### § 120 PERSONAL NAMES OF THE REDEEMER: SUMMARY OF THE CREED AND DECREES OF THE CHURCH

I. The personal names of the Saviour directly characterize Him either as man or as God. As man He received at His birth the name of Jesus (ישוע), Jehovah is Salvation, Matt. i, 21), which is taken from His function of Redeemer. Jesus Himself has a predilection for the name "Son of Man." This designation implies that He is pre-eminently the son of man, the second Adam far above the first in excellence; or also that He is not so much the son of one man as the son of all mankind, the desired of all nations. Neither of these names expresses that intrinsic excellence of His Person which places Him above all men, and fits Him (makes Him worthy) to effect the Redemption of all; this is done by the name Christ, "the Anointed" with Divinity. This name, as will be explained in its place, if fully understood, contains in a nutshell the whole subject-matter of "Christology." The Saviour is called by Isaias (vii) "Emmanuel," that is, "God with us." The manner in which He is with us is expressed in the language of the Church by the term "Word Incarnate," or "the Word made flesh." We shall show farther on that this term contains an explanation of the name Christ, and expresses directly and without figure of speech the constitution of the Person of the Saviour: hence Christology is appropriately described as the treatise on the Incarnate Word of God.

II. The Rule of Faith concerning the Person of the Saviour is laid down in the Apostles' Creed or the Symbol of Baptism: upon this all subsequent definitions are founded. They, one and all, formulate the constitution of Christ in connection with His origin.

1. The original simple form of the symbol of the Apostles, as used in the West, runs thus: "I believe . . . in Jesus Christ His (the Father's) only Son, our Lord, Who was born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary." Here, Jesus, the Son of Mary, and Jesus, the only Son of God, Who shares with His Father the dominion of the world, is said to be one and the same person. Directly His birth from Mary is alone set forth; but the mention of the influence of the Holy Ghost on this birth points to the essential holiness of its product, viz. Christ, the Anointed; and the words "only Son of God the Father" suppose His eternal origin, so that His birth in time appears as a second birth. Most of the Eastern forms run: "I believe in one God . . . and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God," thus laying more stress on the indivisible unity, manifested by common Lordship, of God the Redeemer with God the Father.

2. The heresies of the first centuries, especially the Arian negation of the Divinity of Christ, which caused the definition of Christ's "Eternal Lordship," naturally led up to a closer determination of the relation which His second birth (of Mary) bears to His first birth (of the eternal Father); and also to an assertion of the reality of the second birth against the Gnostics. Thus the Council of Nicæa, after defining the Divine Sonship, continues: "Who *for us men and for our salvation*, came down from heaven and *took flesh* [by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary] *and was made Man*." The bracketed words, which belong to the Apostles' Creed, were introduced into the Nicene formula by the First Council of Constantinople. It is worthy of remark that, whereas the symbol of the Apostles is formulated more on the line of the Synoptic Gospels, the Nicene Creed follows exactly the exposition of St. John i. 1-14.

3. The symbol of Nicæa did not speak with the same distinctness of the temporal birth of Christ as of His eternal birth. The terms "descending from heaven" (*κατελθεῖν*), "taking flesh" (*σαρκουῶσαι*), and especially "being made man" (*ἐνανθρωπεῖν*), were misinterpreted by Nestorius to imply only a moral and accidental union of the Son of God with the man Jesus, the Son of Mary; he divided Christ into two distinct persons, the Divine and the human. Against this heresy the Council of Ephesus did not set up a new definition, finding the existing ones sufficient; but it approved the explanation of the Nicene symbol given by St. Cyril of Alexandria, and also his twelve anathematisms against Nestorius. According to St. Cyril, the three above expressions signify: a substantial or physical union of the Logos with the flesh or with humanity—by which the human flesh becomes as truly His own flesh as the human flesh is the own flesh of the human soul—whence it further follows that the taking flesh out of the Virgin Mary on the part of the Logos, makes the Logos Himself, and no other, the Son of Mary. So that Christ is not the union of two persons (the Logos and Jesus), but one substantial being, are subject at the same time of the Divine and the human attributes (cf. Second Epistle of St. Cyril to Nestorius, and the Anath. appended to the same). By this declaration the Council of Ephesus established the formal unity of the Nicene with the Apostles' Creed, and gave the true sense of the *κατελθεῖν* and *ἐνανθρωπεῖν* used in the former. The second anathematism contains a formal definition of the essential constitution of Christ, giving its principle, its form, and its consequences: that the Word of God the Father unites Himself substantially (*καθ' ὑπόστασιν*) to the flesh, and thus constitutes one Christ by making the flesh His own, and is consequently in one Person God and Man. Another remarkable

formulation of the same doctrine is to be found in the *Libellus Leporii*, probably drawn up by St. Augustine, A.D. 424 or 425; it contains a retraction of the errors of the Pelagian priest Leporius. The "substantial union" of St. Cyril is here described as *mixtio inconfusa* (see the text in Hardouin, i. 1263.)

4. The Council of Chalcedon was specially directed against the Eutychians who understood the "taking flesh," *σάρκωσις*, as implying a fusion of the two natures into one. Hence it lays stress upon the "being made man," *ἐνανθρωπήσις*, as the union of the Logos in His unaltered Divine nature with a perfect and unaltered human nature, and places the two natures side by side under the threefold aspect of perfection, consubstantiality, and origin by generation: "We confess and teach that our Lord is perfect in deity and perfect in humanity . . . consubstantial with the Father as to His deity, and consubstantial with us as to His humanity . . . born of the Father before all time as to His deity, born in recent times . . . of the Virgin Mary as to His humanity." Further, the same Council lays down the technical term for the unity of Christ: "One and the same Christ, Son and Lord unbegotten, must be acknowledged in two natures not confused, changed, divided, or separated; the union nowhere taking away the difference of the natures, but rather safeguarding the properties of each, so that they concur in one person and hypostasis." The symbol of Chalcedon (except for the formula relating to hypostatic unity) is nothing but a compendium of the famous Epistle of Pope Leo I to Flavian, which, in its turn, is no more than a commentary on the symbol of the Apostles.

5. The symbol of Chalcedon, confirmed and in some parts proposed more distinctly by the Fifth Ecumenical Council (Second of Constantinople, A.D. 553), received a further development in the Sixth Ecumenical Council, which defined against Monothelitism, that the two natures united in one subject are, in most intimate conjunction and subordination, the principles of a twofold mental life and operation; in other words, that Christ has two wills and two operations: the Divine will, by which He acts as God; the human will, by which He acts as man, this latter entirely distinct from, but entirely subject to, the former.

6. The most important formulary of the constitution of Christ originated in the West is contained in the so-called symbol of St. Athanasius. With the exception of the clauses comparing the union of the natures in Christ with the union of body and soul in man, it is formed upon the symbol of Chalcedon (see St. Augustine, *In Joan.* tr. 19). The Eleventh Council of Toledo, A.D. 675, gives another very complete exposition of the doctrine of Incarnation. Lastly, the Bull of Eugenius IV (*Decretum pro Jacobitis*) sums up all previous definitions on the subject in question.

III. The chief points of the Catholic dogma concerning the Person of Christ are the following:

1. Christ is not a merely human Being: He is a Divine Person, the Logos, or only-begotten Son of God, and as such has an eternal existence. 2. But this same Person, besides His Divine nature, has a human nature taken unto Him in time; He possesses this nature as really as His Divine nature, and as really as man possesses human nature: hence, the Divine Person of the Word is really man, and as Divine Person incarnate, He is the Person of Christ. 3. The Person named Christ is not merely an ideal or moral whole, but a Being one and indivisible in the strictest sense; in Him the Divine and the human nature are united into one substantial whole, like body and soul are united into one substantial human person. 4. But the unity of Christ, being the unity of two complete living natures, has an advantage over the unity of

mind and matter in man; it is not a unity of nature in the proper sense, that is such an one in which the mixed elements complete and influence each other so as to lose the qualities they possessed before the union, and to form together a new principle of action and passion. In Christ the two natures remain strictly distinct; the lower does not in any way influence the higher, and the higher only influences the lower as it would do even if separated. 5. Hence the substantial union of the human nature with the Divine Person is a truly, but at the same time, a purely, personal and hypostatic union. It is personal and hypostatic because one Person possesses the two natures, and it is purely and only such, because the two natures remain entirely unaltered and distinct. Thus the Christ of Revelation appears as a unique and peculiar Being; no other being is constituted in the same marvellous way or of such elements.

## § 121 THE NEW TESTAMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION OF CHRIST

The doctrine of the New Testament concerning the Person of Christ is contained partly in the several accounts of His origin, partly in the descriptions of His concrete reality.

I. His origin is told in a threefold form.

1. The first form is exhibited in the narrative of the Synoptic Gospels, and corresponds with the form of the Apostles' Creed. St. Matthew and St. Luke describe the origin of the man Jesus from Mary, pointing out the influence of the Holy Ghost and of the power of the Most High, and deducing from this influence that Jesus is more than man, viz. a holy being, the true Son of God, and therefore the promised Christ, Emmanuel and Lord of Mankind. The principal text (Luke i. 31 sqq.) is the message of the Angel to the Virgin: "Behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and bring forth a Son, and thou shalt call His name Jesus. He shall be great, and shall be called (acknowledged and honoured as) the Son of the Most High; and the Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of David His father (= the kingdom promised to David); and He shall reign in the house of Jacob (to whom He was promised) for ever, and of His kingdom there shall be no end. . . . The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee. And therefore also the Holy (*Sanctum*, τὸ ἅγιον) which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God" (cf. Isa. vii. 14, as regards birth from a virgin; and xlv. 8, in connection with the overshadowing).

2. The second form describes the origin of Christ as a descent of the Son of Man from heaven where He was before; as a coming into the world by going forth (proceeding) from the Father or from God; and lastly, as a mission of the Son of God into the world or into the flesh: His temporal birth is represented as a secondary and relative origin. This form is used by St. John the Baptist (John i. 15, and iii. 31 sqq.); by Christ Himself (John iii. 13; vi. 52; xvii. 5; viii. 42, and xvi. 48); and by the Apostle (Rom. viii. 3; Gal. iv. 5; Rom. i. 3, and ix. 6).

3. The manner in which the eternal Son of God came down from heaven in the temporal birth of the man Jesus is explained *ex professo* in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel, and in other places by St. John, and similarly by St. Paul (Phil. ii. 7). Starting from the eternal and Divine existence of the uncreated Word, and God-like Image of God, they teach that the Word (ὁ Λόγος) of God, in Itself invisible, was made flesh, and thus appeared visibly among us as man; and that the God-like Image (εἰκὼν) of God took to Himself the form of a servant, and flesh and blood, and made them His own, and so became in essence equal to man. The first of these two conceptions is peculiar to St. John, and pervades all his writings; the second is proper to St. Paul: both are the basis of all later symbols of faith concerning the constitution

of Christ. Their significance extends beyond the statement that the Son of God, descending from heaven, became man by taking unto Him human nature in Mary, and is thus one Person with the Son of Mary. They further imply (1) that the Incarnation was effected through the substantial union of a human nature with the Divine Son, Who is described as Word and Image of God; (2) that the Son of God, becoming man in the twofold character of Word and Image, manifests Himself to man in the most perfect manner as the Living Word of God, and, being the consubstantial Image of God, contracts an essential likeness with man, the external image of God; (3) that the humanity of Christ, as compared to His Divinity, represents only the accessory, secondary, lower, and external element of His Being. Read St. John i. 1–17, and the beginning of his First Epistle, which probably was written as an introduction to his Gospel; St. Paul, Phil. ii. 6–7; cf. Col. i. 15 sqq.; Heb. i. and ii.

II. The portrait of the Saviour, as made up from the various accounts of His origin, is completed by the Scriptural statements concerning His Person in real existence.

1. Holy Writ asserts and declares in many ways that the historical Person known as Jesus and Christ, is as really and truly man as other men are. Christ calls Himself “Son of Man” as often as “Son of God;” St. Paul compares Him to Adam (Rom. v. 17 sqq.; 1 Cor. xv. 22, and 45–47), and sets forth His humanity as the condition of His mediatorship. If Christ is called “heavenly man,” (1 Cor. xv. 47), this does not imply a difference of nature, but only of excellence, between the God-Man and the earthly man. Again, Scripture attributes to Christ all that belongs to a real man: human descent, birth, component parts, qualities and powers, actions and passions; “tempted in all things like as we are” (Heb. iv. 15). Lastly, the Apostle repeatedly insists on the circumstance that, as our brother, Christ not only possesses the perfections of human nature, but also its “lowliness and weakness,” and shares with us the conditions of “servant” (Phil. ii 7 sqq.; Heb. ii. 11 sqq., and iv. 14–16).

2. Jesus, true Man, Son and Brother of man, is yet distinguished from all men, not only by the dignity of Saviour, but as a Person essentially superhuman and Divine.

(a) His Divine character is particularly set forth in the three names (embodied also in the symbol of the Apostles) under which He is proposed in the Gospels and Epistles as object of faith and adoration, viz. “Christ,” that is the Anointed, the Holy or Hallowed of God; “the Son of God;” “the Lord,” or “our Lord.” These three names express personal dignity and excellence; they are parallel and opposed to the three human names: Man, Son of Man, and Brother. Scripture uses them either conjointly or separately; like the human names, they complete and explain one another. The name Christ, in opposition to “man,” expresses the higher essence or personal constitution of Jesus; “Son of God,” as opposed to “Son of Man,” points out His Divine origin and rank; in fine, the name “Lord,” parallel to “Brother of man,” sets forth His exaltedness over men and all other creatures.

(α) The name Christ—which in the unfigured language of angels and demons is replaced by “the Holy” (*sanctum*, τὸ ἅγιον), or “the Holy of God” (Luke i. 35; Mark i. 24, and Luke iv. 34), or “the Christ, and the Hallowed,” purely and simply—designates the man Jesus as sanctified by God in an eminent manner, or invested with God’s own dignity and sanctity; or, again, as a Being to Whom the plenitude of God’s infinite and immutable goodness is communicated, and Who is thereby made as absolutely holy and adorable as God Himself. The “Anointing” of Jesus implies more than the elevation to the dignity of king or priest in the service of God: His kingdom and priesthood are but a part and the offshoot of the hallowing of His whole being, which is such that it confers upon Him a priesthood of which

the Priest Himself deserves Divine Worship, and a kingdom which gives Him the sovereign dominion over all creatures.

(β) The name “Son of God” accounts for the deep meaning of the name Christ, inasmuch as it connects the anointing or hallowing of Jesus with His generation from the Eternal Father. The Jews, however, did not give to the term Christ alone this deep signification—hence, as a rule, Scripture connects the two names: Christ, the Son of God; and Jesus Himself calls attention to the fact that the former name (Christ) includes the latter (Son of God). See *supra*, § 79.

(γ) The third name, “the Lord,” or “Our Lord,” when applied to Jesus, implies Divine dignity and absolute sovereignty over all creatures; for such sovereignty is an attribute of God the Son as Saviour of mankind. Many prophecies of the Old Testament identify Christ with “the Lord,” and the faithful adore Him as “our Lord.” Moses was a servant in the house of God, Christ was in His own house (Heb. iii. 2 sqq.), and He is the heir of all things because all things were made by Him (Heb. i. 2 and Col. i. i.).

The name “Son of God” alone is used in the Divine revelation concerning the higher character of Jesus: “This is My beloved Son” (Matt. iii. 17, and xvii. 5). These two revelations are confirmed by their witnesses: John i. 34 and 2 Peter i. 17. In the professions of faith demanded and accepted by Jesus, the two names are usually joined: “Christ, the Son of God” (Matt. xvi. 17; John vi. 70; John xi. 27). St. Mark (vii. 29; cf. Matt. xvi. 17) has, “Thou art Christ,” and St. Luke (ix. 20), “the Christ of God,” instead of “Christ the Son of God”; which proves that the name Christ includes that of Son of God. In the utterances of the demons, we find instead of Christ, “the Holy one of God,” and “Son of God” (Mark i. 24; iii. 11, 12; Luke iv. 34). The teaching of the Apostles on the point in question is clearly set forth in Acts ix. 20, 22; John xx. 31; 1 John iv. 15, and v. 1, 5; Acts ii. 35. As to how Jesus claimed the Name, “Son of God,” see Matt. xxii. 41–46 and Luke xx. 41–45; John x. 24 sqq. with Acts iv. 27; and Heb. v. 7.

(b) The names “Christ,” “the Son of God,” and “the Lord,” predicated of Jesus in the sense just explained, clearly proclaim His Divinity. In five other places, He is expressly called God, and in three of these, with the apposition “true God, great God, God above all” (see Book II, § 79). Attributes exclusively Divine, and the most intimate and comprehensive unity and communion, are predicated of Him. “Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God” (Χριστὶν Θεοῦ δυνάμειν καὶ Θεοῦ σοφίαν; 1 Cor. i. 24). If Jesus Himself and the Apostles often ascribe His works to the Father and to the Holy Ghost, they do so to point out the source from which His power is derived, and to witness to the unity of the man Jesus with God the Father. “Amen, amen, I say unto you: The Son cannot do anything of Himself, but what He seeth the Father doing: for what things soever He doth, these the Son also doth in like manner” (John v. 19). It is thus evident that the same Jesus who appears as man among men is also by essence and nature true God. The evidence is corroborated still more by the fact that Divine attributes are predicated of Jesus as man, and human attributes of the same Jesus as God (cf. Book II, § 79); e.g. “God spared not even His own Son, but hath given Him up for us all” (Rom. viii. 32; cf. 1 Cor. ii. 8; Acts xx. 28; Col. i. 17, 18; and Heb. i. and ii.).

3. The simultaneous existence of the Divine and human natures in the same subject supposes that the essence of Christ is composed of two natures, and that these stand to one another in the closest relationship. Scripture illustrates this relationship in two ways: either as the bodily indwelling of the whole plenitude of the Divinity in Christ, or as analogical to the



union of body and soul in man. From the latter point of view, the Godhead is conceived as the most pure Spirit in relation to man as flesh, or imperfect compound of mind and matter. "In Him [Christ] dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally (σωματικῶς), and you are filled in Him who is the Head of all principality and power" (Col. ii. 9, 10; cf. i. 19) "Christ died once for our sins, being put to death, indeed, in the flesh (σαρκί), but brought to life by the Spirit" (Πνεύματι; 1 Peter iii. 18; cf. John vi. 24, etc.).

The invisible Divinity of Jesus is witnessed to by God the Father, either speaking from heaven or confirming Jesus' own testimony by miracles. To this heavenly testimony the Saviour appeals in corroboration of His own human testimony, and this He further corroborated by giving His life to support it: He was sentenced to death because He called Himself the Son of God. His death on that account gives to His evidence the greatest degree of credibility; for not even His enemies deny that He was a wise and holy man. But if He had been deceived Himself or contrived to deceive others on this point, He would be neither wise nor holy. The full and final confirmation of the evidence in favour of His Divinity is ascribed by Jesus to the promised Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost, at His coming, should show innumerable miracles in the spiritual and in the physical order. St. John, in his First Epistle, sums up the testimony for the Divinity of Christ by placing side by side with the three heavenly witnesses three witnesses on earth: the water, the blood, and the Spirit (v. 6-8). See St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, iv. 27-38; Bellarmine, *De Christo*, lib. i.; Franzelin, *De Verbo Incarn.*, thes. ii. sqq.

## § 122 THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN CHRIST, ACCORDING TO THE TRADITION OF THE FIRST FOUR CENTURIES

I. The heresies against the constitution of Christ succeeded one another in perfect logical order. During the first four centuries the Arians impugned the Divine nature, the Apollinarians the human nature: the form of the union was not called in question until the Church had defined the reality of the two natures. We dealt with the Divinity of Christ in our Treatise on the Trinity; here we notice only the heresies against His humanity.

1. The heresy of the Gnostics, starting from the false principle that human nature is essentially bad, refused to acknowledge it in Christ. Marcion, the author of Docetism, denied the reality of the body of Christ, asserting it to be a mere phantasma; while Valentinus admitted a real body but of celestial nature, and entirely unlike the human body.

2. The Arians taught that in Christ the Logos acted as human soul, and was subject to all the imperfections natural to the soul of man, especially to passibility.

3. This doctrine, which entirely destroyed the Divinity of Christ, was modified by the Apollinarians, who held that the Logos took the place of the human soul only in as far as this could be done without debasing His Divinity. Hence they ascribed to the Logos the intellectual functions of the soul. Arius had lowered the Divine Nature to the level of humanity; the Apollinarians raised Christ's humanity to the level of His Divinity, thus once more falling back into the errors of the Gnostics.

II. The earliest Fathers, Ignatius, Irenæus, and Tertullian, opposed Docetism; Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzum, and Gregory of Nyssa, the Valentinian heresies. Their arguments on the reality of the body of Christ and its similarity in substance with ours, may be summed up as follows: If the body and soul of Christ had only been apparent, and not real, like every

other human body and soul, the Gospels would be reduced to a set of fables; the whole public life of the Saviour would have been a deception practised by God, and by Christ as God, on mankind; whence Christ would no more be really God than really man; Redemption itself would be real no longer, because the whole economy of salvation is dependent on the Redeemer's real humanity (1 Tim. ii. 5, and 1 Cor. xv. 14). These arguments are strengthened by the fact that the human nature which was made subject to sin by the first Adam, had to be redeemed, and therefore assumed by the second. The acts of obedience and sacrifice through which the redemption was accomplished, could only be performed by a Being endowed with a human soul and body. Apollinarism was first condemned in the Council of Alexandria (A.D. 362) in the *Epistola Synodalis* of St. Athanasius (Hardouin, i. 731). Pope Damasus (*Anath.* vii.) condemns it thus: "We anathematize those who say that the Word of God was in the human flesh in the room of a human, rational, and intellectual soul: for the Divine Word was not in His body as its rational and intellectual soul, but He took unto Him our intellectual (*intelligibilis*) soul without sin and saved it."

III. The Son of God, having assumed our humanity, is consubstantial with us in the sense that He has our essence. The fact that Christ was born of a human mother not only proves His consubstantiality with man, but also His membership of the human race. His consubstantiality with man thus assumes the same form as His consubstantiality with God, both being founded upon origin by generation. The Council of Chalcedon, in the first part of its definition, expressly puts both consubstantialities side by side, thus showing that it conceives them both as equally perfect. Holy Scripture insists upon Christ's kinship with man: He is promised as the seed of the woman, as the seed of Abraham and of David; He calls Himself by preference the Son of Man; Evangelists and Apostles continually speak of His human origin. In the corporate and organic unity of the human race, with the God-Man as second and higher Head, the Fathers see the foundation and the pledge of the union of mankind with God in supernatural life. By reason of this kinship the flesh of Christ is the property of mankind, and when offered in sacrifice, it has the nature of a gift from man to God. Lastly, only by reason of His kinship with man, Christ, as Mediator and Priest, is the natural and perfect representative of man before God. That the Saviour was born without a human father does not destroy His consubstantiality with man: it has only the effect of freeing the bodily organization of Christ from all defects incidental to generation by man, and to give Him a body at least as perfect as that of Adam issuing from the hands of God. The relation of dependence between progeny and progenitor, in virtue of which the progeny becomes a branch of, and is subordinate to, mankind as a whole, is indeed limited and modified; but this is necessary in order that Christ, as the second and more excellent Father of mankind, may be superior to the first Adam. See Petavius, *De Incarn.*, lib. i.; Thomassin, l. iv., c. 1-11.

### § 123 POSITION OF THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN CHRIST: ITS UNION WITH THE DIVINE PERSON INTO ONE BEING—AS TAUGHT AGAINST THE HERESIES OF THE FIRST FOUR CENTURIES

Although the controversies of the first four centuries mainly bore on the reality of the two natures of Christ, they yet gave occasion not only for the assertion of the union of these into one person, but also for the explanation of the mode of the union. In the present chapter we attempt to give an outline of this earliest evolution of the dogma "that the Son of God and the Son of Mary are one and the same Person."

I. From the beginning the identity of the Son of Mary with the Son of God, expressed in the symbol of the Apostles, was universally understood and professed as meaning that the same subject is both God and man; and consequently, that the human nature of this subject must not be considered as a being independent in itself, but as appertaining to the Person of the Son of God. Such was the profession of faith for which the earliest martyrs shed their blood: the Apostle St. Andrew, St. Ignatius of Antioch, St. Polycarp, and many others whose "Acta" have come down to us, died for their faith in "a crucified God."

II. Cerinthus the Gnostic "divided Jesus" into a heavenly being called Christ, and a human being born of Mary, the former dwelling with the latter. St. Irenæus upheld against this heresy the Catholic doctrine that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and the Word of God, is one and the same subject, Who, on account of His double birth, and of the mixture of the human with the Divine substance, possesses two natures, and so unites in Himself the attributes of both (Lib. iii., esp. cc. 16–19). Other Gnostics denied the reality of human nature in Christ, because they thought its inherent imperfections incompatible with His Divinity. The Fathers who refute them never solve the difficulty by conceding the non-reality of the human body, but argue that the assumption of a real human body was congruous or necessary for the redemption of man, and therefore not incompatible with God's dignity (Tertull., *De Carne Christi*, c. 5). The same Tertullian, writing against Praxeas, who made Jesus a person filled with the power of God but not God, most appropriately explains how the human substance was assumed into the Divine Person without any confusion of the Divine and human substances (*Contra Praxeam*, c. 27).

III. The Arians admitted one person with one nature in Christ, and, from His human attributes, they inferred that He was but a created being. Against this heresy the Fathers taught the concrete (substantial) Divinity of Jesus, maintaining that God not only dwelt in Him as in the Prophets and Saints, but was really made man. They acknowledged that the infirmities of human nature really and truly belonged to the subject whose Divinity they defended, and to whom Scripture unmistakably attributes Divine properties. They accounted for the application of human attributes to a Divine Person by establishing that the whole humanity, essence, and nature are owned by that Person, and are "the flesh of the Logos" (σὰρξ λογωθεΐσα). Again, in opposition to the Arians, the Fathers declared that, although human passibility is attributable to the Logos, still the Logos himself is not subject to suffering: He remains unchanged and unchangeable in the union with human nature, for He is not, as Arius held, the soul of the man Jesus. On the contrary, by reason of the union, the human flesh is no longer necessarily subject to suffering; the sufferings of Christ were voluntary. The effect of the union of the Logos with our nature is in no respect an abasement of the Divine nature, but an exaltation of the human, which becomes the born organ of Divine operations. The favourite expression for this elevation is *θέωσις*, the deification of human nature (cf. St. Athan., *De Incarnatione* and *Contra Arianos*, especially *Or.* iii. n. 29 sqq.).

IV. Whilst the Arians denied Christ's Divinity on account of His human nature, the Apollinarians denied His humanity on account of His Divine nature. Against this absorption of the humanity by the Divinity of Christ, the Fathers teach that the unity of Christ is not effected by the fusion of both substances into one, but by the uncreated substance of the Logos making the created substance physically His own, so that the two constitute one Being but not one essence. Further, they contrast the unity of Christ with the unity of the Persons

of the Trinity. In Christ, one Person has two different natures; in the Trinity, one identical nature is possessed by three distinct Persons. In the controversy with the Apollinarians, as in that with the Arians, the attribution of human and Divine predicates to the same subject is explained on the ground of two natures being really possessed by the same person, and the “theosis,” or deification of the human nature, is equally insisted upon.

V. Arians and Apollinarians alike objected that the Catholic doctrine would give God two Sons, the Logos and Christ. Pope Damasus (*Anath.* vi.) “anathematizes those who assert two Sons, one before all ages, the other after the assumption of flesh from the Virgin.” The Fathers meet the objection by establishing that the assumption of the human nature by the Logos deprives that nature of the independence necessary to personality. Here again the theosis of the lower nature is the leading feature of the defence; the human compound, and the command which the soul possesses over the body, are not of such perfection as to exclude the union of body and soul to a higher principle (the Logos), and after this “commixtion” the command (hegemony) passes to the Logos, and thus the human body and soul are left without independent personality.

VI. The unity of subject resulting from the union of the human nature with the Son of God, was treated by Greeks and Latins as Unity of Person (*πρόσωπον*). Previous to the Council of Ephesus the metaphysical terms used to describe this unity are mostly very abstract and general; Christ is one (*unum*, ἓν); one unity (*μία ἐνότης*); one whole (*ἐν τέλειον, μία τελειότης*); one thing (*una res*); in short, one Being. St. Epiphanius and St. Athanasius, however, already use the concrete “one hypostasis,” or one substantial being. The union of the two natures, the basis of the unity of Person, is described by the same Fathers in a threefold manner.

1. Considering the Divine Person as the object of the union, they express the union by the terms “assumption, susception, *πρόσληψις, ἀνάληψις*,” which convey the idea of a physical union, brought about by the Divine Person “taking unto Him and appropriating” humanity. The putting on of a garment or the taking up of a tool are used as analogies, whence the further expressions, *καταρτισμός*, coaptation, *συμφυία*, coalescence, *ἀνάπλασις εἰς μίαν ὑπόστασιν*, the building up of humanity into the Divine Person. In all these expressions the Son of God is considered as adding to His Being the nature of man.

2. The second series of descriptive terms considers the nature of man as receiving its highest perfection through the union, that is, through the infusion of Divinity. Hence, again, the terms *ἀνάπλασις*, and *ἀναμόρφωσις* = taking of a higher form, viz. the infused Divine form of the Logos; *admixtio* and *permixtio*; insertion and root-taking.

3. Lastly, the Fathers view the two united substances side by side, as constituting one whole. From this point of view they describe the union as “the entering of one substance into the other (*περιχωρεῖν εἰς ἄλληλα*).” They illustrate this mutual penetration by the analogy of a mixture (*commixtio*) or commingling of the various parts of one tissue, e.g. the parts of a plant or the threads of a cloth, and the term *συμφυία* (concretion, growing together) is also used as expressing the meaning. Most of the above designations and analogies are found in St. Augustine, who also was the first to treat at length of the unity of man as a type of the unity of Christ. The same Father points out that the union ought to be conceived simultaneously as the putting on of a garment (*induere habitum*) by a Divine Person, and as a commingling of the Divine Person with human nature; the commingling showing that the putting on of humanity as a vesture implies a physical union, and the dressing as with a vesture showing that the commixtion does not alter the united natures. As a garment when

put on receives a nobler form than it has when off, so the humanity of Christ, through its union with the Logos, receives a much nobler existence; the ennobling being accomplished by the infusion or commingling of the Logos, in the same manner as the human body, through the infusion of the soul, is formed into the garment of the soul (Petavius, lib. iii. cc. 1, 2; Thomassin, lib. iii. c. 1 sqq.; lib. iv. cc. 15, 16).

VII. The much-used term *commixtio*, or mingling of the two substances in Christ, led to misinterpretation on the part of the Nestorians and Eutychians. Hence the Fathers of later times either reject the expression, or use it only with great caution. Yet the meaning which underlies this term is that expressed in the name Christ, and is therefore of the utmost importance in Theology. As, however, it is only an analogical expression, its force should be exactly determined. The Fathers, before as well as after the Council of Ephesus, speak of “a composition without confusion,” as well as “of a mixture without confusion,” the latter being termed *mixtio nova*, *ineffabilis*, *stupenda*. They illustrate their idea by analogies taken from a certain class of mixtures, viz. such in which one ingredient imparts to the other a kind of anointment without either losing its own properties. The name Christ, the Anointed, probably suggested these analogies. We must here limit ourselves to a mere indication of the most common: the mixture of wine and water (wine being considered of an oily nature); the mixture of gold and wood in the ark of the covenant; cloth steeped in balsam; glowing coal or red-hot iron (a mixture of fire and coal or iron). In the light of these analogies, understood as indicated, many doubtful expressions of the Fathers not only admit of an orthodox explanation, but actually throw new light upon the subject. Thus, for instance, we easily understand in what sense they speak of the human nature being “absorbed, transformed, or taken over” by the Divine nature. Franzelin, thes. 17–21.

## § 124 THE WORD INCARNATE AS ONE PHYSICAL PERSON, ACCORDING TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH AGAINST NESTORIUS

I. After the Church had defined the consubstantiality of the Logos with the Eternal Father against the Arians and His consubstantiality with man against the Apollinarians, Nestorius arose to impugn the nature of the union of the Divine Logos with human nature. In his opinion, the two dogmas, that Christ is really God and really man, could only be upheld if in Christ there were two persons, one Divine, the other human, but neither of them God and man at the same time. Between these two persons he divided the Divine and human attributes of Christ. The identity of the Son of God with the Son of Mary, set forth in the Apostles' Creed and generally in the teaching of the Church, was reduced by Nestorius to a moral union: the Son of God dwelling in the Son of Mary as in His temple; Jesus not being God, but only a God-bearing man (*ἄνθρωπος θεοφόρος*), participating to a certain degree in the dignity, authority, and power of the Logos, and being designated by the same names as the Logos, provided these did not expressly signify the physical essence of the Logos. Thus Jesus was not to be called Logos, nor *vice versâ*, but both might be termed Christ, Son of God, Lord, and even God (in the sense in which Moses was the God of Pharaoh). The disciples of Nestorius compared the union of the Logos with Jesus to the union between husband and wife, which makes them two in one flesh.

II. St. Cyril of Alexandria, whose doctrine was accepted by the Council of Ephesus, formulated the Catholic dogma against Nestorius. He found the duality of persons sufficiently

refuted in the Symbols of the Apostles and of Nicæa, which attribute to “one subject” the eternal birth from the Father and the temporal birth from the Virgin, thus establishing the unity of Person and precluding the possibility of predicating the human and Divine attributes of two distinct subjects. See the second Epist. of St. Cyril to Nestorius, and the Anathematisms of the Fifth General Council, can. 2, 3, 6.

1. If the Logos and the human substance are really one subject, the union of the two substances is necessarily more than moral, relative, or accidental: it must be conceived as a true composition, resulting in one indivisible Being, and involving a true appropriation of the human substance by the Person of the Logos, and, as a consequence, the loss of independence or personality in the human substance. This substantial union was expressed in the formula, ἕνωσις καθ’ ὑπόστασιν, *secundum substantiam*, but this term had not then the classical and well-defined meaning which it afterwards acquired: it did not exclude the unity of nature, as clearly appears from the expressions used as its equivalents, e.g. ἕνωσις κατὰ φύσιν (*unio secundum naturam*, etc. On the other hand, the formula ἕνωσις φυσικῆ did not then imply a “unity of nature” in the sense which later on became classical, for it was used in dogmatic definitions against the Monophysites and Monothelites. The tendency of both these formulas was merely to affirm a substantial union against the moral union upheld by Nestorius; they did not claim to define exactly the specific difference of this union from all other substantial unions. That difference was pointed out by describing the union as admirable, ineffable, and incomprehensible. St. Cyril avoided the analogical illustrations, so frequent among earlier Fathers, of κράσις and συμφύια (mixture, concretion), on account of Nestorian misinterpretation; he preferred more abstract expressions, but he constantly illustrated them by the analogy of the union of the flesh with the rational soul in man; an illustration also used by St. Augustine, and now become classical.

2. In the union of body and soul we have, as in the union of the Logos with “the flesh”:

- (1) A true, substantial, physical, and metaphysical union of a higher with a lower substance, resulting in one total substance, in consequence of the infusion or ingrafting of the higher in the lower.
- (2) The distinction of the two substances remains intact after the union: the soul retains its own spiritual life, and is not affected in its essence by the passions of the body; the body also retains its properties, although the union raises it to a much higher perfection.
- (3) The lower substance is subordinated to and dependent on the higher in both the physical and ethical order.
- (4) The union is based entirely on the power of the higher element; it consists in this, that the soul holds, possesses, and rules the corporeal element as its own. This analogy had the advantage of reducing to their exact signification the analogies misused by Nestorius. The humanity of Christ is indeed the temple and the throne of the Divinity, but the temple and throne appertain to and are connected with the Divinity after the manner in which the human body appertains to and is connected with the informing soul. Again, the humanity of Christ is the organ and instrument by which the Logos operates, but it is “His” organ, as much as the members of the body are the organs by which the soul operates. Lastly, the humanity of Christ is an image and a vesture of the Logos, not, however, distinct and separate from Him, but united as our body is to the soul.

As special effect, and therefore as a manifest sign of the substantial and physical union, St. Cyril points out that through it the flesh of Christ becomes itself a life-giving flesh, the Bread of life, the source of all the marvellous operations of the Holy Eucharist. This Sacrament, if the doctrine of Nestorius were true, would be degraded to an act of anthropophagy, the

communicant receiving the flesh of man and not the flesh of God. But the substantial union of the Logos with the flesh not only endows this latter with an immanent principle of a most perfect life, but also with the power to diffuse light and life around it. When creatures not physically united with God, *e.g.* the saints and sacraments, are made the vehicle of supernatural life, they do not possess the life-giving power in themselves; in Christ, on the contrary, this power is as substantially inherent as the life-sustaining power in bread. There is, however, a difference: it is the proper nature of bread to support life; the vivifying power of the Body of Christ is not connatural to it, but is derived from its union with the Logos.

III. The proofs for the substantial union of the two natures in Christ were primarily taken from the texts of Scripture which represent the origin of Christ as the incarnation of the Logos, or as the assumption by the Logos of the form or servant, and from the texts in which human and Divine attributes are predicated of the same subject. Further, it was urged that, if the union were but moral, there would be no real incarnation, no more than if God had not assumed a true human body and soul. Again, if God is not truly man, then the man Jesus is not truly God, and the worship granted to Him and demanded for Him in Scripture is idolatry. Moreover, the purpose of the Incarnation cannot be attained except by a God-Man, for only a God-Man can be a priest of sufficient dignity and a victim of sufficient value to cancel the guilt of sin and merit grace; only by virtue of the power communicated to human nature by its substantial union with a Divine Person can be accomplished the thorough healing of the corruptibility of that nature and the infusion into it of Divine Life. The Redeemer of mankind can be no other than its Creator, because redemption is as much a Divine work as creation: God, therefore, can no more confer upon another the honour of redeeming the world than that of creating it. See Petavius, lib. iii. and vi.; Thomassin, lib. iii.; Franzelin, thes. 22–25.

## § 125 THE EXISTENCE OF ONE DIVINE PERSON OR HYPOSTASIS IN TWO PERFECT NATURES, AS TAUGHT BY THE CHURCH AGAINST MONOPHYSITISM

I. The substantial and physical union of the human with the Divine Substance in Christ, so clearly defined by the Church against Nestorius, was misinterpreted by Eutyches as implying confusion of the two natures into one, after the manner of natural compounds, in which two elements are combined into a third, different from each of the components. The original form of this heresy compared the effect of the union of the two natures to a mixture in which one element, inferior in quantity or quality, is absorbed by the other superior element so as to lose its own essence, *e.g.* a drop of honey thrown into the sea, or a drop of water poured into a great quantity of wine. A later form was less crude. Its authors illustrated their idea by the analogy of gold and silver turned into amber (*electrum*) by mixture (*σύγχυσις, confusio*). The last and more refined form of Monophysitism conceived the unity of nature in Christ as similar to the unity of nature in man, that is, as a compound nature in which both component elements retain their proper essence, yet so as mutually to modify their essential properties. But in this form, as well as in the first and second, an alteration of the combined elements must necessarily be conceded, and this is the fundamental error of the whole system. Its consequences chiefly appear in determining the share of the Divine and human substances in the Passion. According to some, human nature lost all passibility through the unions; according to others, the Divine nature became passible.

II. Pope St. Leo I (*Epist. ad Flavianum*), and afterwards the Council of Chalcedon, defined against Eutyches and his followers that the human substance, after its union with the Divine, retained its nature and essence as, of course, does the Divine substance; whence Christ is not the product of two natures, but exists in two distinct natures. This dogma was inferred from the fact that Christ is really and truly man as well as God, consubstantial with both God and man, which He could not be if, in the union, the human substance had lost its essence or nature. St. Leo appeals to the text Phil i. 6, 7: "Who, being in the form of God . . . took the form of servant," in order to be perfectly like unto man; and repeatedly insists upon the Divine and human attributes being predicated of Christ as one subject: a fictitious human nature in Christ is consistent neither with the truth of these attributes nor with the reality of the work of Redemption. He takes the terms "form" or "nature" in the sense of principles or action, viz. that which in a substance causes it to act as it acts. The influence of the unity of Person on the activity of the natures he limits to this: that neither nature can act or suffer except in union with the other.

III. The Council of Chalcedon, following St. Leo, declared that Christ exists in two indivisible and inseparable, but, at the same time, unchanged and unconfused natures, the indivisible and inseparable unity of Person in no wise destroying the distinction or properties of the natures. It was easy to prove that no essential change had taken place in the natures by the union, not only from the fact that both remained perfect in their kind after the union, but also from scientific principles. The Divine Nature evidently admits of no intrinsic change whatsoever. Human nature, taken as a body informed by a spiritual soul, is, speaking absolutely, destructible, but not miscible with another substance so as to lose essential form or properties. Again, how could God destroy the very nature He came to redeem? Its imperfections could be removed without injuring its essence, but even some of these, e.g. passibility, were necessary for the accomplishment of Redemption. The possibility of the two natures being so closely united without abasement of the Divine Nature or essential alteration of the human, is explained on the ground of God's absolute power, and of His absolute freedom to manifest the power *ad extra*. On account of His absolute power, the Divinity can contract no union through which that power would be damaged in any way; on account of His absolute freedom in the use of His power, the influence of the Divine on the human element is not exerted with physical necessity, like that of the soul on the body, but according to the decrees of the Divine Wisdom and Will (Leo I, *Ep. ad Jul. Coensem*).

IV. The analogy of the substantial union of body and soul—used by St. Cyril against Nestorius to illustrate how two essentially different substances can coalesce into one total substance—was again made use of by the Fathers, and even in the Athanasian Symbol against Monophysitism; in order to show how, notwithstanding this most intimate union, two substances can retain their own, though opposite, qualities. The analogy carried sufficient weight against the first and grosser forms of the heresy, but, at the same time, it gave rise to the last and more refined form: accepting the comparison, the adversaries inferred from it that in Christ, as in other men, the union of the two substances resulted in "one nature." Hence the necessity of a deeper study of the human compound of soul and body. The line of defence set up on the Catholic side may be traced as follows: In a certain sense, there are two natures in man, the spiritual and the animal. Granting that these two are merged into one compound nature, it does not follow that in Christ likewise the Divine and human natures are merged into one compound, different from either of the components. There is



no similarity in the result of the union, because there is none in the component elements. Christ is the Logos, the uncreated Spirit, with His flesh animated by a rational soul; man is a created spirit, with his flesh animated by that spirit. On both sides, the term "spirit and his flesh" indicates a personal union. Whereas, however, in man the fact that his own spirit informs his flesh leads to unity of nature as well as to personal unity, in Christ the fact that not the Logos, but a created soul, informs His flesh, prevents the unity of nature, and the union stops at the unity of Person. For a similar reason, there are virtually two natures even in man: the entire life of the spirit is not absorbed in its union with the body; it retains its peculiarities side by side and above the animal life (Rom. vii.). But in Christ the distinction of natures is real, because the Divine Spirit is not the principle of the life of the body. If in His case there was a unity or fusion of natures, two spirits ought to coalesce in one like two material bodies: this, however, is absurd, because it implies the possibility of a spirit being degraded to the rank of matter. The reason, then, why the union in Christ is purely personal (whereas in man it is personal and material) is the different perfection of the united substances: the lower substance is an incomplete nature in man, a complete one in Christ; in man the higher substance is not perfectly independent or self-sufficient, because as principle of life it depends on the co-operation of the lower substance; in Christ, on the contrary, it is absolutely independent and self-sufficient, and has even the power to appropriate to itself another spiritual substance.

V. The Monophysites appealed to the phrase of St. Cyril: "One, incarnate, nature of the word" (*μία φύσις σαρκαωμένη*) as favouring their heresy. But St. Cyril himself (*Ep. ad Acacium Melit.*) shows that he takes the term "nature" as equivalent to "hypostasis," and the Fifth Council, in its eighth canon, explains the phrase as meaning "that (out) of the Divine nature and the human, being united hypostatically, one Christ was constituted." Against Nestorius the Fathers had to show that the inferior substance passes on to the superior and becomes His own, so that God, on this account, is also man. But this could be shown without distinguishing in the Divine substance the hypostasis or Person from His essence or nature: there was then no reason for avoiding the promiscuous use of the term Person and nature to designate the Divine Substance as existing concretely in the Logos. Against Eutyches, however, it was necessary to insist upon the existence of Christ in two coexisting forms, according to Phil. ii. 6, 7. Hence the Person or Hypostasis had to be distinguished from the essence or nature of the Logos as its Holder and Bearer, Who, in the Incarnation, became the Holder and Bearer of a second essence and nature. See Petavius, *De Incar.*, iv. 6; Newman, *Treats Theological and Ecclesiastical*, p. 285 sqq.

## § 126 THE TWO WILLS AND TWO OPERATIONS IN CHRIST, AND THE ORGANIC RELATION OF THE HUMAN TO THE DIVINE PRINCIPLE: AS DEFINED AGAINST MONOTHELITISM

I. The existence of two natures in Christ, as defined against Nestorianism, implied the coexistence of two free wills, or, speaking more generally, of two distinct principles of operation. Yet, as these two principles are united in one Person, the question arises whether a proper and distinct activity can be attributed to the human principle without elevating it to the dignity of personality and thus destroying the unity of person. Eutyches and his followers answered in the negative, and consequently admitted in Christ only the Divine will; the Church, on

the contrary, maintained the two wills and operations consistently with the unity of person. The definitions on this point complete the Catholic doctrine concerning the constitution of Christ.

The notion "that two wills and two corresponding operations are inconsistent with the unity of person" is the leading principle of all the Monothelites; but in its application they differ. The more strict and logical attribute to the Logos one and all the functions of the human soul; the more moderate but less logical only claim for the Logos the acts of free will and their execution, thus depriving the human soul of all power of self-determination and of all control over the body.

This latter doctrine is cleverly veiled in the letter addressed by the Patriarch Sergius to Pope Honorius. Sergius does not draw the consequence that there is only one will-power or one sort of operation in Christ, but merely purports to point out possible wrong interpretations of the phrases "one operation or two operations (energies) of Christ." He is strong on the unity of Person and the duality of natures, and rightly deprecates two "contrary" will-powers. In his mind, two will-powers would necessarily be opposed to one another, and therefore he admitted but one; yet the expressions he uses are ambiguous, and may be taken to merely imply that in Christ the human will always acted in accordance with the Divine. Honorius was deceived, and did not oppose the Patriarch with as much energy as might have been expected from the Holy See. His error lay in this, that he thought more stress ought to be laid on the moral unity (= absence of contradiction) of the two wills than on their physical duality, and that, under the circumstances, the term "two operations" ought to be avoided, because it was liable to be misunderstood, in the same way as the term "one operation." The Catholic dogma is, however, sharply defined by the Pope at the end of his second letter, where he asserts in Christ two natures, each with its own activities and operations (*propria operantes et operatrices*).

II. The Catholic doctrine was first defined by Martin I in a Lateran Council (649), then by the Sixth General Council (680). Christ, having two natures, has also two physical wills and two physical operations, existing side by side unchanged and unmixed, yet inseparably and physically united in one physical Person, in the same manner as the two natures; these natures, therefore, will and operate conjointly, but in both kinds of volitions and operations, He Who wills and operates is physically one and the same, willing and operating in two different manners. The difference of the two wills does not involve either a contradiction between them or the independence of the human from the Divine; the human will is so subordinated to and influenced by the Divine that it follows this latter in all things (Denzinger, *Enchir.*, xxv. and xxvii.).

Theologians of the time laid particular stress on the duality of "physical" wills. They did not wish to exclude a unity of harmony or co-ordination; their object was to assert the real existence of a human principle of immanent volitions and of operations flowing therefrom, equal in perfection to the same principle and operations in man. We shall consider first the human will and its operations, as resulting from the human nature of Christ; secondly, the relation of the human to the Divine will and operations, as resulting from the substantial union of the two natures.

III. The human nature, through its union with the Logos, loses none of its essential properties or faculties; intellect and will and all the lower powers of the soul remain unimpaired, because without them the human nature in Christ would not be a real human nature.

Besides, special reasons require the existence and functions of an unimpaired human will in the Redeemer. The act of Redemption is a great act of obedience; but obedience, that is free submission of one will to another, cannot be conceived where there is only a Divine Will. Again, if Christ has no distinct human will, all His volitions and operations must be attributed to the Divine Will, which is one and the same in the three Divine Persons, and thus all the human operations of Christ would no longer belong to the second Person, but would be Common to the three Persons of the Trinity. Moreover, if from the unity of Person in Christ, the unity of will could be inferred, then, for a similar reason, a distinction of wills ought to be admitted in the Trinity. But the number of wills follows the number of natures, not of persons; hence there is one will in the Blessed Trinity and two in Christ. Scriptural proof for our dogma is found in all the texts which attribute to Christ human affections, and especially in His agony and prayer, where the two wills appear not only as distinct but also as materially opposed.

The acts of the two wills are so essentially distinct that they cannot even be conceived as fused into one. For a volition is an immanent act: it originates and terminates in the same spiritual principle, it is a “self-motion.”

Immanent acts are necessarily complete in themselves. Besides, in this special case, a fusion of the Divine and the human wills into one, would make the Divine Will dependent on the human in their common activity. The two wills can only concur into one common action after the manner of two distinct persons agreeing to do the same thing or to pursue the same object; with this difference, however, that in Christ the bearer of the two wills is physically one, and that consequently the wills are physically united. The unity of pursuit constitutes only a moral unity of the persons willing the same object.

IV. The first consequence of the substantial union of the two natures, is that the operations of both must be attributed to the same operator, viz. to the Divine Person, to Whom the operations of His human nature appertain not less than that nature itself. Another consequence is, as St. Leo I expresses it, that each nature performs its own operations, yet in communion with the other. The two sets of operations are, however, affected very differently by this communion; the human principle operates dependently on the Divine, but this very dependence gives a greater perfection to its operations. The actions of the human principle, in order to be actions of the Logos, must be caused by the Logos, in the same manner as the acts of man are only attributable to him when they proceed from his free will, *i.e.* from the supreme principle of action. The causation in question is similar to the concurrence of the First Cause in the working of all other causes, with this difference, that in Christ the Divine influence is exercised on a nature hypostatically (personally) united to the influencing Logos, and that thus the actions of that nature are the actions of the Logos, whereas in the general Divine concurrence the actions of creatures do not become actions of God. The influence of the Logos on His human nature extends, however, beyond the general concurrence of God with all created causes. The Fathers analyze it into three factors: permission (*ἔνδοσις*), motion (*κίνησις*), and co-operation (*συνέργεια*). The Logos “permits” the human principle to remain subject to all passibility which involves nothing unworthy of the Divine Person; He “moves or inspires” the human will so as to bring it always into harmony with His own; He “cooperates” with His lower nature so as to add perfection to its ordinary acts, and, under certain circumstances, to enable it to perform supernatural actions. The perfection accruing to the human actions from the Divine influence is pregnantly expressed in the classical phrase:

“Christ does human things in a divine manner” (*humana agit divine*).

V. The Divine Principle in Christ is entirely independent of the co-operation of the human: His “acting in communion” is limited to this, that in external operations in which the co-operation of the human principle is possible, admissible, or congruous, He uses it as His own instrument for carrying out His will. Such co-operation is impossible in creative acts, but not in the natural or supernatural government of creation; it is necessary, hypothetically, in the works which the Logos had undertaken to perform in the flesh; as a matter of fact, it exists in all operations specially ascribed to Christ—that is, not simply to God. It is to these latter operations the Fathers apply the phrase, “Christ does divine things in a human manner” (*divina agit humane*).

VI. The peculiar constitution of Christ the God-Man gives to His operations a peculiar and unique character. They are “theandric;”<sup>2</sup> that is, belonging to the God-Man. This term was first introduced by Dionysius the Areopagite, and later on was much exploited by the Monothelites in favour of their heresy. Its real meaning, as explained by the Areopagite himself, and defined in the Council of Lateran (A.D. 649), can. 15, is that in Christ the human operations are performed under the influence of the Divine Principle, or that the external Divine operations are performed with the co-operation of the human principle. In this sense, all human actions of Christ are theandric; but not all His Divine operations, many of these admitting of no human co-operation. In a more special or eminent sense, the Fathers reserved the term theandric to “Divine operations wrought with human co-operation,” and to “human operations intended to produce, with Divine co-operation, a supernatural or Divine effect.” These latter operations, *e.g.* the healing of the sick by touch, are eminently theandric, because in them both natures act simultaneously, in communion and subordination, and for the same object, thus clearly manifesting the Divine-human constitution of Christ.

VII. The peculiar harmony between the two kinds of operations in Christ results from the manner in which the human soul operates. The human soul knows and loves itself as soul of the Logos, and its one intention is to conform in all things to the will of the Logos. The soul is no blind instrument when co-operating with the Logos: it knows and wills and works for the same ends. And the Divine inspiration of the Logos so assists and influences the immanent actions of the soul as to enable it to rule and regulate all its operations in conformity with the Divine Will.

## § 127 COROLLARIES TO THE DOGMA CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION OF CHRIST

I. The composition of Christ, considered as a whole, presents a threefold aspect. Against Nestorius it was described as the composition of a human nature with the entirely distinct Divine Hypostasis or Person; against the Monothelites as the composition of two essentially different and complete natures into one Hypostasis or Person common to both; against the Apollinarians as the composition into one Hypostasis or Person of three substances different in essence, *viz.* the Logos, the soul, and the body. These three forms represent the same composition, because the binding principle in every one of them is the same, *viz.* the unity of Person. Distinct from the hypostatic composition is that of Christ’s body and soul into one nature—not into one person; without this composition there would be in Christ three

<sup>2</sup>Θεανδρική ἐνέργεια, *operatio Dei virilis*. See Newman, *St. Athanasius*, ii. p. 412.

substances indeed, but not two natures. The unique character of the hypostatic compound forbids us to apply to it the terms applicable to natural compounds, at least without some qualification: Christ is really and truly a composite being, yet in a higher and more perfect manner than natural compounds; the composition of Christ is a “pure” composition—that is, the component elements retain their own nature unaltered.

If Christ is a composite being, He is also a composite Hypostasis or Person, and “the Person of Christ” is a compound, viz. it is the Person of the Logos together with His human nature. Christ may be called “human person,” in the sense of Person having humanity (*persona humanitatis*), as He is called Divine Person as having Divinity. Yet that designation is not commonly used, because misleading.

II. Although unique in its kind, the compound of Christ (*Compositum Christi*) has a great analogy with man, the most perfect of all natural compounds; its unique perfection is even best illustrated by a comparison with Adam, who was a type of Christ. The first man offers a double type of Christ: one as naturally, the other as supernaturally, perfect man. Considered as natural man, Adam was a compound of spirit and flesh; he was thus the substantial link between the world of spirits and the world of matter, and was the natural head of this latter. Christ is a personal compound of Spirit and flesh in a higher sense: His Spirit is God, and His flesh is animated by a rational soul. He is the link between God and the whole world, and the natural head of the latter. As endowed with grace, Adam had the Spirit of God in him, and thus represented not only the unity of the spiritual and the material world but to a certain degree also the union of these worlds with God. From this point of view, Adam was, like Christ, composed of three substances—the Spirit, the soul, the flesh; and he was not an animal, but a celestial man. All this we find in an eminent degree in Christ. Christ possesses as His own the Divine substance which merely dwelt in Adam; He is not merely vivified by the Spirit, but is Himself the vivifying Spirit (1 Cor. xv. 45). Whereas in Adam the flesh is the first element of the compound to which the soul and the Spirit are successively joined, in Christ the Spirit is the first and fundamental element. Again, in Adam the union of soul and body is more intimate and more consistent than the union of both with the Spirit: sin may undo the latter without injuring the former. In Christ, on the contrary, the union of the Spirit with the animated flesh is stronger than that of His soul and body, for this latter is not a personal union, and may be destroyed by death without injuring the hypostatic union. Moreover, Christ is the principle of that supernatural unity of which Adam was only the representative. Finally, Christ realizes the idea of man as “the visible image of God” infinitely better than Adam, for He includes the uncreated and consubstantial Image of God, and in taking unto Him human nature and raising it to participation in His own being, He manifests the Divine Power over creation far better than does the soul of Adam by animating and governing a body.

III. The Word Incarnate having two natures, His essence can only be expressed by compound names, e.g. God-Man, Word Incarnate. Yet the name Christ, although figurative, also describes His essential constitution in a most pregnant manner, and summarizes the whole doctrine concerning His Person. That name designates the God-Man as eminently the “Anointed.” Hence the ointment with which He is anointed is neither a common substance nor a moral consecration or spiritual quality, but a substantial spiritual ointment, viz. the Divine Substance itself, which alone among spiritual substances can act as ointment. In the order of grace, creatures also are anointed with the Divine Substance, but only in a certain

sense. “The” Anointed, on the contrary, receives an anointment formally substantial. He is constituted by the anointing of a created nature by the infusion of the Substance of the Logos; He is Himself the anointing substance, and is thus Anointed by nature and essence: “Oil poured out is Thy name” (Cant. i. 2), Hence the name Christ implies Divinity, for God alone is by His nature and essence self-anointed with Divinity. It also implies humanity, because in Scripture the anointed subject is the flesh or the spirit anointed with the Holy Ghost. Further, the notion of anointment indicates that both ointment and anointed nature remain unaltered in their essential qualities, the anointed nature alone being raised in perfection. Whence, in our case, although the anointment is substantial, its result cannot be union into one nature, but only union into one hypostasis, the hypostasis of the self-existing Logos. And lastly, the notion of humanity anointed with Divinity conveys an idea of the mutual relations between the two natures: the Divine nature filling, penetrating, and perfecting the human, as the balm does the embalmed object.

The name Christ, understood in this way, contains and explains all the other names of the Saviour set forth in the Creeds. Christ, the Anointed with the Divine Substance, is “the only-begotten Son of God, our Lord;” all perfection and power of Jesus is founded on this anointment: by this He is Prophet, Priest, and King, and the principle and source of all salvation: “He is made to us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption” (1 Cor. i. 30) These words of the Apostle contain a full explanation of the phrase, “Oil poured out is Thy name.”

## CHAPTER II

# THE CONSTITUTION OF CHRIST; OR, THE HYPOSTATIC UNION IN THE LIGHT OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE

### § 128 THE HYPOSTATIC UNION: ITS ESSENCE; ITS FORMAL FOUNDATION, OR THE “GRATIA UNIONIS;” ITS FIRST FORMAL EFFECT, OR THE COMMUNITY OF BEING; ITS PROPERTIES

I. The Hypostatic Union, considered in its essence, is the substantial union of the human nature with the Divine Hypostasis or Person: through this union the human nature is made to form One Whole with, or to receive its hypostatic complement from, the Divine Hypostasis; and this latter, by appropriating the human nature, takes the place of a human hypostasis or person.

It is a principle of sound philosophy that when two different elements are combined into one substantial whole, the more perfect intrinsically perfects the other: the lower element bears to the higher the relation of substantial potentiality to substantial actuation; in other words, is able to be made into what the other will make it. This principle applies to the Hypostatic Union as well as to all the other substantial unions, and so we may consider the Hypostatic Union as similar or analogical to the union of matter and form in created substances. There is, however, a difference: the result of the various compositions of matter

and form is always one substance and one nature, whereas in Christ the composition results in two natures. For this reason the Schoolmen avoided applying the analogy of matter and form to the union of the human nature with the Logos. More recent theologians substituted for the terms “substantial form and information,” the expressions “substantial termination (= completion) of the humanity by the Hypostasis of the Logos as completing terminus.” Thus the danger of implying a change in the Logos on account of the union was avoided, and the characteristic element which turns a nature into an hypostasis was brought into prominence. However appropriate this description of the Hypostatic Union may be, it can nevertheless be replaced to advantage by the theory of matter and form, provided that this is understood in a wide sense. The only reason for not applying it to the composition of Christ, is that in Christ the two natures remain distinct, whereas in all other compositions the substances mingle into one. But this difference arises from the singular perfection of the informing nature; it is by no means due to a deficiency in informing or forming power. Hence, if from the Aristotelian theory we eliminate the unessential notion of “one nature resulting from the substantial union of matter and form,” we obtain a more general theory, applicable not only to natural compositions, but also to the peculiar composition of Christ. Thus we find that the following general and essential principles apply to the union of the Logos with the flesh: (1) The form is infused into a substratum, and intrinsically united with it so as to complete its being. (2) The form gives to the informed substratum its determined, complete, substantial being. (3) The form is the principle by which the informed being is intrinsically distinguished from all other beings, and holds its proper place among or above them. (4) The form, being the highest and innermost constituent principle, is also the foundation of all specific perfections, properties, and forces of the compound being, and the principle of all its activity. Every one of these points is realized in the information of human nature by the Logos, and the dogmatic name Christ implies them all (§ 127). The illustrative analogies used by the Fathers, especially the anointment of humanity with Divinity, are based upon the same idea.

II. The formal foundation, or the bond of the Hypostatic Union, which theologians call “the Grace of Union,” in the strictest sense of the word, is neither a third substance nor an accident, and much less an abstract relation. According to St. Thomas it lies in the Logos Himself, Who founds the union on this: that He directly communicates His personal being to the human nature, in the same way as, in natural compositions, the form immediately raises the matter to its new state of perfection. The fundamental form, then, of the union is the completion or termination of the humanity through the Logos: the two elements are made One in One and through One (δι’ ἐνός: St. Gregory of Nazianzum). Hence, the first formal effect of the union is that the Logos forms, with His humanity, a substantial being, or rather an hypostatic and personal being, the man Christ. Christ being One, has one existence; and as in compounds the formal principle determines the existence of the component elements in a way that these, as parts of the whole, participate in the existence of the form, in like manner the Logos determines the existence of the man Christ by making His humanity participate in His own Divine existence. In other words, the human nature of Christ has neither existence nor subsistence of its own: it obtains and possesses both in the Logos.

III. Among all the works of God the Hypostatic Union is the most supernatural, because it confers upon a created nature the highest conceivable perfection above and beyond its natural requirements and capabilities. Yet, in contradistinction to other supernatural unions, the Hypostatic Union is “natural” to Christ as man, inasmuch as from its origin, and by

virtue of its origin through the Holy Ghost, the human nature was intended for, and actually assumed into, the Hypostatic Union. Besides, the principle which effects the union is not external to Christ, but is His own. If, however, the human nature of Christ be considered in its essence, it possesses no claims whatsoever to the union, and from this point of view the union is again supernatural.

IV. The Hypostatic Union may be compared with natural substantial unions in which a higher element informs a lower; and also with the supernatural unions or with creatures through grace. The perfection of the former is measured by the perfection, independence, and power of the higher elements. Among them the union of soul and body ranks highest. But the Hypostatic Union stands infinitely above the union of body and soul, on account of the absolute excellence of its higher principle and of the relative excellence of the lower element: this latter comprising the spiritual form of the human compound. The supernatural unions by grace and glory have in common with the Hypostatic Union that they unite two spiritual substances, though not into one nature, and that the created spirit is in a sense deified by the Uncreated. Their perfection, however, is again infinitely below that of the Hypostatic Union, in which the human spirit is made not only morally, but physically, one with a Divine Person. In the union by grace God unites Himself to an independent personal being for its beatification and glory; in the Hypostatic Union He makes a spiritual living nature His own for the same purpose: hence that union is, to the humanity of Christ, the absolutely highest measure of grace and glory, and, besides, constitutes it the source of grace and glory for all other creatures. The Hypostatic Union, then, is the most perfect of all natural and supernatural unions, because it results in the most perfect Being which can result from a union, and it bestows upon the lower nature the highest possible benefaction: in technical language, it is the highest *ratione entis et ratione beneficii*.<sup>3</sup>

V. The Hypostatic Union is the most intimate and solid of all unions. It is the most intimate, because it alone consists in a real union of the Divine Being to a creature, all other supernatural unions being merely external as compared with it. Again, it surpasses in innerness all natural unions by reason of the penetrating or pervading power of the higher principle, and of the penetrability and adaptability of the lower. It is the most solid, for the Logos has in Himself the power to maintain it for ever, and the human soul is indissoluble. A sign of this solidity is that, after the separation of the soul from the body of Christ, the union of the Logos with both remained intact, and it was by His own power that the Logos reunited the separated parts.

VI. Being supernatural, the Hypostatic Union is necessarily incomprehensible and ineffable. In the sphere of natural thought there is no perfect analogy for it, and the nearest, viz. the union of body and soul, is itself very difficult to comprehend. Yet a judicious use of analogies leads to a sufficient understanding of the possibility of the mystery, and offers the means of dispelling the objections against it. These arise from the infinite distance between the two elements, and from the completeness of each of them. We answer the first here, reserving the others for the next section.

VII. The infinite distance between the two members of the Hypostatic Union only proves the impossibility of uniting them naturally into one nature: it is an essential condition for the union into one person. Such personal union involves the perfect appropriation of a created

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<sup>3</sup>“By reason of being and by reason of benefit.” —Ed.



spiritual nature by a higher spirit; but this can only be accomplished by a spirit whose power surpasses that of the soul at least as much as the soul surpasses its body. In like manner the perfecting of a created spirit by a higher being, supposes a principle absolutely simple and perfect. In fact, it seems easier, from the point of view under consideration, to comprehend the Hypostatic Union than to conceive the union of spirit and matter in man. The Hypostatic Union does not become unnatural or monstrous on account of the distance between its members: their union is indeed a miracle of Divine Power, but they are bound together in such harmony that their union is also a miracle of Divine Wisdom and Goodness. For the Hypostatic Union unites the uncreated with the created image of God in such a manner that the first is externally manifested by the second, and the second is filled and perfected by the first, so that the most perfect revelation and communication of God *ad extra* is brought about. See St. Thomas, 3 q. 2, a. 6, sqq.; the commentaries of Suarez and the Salmanticenses; St. Bonaventure in 3, dist. 6.

### § 129 THE HYPOSTATIC UNION, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE ASSUMING PRINCIPLE

I. The notion of a union purely hypostatic implies that a Divine Person, as distinct from the Divine Nature, is the subject and the terminus of the assumption of humanity. It is wrong to say that “the Divine Nature” was made man, except the term “nature” be taken for self-subsisting nature or person, as is often done by the Fathers. The possibility of the Person—with exclusion of His nature—being the formal terminus of the hypostatic union, is founded upon the virtual distinction between the Divine Nature and the Divine Persons: we can conceive that a Person took flesh, or that flesh was assumed by the Person and not by the nature, if we bear in mind that “to be” a Person really identical with the Divine Nature and “to act” as a Person are not formally the same thing. The real identity of Person and Nature entails, however, as a consequence, that the human and Divine Natures become intimately united in the Hypostatic Union.

II. It is an express article of faith that only one Person was made man, viz, the Second. The possibility of such a separate union rests upon the distinction between the Divine Persons. As the Divine substance is possessed in three distinct ways by the distinct Holders, we can understand that One of them may possess the human nature exclusively to Himself by giving it the benefit of His own subsistence. However, the unity of Nature in the three Divine Persons causes “the plenitude of Divinity to dwell corporeally” in the Incarnate Person. Thus, especially, the Holy Ghost is present in Christ as His Spirit; and Christ is in the Holy Ghost as His temple in a manner essentially superior to the indwelling by created grace in the just. Likewise the humanity of Christ is in the bosom of the Father, and the Father in Him as in His image, in a manner infinitely superior to what grace effects in the sanctified. The special indwelling of the Father and the Holy Ghost in Christ is technically called “presence by concomitancy.”

The fact that the Second Person, rather than any other, was incarnate, is to be accounted for by reasons of congruency connected with the hypostatic character of God the Son, and with the object of Incarnation. Cf. St. Thomas, 3 q. 3, a. 8; and St. Bonaventure, *Breviloq.* l. iv. c. 2.

III. The assumption of a second nature supposes in the assuming person a special perfection. The person, as principle or efficient cause of the Hypostatic Union, requires a special

power over the lower nature; as terminus of the union, He requires a special exaltedness in His mode of existence, sufficient to intrinsically perfect, pervade, and rule the assumed nature. It is certain that a Divine Person, by reason of His nature, possesses such power and exaltedness: according to St. Thomas, a Divine person alone can possess them. All theologians agree in requiring “Divine” power to effect a Hypostatic Union; an angel can no more unite to himself another spiritual nature than he can unite soul and body into one human person and nature. The assuming principle must necessarily be of a higher order than the assumed, and, if the lower be a spirit, according to the common teaching of the Church, God alone can penetrate, pervade, control, and govern it in the way supposed in Hypostatic Union: the searching of hearts is the exclusive privilege of God. In the same way, the power of existing in two spiritual natures is the exclusive prerogative of the Divine Persons, just as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Divine Nature to subsist in several distinct Persons. The first prerogative is founded upon the absolute Highness, the second upon the absolute Riches, and both upon the infinite Perfection of the Divine Substance in general, and especially on its self-sufficiency and power.

IV. Considered in relation to the Divine Persons, the Hypostatic Union is made possible by, and is a manifestation of, God’s infinite perfection. Hence it involves no contradiction to any of the Divine perfections. It is not incompatible with the Divine simplicity, because it implies neither an intrinsic composition of the Divine substance, nor does it reduce it to be part of a whole of higher value. It is not against God’s infinity, because it involves no increase of His perfection, but merely an external manifestation of the riches of that perfection. It is not opposed to the Divine immutability, because it is not a new mode of existence affecting the Divine substance intrinsically. In short, these three Divine perfections could only be affected by entering into a relation of dependency or passivity towards the assumed nature; but the fact is exactly the reverse: the relation of God to the assumed nature is one of active completion, possession, and dominion, and in all points analogous to the relation of God to His creatures. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 3; Franzelin, theses xxxii. and xxxiii.

## § 127 THE HYPOSTATIC UNION CONSIDERED ON THE PART OF THE ASSUMED NATURE

I. Whereas the Divine Element in the Hypostatic Union is the Person, the human element is the nature, exclusive of the human person: Christ is one Person with two natures. The possibility of assuming human nature without assuming a human person, supposes in man a real separability of nature and person which does not exist in God. The difference arises from the different perfection of the natures upon which the personalities are founded. In fact, personality connotes the existence as an independent whole of an intellectual being. The Divine Nature is essentially complete and independent, and cannot therefore be conceived without personality—on the contrary, its infinite communicability enables it to exist in three Persons. The human substance, being finite, is not absolutely complete and independent—it is possible for it to be appropriated by a higher substance. Such is the easy and simple explanation given by the Fathers and the early Schoolmen, *e.g.* St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, and generally accepted by modern theologians in preference to the subtle but confusing theories of later Schoolmen. Franzelin, thesis xxx.

II. The above theory supposes that human nature is susceptible of being assumed by a higher person. Against this supposition it may be urged (1) that a substance complete in

its kind, and especially a spiritual substance, cannot become part or quasi-part of another substance; (2) that such assumption would be unnatural and degrading to the assumed substance. As regards the first difficulty, it may be granted that the receptivity of human nature for a higher hypostasis is on a par with the receptivity of spiritual beings in general for supernatural Divine influences; it belongs to the “obediential power,” and is not knowable without the aid of revelation (§ 104). Yet it is natural in another sense. Just as every material substance may be assumed into a living organism, and become dependent on a spiritual soul or other substantial form; so also the created spirit may be assumed by the higher substance of God, and lose its independent existence. Nor does this loss imply a degradation; for although the human nature in Christ is not independent, still its dependency on the Logos is in every sense a greater perfection than the lost human personality. Again, everything increases in perfection by being raised to a higher order of being, and especially all spiritual beings seek their ultimate perfection in their union with God; hence the Hypostatic Union is but the coronation of a tendency universal in nature. Lastly, spiritual substances are particularly well adapted to enter the Divine Personality, because they, and they alone, are able to retain and to increase their spiritual and moral life in the Hypostatic Union, and render possible a twofold consciousness and a twofold free will in one person. It cannot, however, be maintained that the union of a Divine Person with a material substance is impossible; it is even easier of comprehension than the other, and, as a matter of fact, it took place in the union of the Logos with His dead body in the sepulchre.

III. It is of faith that the Hypostatic Union embraces directly and immediately soul and body, or “flesh” (σάρξ), because this is expressly laid down in the definitions of the Church. The term flesh or body applies directly to the solid parts, and as the Councils describe the assumed flesh as “animated,” it follows that at least all the parts of the body animated by the soul are taken up into the union. To what extent, if at all, certain solids or fluids present in the bodily organism, but not directly animated by the soul, are comprised in the union, is a question of little interest to the theologian. With regard to the immediate union of the blood, doubts have been raised on the ground that it is not expressly mentioned in the definitions, and that—according to ideas once prevalent—the blood is not an integral part of the body, and is not animated by the soul. The teaching of Scripture on this point, however, is decidedly in favour of the union. Christ places His blood on a line with His flesh as having Life-giving power, which supposes the blood as well as the flesh to be in Hypostatic Union with the Logos (John vi. 56). In the Blessed Sacrament, the Church gives Divine honour to the Blood separately from the Body. Clement VI, in his Bull *Unigenitus*, declares that one drop of Christ’s Blood would have been sufficient to redeem the world “because of its union with the Word.” See also Heb. ii. 14; Apoc. xx. 28.

IV. The Hypostatic Union took place at the very moment the human nature entered into existence. If it had taken place later, Christ, previously to it, would have been purely man, and Mary would not be the Mother of God (Θεοτόκος). If it had taken place sooner—say with a pre-existing soul, or before the animation of the body—the constant teaching of the Church, that the union was contracted through assuming “human nature,” would lose its signification.

V. The dissolution of the human nature of Christ by death did not entail the cessation of the Hypostatic Union with either body or soul. This is contained in the Apostles’ Creed: “The Son of God, Who was buried (as to the body), and descended into hell (as to the soul).” It

also stands to reason, for if body and soul were conjointly taken into the union, and intended to remain united to the Logos for ever, their temporary separation from one another could not involve their separation from the Divine Hypostasis. The incorruptibility of the body, and the power of the soul to rejoin the body, are both derived from their continued union with the Divinity. It is not, however, of faith that the blood shed by our Lord during the Passion remained in the union. Pope Pius II forbade any censure upon those who held the negative opinion. Yet, considering the great probability of the Hypostatic Union extending to the blood before the death and after the Resurrection of Christ, the opinion that it was not united during the time of death loses all probability. The blood, however, which was not taken up again at the Resurrection, the blood of the Circumcision, and likewise the tears and sweat of the Saviour, once they were separated from the body, were dismissed from the Hypostatic Union for ever.

Although hypostatically united to both body and soul during the time of death, Christ during that time was not man, strictly speaking, because His human nature was temporarily destroyed. St. Thomas, 3, q. 50, a. 4.

#### § 12ξ    ORIGIN OF THE HYPOSTATIC UNION THROUGH THE SUPERNATURAL ACTION OF GOD

I. The Apostles' Creed and that of Constantinople ascribe the birth of the Logos as man and His incarnation to the Holy Ghost as principle, and thus set down God, acting in a supernatural manner, as the author of the Hypostatic Union. If the infusion of the soul into the body and the infusion of grace into the soul require Divine Power, much more does the infusion of the Logos into a human nature require such power, and, as it is an external action of God, it is necessarily common to the three Divine Persons. The "unitive action" considered as a sending of the Son by the Father is but an expansion, *ad extra*, of the "productive action" of God the Father, and, from this point of view, is rather proper, than appropriated, to the first Person. Likewise, if we consider the terminus of the same action, the Second Person alone can claim it. The "unitive action," as it is technically called, is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and the participation in it of the other Persons is expressed by saying that the Holy Ghost is the Mediator of the assumption on the part of the Son, or the Executor of the decree of Incarnation appropriated to the Father. The reasons for appropriating the Incarnation to the Holy Ghost may be seen in St. Thomas, *Contra Gentes*, l. iv. c. 46; or Alexander of Hales, p. iii. q. xi.

II. The Hypostatic Union is a unique work of grace. The Grace of Union is the most precious that can be bestowed upon a creature, and it is less a possible object of merit than any other grace. It communicates the Divine Substance itself; it anticipates all possible merit on the part of the human nature, because human nature derives its subsistence—the first and most essential condition of meritorious acts—from the Logos. Besides, the Grace of Union is superior to all others in this, that it constitutes the personality of Christ, and thus makes all the privileges which it contains Christ's own personal and natural property. The "unitive action" is also a peculiar work of Divine predestination. Predestination in general is a Divine decree calling and promoting a creature to a state of supernatural perfection; in the case of Christ, however, the decree refers to a created nature, not to a created person. If we apply the general notion of predestination to the Person of Christ, it must be conceived as analogous

to the predestination of natural man to his natural perfection as image of God and lord of the visible world: that is, as a Divine decree which establishes Christ, at the moment of His origin and by virtue of His constitution, in His supernatural perfection.

III. The unitive action in Christ is distinguished by its “generative character” from the unitive actions by which God infuses the soul into a body or grace into intellectual creatures. Generation is production by communication of substance, resulting in a similarity of nature in progenitor and progeny. The infusion of the soul is not a generation, because the substance of the soul is not taken from God, but created out of nothing; the communication of grace is but distantly similar to real generation, because it does not result in a strict similarity of nature. But in Christ, the very substance of God is united with a created substratum; it becomes the personal principle of the being thus constituted, and makes Divine nature the nature of Christ. Hence the Divine action which results in the Hypostatic Union has the character of a true generation, and is closely akin to the eternal generation of the Logos. The difference lies in this, that in His eternal generation the Logos, as to His whole substance, is produced from God and in God—as the fruit is produced by and on the tree; Christ, on the other hand, is constituted by the infusion of the Divine Substance into an extraneous substratum—as the seed combined with the soil produces a plant.

The unitive action stands in organic connection with the eternal generation in more than one way. Considered as assumption of a second, external, and temporal existence on the part of the Son of God, the unitive action is an external manifestation of the eternal generation; a going-out from God as on a mission; the visible birth (*partus*) of the Son begotten in the bosom of the Father, or the outward continuation and expansion of the eternal generation. In the production of Christ the two actions—unitive and generative—concur into one total or common generative action. St. Thomas, 3, q. 24.

### § 130 SUPERNATURAL ORIGIN OF THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST THROUGH THE HOLY GHOST FROM THE VIRGIN MARY

I. The Creeds attribute the origin of Christ's humanity to the combined Divine action of the Holy Ghost and the maternal action of Mary: “The Son of God, conceived of or by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary; or born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary.” Mary, then, is, in subordination to and in co-operation with the Holy Ghost, the principle of Christ as man.

II. The Nicene (Constantinople) formula, *Incarnatus est de Spiritu Sancto ex Maria Virgine* (Σαρκοθέντα Πνεύματος Αγίου και Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου), implies first of all that the body of Christ was not sent down from heaven, or taken from the earth like that of Adam, but that its matter was supplied by Mary. This alone, however, does not constitute Mary the mother of Christ—otherwise Adam, for the same reason, would be the mother of Eve. It is further required that the Virgin did co-operate, like every other mother, in the formation of the body. That co-operation consists in the preparation of a germ, which being fecundated from without, will develop into a human body. After the fecundation, the work of the mother is to minister of her own substance to the growth of the germ until it is able to live a separate life. Hence, in contradistinction to the paternal generation, the maternal is essentially only a co-operation with another principle, on which latter the existence of the progeny is in the first instance dependent. The mother bears the same relation to the

person of her progeny as she does to the fecundating principle, viz. a relation of subserviency, consisting in preparing and forming the progeny's body: she has no direct influence on her child's existence as a person, but merely contributes to its material or substantial part. For these reasons the Divine generation is paternal, not maternal. The same reasons make it clear that maternal generation may, without difficulty, concur in giving a second bodily existence to a person already subsisting in Himself. If the specific notion of "maternal" generation be well kept in mind, all the difficulties besetting the maternity of Mary find an easy solution.

III. The dogma that Christ "was conceived by the Holy Ghost," excludes the natural fecundating principle and replaces it by a spiritual principle and a purely spiritual power. From this cause the generation of Christ enjoys the same advantages which the prologue of St. John's Gospel attributes to the generation of the Children of God: it is not of the will of man, but directly of the will of God; it is not of the will of the flesh—not even on the part of the mother, because the concupiscence of the flesh is only excited by the intervention of man—but of the will of God; it is not of blood, that is, of the commingling of blood as in natural generation, but of a germ animated by Divine influence. On this account the origin of Christ bears a resemblance to the origin "directly from God" of the first Adam, the difference, however, remaining that Christ is also by generation the Son of man.

The fact that the generation of Christ was supernatural in the manner described, also proves that this manner was congruous to such a degree as to render natural generation entirely incongruous. The reasons for this incongruity are many: the honour of the Mother of God is incompatible with the loss of her virginal purity in the very act which raised her to the highest dignity; the Mother of God cannot be made subject to the will of man, and the temple of the Holy Ghost must not be violated. Deeper reasons are found in the sublimity of the product of this generation, and of the generation itself. The product is God, and the generation is an expansion of the eternal generation by the Father; but the existence in time of a Divine Person cannot be made dependent on the will of man; the temporal generation must be the exact image of the eternal, and therefore proceed from a purely spiritual principle, etc. Cf. St. Thomas, 3, q. 28, a. 1; Thomassin, l. ii. c. 3, 4.

IV. The fecundating influence of the Holy Ghost is described as a descent on the Virgin, and as an overshadowing with the power of the Most High: Πνεῦμα Ἁγίου ἐπελεύσεται ἐπὶ σέ καὶ δύναμις ὑψίστου ἐπισκιάσει σοι (Luke i. 35). These images establish a parallel between this supernatural generation and natural generation in general, on the strength of which the Fathers sometimes call the Holy Ghost *semen divinum*.<sup>4</sup> As the *semen materiale*<sup>5</sup> points to a human father, so the *semen divinum* points to the Divine Father. Yet the Holy Ghost Himself is not that Divine Father. For He does not through His substance constitute the flesh of Christ; He does not form in Christ a nature consubstantial to His own; and lastly, as Divine Person distinct from Father and Son, He has no peculiar relation of principle to the flesh of Christ, but acts in union with the other Persons, and especially in the power of the Father.

V. The older form of the Apostles' Creed says that Christ "was born of the Holy Ghost and of the Virgin Mary." These words directly apply to the first conception, but, according to universal tradition, they also imply a supernatural influence of the Holy Ghost on the actual birth of the Saviour. The object of this influence was not merely to preserve the integrity of

<sup>4</sup>"Divine seed." —Ed.

<sup>5</sup>"Material seed." —Ed.

Mary's virginity in the birth, as it had been preserved in the conception of the Saviour. In the sense of the Creed, it is, moreover, a singular privilege of the origin of Christ, the complement of His supernatural conception; the Eternal Father, having formed and generated Christ in the womb of the Virgin, completed His work by introducing His Son into the world in a manner becoming His Son's dignity and eternal origin. Thus the birth or external generation of Christ reflected His eternal birth from the Father in this, that "the Light from Light" proceeded from His mother's womb as a Light shed on the world; that "the Power of the Most High" passed through the barriers of nature unhindered and without injuring them, and that "the body of the Logos" formed by the Holy Ghost passed through another body after the manner of spirits. These privileges constitute what the Fathers call the supernatural, celestial, divine, and spiritual birth of the Redeemer.

The most essential feature in the supernatural birth is that Christ was brought forth *utero clauso vel obsignato*, the womb remaining closed or sealed, like the sepulchre from which He rose after His death. This privilege naturally includes, on the part of the Mother, exemption from all pain; and on the part of both Mother and Child the absence of all impurities connected with natural birth (*Sordes nativitatis naturalis*). For these two latter immunities special reasons are to be found in the dignity of Mother and Child. The supernatural character of the birth of Christ does not exclude the natural co-operation of the Mother in the actual parturition (*nisus edendi prolem*), nor does it require that the child should issue from the mother by any other than the natural way.

The birth of Christ from a womb closed or sealed is an article of faith. It was always considered as such, and based upon the Apostles' Creed and Isa. vii. 14 ("Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bring forth a son"). When Jovinian denied it, he was strenuously opposed, and it is noteworthy that the reason for the denial was not the want of traditional evidence for the miraculous birth, but its miraculous character itself; in other words, Jovinian founded his objections on rationalism (see St. Ambrose, *Ep.* xlii., n. 4, 5, addressed to Pope Siricius in the name of the Council of Milan; St. Aug., *Enchiridion*, c. xxxiv.; *Ep. Dogm. Leonis I. ad Flavianum*; defined under anathema in the third canon of the Lateran Council under Pope Martin I). The presentation in the Temple (Luke ii. 23), in compliance with the laws of Moses (Exod. xiii. 1, and Levit. xii. 2), is no proof that Mary either conceived or gave birth in the same way as the women for whom these laws were made.

The miraculous conception and birth of Christ compel us to admit that during the time of gestation, Mary was likewise under the special influence of the Holy Ghost, although particulars are nowhere exactly defined.

We shall further deal with the Divine Maternity of the Blessed Virgin in Part IV.

# CHAPTER III

## THE ATTRIBUTES OF CHRIST

### A. ATTRIBUTES OF CHRIST IN GENERAL

#### § 131 PERICHORESIS OF “THE DIVINE AND THE HUMAN” IN CHRIST; OR, THE COMMUNION OF NATURES, AND THE COMMUNICATION OF IDIOMS

I. The term “perichoresis,” so familiar to the Fathers, was almost entirely lost sight of by the Schoolmen; Petavius and Thomassin reintroduced it into theology. As a technical term, its Latin equivalent is *communio naturarum*<sup>6</sup>; etymologically it expresses the “firm grip (χωρῆν) which each of the united substances holds on the other.” The term was suggested to the Fathers by the name Christ, the Anointed; and illustrated by the analogies of the immersion of a solid body in a liquid or ethereal substance, and of the infusion of the spiritual soul into the flesh. Both analogies represent unions of substances by mutual penetration or permeation (see § 87).

II. The Divine and the Human in Christ may be considered in the abstract or in the concrete, and may accordingly be combined in four different ways, each of which is the foundation of a distinct form of perichoresis. These four combinations are:

1. Between the abstract human nature or essence and the concrete Divine Nature, that is, the Person of the Logos. In this combination the perichoresis is but another way of viewing the Hypostatic Union; the Divine Person taking hold of and immersing Himself into the human nature, so as to become *ὁ Θεὸς ἐνανθρωπήσας*: the God-Word incarnate. Human nature is not immersed in the same way in the Logos, but assumed into His personality, so as to become man subsisting in the God-Word, or receiving personality from Him: *ἄνθρωπος λογωθείς*, or *θεωθείς*.

2. Next there is a perichoresis between the Divine and the human natures considered concretely, that is, between man and God. This perichoresis is the first consequence of the Hypostatic Union, and consists in this, that the two concrete natures are made one personal being, Who is at the same time God and man, or in Whom God is man and man is God; the two natures being intimately united and interwoven, each retaining its own peculiarities, and yet communicating them in a sense to one another through the medium of one Person.

3. The third form of perichoresis is between the concrete human nature and the abstract Divine, or between man and Divinity. It is a second consequence of the Hypostatic Union, distinct from the former in this, that here the Divinity is not merely considered as a nature existing side by side with the human, but as the essence of the Principle which gives to the man Christ His Divine Personality. Hence this form of perichoresis causes the man Christ to participate in the Divine rank and dignity which are essential to the Word: it is properly the “anointment of human nature with Divinity.”

4. The fourth and last form of perichoresis exists between the two abstract natures, *i.e.* between humanity and Divinity. It is the third and last consequence of the Hypostatic Union, and is only a closer definition of the second consequence. It consists in this, that the

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<sup>6</sup>“Communion of natures.” —Ed.



Divine nature, being substantially united with humanity, becomes the inmost property of the hypostasis of the Man Christ—dwells “corporeally” in Him like the soul of man in his body, and thus “deifies” Him. More will be said of this further on.

III. Christ, the Word Incarnate, on account of His peculiar constitution, is the subject of three kinds of predicates; some being proper to the Word, some to the flesh, and some to both taken together. The first kind, or simple predicates, the Word has in common with the other Divine Persons; the second kind, also simple, He has in common with persons purely human; the third or mixed kind, belong to the Person of Christ alone. Like the composition of Christ, so also the multiplicity and diversity of His attributes have an analogy in the human compound, yet with a twofold difference: Christ subsists in the two component parts of His being as in two complete natures, and has, therefore, two essential names (God and Man), each of which can designate Him as the bearer of both kinds of attributes; besides, the mixed predicates are attributable to Christ by reason of His being one Person, whereas to man such mixed predicates are attributed by reason of His one nature.

IV. 1. In the Hypostatic Union the Word remains unaltered; hence He retains all the attributes proper to the Divine Persons: Christ is God, Creator, eternal, the source of life, the absolute truth and sanctity, etc. Certain Divine predicates, however, can only be attributed to Christ with a qualification, viz. such as are in opposition with His compound being, or which express the position of the Logos in the compound. Thus we cannot say, without restricting the meaning to the Logos, that Christ is simple and immutable, or that Christ inhabits in the flesh, is united to the flesh, etc.

2. The flesh in the Word Incarnate being a complete human nature and His own, we must, speaking generally, give to Christ all the predicates expressing human origin, essence, and activity, not excluding those which are opposed to the Divine predicates. Christ is true man, formed by God, born in time, passible, mortal, etc. But here, as with the Divine predicates, an exception must be made as to predicates denying, directly or indirectly, the composition of Christ’s humanity with a Divine Person, or directly expressing the position of His humanity in the compound; these can only be used with a restrictive qualification, *e.g.* Christ is not eternal, viz. according to His human nature.

3. The third class of predicates, specifically proper to Christ, comprises those based upon the composition of the Word Incarnate. Thus the name Christ itself denotes His origin and essence; the name God-Man or Man-God, His essence or being; the names Envoy of God, Head of creatures, Mediator between God and creatures, Saviour, etc., understood in their eminent and absolute sense, denote His properties.

V. The Divine and human predicates properly belong to the Subject connoted by the terms “Christ” and “Word Incarnate;” yet according to a general rule or logic, they may be connected with any other term demonstrating or supposing the same subject, though this other term does not “formally” represent the subject as bearer of the predicate used; *e.g.* of the Man Christ we predicate Divine attributes, although “formally as man” He is not entitled to them. *Vice versa*, of the God Christ we predicate passibility, etc., though as God He is impassible. We have thus a transfer of predicates or attributes from one nature to the other, and an exchange of properties, technically known as “Communication of Idioms.” The Greek Fathers use ἀντιδοσις, ἐναλλαγή (= exchange), and connect it with the second form of Perichoresis (Newman, *Athanasius*, ii. p. 367). The rules laid down above for the predication of the several kinds of attributes (iv.) apply likewise to the interchange of idioms.

In propositions whose predicate is an adjective, special attention is required not to take the subject of the proposition as being also formally the subject of the attribute.

The exchange of idioms in Holy Scripture is the strongest proof for the unity of Person in Christ, and the most prominent manifestation of its wonderful character. The law, however, by which in our speech we interchange the predicates, is not peculiar to Christ; it is a general law of logic, which finds its application in the human compound and in many others, but nowhere so perfectly as in Christ.

VI. From the nature and laws of the communication of idioms, it is manifest that, in general, the term which stands as subject in the proposition does not suggest the reason why the predicate is contained in it; this reason lies in some property which the subject possesses concomitantly with the property actually expressed. For instance, in the proposition, “the Son of Mary is the Word,” the reason why He is the Word is not pointed out by the term “Son of Mary;” it is contained in the Divine nature which the Son of Mary possesses concomitantly with the human. Hence the technical term “predication by concomitancy” is applied to phrases expressing the exchange of idioms. Another technical term, but not so appropriate, is “material and indirect predication.” Predication by concomitancy is based upon the Perichoresis or communion of natures, and is therefore not merely rhetorical or verbal, as it was styled by many Protestant theologians. St. Thomas, 3, qq. 9, 16; Franzelin, thes. xxxvii.

## § 132 CHRIST AS A PERSON RELATIVELY AND VIRTUALLY DISTINCT FROM GOD

I. Notwithstanding that Christ is God, that He subsists and acts in the Divine Nature, and further, that the same, by reason of the exchange of idioms, must be said materially of the “Man” Christ; the language of Scripture and Church represents Him over and over again as a subject of attributions distinct and separate from God. He is the Mediator between God and man; He is “of God,” as “we are of Christ” (*ὑμεῖς δὲ Χριστοῦ, Χριστὸς δὲ Θεοῦ*, 1 Cor. iii. 23), and even where His intimate union with God is set forth, it is spoken of in terms analogous to those expressing the union of creatures with God through grace. In the Old Testament He is “the chosen Servant of God” (Isaias), “the man that cleaveth” to the Lord (Zach. xiii. 7); in the New Testament He is begotten, sanctified, glorified, protected, and guided by God; He prays to God, and reconciles the world with Him, etc.

II. To account for these apparent anomalies, it is not sufficient to say that in such texts “God” means God the Father exclusively. This is only true where Christ is represented as the Son of God; in all other cases Christ is set forth as a subject distinct from God purely and simply, from the Word as well as from the other Divine Persons. We have to explain how this can be done without destroying the unity of Person in Christ.

The unity of person in man is not injured by speaking of man’s lower nature as distinct and opposed to his higher nature. But our lower nature is deprived of reason, and, therefore, is never spoken of as a person. In Christ, on the contrary, the lower nature is a complete, rational and animal, human nature, receiving its personal complement through the Logos or Word. Hence we may speak of Him as a human person, existing side by side with God or inferior to Him, provided we conceive Him formally as a human personal being, viz. as the Logos “subsisting”—not only dwelling—in “the flesh,” not in the Godhead. This way of

conceiving the Word Incarnate is evidently implied in the names “Christ” and “Emmanuel” (God with us). It affords sufficient foundation for mentally distinguishing in Christ two personal beings, and consequently for speaking of the Man-God as relatively independent and virtually distinct from the God-Man. This distinction is not tantamount to abstracting from Christ’s Divinity: He is considered as God, but the mental stress is laid on His subsistence in a human nature. The analogical designations for Christ, taken from all orders of created things—the Anointed or Branch, the limb or member, the image of God—might indeed express no more than a union with God through grace. Yet they likewise may be used as descriptive of the Hypostatic Union, for they all represent a most real and intimate union between some being and a higher principle differing from it in essence. We have dealt with them in former chapters. It is to be remarked that Holy Scripture, and the Church after its example, are most careful to avoid phrases which, by representing Christ as a subject distinct from God, might imply a real distinction of persons or a multiplication of the Divine Nature.

III. The notion of Christ as a subject of attributions distinct from God, has been entirely perverted by Berruyer, and only imperfectly proposed by theologians even of high note. Berruyer, in order to avoid Nestorianism, calls the Man Christ a *quasi-suppositum* (or quasi-person), but then describes Him as a Person perfect in every respect. St. Alphonsus opposed the new form of the old heresy with holy zeal, and it was condemned by Benedict XIV and Clement XIII. Yet traces of it are still found in many modern Nestorianizing theologies. Berruyer’s heresy and cognate Catholic opinions fail to understand, or at least to work out, the consequences of the principle that “the Man Christ, however He be considered, is and always remains the personal human compound constituted through the anointment of humanity with the Logos; that in this compound the human essence is the material part, and the Divine Logos the formal principle, of its substantial—subsistential or personal—existence.” In the same way, in whatever manner we consider natural man, he is and remains a body informed by a soul. Christ cannot be considered independently of the personality of the Logos by which He subsists, though, as the Fathers express it, He can take the part of a servant (*gerere personam servi*), and also can act in the Person of God (*esse et agere in persona Dei*). In the stage of His life which the Apostle calls “the days of the flesh,” He acted the part of a servant, and “in the day of His power,” He acts as Divine Person. See Franzelin, *De Verba Incarn.*, p. 366, sqq.

### § 133 REDUNDANCY (OVERFLOW) OF THE DIVINE IDIOMS ON CHRIST AS MAN: HIS DIVINE GLORY AND POWER

I. Having obtained a clear notion of Christ as distinct subject of attributions, we are enabled likewise to gain a deeper insight into the communication of idioms between the Man Christ and the God Christ. Although, in general, the communication is mutual, yet it is not the same on both sides: “the human” is appropriated by God, but has no influence on His Divine Existence, whereas “the Divine” is infused into man and gives him a more perfect existence. Besides, the Divine privileges (*axiomata*) are more communicable than the human properties, and some of them must be attributed to Christ as man directly and formally, by reason of His formal fellowship or participation in them. From this point of view, the communication of idioms appears as an outpouring of the Divine privileges on Christ as man, and may fitly be termed “communication by redundancy.” This term, then, implies that the Word Incarnate

not only retains His Divine privileges in His Divinity, but also transfuses and enforces them in the Man constituted by the Hypostatic Union, and that, consequently, this man, even as man completed in his personality by the Word, has co-possession and co-fruiting of these privileges.

II. The Redundancy of privileges is founded upon the general principle that in every substantial compound, the whole, even considered in its material elements, participates in the privileges or excellences of the formal principle, whether this be an inherent form as in natural compounds, or an insubstisting form as in the Incarnate Word. The term “redundancy” itself describes the manner or form in which it takes place—transfusion of Divine privileges into God’s consubstantial image, or into the Anointed and the Bud of God. The subject-matter of this communication is summed up by Scripture and the Fathers as a participation in the Divine Glory and Power (δόξα, δύναμις, *gloria et virtus*, cf. 2 Peter i. 3, etc.).

III. Holy Scripture describes the essential glory of Christ as of the highest dignity and power, and worthy of the highest honour and worship: He is the God of gods, the Lord of lords, and the Holy of Holies (§ 79). The names “God,” “Lord,” and “Holy” connote here a glory communicable to creatures; but the first, “God,” must be taken in contradistinction to Jehovah, as conveying the idea of the godlike highness and power of some person. Now the fact that Christ is placed above all other gods, lords, and saints, in a manner proper to the true God alone, shows that His participation in the Divine glory is not merely extrinsic and accidental as in other creatures, but intrinsic and substantial: He is not a simple image, but the perfect likeness of God; He is the Lord, sitting at the right hand of the Father, on the same throne, and exercising the same power. Just as in the constitution of Adam—created to the image and likeness of God—the foundation was laid for his natural glory and dominion over the world, so in the constitution of Christ—the consubstantial image of God (that is, who subsists in a Divine Person)—the foundation is laid for His Divine Glory and Power.

1. The Man Christ is God, and shares with God the title of Lord pure and simple, or Lord of glory (2 Cor. ii. 8), by reason of His Divine Personality. He is independent of any superior being, and really Sovereign, equal in rank and dignity with God. Again, for the same reason, He has an essential and absolute right to all internal and external goods of the uncreated and self-subsisting God; in the first place, to the Divine Essence and Nature. He has especially the right to enjoy and use these goods in and through His humanity, in as far, of course, as this can be done by a created nature. Lastly, this co-possession of Divine properties entitles the Man Christ to all the honour and worship due to God by virtue of His infinite excellence.

2. The supreme glory of God shines forth most in His Holiness, which is the splendour of His infinite perfection considered as the supreme and absolute God (§ 75). In this absolute Sanctity the Man Christ participates through the fact that His personal Principle is Himself Holy God, and that the Holy Ghost substantially dwells in Him as His own Spirit, and excludes even from His human nature all kind of unholiness. The holiness of Christ differs from that of other creatures, as the substance differs from the accident; it is part of His essence, and can neither be lost nor impaired.

3. Not only the Divinity and Holiness of the Lord are poured out on the Man Christ—the Divine Power is also communicated to Him, inasmuch as Christ “has life in Himself” like God (John v. 26), and is “the prince or author of life” (Acts iii. 15), and “vivifier,” that is, giver of eternal life (Heb. v. 9; cf. 1 Cor. xv. 45; Heb. ix. 14, and vii. 16). This third feature of the glory of the Man Christ is, like the two preceding, founded on His being constituted a Person

by a Divine Principle, the substance and source of life. Observe, however, that this power is always in Holy Scripture attributed to Christ as a saving, sanctifying, beatifying, but never as a creating or conserving power; thereby indicating that creative power must not be attributed to the Man Christ formally as man, since creative power admits of no created co-operation.

IV. The participation of the Man Christ in the glory and power of God is specially a participation in the glory and power of the Word: the Divine prerogatives of the Internal and Eternal Image of God flow on to His perfect external Image and Likeness. An intimate analogy exists between the communication of the Father's Divinity to the Son, and the communication of the privileges of the Logos to His humanity. As the Logos is the "Wisdom and Power of the Father" in this sense, that He is not only the same in essence with the Father, but also the seat, the bearer, and the administrator of the Father's Wisdom and Power; so likewise the Man Christ is the seat, the bearer, and the administrator of the prerogatives of the Logos. This Christ expressed in the words, "I am the way, the truth, and the life"—that is, I am the perfect Mediator of truth and life. St. Paul teaches the same: "Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption" (1 Cor. i. 30).

V. The whole theory of the redundancy of Divine glory and power may be thus summed up: All the glory and the power which by virtue of the eternal generation flow from the Father to the Son, flow over from the Son to the Man Christ, and replenish Him to the utmost of His capacity; Christ, as Son of God, is the born heir of Divine Power; as co-owner of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, He is the Giver of supernatural life.

#### § 134 THE MAN CHRIST AS OBJECT OF DIVINE WORSHIP

I. The redundancy of Divine glory on Christ appears most strikingly in His adorability, or right to the worship due to God alone. It being admitted that the humanity of Christ forms with the Logos one personal Being—Christ, the Incarnate Word—it follows that this one Being, in His entirety, is entitled to the same Divine worship as the Logos Himself. Hence the Logos is adorable not only as Logos, but also as Logos Incarnate, or in and with His humanity; and His humanity is likewise adorable in as far as it is the humanity of Christ and the flesh of the Logos, that is, physical part of a Being adorable on account of its formal Principle.

II. The adorability of the Man Christ was so firmly held in the early Church, that even Nestorius could not deny it; and the Eutychians and Apollinarians even argued from it in support of their heresies. Against Nestorius, the Council of Ephesus defined that the Man Christ (*assumptus homo*) is adored with the Logos (*una adoratione*); that is, not as a distinct term and object of adoration, but as one with the Word made flesh (*Anath.* viii.). The ninth canon of the Fifth General Council is worded against the Apollinarians and Eutychians. The flesh or humanity of the Word Incarnate must be included in one adoration with the Word Incarnate, not as being of Divine essence or nature, or changed into the Divine Nature, but as belonging to the adorable Person of the Logos. Holy Scripture frequently relates acts of adoration addressed to Christ, all more or less explicitly bound up with a profession of faith that the Adored was the Son of God and absolute Lord. The right to adoration is formally declared (John v. 23), "that all might honour the Son as they honour the Father," and (Phil. ii. 9) "God . . . hath given Him a name which is above all names: that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow . . . and that every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ

is in the glory of God the Father.” (For the Fathers, see Petavius, lib. xv. cc. 1–4; Thomassin, lib. xi. cc. 1–3.)

III. The adorability of Christ, including His humanity, may be conceived in a twofold manner, and the adoration itself may be carried out in two corresponding ways. First, we can conceive the Incarnate Word as subsisting in the Divine Nature conjointly with the other Divine Persons, and so accepting adoration by His Divine Will. Thus His humanity is included in the adoration merely as something substantially connected with Him. From this point of view the adoration of Christ’s humanity is analogous to that relative adoration or worship which is exhibited to an object by reason of its close connection with a Person worthy of adoration or worship. Yet there is an essential difference, because in Christ the connection is personal, that is to say, His humanity is embodied in His Divine Personality. Secondly, in the adoration of Christ, we can consider the Word Incarnate as specifically subsisting in the human nature, or as the Man who receives his personal complement through the Person of the Logos, and who in a certain manner is adored side by side with God, and accepts the adoration by His human will. From this point of view Christ appears especially as participator in the Divine glory, as Lord, as Holy, and as the Prince of life; and this redundancy of Divine greatness on Him is here the reason or motive of His adorability. The adoration of Christ in this form is as much an act of Divine Adoration (*latría*) as in the other form, because here also the ultimate motive of adorability is the Divine excellence of His personal Principle, and because this Principle is actually included in the object of adoration. The first of these two forms is principally useful to explain and defend the inclusion of Christ’s humanity in the adoration of the Logos; the second is more commonly supposed in the practical adoration of Christ.

IV. Christ’s humanity is adorable in itself, though not for its own sake; in other words, it is the material, not the formal, object and terminus of adoration. It is adorable in itself, inasmuch as the action by which the Logos confers upon it His own personality is, like the action of a substantial form on its substratum, eminently intrinsic: the Logos subsists in the human nature, and communicates to it His adorability in the same degree and manner as His Divinity. Hence it is inexact to say that the reason of the adorability of Christ’s humanity is extrinsic or outside the human nature; or that it is only mediately intrinsic as, *e.g.*, the wisdom of the soul is mediately intrinsic to the body. Yet, notwithstanding this, Christ’s humanity is but a “partial” object of adoration, inasmuch as it cannot be adored except as part of the theandric compound. To adore it apart from this connection would be adoring a creature. As defined by the Church, only one adoration of the flesh of Christ is admissible, and that is the “adoration of the Word Incarnate with His flesh.”

V. Although the humanity of Christ (the Man Christ) is entitled to Divine honour by reason of its personal Principle, it is not therefore without a title to such worship as is exhibited to the Saints on the ground of their sanctity: the perfection which grace confers upon Saints is possessed in a much higher degree and much more intimately by that nature to which the Logos gives Divine Personality. Even considered apart from the Logos, or deprived of its personality, the human nature of Christ, though no longer adorable as a person, would still be an object worthy of veneration because of its inherent perfection. Such veneration, however, ought to be limited to acts of admiration and praise: acts of adoration, including subjection of the worshipper to the Worshipped, can only be addressed to a personal being.

Again, the worship termed *dulia*, or rather *hyperdulia*, when offered to Christ, is neces-

sarily connected with the worship of adoration. For whatever form the worship takes, it is addressed to the Divine Person, in whom the created excellences appear as merely subordinate and secondary reasons for worship, and cannot be isolated from the Divine root from which they grow.

VI. Christ cannot adore Himself as man any more than God can adore Himself; because submissive adoration supposes at least a relative substantial distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped. As man, Christ can adore Himself as God in union with the Father, because He possesses a nature different from and subordinate to His Divine Nature. His personal dignity, which puts Christ on a level with God, enables Him to offer to God an adoration of infinite value. Furthermore, His adoration of God is itself adorable in as far as an action can be the object of adoration, for it is an act of infinite value. The "Lamb that was slain," and Christ crucified, are proposed for our adoration because of the infinite value of Christ's sacrificial act.

VII. The sacred humanity of Christ is an object of adoration in its parts as well as in its totality, because each part is anointed with Divinity. If, therefore, special motives suggest the selection of one part as object of a special devotion, such devotion ought to take the form of adoration (*cultus latriæ*). Such motives exist as regards the organs which were prominently instrumental in Christ's great sacrifice of Himself for our redemption. These organs are associated in our minds with the sublime Holiness of the Victim in the redeeming sacrifice, and with the immense charity that prompted Him to sacrifice Himself; their contemplation is most apt to excite our admiration, gratitude, contrition, and love. For these reasons the Church proposes for our adoration the wounded Hands, Feet, and Side of our Lord, which bear the external signs of His sacrificial sufferings; and His Sacred Heart, which is the organ of His inner and greater sufferings. Special motives invite to the worship of Christ's Heart; it is the source of the blood shed through the external wounds, and it was pierced in order to yield the last drop. Thus the heart is the kernel, the most intrinsic and noble part of the victim in Christ's sacrifice, and, at the same time, the altar on which the sacrifice was performed. Again, the heart is the material seat of inward sufferings and of the love from which these proceed, and it takes over all external sufferings; it is not indeed the principle of love and suffering, but the substratum in which love directly and sensibly manifests itself in the bodily organism. Hence the heart is also the altar on which the sacrifice is burnt, and the living organ of the loving dispositions which prompt the sacrificer to accomplish the sacrifice. In short, the Sacred Heart is the most perfect symbol of Christ's sacrificial Love, and it is an object of adoration because the Love which it symbolizes dwells in it substantially. See St. Thomas, 3. q. 25; Franzelin, thes. xlv.

### § 135 THE HUMAN SONSHIP OF CHRIST AS ASSUMED SONSHIP OF THE GOD LOGOS; AND THE CORRESPONDING MATERNITY AS DIVINE MATERNITY

I. Christ, and more particularly the Man Christ, is the Son of the Virgin Mary, so that, notwithstanding His Divine Origin, a human sonship must be attributed to Him. And inasmuch as on the part of Mary everything was done that nature requires of a human mother, the human sonship of Christ is natural. But it is supernatural also, inasmuch as it refers to no human father. If Christ is called the "Son of David," or of any other ancestor of

the Virgin, the paternity of these patriarchs implies only that of their race came the matter of Christ's body; or, in a higher sense, that the Son of God was sent in answer to their desires, and in recompense of their faith in the promised Messiah. Human sonship must be predicated of the Divine Person of the Logos as well as of the Man Christ: the Word Incarnate is the Son of Mary by maternal generation as truly and properly as any human person is son of his mother. This truth is evidently contained in the other, viz. that "Christ" is the Son of Mary. For Christ is the Incarnate Word, the Word made flesh, or the Man whose personality is that of the Logos; hence the Mother of Christ is the Mother of the Logos, and reciprocally the Logos is Son of Mary. That Mary is Mother of God (Θεοτόκος, *Deipara*) has been dogmatically defined in the Council of Ephesus (can. ii.); in the sixth canon of the Fifth Council, and again in the third canon of the Lateran Council, A.D. 649. Holy Scripture nowhere uses the expression "Mother of God;" but its equivalent is found in the prophecy of Isaias, and in the words of the Annunciation, "that the Virgin should conceive and give birth to the Emmanuel (= God with us)" and to "the Son of God." Again, in Rom. i. 2, and Gal. iv. 4, and in the salutation of Elizabeth, "Whence is this that the Mother of my Lord should come to me?" (Luke i. 43.)

The title "Mother of God," given to Mary long before the Council of Ephesus, sufficiently shows the tradition of the early Church.<sup>7</sup> It is worthy of remark that those who have dropped this title from their Liturgy, or only used it with a kind of reserve, have by degrees lost the idea of the Divinity of Christ Himself. The Fathers often observe that the term *Theotokos* is dogmatically as important in the doctrine of the constitution of Christ, as the term *Homoousios* in the doctrine of the Trinity.

II. The terminus, or result of this maternal activity, may be considered as a child, or specially as a son. Considered as Child of Mary, Christ appears as the ἄνθρωπος Θεωθεΐς, the Man deified, of the Greek Fathers, or as "the Holy that shall be born of thee" in the message of the angel. Viewed as Son, that is, strictly as a Person, Christ appears as the Θεὸς ἐνανθρωπήσας, the God made Man, the Emmanuel of the prophecy.

1. As Child of Mary, Christ appears first and directly as man. But this Man is the fruit of generation, and is truly a child only inasmuch as He is a being independent of the mother, *i.e.* subsisting separately. Now the principle of His subsistence is Divine; therefore He is Child of Mary only because He subsists in a Divine person. Mary, then, is the Mother of a Divine Child—of a Child personified by the Logos—as really and truly as ordinary mothers are mothers of children informed by spiritual souls. Again, the maternal generation of Mary directly and formally went to produce a "Holy Child," in the same degree as ordinary maternal generation tends to produce an ordinary child. For, in the production of the child, the mother acts only in co-operation with the father, who, being the principal agent, determines and directs her activity. But the supernatural influence of God directed the maternal activity of Mary towards the union of the Logos with the flesh ministered by her; the direct and formal terminus of the Divine action being the personal (hypostatic) completion of the flesh, in the same way as the action of the natural father terminates in the union of a spiritual soul with the maternal flesh. Nay, in the Incarnation the Paternal influence excels the natural action of the father in this, that it is the efficient cause of the union of the flesh with its hypostatic Principle; and again in this, that here the union of the Logos with the flesh is logically prior to

<sup>7</sup>See Newman, *Difficulties of Anglicans*, ii. p. 63.



the infusion of the soul. In other words, in natural generation God creates the soul in order to complete the action of the father; in the Incarnation the Paternal action itself comprises the infusion of the personal Principle, and the flesh (or human nature) is formed in order to accomplish the previously intended Hypostatic Union.<sup>8</sup>

2. If we consider Christ as a Son given to His Mother by God, this Son is indeed first of all Eternal God and Eternal Son of God, but precisely as such He becomes directly and formally the terminus of Mary's maternal activity, even more so than a natural son. For here the God Logos Himself is the subject-matter of the maternal conception, inasmuch as He assumes flesh in and of His Mother, and inasmuch as the procreative action of the Mother is from the beginning, and uniquely intended to clothe the Logos with flesh. From this point of view Mary is directly and formally the Mother of the Divine Person of the Logos, because the Logos is the Holder of the flesh taken of her; and even in holding or assuming this flesh He asserts the full extent of His Personality or independence in existing. Whence the title "Mary Mother of the Word" (*Mater Verbi*) is fully justified: it points out the proper terminus of Mary's maternity, and correctly characterizes this maternity as "spiritual relation to a Person spiritual by essence."

The relation between Mary and Christ, viz. the maternity of Mary and the filiation of Christ, receives new light from the above explanations concerning the terminus of the Divine Maternity.

III. In what respect is Christ the Son of Mary? Some theologians reply: Inasmuch as He is man and born of Mary. This answer is at least incomplete, and certainly too shallow, for it considers Christ only as the fruit or the child of a human mother. The complete and only correct answer is, that Christ is the Son of Mary as Divine Person, or as Logos; He is the subject of filiation just as He is the subject assuming and possessing human nature. From this point of view, the human sonship of the Logos no longer implies a dependence on His Mother; it is a relation of reason, the foundation of which lies in the real possession of humanity by the Logos, and in its origin from Mary. Like other relations of God to creatures, it implies a real dependence of the creature on God: Mary is made Mother by the Logos, but the Logos is not made Son by Mary.

The relation between the two filiations or sonships of Christ clearly and fully appears in the above manner of considering His human filiation; by attributing both filiations to the same Divine Person as their immediate subject, they are at the same time sharply distinguished and harmoniously joined. They are sharply distinguished, inasmuch as the Divine Sonship alone is set forth as real relation (*i.e.*, intrinsic and founded on His origin), whereas the human is only a relation of reason; they are harmoniously united, inasmuch as through this very distinction it is impossible to consider the human sonship as attribute of a second person or as complement of the Divine Sonship. For these and other reasons the princes of scholastic theology (St. Thomas, 3, q. 35, a. 4, 5; and St. Bonaventure, *In. III.*, *Dist.* 8) have most strenuously upheld this doctrine, and the other great Schoolmen of the thirteenth century also seem to have adopted it.

IV. The fact that the Logos is really and truly the Son of Mary, confers upon the Mother

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<sup>8</sup>The Scotists and Vasques are quite wrong when they assign as terminus of the maternal activity of Mary the mere production of the human nature of Christ; that is, a mere man, who consequently becomes God-Man. Mary conceived a Divine Seed, whose direct and natural terminus was a Divine Child, so much so, that but for this object she would not have conceived at all.

the highest dignity to which a created person can attain, viz. a participation in the dignity of her Son. Fully to appreciate this feature of the Divine maternity, it is necessary to consider it from a twofold point of view: as founded upon the natural operations of the Mother, and as the work of the spiritual and free operation of the Son.

1. The natural operation of the Mother results in the production of the absolutely most perfect fruit that can be produced; it “reaches the confines of the Godhead” by furnishing God with a new nature, whereas all other created activity reaches God only by knowledge and love; it is a co-operation with God’s own internal activity, whereas the co-operation of other mothers in the production of the human soul by God, is only a co-operation with God’s external creative activity. Hence the maternity of Mary is the highest ministry to which a creature can be elevated by God.

2. Again, the Mother of Christ is a relation by blood to Christ as man, and a “relation by affinity” to God Himself as pure Spirit. Man is related by affinity to persons who marry his blood relations, because such persons become morally or juridically one with the blood-relations. Now, the humanity of Christ, related by blood to Mary, is united to the Logos more intimately than wife to husband; hence the affinity to God, contracted by Mary, is more intimate and perfect than any affinity among men.

The connection with God, based upon Mary’s maternity, may also be conceived as an eminent and unique Divine filiation. Her title to a share in the good things of God, in His Life and Beatitude, is not merely owing to grace, as in the case of God’s adopted sons; it arises from her substantial relations with the Divine Family. The “Seed of the Word of Truth,” out of which the sons of adoption are born, is itself infused into Mary. The Fathers, from this point of view, speak of Mary as ἡ θεόπαις (the child of God), ἀμνός and *agna Dei* (the little ewe-lamb of God), and as the only-beloved and only-begotten daughter of God. See Passaglia, *De Immac. Conc.* sect. vi. cap. iii. a. 5; and on the whole of this section, Franzelin, thes. xxxix.

### § 136 THE DIVINE SONSHIP OF THE LOGOS AS THE ONLY TRUE SONSHIP OF CHRIST, EXCLUDING ADOPTION AND HUMAN SONSHIP

I. If the Divine Sonship of the Logos be considered not as a relation to God the Father, but as the constituent character of His personality, we must evidently attribute this Divine Sonship to Christ as man or to the Man Christ, because the personality of Christ is identical with the personality of the Logos: Christ is the Word Incarnate; the Word Incarnate is the true and only-begotten Son of God, hence Christ is the true Son of God. Christ considered as this particular man (*ut hic homo*) is the natural Son of God, and has the personal rank and character of Son of God, in the same way as natural man is the image of God, not only in as far as he has a spiritual soul, but also as this particular corporeal and animal being, whose personality is completed by a soul made to the image of God.

II. Sonship may also be considered as relation from person to person, viz. from son to father. From this point of view arises the question: Is Christ as man, or the Man Christ, Son of God? In other words, is the term Sonship applicable to that relation between Christ and God which is distinct from the eternal Sonship of the Logos, and from the sonship by grace of the just? It cannot be denied that Holy Scripture represents this relation as a sonship. Yet, on the other hand, it differs in four respects from the Eternal Sonship of the Logos: (1)

It is not based upon the internal and eternal generations in the bosom of the Father, but on a temporal communication, *ad extra*, and on a gracious assumption into Divine union. (2) Christ as man is, by nature, inferior to the Father. (3) The principle and terminus of the relation of Christ as man to God, is not the Father as Father, but the whole Trinity, including the Logos. (4) The relation in question would remain unaltered if the incarnate Person were the Father or the Holy Ghost.

These considerations have led the Adoptionists to assert that Christ as man is not truly Son of God, but only an adopted Son; and many theologians build upon the same foundation a second Divine Sonship, analogous to the Sonship by grace.

III. The Adoptionists of the eighth century attributed natural Sonship to the Logos alone, the Man Christ being only son by adoption (*filius adoptivus sive nuncupativus*). Their doctrine, a badly disguised form of Nestorianism, was at once condemned by Pope Hadrian I and the Council of Frankfort (A.D. 792), defining that Christ as man (*secundum humanitatem*) is, by reason of His personality, which is the personality of the Word Incarnate, the true and natural, not the adopted, Son of God (Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, xxxii.). Adoption presupposes that the person to be adopted is not a son but a stranger to the adopting father; and, besides, adoption merely constitutes a moral, external union, entirely different from natural sonship: it rests entirely on an act of the will, whereby the adoptive father admits the adopted son to the rights and privileges of a natural son. Wherefore, Christ cannot be called the adopted Son of God, except it be supposed that He is not one Person with the Logos, or that the Logos, by assuming human nature, lost His natural Sonship and became something foreign to God. The first hypothesis is the Nestorian heresy of two persons in Christ. The second is evidently absurd. The fact that the Man Christ has no other personality but the personality of the Logos, prevents Him from having any sonship but that of the Logos: adoption is rendered impossible by His very essence of Word Incarnate. Holy Scripture attributes to the Man Christ all the predicates which belong to the Eternal Son, so much so that most of the proofs in favour of the eternal sonship of the Logos are deduced from these utterances (see Book II Part II, especially § 79). Again, Christ is adorable, and He is the principle of the adoption of man, because He is the natural Son of God: an adopted son could neither claim Divine Worship nor confer Divine Sonship upon others.

IV. The Fathers often describe the Sonship of Christ as a work of grace and predestination, and some, even St. Cyril of Alexandria (Dial. III., *De Trin.*), apply to them the Greek equivalent for adopted son (*υιός θετός μεθ' ἡμῶν*). Such expressions, however, present no difficulty if it be borne in mind that the grace by which Christ is made the Son of God, makes Him the natural Son of God, and excludes the very possibility of adoption. The Greek term for adoption, *υιὸν τιθέναι*, does not, like the Latin *adoptare*, imply the negation of natural sonship; it directly conveys the notion of "being constituted or installed as son," and, therefore, it may rightly be applied to the act of grace by which human nature was united to the Logos, and Christ made the Son of God. The frequent expressions to the effect that Christ was "assumed or admitted into Sonship," are but another way of presenting the same idea.

V. The Schoolmen of the Middle Ages constructed several systems of adoptionism free from heresy, yet incorrect as theological speculations. No "second Sonship" of Christ is admissible, according to the principle laid down by St. Thomas: "Terms used of a person in their proper and fullest sense (*secundum perfectam rationem*), cannot be applied to the same

person in a figurative or imperfect sense (*secundum rationem imperfectam*). Thus Socrates, being termed ‘man’ in the full and proper sense of the word, cannot be called man in the improper sense in which a portrait is called man, though Socrates may bear in him the likeness of some other man. But Christ is the Son of God in the full and proper meaning of the term sonship or filiation; wherefore, although created and sanctified as man, He ought not to be called Son of God either by creation or by justification, but only by eternal generation, according to which He is Son of the Father alone” (3, q. 24, a. 3; see also Franzelin, thes. xxxviii.).

VI. The attempts to establish a second filiation in Christ, existing side by side with His eternal Sonship, are either heretical or confusing; they also fail to exhibit in its real light the organic connection between the Man Christ and God. Theologians have been so much bent upon finding analogies for this connection in the relation of natural filiation and of filiation by grace, that none of them has thought of another and far better analogy suggested by St. Paul (1 Cor. vi. 17; cf. Gen. ii. 24). Christ as man stands to God in a relation similar to that of son-in-law, although the term son-in-law, because implying independent personality, cannot be applied to the Man Christ, Who is constituted a person by the personality of the Logos. The Greek Fathers also use this analogy—kinship by marriage—to illustrate the relations of sonship by grace, and the same is in their mind when they speak of Christ as the assumed or adopted Son of God. They represent the Hypostatic Union as a matrimonial union, accomplished in the original *thalamus* of Mary, between the Logos and the flesh, whereby the flesh is made “one spirit” with the Logos far more really than the soul sanctified by grace is made one Spirit with God (1 Cor. vi. 16). From this point of view they see the human nature as a Bride, without, however, treating it as a hypostasis or quasi-hypostasis, for the notion of bride carries with it an idea of inferiority and dependency similar to the relation of a part to the whole. The function of the bride is passive: she is made a member of a whole whose head is the bridegroom; in the mystical marriage of the Logos with the flesh, this function is carried out with the highest perfection; for the union of the flesh with the Logos results in one physical Person, whereas bride and bridegroom remain physically distinct persons. If, then, we consider the human nature as virtually distinct from the Logos, and united to Him in bridal or matrimonial union, that relation of kinship arises which exists between a father and his daughter-in-law. Yet we cannot designate this affinity by terms denoting personality, *e.g.* bride, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, but must confine ourselves to impersonal expressions, *e.g.* Christ as man is the Lamb of God, the Flesh of God (*caro Dei*), and more strictly, a member under God as Head.

VII. From the above we infer that the relation of the Man Christ to God, if conceived as affinity by espousals—rather than as a second sonship different from the eternal Sonship of the Logos—does not endanger the Hypostatic Union, but formally presupposes it. Further, that this affinity, being real kinship, expresses the relation of Christ as man to God better than sonship by adoption or by grace alone. Again, this mode of considering it does away with the four difficulties mentioned above (n. II.). And lastly, it has the advantage of uniting in one beautiful organism the Eternal Sonship of the Logos and the kinship of Christ as man.

VIII. To sum up this exposition of the Sonship of Christ as man: there is but one Sonship in Christ, and that is the Eternal Sonship. This belongs to the Man Christ by redundancy, so that He participates in it, and so that through it and from it His own specific relation to God receives the form and character of a Sonship. Hence the two different relations of Christ

to God—as Logos and as Man—do not merely coexist side by side, but organically work together and into one another, so as to constitute the peculiar Sonship proper to Christ as man. The constitution of Christ being unique, His Sonship must be unique, and no perfect analogy for it can be sought for in heaven or on earth. It is neither the human sonship of a man, nor the Divine Sonship of God as God, but it is the Divine Sonship of a man. Hence the notion of generation, on which Divine and human sonship is founded, must be modified before it can be applied to the present case; the perfect similarity of nature which results from ordinary generation, becomes here an imperfect similarity of nature, but a perfect similarity of person.

IX. The peculiar character of the Divine Sonship in the Man Christ, as distinct from both the Eternal Sonship of the Logos and the adaptive Sonship of the just, is aptly expressed by the Scriptural name, ὁ Παῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ, *Puer Dei*, = the Boy or Childe of God, applied to Christ. So Matt. xii. 18, quoting Isai. xlii. 1, after the Septuagint; Acts iii. 13, 26, and iv. 27, 30. The boy bears to his father the double relation of son and child. He is son because in him the person of the father is represented and reproduced; he is child because he is the yet immature product of both father and mother, and is, by reason of his incomplete development, like the mother, a member of the family subordinate to the father. These notions find an easy application in the “Childe” of God. The Man Christ is Son of the Eternal Father in as far as His Personal principle is a Person like unto the Father; He is Child of the Father by reason of the inferiority and impersonality of His human nature: He is a subordinate member of the Divine Family (*filius familias*). Instead, then, of two sonships in Christ, we have the double relation of Son and Child commingled in the “Boy” of the Father, and both resulting from the same Divine act to which the Man Christ owes His origin. The New Testament but seldom uses the appellation Παῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ; yet whenever the “Son” speaks of Himself as inferior to the Father, or as the object of the Father’s loving care, as also in many texts relating to His origin and final glory, the “Son” is considered as “Child.” At any rate these passages, thus understood, give an easy, harmonious, and beautiful sense, which is not brought out by the common interpretation, “that the Son of God is there considered as man or in the form of servant.” The “Childe of God” is “the Firstborn amongst many brethren” (Rom. viii. 29), viz. God’s children by grace, of whom He is the Exemplar and the Head.

X. There is good reason to think that the meaning of the name “Lamb of God” is identical with that of παῖς (Boy) of God. St. John uses this appellation much in the same way as the Prophets use the term “Bud of God.” Its masculine form, ἀμνός, corresponds with παῖς, the boy; its neuter form, ἀμνίον, with παιδίον, the child. In sacred and even in profane language, the relations between shepherd and flock afford the standard illustrations of the filial or paternal relations between superiors and inferiors; kings and priests are “pastors” of flocks; the newly baptized infants are styled *agni* or *agnelli* (the little lambs) of God; God and Christ express their loving care and kindness to man by assuming the title of Shepherd, and mankind is then always represented as a flock of sheep and lambs. There is, then, the possibility that “Lamb of God” may be synonymous with Boy or Childe of God. That it really is so, is made probable by the following considerations. When the Baptist addressed Christ as Lamb of God, he used the Aramaic word *Thaljob* (“young one”), which is applied to both lamb and child, and has been retained in the Syriac version of the Gospel. Now the words of the Baptist sound like an echo of the words of God the Father: “This is my beloved Son;” at all events, they have the same signification. Even granting that, in the words of John, Christ is pointed

out as the perfect victim of the great redeeming sacrifice, it must still be conceded that the speaker bore in mind the intimate connection of Christ with God which made His sacrifice acceptable. Again, Christ is the Lamb of the Father, as we, the children by grace, are the lambs of Christ (John x. 14, 15). Isaias (xvi. 1) calls the Lamb the Ruler of the earth; and in the Angelic Hymn (*Gloria in excelsis*) we read: "Lord God, Lamb of God, Son of the Father, who takest away the sins of the world," etc., whence it appears that the notion of victim is not the only one conveyed by the term "Lamb," but that it has also the sense of Lord and God.

Among the Fathers, Clement of Alexandria is the only one who draws attention to the connection between *παῖς* and *ἀμνός* as names of Christ (*Pædagog.*, l. I. c. 5). Toletus (in Joan i.) first made use of the exposition of Clement, and after Toletus only a few others. See Cornelius à Lapide, in Apoc. v. 7.

### § 137 CHRIST AS CREATURE; HIS SUBORDINATION TO GOD

I. The words of Christ, "I ascend to My Father and to your Father, to My God and to your God" (John xx. 17), imply a relation between Him and God analogous to the subordination of creatures to their Creator. The Man Christ is an external work of God, Who "created Him" (Is. xlv. 8), and "made Him (*ποίησαντι*)" (Heb. iii. 2). He is, however, a creature only as to His human nature. And even in this respect He stands out above all other created beings; in His created nature subsists a Person increated, eternally begotten from and like to the Father.

II. The human nature of Christ being created, Christ as man is inferior and subject to God like other creatures. St. Thomas (3, q. 20, a. 1) distinguishes in His human nature a threefold inferiority to God, forming the counterpart to the threefold equality which belongs to His Divine nature: (1) Christ as man is inferior to God in substantial and accidental perfection; (2) He is subject to the ruling Power of God; and (3) bound to adore and serve God as His principle and final Object. Even when co-operating with the Divine Power, the human nature acts but as an instrument. Yet this threefold inferiority differs from the inferiority of mere creatures. The infinity of perfection, which is denied to Christ's humanity, is possessed by His Divine Personality; His subjection is not a subjection to an alien power, but to a Power which is His own as God; His service and ministry are given, not to a stranger, but to the Godhead of which He is a Person and whose supereminent dignity is His own. St. Paul beautifully describes this relation (1 Cor. xi. 3) as the subordination of a member to the head of a family: "The head of every man is Christ, . . . and the head of Christ is God."

III. With those who possess correct notions of the nature and origin of Christ, the question in how far He can be styled "servant of God," is but a question of words. The term "servant" (slave, *servus*, *δούλος*), used without restriction, implies exclusion from the position, dignity, and possessions of the Master: it would be heresy to apply it, in this sense, to Christ, Who is at the same time Servant of the Lord and Lord Himself. True, the Latin Vulgate in the Old Testament often calls the Messiah *servus Dei*. But the Hebrew does not convey the idea of servitude implied by the Latin *servus*; it means a minister, one of the household of God, *οἰκέτης*; a true worshipper of God and executor of the Divine will. In a similar sense we call saints "servants of God."

## § 138 CHRIST AS LORD OF ALL THINGS

I. On account of His humanity, Christ is subordinate to the Creator; on the other hand, by virtue of His Divine Personality, He shares with the Creator the Lordship over all things. He is, with and next to God, our Lord and “the Lord of all” (Acts x. 36; Heb. i. and ii.; Ps. viii. and cix.) St. Paul lays down and develops this point of faith in Heb. i. and ii. The reason he gives for the appointment of Christ as man to be heir of all things, is that by Him God “made the world;” that He is “the brightness of God’s glory and the figure of His substance, upholding all things by the word of His power” (Heb. i. 2, 3; iii. 1–6. See also § 133 on the Redundance of Divine Glory on Christ, and § 128 on the *Gratia unionis*).

II. Christ’s *dominium* (ownership, lordship) over all things springs from the identity of His Person with the Creator, and is therefore infinitely above any *dominium* which God may give to a mere creature. This Lordship embraces all things without exception, and extends to their innermost being. Unlike created sovereignty, it includes the right to turn to Christ’s own service and glory all persons and things subjected to it, so that the final object of things is to minister to the glory of Christ as well as to the glory of God.

III. The title “King of kings and Lord of lords” (1 Tim. vi. 15; Apoc. xvii. 14, xix. 16) is given equally to Christ and to God. It implies that the lordship of the world belongs to Christ purely and simply, and that His Lordship is the most perfect image and likeness of the Divine Sovereignty. The only difference is that the Sovereignty of God is “essentially” the source of all other sovereignty, whereas the Lordship of Christ is neither essentially nor as a matter of fact the source of all lordship; in other words, all lordship possessed and exercised in the name of God is not also “essentially, or from its very nature,” held in the name of Christ. In all other respects the resemblance is most perfect: the Lordship of Christ eminently and virtually contains all other lordship; no other power can limit His Power, but every power must minister to His ends, submit to His will, and deal with the persons and things over which it rules, as being His property as well as the property of God. “All power is given to me in Heaven and on earth” (Matt. xxviii. 18; cf. Phil. ii. 9, 10).

IV. A question much debated among the Schoolmen is whether Christ formally possesses all the political power held by temporal rulers, and whether He is the real (formal) owner of all private property. As to political power, it is evident from John xviii. 38, “My kingdom is not of this world,” that Christ is not the only and exclusive holder of such power. He never once claimed the exercise of political sovereignty to the exclusion of its natural holders. His “eminent” *dominium*, like the eminent *dominium* of God, is perfectly compatible with real ownership in creatures. Christ’s universal Lordship being founded on His substantial and personal relation to the Creator, implies the right of disposing of all created powers and things according to His will: the “Lord of all” is not merely entitled to make things temporal subservient to the ends of His spiritual kingdom; He disposes of everything for what end He pleases. And yet His Sovereignty is not formally “political,” because it does not include the will or the mandate to perform acts purely political. But it contains “supereminently” all political *dominium* of man, that is, Christ can dispose directly and freely of the possession and exercise of all human sovereignty, for He is King of kings and Lord of lords. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 59, a. 4. ad 1.

V. The principles laid down concerning Christ’s political power, likewise apply to His *dominium* over private property and actions of individuals. Natural ownership is nowise

impaired by Christ's overlordship: He who created property, also created the owner's title to hold it. Yet Christ's overlordship is not simply a right to dispose of things temporal for spiritual ends, after the manner of the right of society to dispose of individual property for the common good; it is a real and direct ownership, in virtue of which Christ can dispose of all property as He chooses. It differs, however, so much in its origin and exultedness from what we call private ownership, that this appellation does not formally apply to it. As a matter of fact, Christ renounced the exercise of His *dominium* over private property and chose to be poor. The right itself He could not renounce, because it is connatural to His Divine Personality. See the commentaries of Suarez, Lugo, and the Salmanticenses on St. Thomas, 3, q. 22.

### § 139 CHRIST AS THE NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL HEAD OF ALL CREATURES

I. By His human origin Christ is like and akin to the sons of Adam; He is a member of the great human corporation (Heb. ii. 11 sqq.), and occupies a place in the created universe. But, by reason of His Divine Personality, He is "the image and likeness of God" to a degree unapproached by either man or angel. Moreover, men and angels and all things have been created "in," that is, "by and for" Him. He, then, "is the first-born of every creature . . . the head of the body" (Col. i. 15-17; cf. § 133, III. 3). His superiority rests upon His belonging to a higher order than His brethren; whence He ranks above them as they rank above the animal and material creation, and not merely as a king ranks above his subjects.

II. The practical object of Christ's headship is not only to place the universe, and especially mankind, under a Divine king; it is the intention of God and the will of Christ that the Incarnation should establish between the First-born and His brethren a real kinship or affinity, Christ becoming the Head of the human family, and the human family acquiring a title to participate in the supernatural privileges of their Head. "When the fulness of time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, that we might receive the adoption of sons" (Gal. iv. 4, 5; cf. Rom. viii. 29). When, in the virginal womb of Mary, the Word espoused human flesh, all human flesh became akin to Him; all men acquired affinity to the Man-God and fellowship in His exalted privileges: "we are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones" (Eph. v. 30). The idea that Christ by taking flesh "espoused" not only the Church, but all mankind, is often dwelt upon by the Fathers. See St. Augustine, *In Joan.*, ar. 1, ch. 2; St. Gregory the Great, *Hom. xxxvii. in Ezechielem*; St. Leo the Great, *Sermo xvi. in Nativ.*; St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Comm. in Joan.*, i. 14, etc.

III. The name "Head" so frequently given by St. Paul to Christ, is, speaking strictly, but a figure of speech; but, like the name Christ, it has a dogmatic significance. The Apostle connects it with our Lord's Divinity; the Fathers and theologians with the plenitude of Holiness and Grace, of which He is the fountain. Christ is Head in the moral and in the physical sense: head of the human family, head of the mystical body, the Church. Both senses are used by St. Paul. "God hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings . . . in Christ . . . He hath graced us (*ἐχαρίτωσεν*) in His beloved Son . . . that He might make known to us the mystery of His will . . . to re-establish all things in Christ, which are in heaven and on earth, in Him. . . . Raising Him up from the dead and setting Him at His right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality, and power, and virtue, and dominion . . . and He hath put all



things under His feet, and hath made Him head over all the Church, which is His body, and the fulness of Him who is filled all in all" (Eph. i. 3–23). "God hath quickened us together in Christ . . . and hath raised us up together, and hath made us sit together in the heavenly places through (ἐν) Christ Jesus" (Eph. ii. 5, 6). "That we may in all things grow up in Him (εἰς αὐτόν) Who is the head, Christ: from Whom the whole body being compacted and fitly joined together by what every joint supplieth, according to the operation in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in charity" (Eph. iv. 15, 16. See also Eph. ii. 19–21; v. 22 sqq.; Col. i. 13–20, 23, 24; ii. 8–10, 18, 19; 1 Cor. xii. 12).

Christ is the Head of mankind as man, yet not by reason of some accidental perfection or external appointment: He heads the race by reason of the substantial perfection imparted to Him through the Logos, just as the head—the seat of reason—is the noblest part of the body. Again, Christ's headship being founded upon His supernatural excellence, He is our "supersubstantial" Head, to whom all the properties and functions of the natural head belong in an eminently equivalent degree. Whatever dignity accrues to the bodily head from its being the seat of the soul's chief activity—whatever power of influencing, governing, and unifying the other members is possessed by the head—the same dignity and power belong to Christ as Head in relation to mankind. His Divine Principle works on man in general, and especially on the members of the Church, with a power more perfect than that of the soul in the individual man. "In Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally; and you are filled in Him who is the head of all principality and power" (Col. ii. 10; cf. Eph. i. 22, 23).

IV. Adam, the first head of mankind, was a type of the Second Head inasmuch as he was the principle of natural life, the intended transmitter of supernatural life; and, in this respect, he acted on behalf of the whole human race. But, whereas Adam is the earthly, animal, and guilty head of the race, Christ is its heavenly, spiritual, and substantially holy Head. Adam is the principle of the material unity of mankind; Christ is much more the principle of its spiritual unity. Adam was a precarious mediator of supernatural life; Christ is its essential and unchangeable mediator. Hence Christ not only supplements the failings of the first head, but completes and perfects the headship. The first head, then, was, as it were, the material root of the race which was to be incorporated in and brought to perfection by Christ, its real principle and final object (τέλος). Cf. 1 Cor. xv. 45 sqq.; Peter Lomb., 3, dist. 13; St. Thomas, 3, q. 8.

## § 137 CHRIST THE SUBSTANTIAL AND BORN MEDIATOR BETWEEN MAN AND GOD

I. Christ's Headship over mankind appears in its brightest light in His office of mediator between God and man. The office of mediator in general supposes the mediating person to stand midway between two contending persons or parties. When the parties are of different rank, as God and man, the intermediate position requires rank below the higher and above the lower party. Such a position belongs to the "one mediator of God and man, the Man Christ" (1 Tim. ii. 5) by reason of His essential constitution: as true man, He is below God; as the "Man Christ," He is above all creatures. As God, He is a Person distinct from the Person of the Father; as Man, He represents a Person virtually distinct from the Logos. The Mediator, further, must be connected with both parties. The Man Christ is consubstantial with man and with God: by His humanity He is the born Head of mankind; by His Divinity

He is the Only-Begotten of the Father and like unto the Father. “The head of every man is Christ . . . and the head of Christ is God” (1 Cor. xi. 3). His mediatorship, then, is not accidental or delegated: it arises naturally from His personal constitution, which also makes Him the only, the universal and perfect, mediator between man and God.

II. Christ’s function as mediator necessarily proceeds from His human nature as *principium quo operandi*,<sup>9</sup> yet it obtains its mediating efficacy from the Divine Nature, *i.e.* from the dignity of the acting Person. Its first object, as commonly stated, is the remission of sin and the granting of grace, whereby the friendship between God and man is restored. This object is attained by the worship of infinite value, which is offered to God by and through Christ. Christ, however, is mediator on the side of God as well as on the side of man: He reveals to man Divine truths and Divine commands; He distributes the Divine gifts of grace and rules the world. St. Paul sums up this two-sided mediation in the words, “Consider the apostle and high priest (*pontificem, ἀρχιερέα*) of our confession, Jesus” (Heb. iii. 1). Jesus is the Apostle sent by God to us, the High Priest leading us on to God.

III. The fact of Christ’s existence is in itself a mediation, a bond, between the Creator and His creatures. By uniting our humanity to His Divinity, He united us to God and God to us. He is of God and in God, but He is also of us and in us. In Him we know, love, and worship God; God, on the other hand, pours out His supernatural gifts on the Head of our race, and through the Head on the members. A substantial—or, as the Fathers prefer to call it, a physical—union is thus effected between man and God. “That they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me and I in Thee. . . . I in them and Thou in Me, that they may be made perfect in one” (John xvii. 21–22); St. Thomas, 3, q. 26.

## B. THE SUPERNATURAL ATTRIBUTES OF CHRIST’S HUMANITY

### § 13ε THE “GRACE OF UNION” THE GROUND OF ALL OTHER PRIVILEGES

I. All supernatural privileges granted to creatures have their ground in a deification, that is, in a union with, and an assimilation to, God (2 Pet. i. 4). Sanctifying grace in general, and the grace of union especially, consist in a participation in the Divine Being. Sanctifying grace, however, is but an accidental assimilation and union with the Godhead, whereas the grace of union, *viz.* the unction and impregnation of a human nature with the Divine substance, must be termed a substantial deification, or a being Divine substantially: thus the being human of the body, grounded upon its impregnation with the soul, is a being human substantially. The “being Divine” (*θεωθεΐσα, deificata*) of Christ’s humanity is not a “being God;” yet it is more than a “being of God;” it is a participation in the Divine Life and Being of the Logos. The Fathers describe it as pneumatic, spiritual, and celestial being (*esse*), analogous to the higher being imparted to the body by the soul. The being Divine of Christ’s humanity includes a substantial participation in the glory and power proper to the Divinity or to the Divine Spirit. The specific glory and power of the Divine Spirit, as distinguished from the glory and power of created spirits, lies in His Holiness. Hence all participation, by union and assimilation, in

<sup>9</sup>“Principle of operation by which.” —Ed.

the Divine glory, is considered as a consecration or sanctification, and especially the deification of Christ’s humanity is set forth as a substantial sanctification. This term expresses the nature, the ground, and the effects of the deification.

II. In the same way as the effect of sanctifying grace on the soul is to give it a holy being, the effect of the grace of union is to give to Christ’s humanity a holy being; with this difference, however, that the soul is but enriched with an accidental quality. The humanity of Christ, on the contrary, is sanctified substantially: not any created quality, but the Substance of the Logos impregnates and pervades it with its own infinite sanctity, and to the utmost of its communicability. The sanctity here in question is the objective sanctity of the Divine Substance, via the exaltedness of God founded upon His most pure, infinite, immutable perfection. This Divine Excellence communicates itself, in various degrees, to all things of which God takes possession or sanctifies by His indwelling; the communication attains its highest degree—perfection pure and simple—in the Hypostatic Union. Here the Divine Perfection becomes, through supernatural information (insubsistence), the perfection of Christ’s humanity. That created grace, which as an accident inhering in the substance of the soul operates in an imperfect manner, is here brought to the highest possible perfection by the Godhead inhering substantially in the humanity of Christ. The grace of union makes the deified humanity infinitely more pleasing to God and worshipful to man than sanctifying grace does in the souls of the just. The excellence conferred by the grace of union cannot be lost; it excludes all, even the slightest, sins; it secures the possession of all that is necessary to lead the most perfect life, and is in itself a title to the Beatific Vision.

III. The humanity of Christ is deified by the inexistence of the Logos substantially and directly. Other supernatural and Divine privileges, however, being of the nature of accidental qualities, cannot be communicated directly by the inexistence of another substance: their production is due to the assimilating action of the Divinity on the favoured person. The humanity of Christ, then, like other creatures, receives its qualitative sanctity—as distinguished from substantial holiness—through the assimilating influence of the Logos. The influence, however, of the Logos on His own human nature is eminently superior to that of any other creature. The assimilating Principle is immanent in Christ, is part of His substance, and pervades His human nature as fire pervades red-hot iron. By this union Christ’s humanity has a natural right to, and possesses radically and virtually, the highest degree of assimilation to God of which it is capable. By nature, and from the beginning, it possessed not only its spiritual likeness to God and the sanctity of the soul implied therein, but also the immortality of the body, and a participation, though limited, in the Divine omnipresence: the indwelling Divine Power could preserve the body from death, and endow it with spiritual existence. It cannot, however, be said that, from the beginning, the humanity of Christ necessarily possessed the “fulness” of all the privileges rooted in the Hypostatic Union. Its qualitative sanctity is the work of God’s free will, and could therefore be dispensed by degrees. Nor does the dignity of Christ require, with moral necessity, the immediate possession of the plenitude of His privileges; He can, without lowering His dignity, renounce His “external” glory and beatitude for a time. As a matter of fact, Christ’s humanity began its spiritual and Divine Life at the moment of the union, whereas the transfiguration of its bodily life was not completed till later.

IV. The Logos animates His humanity after the manner in which the human soul animates the body. Yet, although He acts as a substantial form on matter, He is not the substantial

form of His human nature. This humanity would derogate from the integrity of both the Divine and the human natures. The informing action consists in actively influencing, by transfiguration, elevation, and extension (enrichment), the natural Life-power of the lower nature, thus producing assimilation. The power of assimilation is far greater in the Logos than in the soul of man. The soul cannot assimilate to itself the material body, nor is the soul the direct object of the bodily life. The Logos, on the contrary, can and does give a deified being to His human nature, and Himself is the direct object of its spiritual life. As He is the personal Principle of His humanity, that which in man is self-knowledge and self-love, in Christ is knowledge and love of God. All acts of consciousness in Christ's soul are founded upon, and centre in, this living union with the Divinity. The heavenly type of His Life is the community of life between the Father and the Son in the Blessed Trinity. See Franzelin, *thes.* xli.

#### § 140 THE FULNESS OF THE SUPERNATURAL PERFECTION OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF CHRIST'S HUMANITY—FULNESS OF CREATED GRACE

I. Although the Hypostatic Union did not destroy the essential likeness of Christ's human nature to ours, it none the less freed the united nature from all spiritual imperfection. Christ's lowliness, which is necessary for the ends of the Incarnation, extends to external appearances and internal passibility, but by no means to spiritual imperfection. The twelfth canon of the Fifth General Council lays down as a dogma, against Theodore of Mopsuestia, that Christ's spiritual perfection was not gradually developed from a state of imperfection like ours, and by a similar process. The same doctrine is stated with more detail in the *Confessio Leporii* (Hardouin, i. p. 1267). The body of Christ was indeed subject to natural growth, and He submitted to this in order to show His true humanity, and to set us an example of spiritual progress. Yet this only requires that the external manifestation of internal perfection should keep pace with the natural development of His bodily life. The imperfections of this latter, when accepted freely and for a good end, are neither dishonourable nor useless; whereas imperfections in the spiritual order, never can be either honourable or useful. In Christ such spiritual shortcomings would be a degradation of His Divine Person, and opposed to the ends of the Incarnation.

The scriptural texts which insist upon Christ's likeness to us in all things, if read in the context, only refer to His external lowliness and passibility. "Christ, being in the form of God . . . debased (*ἐκένωσεν*) Himself," etc. (Phil. ii. 6, 7; see also Heb. ii. 17, 18, and iv. 15, and context).

II. Holy Scripture describes the perfection of Christ's humanity as complete from the beginning: as given, *ipso facto*, with the Hypostatic Union. Christ, on the one hand, appears as full of grace and truth and wisdom; on the other, as the model and fountain-head of all spiritual perfection in creatures. He is the Vine of which we are the branches, the Head of which we are the body. As mediator between God and man, He receives from God the fulness of perfection, and communicates perfection to man. As to the measure of His created perfection, the Fathers—at least since the Nestorian heresy—and the Schoolmen without exception, hold that in intension and extension it surpasses the perfection of all creatures. "And the word was made flesh . . . and we saw His glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, . . . and of His fulness we all have received, and grace

for grace” (John i. 14–16; cf. iii. 34, 35). “He is the head of the body, the Church; Who is the Beginning, the First-born from the dead; that in all things He might hold the primacy: because in Him it has well pleased (the Father) that all fulness should dwell . . . ” (Col. i. 18 sqq.). “In Whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge . . . for in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally, and you are filled in Him Who is the head of all principality and power” (Col. ii. 3, 9, 10). In presence of these dogmatic utterances, the historical text, “Jesus advanced (*προέκοπτεν*) in wisdom, and age, and grace with God and man” (Luke ii. 52), must be understood of the external manifestation of wisdom and grace, such as would be noticed by the historian. The Fifth Council has defined this against Theodore of Mopsuestia.

III. Like the spiritual perfection of other creatures, the perfection of the soul of Christ is due to created grace, which perfects its substance after the manner of an accidental vital quality. Such grace was not required in order to make the soul of Christ holy in itself, pleasing to God, and worthy of eternal life; in fact, it is not so much a grace as a dowry due to the soul of the natural Son of God. It was only required in order that His exalted dignity should be fully endowed with all Divine gifts, should possess the principle of a life perfectly holy, and thus exhibit to God a perfect Divine likeness, and to man a perfect model of sanctity. The uncreated grace of union gives the soul of Christ right and power to hold all the supernatural perfections of its life; yet directly and effectively this perfect life is infused through grace created by the Divinity. Both ought always to be considered as organically connected.

IV. The created grace of Christ is of the same nature as that given to men and angels, and is accompanied by all the gifts ordinarily connected with sanctifying grace, viz. the theological virtues which accomplish the supernatural living union with God, and the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, as expressly foretold by Isaias (xi. 2). From the theological virtues, however, must be excluded the obscurity of the faith, and also hope, so far as it is the unfulfilled desire of the Beatific vision. Again, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, Fear must be taken in the sense of Reverence. Besides these ordinary graces, Christ possesses the extraordinary ones gratuitously given (*gratis data*) to the sons of adoption, either for their personal distinction, or for the good of others, e.g. the gift of prophecy and of miracles. The Holy Spirit, from Whom these extraordinary graces come, being the own Spirit of Christ, Christ possesses them as a natural endowment, whereas in the Saints they are but externally, and more or less accidentally, connected with sanctifying grace.

V. The created grace of Christ cannot be properly infinite, because it is created. Yet it possesses a threefold infinity, which may aptly be described as comparative, moral, and virtual infinity. In the existing order of things, the measure of grace given to Christ is such that, compared to all other graces given to creatures, it surpasses them all beyond comprehension, and no greater measure of grace can be conceived. Again, considered in its organic unity with the grace of union, the created grace of Christ gives to all His actions an infinite moral value, and makes His soul the source from which an infinite number of subjects draw sanctification. In short, created grace in Christ is infinite as possessing infinite moral excellence and infinite power.

VI. Any increase in perfection is impossible in Christ: from the first moment of the Incarnation His perfection was *consummata*, i.e. brought to the highest possible degree. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 7; and on the text, Luke ii. 52, see De Luge, *De Verbo Incarnato*, disp. xxi. § 1, and Franzelin, thes. xlii.

§ 141 MENTAL PERFECTION OF THE SOUL OF CHRIST—FULNESS OF  
WISDOM AND TRUTH—VISION OF GOD

I. The integrity of Christ's human nature postulates intellectual cognition by acts of the human intellect. The "Man Christ" is indeed wise by the wisdom of God; yet "the humanity of Christ" knows by its own mental act, not by the act of the Divine nature. All theologians, excepting Hugo of St. Victor, teach that the soul of Christ is elevated to participation in the Divine Wisdom by an infusion of Divine Light—in the same way as other creatures.

II. The Light infused into Christ's soul was given all at once, as in the case of Adam and of the Angels. So Holy Writ expressly teaches: "*Coming into the world, He saith: Sacrifice and oblation Thou wouldest not, but a body Thou hast fitted to me . . . then I said: Behold I come . . . that I should do Thy will, O God*" (Heb. x. 5-7). St. Jerome explains in the same sense (Jer. xxxi. 22): "A woman shall compass *a man*." Christ was a new creation more than Adam and the Angels, and, like them, was made perfect from the beginning. The Divine excellence of His Person required, from the beginning, the consciousness of His dignity; and He would not be the Head of all creations if some creatures at any time surpassed Him in mental perfection.

III. The Light shed on Christ's intellect by the Logos made it the most perfect image of the Divine Wisdom and Omniscience. Its knowledge embraced God, the universe and its laws, the past, the present, and the future. Such is the sense of John iii. 34: "He Whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God, for God doth not give the Spirit by measure (ἐκ μέτρον);" cf. Isa. xi. 2, "The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of Wisdom," etc. (see preceding section, n. II.). Knowledge of such perfection was due to the Soul of the Eternal Wisdom, to the Head of all intellectual creatures. Christ manifested it on earth by revealing the secret thoughts of men, and by foretelling future events (Luke v. 7, 8; John xiii. 11; ii. 24, 25, etc.). Christ's knowledge excludes all and every error and ignorance of fact. Yet it is not infinite. Its limit, however, is only to be found in the "Possibilia," viz. in the domain of things which are possible to God's Omnipotence, but are never to be realized: the Divine ideas already realized, or still to be realized, cannot be unknown to the Head of the universe. Nescience of these latter in Christ would amount to positive ignorance, like the ignorance of law in a judge.

The difficulty from Mark xiii. 32 admits of solution. The Son has no knowledge of the day of judgment which He may communicate, or any knowledge having its source in His human intellect.

IV. The theologians of, at least, the last six centuries, unanimously teach that the fulness of knowledge in the soul of Christ resides in His original and immediate vision of God. The vision of God assimilates to God (deifies) all those who enjoy it: it deifies the soul of Christ to a degree as far superior to any other as the grace of Christ is superior to any other grace.

The fulness of truth and the completeness or consummation of His grace, require that Christ should possess the vision of God. Any knowledge of God inferior to immediate vision is imperfect and unworthy of Christ (1 Cor. xiii. 9-12). Christ is an eyewitness of things Divine, which the Prophets only knew by revelation (John i. 18; iii. 31, 32). He says of Himself: "Amen, amen, I say to thee, We speak what we know, and testify what *we have seen*" (John iii. 11 sqq.) The reason He gives for "having seen" what He testifies, is that He ascended into heaven, which refers to His humanity taken up in the Divinity. Again, Christ's frequent

assertion that He knows the Father and is known by Him, and that He knows what the Father knows, admits of no satisfactory explanation if not understood of the Beatific Vision. Christ's soul certainly was conscious of its union with the Logos, Whom it knew with perfect, that is, intuitive science; and such science is identical with the Beatific Vision.

It is difficult to reconcile Christ's life and sufferings on earth with the beatitude demanded by the immediate vision of God. Yet this difficulty has not induced theologians to give up the doctrine in question: their unanimous consent, in spite of the difficulty, is a strong proof of the solidity of the doctrine. The only solution they offer is to the effect that in this greatest of mysteries—the union of the Highest with the lowest in one Person—minor miracles are to be expected as natural concomitants.

V. Although the knowledge possessed by Christ's human soul in the Beatific Vision comprises eminently other kinds and degrees of knowledge, it is almost universally admitted that God infused into it a knowledge similar in kind to that of the Angels. The subject-matter of this infused science was the things outside of God, natural and supernatural. These were known in the most perfect manner, intuitively, and, according to some divines, even comprehensively. The existence, however, of infused science in Christ is less certain than His original and continual fruition of the vision of God. It is attributed to Christ on theological grounds only, viz. His soul, the first and most perfect of created Spirits, cannot be deprived of any perfection enjoyed by lower spirits. Besides, a created intellect is simply perfect only when, besides the vision of things in God, it has a vision of things in themselves. God sees all things in Himself comprehensively. Not so the blessed spirits; for these, then, there remains room or another kind of knowledge, and it is meet that Christ should have possessed it. Besides the Divine and the Angelic science, most theologians admit a "science infused *per accidens*," similar to that given to our first parents. See, however, St. Thomas, 3, q. 1, a. 2; and on this whole section, 3, qq. 8–12: 15, a. 2.

## § 142 HOLINESS OF THE HUMAN WILL OF CHRIST

I. As the outpouring of grace on the human intellect of Christ filled it from the beginning with heavenly light, so the effusion of grace on His human will filled this with heavenly warmth, *i.e.* with supernatural power and inclination to all that is morally good, and especially with the sublimest and most ardent love of God, immensely above that of all Saints and Angels. His exalted Holiness was complete from the first: not subject to increase, or change, or loss, or interruption. Such is the perfection of the holiness which the Saints acquire through the Beatific Vision; to the soul of Christ the highest degree of the same moral perfection is natural. For the plenitude of all grace (*gratia consummata*) belongs to it by reason of its substantial union with the Logos: in fact, its Holiness is but the Holiness of a Divine Person in His human nature. Again, the love of self, the most natural of all tendencies, is, in the soul of Christ, the love of God—the love of the Logos for Himself. And as all holiness or moral perfection resolves itself into love of God, it follows that holiness in Christ is not dependent on acts of His free will, but is as necessary and natural as the act by which He loves Himself. All the holy actions of His soul were but manifestations of the natural love which God the Son bears to God the Father.

II. Christ's holiness shines forth most conspicuously in His sinlessness and impeccability. He is "a high-priest, holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners" (Heb. vii. 26; cf. ix.

14, and iv. 15). He is the “Holy” born of the Holy Ghost, without original sin (Luke i. 35). Holy Scripture repeatedly asserts the fact that Christ is without sin, but it nowhere distinctly sets forth His impeccability or inability to commit sin. Tradition, however, is unanimous on this point, which was settled when the Sixth General Council (Third of Constantinople) defined that the human will of Christ cannot be opposed to His Divine will. Christ cannot sin, because He is God. All His actions are the actions of a Divine Person. The Logos controls all the motions of His human soul: to permit a sin in it would be tantamount to committing sin Himself. Again, the soul of Christ has no independent self; it cannot be conceived as acting away from God; hence it lacks the first condition of sin. It also lacks the fundamental form of all sin, viz. love of self as opposed to love of God, for in Christ self-love is Divine Love. These considerations show that Christ’s impeccability is a “metaphysical impossibility to commit sin,” more perfect, therefore, than the physical impossibility to sin granted by the Beatific Vision, or the moral impossibility granted in this life to Saints “confirmed in grace.” Although Christ’s impeccability is grounded on the Hypostatic Union, it is worked or brought about by means of the fulness of His grace.

III. As Christ cannot commit sin, He cannot be tempted from within. When Scripture speaks of the temptations of Christ, it deals with external occasions of practising some virtue, e.g. patience; or with challenges to sin which were temptations only in the mind of those who proposed them.

IV. The perfection of the human will of Christ may be summed up in its conformity with the Divine will: Christ wills all things that God wills and wishes Him to will; and Christ wills them because such is the will of God: “I do always the things that please Him” (John viii. 29). In technical terms, the will of Christ is materially and formally conformed to the will of God. The ground of this conformity lies in this, that the two wills belong to the same Person Who effectively rules His human by His Divine will. Then His Self-love implies Love of the Divine Person and pleasure in all the dispositions of the Divine will. As the will of the Logos is conformed to that of the Father by identity, so the human will of the Son of God is conformed to the same by filial submission. See St. Bonaventure, in 3, dist. 17, a. 1, q. 3.

V. Not only actual sin but all moral imperfection, and whatever may imply a moral stain, is incompatible with the Holiness of Christ. For this reason alone original sin could not have touched Him, even if He had not been exempted from it by His supernatural origin. The exclusion of original sin from Christ, in the sense of the Church, implies the exclusion of all its evil consequences, the full possession of original justice, and especially freedom from the law of concupiscence (*fomes peccati*). See St. Thomas, 3. q. 15.

### § 143 FREE WILL OF CHRIST

I. The Holiness which excludes all possibility of sinning, does not extinguish or prevent the exercise of Christ’s moral liberty. The power of sinning or of performing imperfect actions, is not essential to the notion of free will. The freedom of the will is the more perfect the more the will is inclined to and fixed upon what is morally good.

The exercise of Christ’s free will is, however, essentially distinct from that of creatures here on earth (*in statu viae*). Creatures exercise their free will in order to acquire, by independent choice, that stability in holiness which is not granted to them by nature: a loving union with God is the fruit and the reward of their exertions. Christ, on the contrary, being by reason



of His constitution united to God from the first, can only exercise His free will in order to manifest, *ad extra*, His perfect union with God. The fruit of His actions is the glorification of God and the Atonement for the sins of the world. Their reward consists partly in the final acquisition of the external glory and dominion which were suspended during His life here on earth, and partly in the reunion of mankind with God. Christ's human will, then, is like His Divine will in this, that the moral perfection of neither depends on the exercise of freedom. The two wills are also alike in this, that their moral perfection, though not freely acquired, is their own, and is honourable to them, much more than freely acquired perfection is honourable to creatures. For the moral value of acts of the will is derived from the goodness of their object: an act performed with knowledge of and complacency in a good object, is a good act, whether it be free or not. In technical language, essential liberty gives moral value to acts of the will, even when the will lacks the power of choosing between acting and not acting. Christ possesses holiness by reason of His personal constitution, and therefore in a more perfect manner than creatures, who acquire it by exercising free will.

II. The essential difference between Christ's free will and that of mere creatures does not interfere with His capacity for performing meritorious acts. The Council of Trent (sess. vi. ch. 7) lays down that Christ "merited" our justification, But the notion of merit essentially requires the meritorious action to originate in the agent's free choice, and to be intended for the benefit of him who is to reward it. External compulsion and internal necessity are incompatible with merit. The fact of Christ's freedom from compulsion or internal necessity as regards the work of Redemption, is clearly set forth in Scripture: "I lay down My life for My sheep. . . . Therefore doth the Father love Me because I lay down My life, that I may take it again. No man taketh it away from Me, but I lay it down of myself: and I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again. This commandment I have received from My Father" (John x. 15-18; cf. Is. liii. 7, and Heb. xii. 2).

III. We have now to explain, as far as possible, how the freedom of will displayed in Christ's meritorious actions is consistent with His Holiness. In consequence of the Beatific Vision, the Love of God is not free, but natural to Christ, whence it would seem that all His actions performed for the Love of God are likewise not free, but a natural and necessary consequence of His union with God. Again, His impeccability seems to imply an intrinsic necessity for carrying out at least all Divine commandments. Lastly, the perfect conformity of His human will with the Divine will seems to make it impossible for Him not to perform even such good actions as are not strictly commanded by God.

1. All theologians admit that Christ's love of God is not free. How, then, can actions inspired by this necessary love be free and meritorious? Many authors of great weight suggest that, besides the act of love included in the Beatific Vision, other acts of love exist in Christ, regulated by infused science, and therefore free, like the acts of creatures here on earth. St. Thomas (*De Verit.*, q. 29, a. 6, ad. 6) sees no difficulty in taking as principle of merit the same act by which Christ loves God necessarily. The act of Beatific Vision, according to the Saint, was at the same time in Christ, an act of the Wayfarer (*viatoris*), inasmuch as His Beatific Love moved Him to will and to accomplish freely and willingly, during His mission on earth, the things ordained by God, and thus to gather merit for Himself and others. In fact, it appears quite possible that Christ's Love of God, although itself necessary, gives to the free acts of His humanity their highest moral perfection by investing them with its own moral excellence, which is independent of freedom.

2. Christ cannot sin: He cannot break the Divine commandments. How, then, does He keep them freely, and merit by so keeping them?

The precepts of the natural law, especially affirmative precepts, are vague and undetermined as to the time and circumstances: they leave a wide field for the exercise of free will, even if the will is irresistibly bent on keeping the whole law. Positive commandments—if we admit that any such were binding upon Christ—are more clearly defined than natural laws. Yet even here there is room for the use of free will. Christ could freely fulfil, *e.g.*, the mandate of redeeming us by His death on the cross, by willing His death not as something commanded and inevitable, but by showing Himself ready to die simply because it was the Divine will and pleasure, or because of some other holy motive.

As regards the mandate of Redemption by death, the majority of modern theologians deny its strict obligatory character. The personal dignity and the perfect sanctity of Christ exclude the idea of a commandment so humiliating and so harsh. The Fathers give such a wide meaning to the mandate (*ἐντολή*), that they apply it even to Christ's Divinity. Scripture uses the term to signify not only mandate, but sometimes not more than permission or leave to do something. St. Anselm (*Med.* xi. c. 5) sums up the question thus: "Human nature in this Man suffered nothing from any necessity, but solely from free choice . . . no obedience compelled Him; He was led by His wisdom and power. God did not compel Him to die, but He did freely and willingly (*sponte*) what He knew to be pleasing to the Father and profitable to man. And, as the Father gave Him this good will, although free, we can rightly say that He received it as a precept from the Father." (Cf. St. Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, l. i. ce. 9, lo.)

3. The above solutions do not meet the difficulty arising from the fact that, because of His Holiness, Christ infallibly fulfilled all God's wishes as well as orders, and that these Divine wishes and ordinances, which extended to every detail of His life, were known to Him. (Cf. Matt. xxvi. 54.)

This very serious difficulty has no better solution than that proposed by the school of St. Thomas. If the will of Christ, independently of the wishes, ordinances, and foreknowledge of God, had the physical power to omit an action, then He retains this same power when under the influence of the said wishes and ordinances; for these do not alter Him intrinsically. It lies in the nature of Divine ordinances addressed to a free will to appeal to its freedom of action, just as the Divine prescience of free actions presupposes their freedom. The external circumstances under consideration cause the free decision to take place without fail. The result, however, is not due to a restriction of the natural power of the will. It is due to the fulness of its perfection which enables it to tend to whatever is good, without being liable to misdirect its choice; or to the readiness of Christ's most holy will always to conform to the will of God. The certainty that a given choice will be made is not sufficient, by itself, to destroy the intrinsic liberty of the choice; to destroy liberty, the certainty of the choice must be caused by intrinsic impossibility to act otherwise. But does not Christ's knowledge of God's will and foreknowledge impose upon His will an antecedent moral necessity to conform to them? It does so, in fact; yet this moral necessity is not such as to impair the freedom required for meritorious actions: it is not an inner moral necessity, such as would lay the will under the irresistible influence of some good, and induce it to act without choice. The impossibility for Christ to act against God's decrees known to Him must be put on a par with the impossibility for us to act against God's decrees unknown to us: neither impossibility affects the choice of free will.

IV. Christ's human will is the will of God-Man: its free operations are unlike those of mere human wills; they are "theandric" or divine-human operations reflecting the peculiarities of the Divine freedom. Holy Scripture at one time speaks of the Son Whom the Father has sent into the world, Who executes the Paternal mandate, and in all things does what pleases the Father; at another time it speaks of the Son equal to the Father, freely debasing Himself to the rank of servant and to a shameful death; again, it represents Him as the good Shepherd, who, having power over life and death, freely chooses to die for His flock. In all this we see the human will of Christ in organic union with the Divine will as in the Logos. The two wills aim at the same objects, and the human will is set forth as acting in union with the Father, and with the same dignity and power as the will of God the Son. An example of the harmonious and organic co-operation of the two wills is given in Phil. ii. 6, 7: "Who (Christ) being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal to God, but debased Himself, taking the form of a servant," etc. Here the act of the Logos taking the form of man is necessarily an act of His Divine will, whereas the subsequent humiliation unto death is primarily the act of His human will. The human will of Christ is as infallibly conformed to His Divine will as this is conformed to the will of the Father through identity of essence. The conformity in both cases results from inspiration and love, rather than from command; in the human will it is a kind of filial submission to the Divine. The obedience of Christ, upon which the Apostle insists, viz. His works in the form of servant were not, as in other creatures, a natural duty towards God, but only claimed by God as a free service of love: such burthens and sacrifices could not be due by Christ because of His innocence, nor could they be imposed on Him without impairing His dignity as Lord of all things. With us merit is acquired by giving to God either what He exacts or might exact from us by right; Christ merits by freely renouncing His rights for the love of God. We pay the lawful tribute of our servitude; Christ freely submits to a servitude not intended for Him (cf. Heb. x. 1 sqq., v. 7 sqq.). For this reason the time for meriting ceased with the earthly life of Christ: in His glory He cannot offer the services of a servant. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 18; Franzelin, thes. xlv.

#### § 144 VALUE OF CHRIST'S ACTIONS AS ACTS OF WORSHIP

I. Theologians distinguish a threefold value in every good work: (a) the "substantial" or essential value arising from its own intrinsic goodness; (b) an "accidental" value accruing to it from the accidental holiness of the agent; and (c) a "personal" value derived from the personal dignity of the same agent. Each and all of the works of Christ were performed in the service of God, directly tending to His honour and glory; they proceeded from the fountain-head of all holiness; and they were the actions of a Divine Person. They were, therefore, the best of works, done with the highest amount of Divine Love, and by the most excellent Being. The infinite worth of their author communicates itself to the works of Christ and gives them infinite value (see § 101, II).

Closely connected with, yet distinct from, the value of Christ's actions, is their efficacy for merit and atonement. This value and efficacy are related as cause and effect. The intrinsic value of an action may be compared to the intrinsic value of a coin; its efficacy to the coin's value as money. The Church uses the term *valor* to express both the intrinsic and the effective value of the Redeemer's actions.

II. The intrinsic value of moral actions is determined by their relation to the final object of all morality: the honour and glory of God. The character and the measure of the honour

and glory of God arising out of an action (*obsequium Deo præstitum*) determine the action's intrinsic value. The moral works of Christ, owing to His personal excellence, give to God an honour quite unique in its kind and exaltedness. The acting principle (*principium quod*), the Man Christ, is a Divine Person subsisting in a human nature. The principle by which (*principium quo*) the actions are performed is a human nature united to, and, as it were, animated by the Divine Person, whose organ it is. But the greatness of honour rendered is commensurate with the dignity of the person who renders it. Again, the essence of giving honour consists in the submission of self to the person honoured. Hence, if we consider Christ as the honour-giving Subject, we find that the honour He gives acquires a peculiar excellence from the dignity of the Personal Principle who, in His human nature, submits Himself to God. Lastly, Christ is not only the principle and the subject, but also the subject-matter of His honorific actions. The worship of God—if not also other honorific actions—is a reflexive act: its principle and subject offers and subjects itself to God as a tribute of honour. Now, as a rule, the value of the tribute measures the greatness of the honour intended to be conferred: hence the worship of Christ, offering and subjecting Himself to the Father, is of unique, viz. of Divine value.

The specific value of Christ's worship is most manifest from this last point of view, especially in His abasement and in His death. By His voluntary abasement He renounced the exercise of His rights of Lord of all things, and offered to God a sacrifice immensely superior to the affective sacrifice by which a creature offers to God that which already is God's own. By His death He renounced and sacrificed His own Self. To sum up—the formal reason of the specific value of the actions of the Man Christ, as distinguished from those of other men, is best expressed thus: The adequate principle of Christ's actions is a Man who, even as Man, is, owing to His anointment, vested with Divine glory and holiness, and possesses the rank and character of Lord and of natural Son of God.

III. The influence of the Hypostatic Union on the actions of Christ gives them infinite value, in the same manner as it gives infinite dignity to His Body. Their value is not only relatively or comparatively, but absolutely infinite, viz. not only does it surpass any given value, or the value of all other moral actions put together, but it is equal to the infinite glory and holiness which entitle the Man Christ to Divine Worship or Adoration. Their infinitude, then, consists primarily in this, that they adequately contain the full honour to which the Divine Majesty is entitled. Hence their value cannot be equalled by the value of all actual and possible good actions of mere creatures. Especially the honour which Christ gives to God by humbling Himself is at least equivalent to all the dishonour to God arising from the sins, real and possible, of creatures.

The subtle difficulties adduced by Scotists and Nominalists against the infinite value of Christ's actions fall to the ground if the nature of that infinitude be well kept in mind. It is a participation in the "value for honour" (= honour-value) essential to Divine acts, in the same way as Christ's adorability is a participation in Divine Dignity. St. Thomas, 3, q. 1, a. 2; Franzelin, thes. xlvi.

## § 145 MERITORIOUSNESS OF CHRIST'S HUMAN ACTIONS

I. The human actions of Christ, in addition to their eminent power for giving honour and glory to God, possess that peculiar efficacy which, in the wayfaring state (*in statu viæ*), gives

the doer of good a claim to supernatural advantages. This efficacy is “impetratory,” inasmuch as impetration (*patrando obtinere*) connotes successful striving after a thing or fulfilment of a desire. The term “impetratory,” however, does not sufficiently point out that the success of the striving or wishing is consequence and fruit of the successful action itself. In order to express the congruency or necessity of granting to the author of moral tending or acting the good he wishes to acquire, and to grant it on the ground of the worth (worthiness) he displays in his moral action, we must describe the efficacy in question as “impetratory and meritorious.” Each term connotes a particular form of efficacy; impetration points to wishing and praying; merit to actual work in the service of God. Taken in organic connections, the two terms set forth all intermediate forms or means of efficacious striving after supernatural goods.

Later Schoolmen speak of the “moral” efficacy of Christ’s actions, inasmuch as they appeal to the will of another, and as they imply “moral worth” on the part of their Author. But the worth of the doer or good does not, by itself, imply the success of his actions. The notion of a right or title to success must be added. “Moral and juridical, or ethico-juridical efficacy,” is the adequate expression. The title to success may lie in the acceptance or ratification by God, as in the prayers of Saints; or it may lie in the action itself, as in the case of Christ, whose acts, from their very nature, possess infallible efficacy: for in these the human will works with Divine power.

II. 1. Christ being God, and one God with the Father, is physically the same Person Who merits and rewards, Who prays and answers His prayers. The double function is rendered possible by the coexistence of Christ’s two wills: He acts as Man and as God, virtually as a double Person.

2. Christ, even as Man, has the power to grant all that can be prayed or worked for. Yet this power is not inherent in His Humanity, it only belongs to His Humanity as organ of His Divinity (*ministerialiter* or *instrumentaliter*). By an ordinance of God and of Christ Himself, the exercise of such instrumental power may be made dependent on prayer or meritorious work on the part of Christ’s humanity. Thus the possibility of prayer and merit remains intact.

3. Christ’s humanity cannot acquire any greater glory and honour or a better title to these than its Hypostatic Union with the Logos. Hence His meritorious actions can add nothing to His perfection or to His title to it. Their effect is simply to make Him worthy of Divine goods “in a new manner.” And, in order to obtain this result, it was necessary that Christ should act in the form of a servant, praying and serving God after the manner of a mere creature.

4. In Christ there was no necessity of prayer and meritorious works. Whatever these can obtain, is Christ’s own by birthright (Ps. ii. 7 sqq.). Nay, by birthright also He could claim the distribution of Divine gifts to others for His own external glory. As Head and member of our race, He was entitled, on the sole ground of His personal dignity, and without any further meritorious work, to claim for us a participation in His Divine privileges.

5. Hence a necessity of meritorious works can only be derived from a positive ordinance of God and of Christ Himself, to the effect that Christ should act as Servant of God (*in persona et habitu servi*). The direct object of this dispensation was that Christ, as servant of God and as representative of man, should by His merits obtain what mankind was bound but unable to obtain by itself. Hence he had to adopt the form of service natural to man: suffering and suppliant prayer. The indirect object of the same economy was the acquisition by personal merit of those gifts and privileges which Christ renounced in His voluntary

abasement. The necessity of meriting, then, was “economical” in a twofold sense: it was a positive dispensation in favour of, and a free accommodation to the position of, others. Even when Christ prayed “for Himself,” He did so partly to set us an example, partly to make us benefit implicitly by His prayer.

6. In fine, the meritorious work of Christ tended to pour out His own Holiness on mankind, and to transfigure and glorify the lower part of His own humanity. Thus His merits tend to spread “the Divine Anointment” from the Head to the body: in Himself from His higher to His lower Being; in mankind, from the mystical Head to subordinate personal members.

III. The intrinsic value of Christ’s actions being infinite, their power of meriting is necessarily infinite also: no Divine gift is possible which Christ cannot by His merits purchase at its full value (*i.e.* merit *de condigno*); no other merit is possible which is not surpassed by, and virtually contained in, the merit of Christ. No finite reward can adequately remunerate His merit; no amount of other merit, not even that possible to all possible creatures, can equal it. This doctrine was opposed by Scotists and Nominalists, but has been for centuries universally admitted.

1. It is the intrinsic value or power for merit which is infinite: the reward actually obtained is finite.

2. The infinitude of Christ’s merits does not imply that they at once “bind” God to grant them a commensurate reward, or to accept them as title to such reward. God is only bound by His own promise. Yet, independently of the Divine promise, works which Christ wishes to be rewarded, receive their reward infallibly, thanks to the excellence of His personal dignity and to the organic co-operation of His two wills. No opposition is possible between the unconditional intentions of the will which merits and the will which rewards. Christ’s human will cannot unconditionally desire a reward except on the knowledge that God has decreed to grant such reward. We may, then, sum up Christ’s power for merit in the formula: “Christ effectively obtains all that He wishes to obtain and all that God has decreed should be effectively obtained.”

3. Although a reward actually infinite is not necessarily connected with Christ’s infinite merit, yet such infinite reward, specifically commensurate with the merit, is assigned to them. Holy Scripture points out, as reward of the Saviour’s work, His exaltation to Divine honours given Him by God and man (Phil. ii. 9 sqq.); a privilege which can only be bought by infinite merit. Again, sanctifying grace, acquired by Christ for others, is of infinite value, because it gives a claim to the immediate possession and fruition of God Himself. No mere creature can merit it adequately (*de condigno*); even when possessed, it merely entitles its holder to an increase and to the completion of itself. But Christ adequately merits sanctifying grace for creatures entirely unable to merit it themselves, and hence His meritorious work is remunerated by a good of infinite value.

4. The infinitude of Christ’s meritorious actions, being based upon the excellence of their Author, is not restricted either to any one of them or to their sum total; it belongs to each and all. Hence the same reward can be merited by several separate acts. Moreover, as the reward depends upon a Divine ordination and Christ’s own intention, it is possible for the reward to be granted only to a certain number of acts organically connected. As a matter of fact the merit of the whole work of Christ was made dependent on its supreme act, the sacrifice on the Cross.

An almost perfect analogy for the infinite meriting power of Christ and its effects is found in the Divine omnipotence and its creations.

IV. The infinitude of Christ's merit implies that He can adequately merit all things whatsoever mere creatures, and also Himself, may pray for; and further, that His prayer itself is an act of merit sufficient to obtain whatsoever is prayed for. There is, however, another point of view from which the impetratory power of His prayer appears infinite. The infinite loveliness of the Son of God requires that the Father should not refuse to His prayers any of the gifts which He, to a certain extent, grants to the prayers of the just and even of sinners. Many Greek Fathers corroborate this view from Heb. v. 7, "He was heard for His reverence" (*ἀπὸ τῆς ἐδλαβείας*). They take "His reverence" to mean the esteem which God the Father has for His Son; for prayer is answered in proportion to the esteem which God has for him who prays, whereas merit derives its value from the esteem which he who merits shows to God, and the prayer of creatures only appeals to God's Love and Mercy. Christ's unconditional (absolute) prayers are infallibly answered: otherwise the constant assertions of Scripture that Christ's prayers are certain of success would have no sense; and Christ's Divine will would oppose His human will. His prayer in the Garden was conditional: "My Father, *if it be possible*, let this chalice pass from Me" (Matt. xxvi. 39).

V. Another consequence of the infinite value of Christ's merit is that it can obtain for any number of other persons all the privileges of supernatural grace and glory. In this respect it is "the merit of the Mediator," inasmuch as Christ obtains privileges for others in His quality of Mediator, and transfers His own rights to His clients. The merit of the Mediator is often described as "Merit of the Head" (*meritum capitis*), to point out how and why the superabundant merits of the Head of mankind overflow upon the members of His mystical Body.

VI. When Christ acts with a view of meriting for Himself or others, He acts in the person of servant, and His claim to reward is, after all, like that of mere creatures, founded upon the Divine promise of acceptance of His work; technically, on a *pactum divinum*.<sup>2</sup> Christ, however, acts not only in the person of a servant; He acts also as "minister of God," and as such in the person of Lord. His position is that of a steward or minister, with special powers to administer his master's goods, who acts at the same time as representative of the master to the servants, and as representative of the servants to the master. Hence Christ's meritorious works bear a twofold character: they call for a reward as works of a servant; and their success is guaranteed as works approved and accepted by the Lord. Again, Christ being the representative and organ of the "Lord" in such a way as to be also Lord Himself, His guarantee of success is tantamount to a disposition of His own goods, made by the owner himself. St. Paul insinuates this when he connects the acquisition of heavenly goods by Christ with the idea that Christ's sacrifice was like the death of the testator, who disposes of his own goods (Heb. ix. 16). From this point of view, the "merit of the Mediator and Head" appears in a new light. It is a merit sufficient in itself to obtain supernatural goods, not only because the Mediator, as representative of His clients, makes them perfectly worthy of the said goods, but also because the Mediator and Head, in the name and power of God, grants and gives full legal possession of the acquired goods to His clients and members. It is the substantial anointing of Christ through the Grace of Union which constitutes Him, not merely a Servant holy and

<sup>2</sup>"Divine bargain" or "agreement." —Ed.

pleasing to God, but likewise a participator in the power and lordship of God Himself, a Holy Lord and a Royal High-priest, and thus secures the perfection of His merit as Mediator and Head. We are therefore justified in saying that the efficacy of Christ's work is not due to the Divine promise or pact alone, but that it has its root and origin in the Hypostatic Union. "Christ did not glorify Himself to be made a high priest, but He that said to Him: Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee" (Heb. v. 5). See St. Thomas, 3, qq. 19, 21.

#### § 146 SPECIFIC POWER OF CHRIST'S HUMANITY TO PRODUCE SUPERNATURAL EFFECTS

I. In the preceding section we have dealt with Christ's power of meriting supernatural goods. A question now arises as to the share of Christ's humanity in the production of these Divine goods. Does He only procure them in the sense that His merit moves God to confer the goods, or does He participate in the Divine producing power, so as to have a direct part in their production? In technical language: Is Christ's influence on the production of supernatural goods merely ethico-juridical, or also organico-dynamical? We hold, with the Fathers and St. Thomas, that Christ, besides His ethico-juridical power, possesses a "Divine dynamic power," viz. that He participates in that supernatural and spiritual power of God from which proceed all Divine benefactions and graces relating to the salvation of creatures; whether they be physical operations, such as miraculous healings and the granting of sanctifying grace, or juridical acts, such as the remission of sins and legislation. In the exercise of this Divine power, the humanity of Christ acts as an instrument of the Divinity, that is, in formal connection with the superior Divine power: as an official acts in the name or by the authority of the king, and as a tool works through the skill of the artist. He is, however, instrumental after the manner of a mystico-physical organ of the Divinity: the "flesh of the Word," being "eminently" actuated and informed by His Divinity, is the seat, the bearer, the vehicle of the Divine power; this power works through it in the same way as the powers of the human soul work through the organs of the body (*supra*, p. 42).

II. Christ's humanity possessed the power of producing supernatural effects, at least in the form of the grace of miracles and of the ministerial power held by the ministers of the Sacraments; and He possessed this power to its fullest extent from the beginning. Such power was necessary for the objects of His mission, and as part of the fulness of His grace. The power of Christ, however, differs in many ways from the analogous power in mere creatures. It is universal, embracing all supernatural effects within the domain of creation; it is transferable to others, and not bound up with fixed forms and ceremonies; it is natural to Christ, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost is His own Spirit by substantial union. For this latter reason the supernatural works of Christ are produced by a power corporally dwelling in Him, although not inherent in His human nature; whereas similar works of creatures are produced by a power external to them.

The Fathers teach the Divine virtue and power of Christ's humanity, as here described, in connection with the life-giving power of His flesh in Holy Eucharist. They attribute this *δύναμις ζωοποιός, vis vivifica*, of the Flesh to its impregnation with Divinity, and consider it as an essential element of the *θεώσις* (deification) and of the spiritualisation (1 Cor. xv. 45) of Christ's humanity. So little do they doubt this power, that they use it against the Nestorians as one of the chief arguments in proof of the physical reality of the Hypostatic Union. (For passages of the Fathers, see Petavius, l. x. c. 2.)



III. Holy Scripture sets forth the same doctrine in many ways.

1. The principle is laid down that "God anointed Him (Jesus) with the Holy Ghost and with power; Who went about doing good . . ." (Acts x, 38). The union of Christ with the Holy Ghost is substantial.

2. The working of the power received through the Anointing appears where Christ calls His Flesh as true a food as bread (John vi.); but bread is a substance which nourishes by its own physical power. "Virtue went out from Him and healed all" (Luke vi. 19, and viii. 46), evidently attributes a Divine power to Christ's body. The Fathers connect this healing "virtue" with the vivifying power of Christ's Body in the Holy Eucharist.

3. Christ is the principle of our life after the manner in which God is the principle of Christ's life: "As the living Father has sent Me, and I live by the Father; so he that eateth Me, the same also shall live by Me" (John vi. 58). Hence Christ stands between us and the Father as an "organic" mediator.

4. The Scriptural figures of Christ, the true Vine, the Head of the Church, and the comparison "the first man Adam was made a living soul, the last man a quickening spirit" (1 Cor. xv. 45), are almost meaningless if Christ's humanity is not organically active in the granting of supernatural life.

IV. 1. The form in which the power under consideration is exercised, may be stated as follows: Although Christ's whole humanity is the organ of His Divinity, yet the Divine Union chiefly impregnates the soul and thence spreads to the flesh. The human will, then, can pronounce the "word of His power" (Heb. i. 3) upon which supernatural effects will follow, on the ground of its mystical and organic relation to the Divine will. As the acts of Christ's human will essentially belong to the Person of the Logos and proceed from Him, they are intrinsically and essentially impregnated with the co-operating Divine power. The supernatural effect follows upon them, not as the answer to a prayer or the fulfilment of a promise, but in obedience to the "word of power" uttered in the name and authority of God. What is true of Christ's will, is likewise true of all His human actions, in as far as these are dependent on the will. In order to acknowledge the dependence of His power on Divine co-operation, Christ often accompanies its exercise with prayer and thanksgiving (*e.g.* Matt. xxvi. 26, *et passim*). Through such prayer the organic relation becomes also an ethical (moral) relation; the prayer itself is like the spiritual absorption of the influence of the spiritual power to which the soul is connected organically.

2. The Body of Christ, as well as His soul, is invested with Divinity. Christ clearly implies this in His teaching on the Eucharist (John vi., *et passim*), and the Fathers so much insist upon this point that sometimes they appear to know of no other "vivifying power" in Christ's humanity.

3. By means of the blood the soul maintains the vegetative life of the body. The blood, as a vehicle of life, represents the life-giving power of God in a special manner: in Christ the Blood is like a stream of Divine power and life. Nay, the Eucharistic Flesh is a life-giving Bread because it contains the vivifying Blood of Christ. For this reason also Christ could speak of the necessity of drinking His Blood without making the chalice obligatory to all: the Blood is taken with the Flesh.

4. The power of Christ as organ of the Divinity, being a participation in the Divine Power, works also under the same external conditions as the Divine Omnipotence. Thus it is not restricted to space. As a matter of fact, in the Holy Eucharist the power is exercised by contact;

but this is not as a matter of necessity. Again, according to St. Thomas, Christ can perform acts which will have their effect at a future time. *E.g.* the institution of the Sacraments, which act virtually contained the future effects of the Sacraments, in analogy to the act of the law-giver which binds future generations.

V. The power of Christ as organ of God is the complement of His ethico-juridical power. These are not two heterogeneous powers, but work together organically. They have the same object, the salvation of man; and the same root, the union of Christ's humanity with Divinity, which diffuses both the odour of sweetness and the odour of virtue (*odor suavitatis et virtutis*). The authoritative power of Christ's will completes to perfection the meritorious efficiency of His acts, and the same is at the foundation of all His physical works of power. The same act, or set of acts, *e.g.* the Passion, may be and probably is endowed with twofold efficiency: meritorious efficiency on account of Christ's personal dignity; dynamic efficiency on account of His investment with Divine power. St. Thomas attributes to the Passion an "effective virtue" in addition to its merit; and the Greek Fathers attribute its saving force to the dynamic power of Christ as Divine organ. The same notion seems implied in Heb. ix. 13 sqq.: "For if the blood of goats and of oxen . . . sanctify such as are defiled . . . how much more shall the blood of Christ, Who through the Holy Ghost (Πνεύματος αἰωνίου) offered Himself unspotted to God, cleanse our conscience from dead works . . ."

VI. The language of the Church attributes a certain efficacy to events in Christ's life which cannot be classed with meritorious actions. Thus His Resurrection and Ascension, His death and burial, even the opening of His side after death, are styled mysteries of salvation (*sacramenta salutis*). They have first a certain efficacy as symbols, types, and pledges of similar events ordained to take place in redeemed man. St. Thomas, however, and after him the Catechism of the Council of Trent (Part I. ch. 6, n. 13), also attribute to them an "efficient" causality, for which no better reason can be found than Christ's power as organ of the Divinity; *e.g.* the Resurrection of Christ "virtually" contains ours, because the virtue or power of Christ's will is such that the act by which He willed His Resurrection to be a type of ours, is also sufficient to warrant our resurrection. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 50, a. 6; q. 56, a. 1.

## C. STATES AND MYSTERIES OF CHRIST'S HUMAN LIFE

### § 147 THE VARIOUS STATES OF CHRIST'S LIFE IN GENERAL

I. Christ, being in the form of God (Phil. ii. 6), had the right and the power to appear, even in His humanity, as "equal to God," viz. with the Divine power and glory which He now enjoys sitting at the right hand of the Father. But His mission to man for the service of God made it necessary for Him "to suffer, and so to enter into His glory" (Luke xxiv. 26); as for Him, "the author of salvation," to be made perfect "by His passion" (Heb. ii. 10); as Head and Mediator of mankind, He had to be made like unto His members and His clients (Heb. ii. 10; v. 7 sqq.; vii. 27, 28). Hence Christ adopted a life similar, in its successive stages, to the life of man here below.

II. The Apostles' Creed divides the life of Christ into three stages. First, the stage of abasement: "Born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified and died." Second, the stage of transition: "Was buried, and descended into hell." Third, the stage of exaltation: "He rose from the dead, ascended into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of

the Father.” The opposition between the states of abasement and of exaltation is a favourite theme of St. Paul’s (1 Cor. xv.; Phil ii.; cf. Heb. it and ii; also Ps. ii., xxi., and cix.).

### § 148 THE STATE OF ABASEMENT (ΚΕΝΩΣΙΣ)—IMPERFECTIONS IN BODY AND SOUL ASSUMED BY CHRIST

I. The state of abasement consists in the assumption of humanity and the simultaneous occultation of Divinity. The assumption of our nature by the Logos, if accompanied by a complete manifestation of His power and glory, would not be an abasement, but an act of gracious condescension. But He, to whom perfect glory was due from the beginning, chose to lower Himself not only to the position of our First Parents before the Fall, but to the condition of “the sons of man.” He began life as an infant, lowly, weak, and dependent on others, and only gradually attained the ripeness of manhood in which Adam was created. Placed by His birth among sinners, He renounced some of the privileges of His original justice and integrity, and submitted—as far as consistent with His dignity and conducive to the salvation of man—to the imperfections of human nature, and to the ordinances and laws to which human nature is subject. He thus did homage to God sufficient to redeem His brethren; He ennobled lowliness, and showed its value in the service of God; He set us a perfect example of all virtues, but especially of humility, patience, and mercy; He acquired a perfect title to our love.

II. The likeness of Christ in His abasement to the fallen sons of Adam does not comprise the actual loss of justice and sanctity, but only the pains and penalties attached to the loss. These pains and penalties fall partly on the body, partly on the soul, and consist in a liability to suffer from internal and external causes.

1. As regards the body, Christ resembled fallen man in that He was subject to most of the pains consequent upon bodily exertion and adverse external influences, *e.g.* fatigue, hunger, wounds. These sufferings were natural to Christ, inasmuch as they had a sufficient reason in the nature of His body: they could only be avoided by either avoiding their causes, or by suspending the action of these causes. But Christ, unlike His brethren, had a right to be free from actual suffering (because of His holiness), and His human will had the power either to remove or to suspend the action of all causes of pain. Hence in Christ the natural necessity of suffering was entirely subject to His free will: He suffered nothing which He did not choose to suffer (Isa. liii. 7; John x. 17, 18).

Some bodily pains or states are not compatible with the dignity of Christ or useful to the objects of His mission: these He did not choose to suffer. Such are corruption (*φθορά*), disease (not weakness or wounds), and decomposition after death. A body inhabited by the all-preserving power of God could not be given over to corruption; the body of the eminently Holy One could not be submitted to a decomposition which is the image of the destroying power of sin. “Thou wilt not give Thy Holy One to see corruption” (Ps. xv. 10). Disease is the beginning of corruption, and was therefore excluded from Christ’s body. Other reasons are given by theologians: diseases are due to particular influences, not to the general weakness of our nature, which is all that Christ assumed; Christ’s body, formed by the Holy Ghost, did not contain the germ of disease any more than did the body of Adam created by God.

2. The natural weaknesses of the soul, the “passions” of the sensitive and rational appetites, were also retained in the soul of Christ, yet with a twofold restriction.

(a) The inordinate and sinful motions to which the soul of fallen man is exposed, found no place in the soul of Christ. They are inconsistent with His perfect holiness, and they cannot be used as means for the ends of His state of abasement. Only passions or affections of the soul, which are morally blameless (*πάθη ἀδιέβλητα*), and which in fallen man are pains or penalties, inasmuch as they cause the soul to suffer or to be disturbed, are useful to Christ's ends, and therefore were permitted to coexist with His divinity and spiritual perfection. Such are the feelings of fear and sadness (Matt. xxvi. 37; Mark xiv. 33, 34), and the share which the soul has in the sufferings of the body.

(b) Although sadness (*tristitia*) and other painful feelings affected the soul of Christ, they did not originate and act in Christ as they do in man after the Fall. The soul of Christ, like that of Adam before he sinned, possessed the power to prevent all such affects: their origin, intensity, and duration were alike dependent on His free choice. Moreover, He possessed the still greater power to prevent such emotions from having any disturbing effect on the operations of His soul and on His peace of mind. Fear and sadness are indeed a disturbance of the mind; yet they only upset the peace of mind when the mind resists the disturbance, which in Christ was not the case: He freely admitted the emotion, and exactly regulated its working.

The Fathers prove Christ's power of regulating the emotion of His soul from John xi. 33: "Jesus, when He saw her (Mary, the sister of Lazarus) weeping . . . *troubled Himself*," viz. allowed the feeling of compassion to affect Him. See St. Augustine, *In Joan.* tr. lx.

III. To complete His abasement Christ chose to submit Himself to His Foster-father and His Mother; to the laws of the state, and to the positive laws of God. Yet instances occurred in which Christ by word and deed asserted His independence of all such laws. There was a special abasement in His submitting to the rite of circumcision and to the baptism of John, both of which were intended for sinners. Lastly, He took His social rank among the poor and lowly, and shared their hardships and privations. See St. Thomas, 3, qq. 14, 15.

## § 149 COMBINATION OF VARIOUS HUMAN STATES IN CHRIST

I. The possession of two natures so widely different as the Divine and the human, places Christ simultaneously in widely different states. His soul was united with God and filled with the plenitude of sanctity, like the souls of the Blessed. His will had power over the forces and elements of nature sufficient to render them innocuous, like Adam in the state of integrity. But as He refrained from the use of this power, and willingly submitted to the penalties of sin, He placed Himself in the state of man after the Fall.

II. A considerable difficulty arises here from the natural incompatibility of the highest beatitude implied in the Beatific Vision, with the extreme of wretchedness suffered especially during the Passion (Matt. xxvi. 38). St. Thomas, and after him the majority of theologians, propose the following solution: The highest joy and the deepest misery cannot coexist *naturally* in the same soul, for they are opposed to one another. They cannot even coexist *supernaturally*, *i.e.* by a miracle, if they are to be felt in the same mental faculty, and to bear on exactly the same object. As, however, there are various faculties and, as it were, various regions in the soul; as, again, the same object may be considered under different aspects, and thus appeal differently to our faculties, we can understand that the soul of Christ, in its superior region, was filled with joy at the vision of God, whilst sadness for the sins of man afflicted its

inferior region. Likewise His Passion considered as leading to the Redemption of mankind was a source of joy, whilst that same Passion gave intense pain to His body and soul. But as, on account of the unity and simplicity of the soul, the pleasures and pains of one faculty or of one region are felt by all other faculties and in all other regions, it may be asked how the infinite pleasure of the Beatific Vision did not render the soul of Christ inaccessible to sadness or pain of any kind. Or, on the other hand, how did His agony not interfere with His heavenly beatitude? It was a miracle: Christ, by His Divine power, prevented the feelings of one faculty from overflowing into and affecting any other. St. Thomas, 3, q. 46, aa. 7, 8.

## § 147 THE PASSION OF CHRIST

I. The voluntary abasement of Christ attained its lowest depth in His Passion and ignominious death. But He died “according to the Scriptures” (1 Cor. xv. 3, 4), viz. as foretold by the Prophets and by Himself, and thus His death impressed the seal of divinity on His whole mission. The prophecies of Christ’s Passion in the Old Testament are expressed in words and in types. The Proto-evangelium itself contains the germ of such a prophecy, but its fullest statement is to be found in the Psalms, especially in Ps. xxi., and in Isaias lii. 3; liii. 12. Daniel (ix. 26) points out the time of Christ’s death. Zacharias concludes the prophecies of the Old Testament referring to the Passion (xi. 12 sqq.; xii. 10, cf. John xix. 39; xiii. 7, cf. Matt. xxvi. 31). Types of the Passion are the Sacrifice of Isaac, the Brazen Serpent (Num. xxi. 9; cf. John iii. 14), Jonas, the Paschal Lamb and the bloody sacrifices of the Mosaic Law. For Christ’s own predictions, see Matt. xvi. 21; Luke xviii. 3; Matt. xxvi. 24; Luke xxiv. 35, 44 sqq.

II. It was not physically necessary for Christ to suffer death. Many other ways were open to Him to effect the salvation of mankind. Yet as this way had actually been chosen by God and foretold by the Prophets, Christ was under a moral necessity of accepting it. “Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise again from the dead the third day; and that penance and remission of sins should be preached in His Name unto all nations” (Luke xxiv. 46, 47).

III. Independently of the soldiers who actually crucified Christ, several other efficient causes of His death must be considered, viz. God and Christ Himself, His human persecutors, and the powers of hell.

1. The repeated assertion of Scripture that God gave His Son for us, or handed Him over to His enemies, implies a direct intention on the part of God, and of Christ Himself as God, that the Saviour should suffer death. The Divine intention directly bore on the good arising out of Christ’s sufferings, viz. the glory of God and the salvation of mankind. Hence God caused the sufferings, inasmuch as He gave Christ the mandate to suffer, and inspired Him with the willingness to carry out the mandate, at the same time permitting the immediate authors of the Passion to work unchecked. He intended the Passion as a means to higher ends, and did not prevent it as He might have done.

2. In the same manner Christ Himself caused His own Passion and death. His complying with the Divine mandate is a perfect act of obedience, such as the final object of the Passion (Rom. v. 19) and the perfection of His self-sacrifice required. Directly, the Saviour caused, e.g. His sadness (*tristitia*) for the sins of man and the Agony in the Garden; indirectly, the persecutions which His open and fearless teaching challenged, and which He did not resist with His Divine power. Hence His sufferings exhibit the most perfect self-sacrifice: He died

of His own will, renouncing the use of His Divine power to save Himself, and using His dominion over His own life to lay it down as the perfect victim of His great Sacrifice (Isa. liii. 7; John x. 17, 18).

3. Besides the soldiers who crucified Jesus, three moral causes of His death are to be considered: Judas, who delivered Him to the Jews; the Jews who, moved by hatred, gave Him up to the Romans; and the Roman authorities who, to please the Jews, commanded the crucifixion. The cooperation of human causes was necessary if Christ had to die the shameful death of the cross. God permitted this greatest of crimes in order to make sin subservient to its own destruction. The sin of the Jews, taken objectively, differs from all other sins in this, that it directly strikes at a Divine Person, whereas all other sins only affect the Divinity externally. Taken subjectively, the guilt of the deicides was diminished in many by their ignorance, however culpable that ignorance may have been. For these the Saviour implored forgiveness with His last breath. "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do" (Luke xxiii. 34); although He had said of them, after the Last Supper, "All these things they will do to you for My Name's sake, because they know not Him that sent Me. If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin. He that hateth Me, hateth My Father also. If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin; but now they have both seen and hated both Me and the Father" (John xv. 21-24).

4. The human causes of Christ's passion were the instruments of Satan, under whose instigation they acted. The hatred of the Jews towards Christ is ascribed by Scripture to the devil, and so, too, is the treason of Judas. The Fathers dwell on this point in connection with the Proto-evangelium, in which they see foretold the great war between Christ and Satan, ending in the crushing of Satan's head under the heel of Christ. From many passages in Holy Scripture it is certain that the devil, though perhaps not from the beginning, knew of Christ's divinity, although he may have been ignorant of the mystery of the Redemption and its benefits to mankind (1 Cor. ii. 8) In his hatred of God, he did his utmost to put the Man-God to death (St. Thomas, 3, q. 47).

IV. Christ suffered something from all external causes which can inflict pain upon man; but from organic disease He was free on account of His supernatural perfection. Heathens and Jews, princes and their servants, and His own Apostles, contributed their share to His sufferings. He suffered in all that is dear to man: in His friends, who deserted Him; in His honour and good name through insults and blasphemy; in His possessions, when even His garments were taken from Him; in His soul through sadness and sorrow; in His body through blows and wounds—nay, in all the members of His body, and in all His senses. The pains He suffered exceeded all those which man can suffer in this life: not only because of their bitterness and their number, but also because of the supernatural perfection of the Sufferer's constitution, and of His voluntary assuming an amount of suffering proportionate to the end for which He suffered, viz. the liberation of man from sin. Read St. Thomas. 3, q. 46, aa. 5, 6; Newman, "On the Mental Sufferings of Christ" (*Sermons to Mixed Congregations*).

## § 14€ THE STATE OF CHRIST BETWEEN HIS DEATH AND HIS RESURRECTION

I. The Son of man after death "descended into hell," thus sharing to the end the common lot of His brethren. But although His body and soul were separated from one another, they

both remained united to the Divine Person. Even after death Christ possessed a body and a soul, and thus was still man in a fuller sense than the other dead. The Person of Christ was at the same time in Limbo and in the sepulchre; yet all that belongs to His Person was in neither place.<sup>ε</sup>

II. The entombment of Christ confirms His death, and so shows the miracle of the Resurrection in a clearer light. It also symbolizes the death of sin in the baptized (Rom. vi. 3, 4). Corruption did not contaminate the Divine Body, and His sepulchre was glorious, as prophesied by David and Isaias (Ps. xv. 10; Isa. liii. 11).

III. The dwelling place of the souls of the departed is called in Scripture Ἅιδης, *infernus*, the lower parts of the earth. All these and similar names connote some space outside of, and opposed to, heaven, the dwelling place of God and the Angels. As to its situation, we are completely ignorant, and of its nature we know but little (*infra*, Book VIII.).

1. The fact that the soul of Christ descended into this place, is set forth in the various creeds, and has expressly been defined in the Fourth Lateran Council. Scripture and Tradition abound in corroborating evidence (Acts ii. 24, 31; Eph. iv. 8–10; 1 Pet. iii. 18). The substantial, as opposed to potential, descent was denied by Abelard, whose doctrine a council of Sens censured, and Pope Innocent III condemned. The opinion that Christ only stayed an instant in the lower world, either immediately after His death or before His Resurrection, was advanced by Nicephorus, but never found any supporters. According to the common belief, He remained there all the time between His death and Resurrection. It is certain that Christ, having consummated His sufferings on the Cross, did not go down to Sheol in order to partake of the pains of the damned, or of those in Purgatory. He dwelt with the souls of the just detained in “Limbo”—the Border of Hell—so called to distinguish it from Hell and Purgatory. That such a place existed may be gathered from many utterances of the Old Testament. The New Testament clearly mentions it in the parable of Dives and Lazarus. But even the just who rested in the bosom of Abraham, though free from pain and in possession of a certain beatitude, did not enjoy the vision of God. Such is the constant explanation given to Heb. ix. 7, 8: “The way into the Holies was not yet made manifest, whilst the former tabernacle was yet standing;” and ix. 15–17: “He is the Mediator of the New Testament, that by means of His death . . . they who are called may receive the promise of eternal inheritance. For where there is a testament, the death of the testator must of necessity come in. For a testament is of force after men are dead. . . .” Besides, the gospel was preached as the good tidings of the coming kingdom of heaven. As a matter of fact, it was not becoming that those redeemed by Christ should enjoy the full fruits of Redemption before the Redeemer Himself.

2. In the lower world Christ brought to a close His mission to mankind. The Redemption He had preached on earth was now an accomplished fact; the souls of the departed just were to reap its fruit. In all probability the Beatific Vision began for them at the moment when the Saviour appeared in their midst. Limbo then was changed into Paradise, and the promise made to the Penitent Thief was literally fulfilled. It is certain that the Beatific Vision was not delayed beyond the moment the souls left Limbo with Christ. The apparition of the Saviour in Hades was probably made known to all who dwelt therein—to the evil spirits and the souls of the damned, as well as to the souls of the just already purified, or still being purified. To these latter the coming of Christ was no doubt the occasion of a total or partial remission

<sup>ε</sup>Totus Christus in sepulchro et totus in inferno, sed non totum quod est Christus.

of their pains. The damned and the devils “bowed the knee” to confess “that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of the Father” (Phil. ii. 10). By leading away the captive souls (Eph. iv. 7) Christ gave Satan a first proof of His victory, and a pledge of future triumphs.

## § 150 CHRIST’S GLORIFICATION—HIS RESURRECTION AND ASCENSION

I. The Resurrection of Christ has many points in common with the general resurrection of mankind. Of this we shall treat in the Eighth Book. His Resurrection, however, has the following peculiarities: 1. It is necessarily a glorious Resurrection, implying not only the restoration of life through the reunion of body and soul, but also the glorification or transfiguration of the body and the bodily life: it is a new birth, the beginning of a higher life. 2. It happened very shortly after death, viz. as soon as sufficient time had elapsed to leave no doubt as to the reality of His death. 3. It was the first resurrection unto life immortal (Col. i. 18; 1 Cor. xv. 20). 4. Christ rose, or was raised, from the dead by the power of the Father, that is, the power of God. But as the power of God is Christ’s own power, He rose, or raised Himself, from the dead by His own power (John ii. 19; x. 7, 18). 5. Lastly, the Resurrection having been predicted and promised as the principal proof of His preaching, it has a greater dogmatic importance than any other fact: “If Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain” (1 Cor. xv. 14, *et passim*; see also the *Catechism of the Council of Trent*, Part I, ch. 6).

II. The transfiguration of Christ’s body and bodily life was of the same kind as that which awaits the Blessed at their resurrection. Both are described in the same words (1 Cor. xv. 42–44): “So also is the resurrection of the dead: it (the body) is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption; it is sown in dishonour, it shall rise in glory; it is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power; it is sown an animal body, it shall rise a spiritual body.” Yet there is between the two a specific difference: the very constitution of Christ requires the glorious transfiguration of His body, whereas the constitution of man naturally tends to corruption. The transfiguration of Christ is a manifestation of His own Divine power, and therefore a guarantee of the transfiguration of the Elect, the members of His mystic body. Read St. Thomas, 3, q. 56.

III. According to the clear teaching of Scripture, the Ascension of Christ into heaven must be looked upon as a local change of His glorified humanity from this earth to a place outside of it. The expression “He ascended above all the heavens” (Eph. iv. 10), used to be taken literally until astronomy transformed our ideas of the heavens. In St. Paul the “ascension above all the heavens” is identical with an exaltation above all the choirs of Angels and with sitting at the right hand of God: it may therefore not refer to any definite place at all, for the right hand of God is everywhere and nowhere.

Christ “was taken up” into heaven by the same Divine power that raised Him from the dead, to which, however, must be added the power which His glorified soul had over the likewise glorified body. In heaven Christ occupies a place in keeping with His Majesty and Beatitude, and with the functions He continues to perform. He sits enthroned over all creatures as their perfect Head; as perfect Mediator He stands nearest the throne of God; or, rather, as Highest King and plenipotentiary Dispenser of graces, He sits on the right hand of God on the same throne. As the Resurrection is the ground of our faith, so the Ascension of



Christ our Head is the foundation of our hope, and a potent incentive to a godly life. The sending of the Holy Ghost was a first and striking proof of Christ's continued life and work in perfect communion with the Father.

IV. The sitting of Christ on the right hand of God (Ps. cix. 1 sqq.; Heb. i, 3, 4), with which is connected the subjection of all things under His feet and an excellence above that of the Angels, implies His equality with God, as the Fathers often point out. Henceforth on His Divine Throne (Ps. xlv. 7) Christ receives the adoration of mankind, and all due honour from God, with Whom He shares, by nature and by merit, the royal power, the dominion over the Divine treasures, the authority over all creatures, and the juridical power. On Christ's Death, Descent into Hell, Resurrection, and Ascension, see St. Thomas, 3, qq. 50–58.

## PART III

### WORK AND FUNCTIONS OF THE REDEEMER

#### CHAPTER I HIS WORK

##### § 151 THE SALVATION OF MANKIND

I. Christ came into this world to work out the salvation of mankind (Matt. i. 21; Heb. v. 9; "Who for our salvation came down from Heaven," Nicene Creed). His salvation is announced by the Prophets as "life" and "health," "peace," "freedom," and "justice"; in the New Testament it is described as "life eternal," "grace," "holiness," and "heirship of the sons of God." On its negative side it is spoken of as "redemption," "ransom," "deliverance from sin," and all the consequences of sin (λύτρωσις, ἀπολύτρωσις, *redemptio*). Its positive side is the reconciliation of the sinner with God (κατάλλαξις, ἀποκατάλλαξις, *reconciliatio*), or the restitution of man to his original state of friendship with God. "In Whom we have redemption (τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν) through His blood, the remission of sins" (Eph. i. 7; cf. Col. i. 14). "We glory in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom we have now received reconciliation (τὴν κατάλλαγὴν)" (Rom. v. 11 to the end). Daniel (ix. 24) prophesies the remission of sins and the reconciliation with God conjointly. Salvation, then, as wrought by the Redeemer, is the raising up of mankind from spiritual death unto supernatural life, a translation from sin to sanctity. The infusion of life into the dry bones of the plain in the vision of Ezechiel (xxxvii.), and the sanctification of the people of Israel into a priestly kingdom (Exod. xix. 6), were figures of our spiritual regeneration and sanctification. Mankind, regenerated and sanctified in Christ as its Head and Mediator, is the supernatural kingdom of God: the work of salvation is the perfect restitution of the supernatural order destroyed by sin. The order restored by Christ, according to many texts in the New Testament, is more perfect than the order (economy) of the Old Testament; more perfect even than that of the original state, especially as regards the communion of man with God and the perfection of God's kingdom. "The dispensation of the fulness of time" in which the God-Man assumes the headship of all things, and gives man a share in the Divine Life, brings man and all things to their ultimate perfection (Eph. i. 10).

II. Christ working with God, or as the organ of God, is the cause, or principle, of Salvation: He “is made to us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption” (1 Cor. i. 30). The question, however, arises: in what manner or form did He accomplish His work? Only they who deny Christ’s divinity, and the restoration by Him of the supernatural Economy of Salvation, will reduce His work to moral teaching and good example; for if such were the case, man would be his own saviour. Neither is it sufficient to say that Christ announced to man God’s will and willingness to save him, and confirmed the truth of this announcement by His death and Resurrection. This latter was the work entrusted to the Apostles, as St. Paul expressly teaches: “God hath reconciled us to Himself by Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation. For God, indeed, was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, . . . and He hath placed in us the word of reconciliation” (2 Cor. v. 18, 19). Scripture forces us to regard the work of the Saviour as a real, efficient cause of our salvation. His work partly replaces, partly completes, partly renders possible and efficacious, the saving work of man himself; on the other hand, it is a condition of, and merits, the saving work of God. It thus differs both from the purely human and from the purely Divine influence on our salvation: for it is a “mediation.”

III. Our redemption through Christ being a fundamental dogma of the Christian faith, and seldom directly assailed by heresy, the Church has but rarely formulated it authoritatively, and then only in general outlines. She has defined that Christ is the mediating cause of salvation, inasmuch as through His death, as a sin-offering, He has merited our salvation; and, making satisfaction for us to God, has blotted out sin. In other words, His merits and satisfaction, as being those of our Representative and Mediator, have obtained for us salvation from God. The oldest expression of the dogma is in the Nicene Creed: “crucified also for us” (*pro nobis*, ὑπερ ἡμῶν). The Council of Ephesus (Anath. x., xi.) speaks of the sacrifice of Christ as of a sin-offering; and the Creed of Toledo formally describes it as such (Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, n. xxvi.). Pope Eugenius IV (*Decr. pro Jacobitis*) expressly mentions the “merit of the Mediator,” Who cancelled sin and opened heaven. The Council of Trent several times insists upon the merit of the Mediator; *e.g.* by the merit of the lone Mediator original sin is taken away (sess. v. can 3); the meriting cause (*causa meritoria*) of our justification is Christ, Who for us made satisfaction to God the Father (sess. vi. ch. 7). The terms “vicarious satisfaction,” “vicarious merit” are not expressly found in the Church’s formularies; but their sense is sufficiently implied in the term “satisfaction for us” (*pro nobis*).

IV. 1. The dogma, as above formulated, forbids us to ascribe our salvation exclusively to either the power or the intercession of Christ glorified in heaven. It was His work on earth that saved man; in heaven He administers the fruits of His work on earth. “He sitteth at the right hand of God;” “always living to make intercession for us” (Col. iii. 1; Heb. vii. 25).

2. The work of the Saviour on earth was the obtaining of the good-will of God towards man. The first step was to appease the offended God. This He brought about by employing Himself on behalf of man, by interceding and intervening for him with God, in His quality of Mediator and perfect representative of mankind. Yet His work was more than a mere asking or intercession; it merited what it asked for, *i.e.* it was of such value before God that the salvation obtained is its rightful equivalent.

3. As Salvation implies remission of sin, the Mediator must take upon Himself the obligations or debt of the sinners, and make satisfaction for them to God. His work thus assumes the form of an Atonement or Expiation, by which He honours and pleases God

more than sin had dishonoured and displeased Him.

4. The Atonement (expiation, satisfaction) for our sins, although a most essential part of Christ's saving work, does not adequately represent this work. The Atonement is subordinate to, and co-ordinate with, the merit that purchases the Divine friendship. Apart from merit, atonement would be a bare punishment, or, at most, an appeasing of the Divine anger. Taken together as one organic whole, atonement and merit come under the general notion of Sacrifice; *i.e.* any action performed in order to give God the honour due to Him alone, and so to gain the Divine favour (St. Thomas, 3, q. 48, a. 3).

5. Both the satisfactory and the meritorious action must comply with the following three conditions: (a) The agent must be innocent and undefiled (Heb vii. 26), holy and pleasing to God: his holiness must be infinite if his satisfaction is to be perfect. (b) The action itself must be a work of justice (*δικαίωμα*, Rom. v. 18), as sin is a work of injustice; and a work of obedience opposed to the rebellion of the sinner against God's will (Rom. v. 18). (c) Lastly, the action must be prompted by reverence for God's majesty and law and by love for His goodness, in order to compensate for the sinner's irreverence, lawlessness, and want of love. All of these conditions are fulfilled in Christ's work. It is peculiar to the work of satisfaction that it should consist in voluntarily accepted suffering. Suffering inflicted on the sinner is the means by which God satisfies His outraged justice and re-establishes the violated order of things; hence, suffering is likewise the natural means of atonement. The sinner deserves death: having unfitted himself for the attainment of the bliss for which he was created, his further existence on earth is purposeless. Hence, Christ accepted death as the chief feature of His atonement. All this is fitly expressed by the technical term *satisfactio* (atoning suffering) applied to the Saviour's work. Although satisfaction and merit tend in different directions—the former aiming at paying off a debt, the latter at acquiring goods—yet satisfaction, even as such, cannot be adequately conceived without the element of merit. Satisfaction for sin implies, besides the reparation of the Divine Honour, the acquisition for the sinner of the grace of repentance, without which no sin can be remitted, and the reacquisition of supernatural habitual justice, which every man is under obligation to possess. Now, God alone gives grace: therefore Christ's satisfaction for us would be incomplete and imperfect if it did not merit the graces of repentance and of habitual justice. Like a true sacrifice, the work of the Saviour is expiatory (atoning), because it is at the same time sanctifying.

Christ gave Himself for us, and thus made Himself the objective means, the real price, of our Redemption. In the sacrifice of Himself (a) He willingly suffers the pain of death inflicted on mankind for their sins; (b) He humbles and empties Himself to atone for the sinner's disobedience, to pay to God the greatest honour, and to merit grace for man; (c) He substitutes His innocent life for the life of man forfeited by sin. In the sacrifices of the Old Testament, animals were indeed substituted for man; but Christ's substitution is far more perfect, for His life is a human life anointed with Divinity. Thus the Sacrifice of Christ contains vicarious satisfaction (atonement) for our sins, and also the purchase-price (merit) of our salvation.

The word Redemption—the classic term for Christ's work—expresses the purchase (*emptio*) of the freedom of man from the captivity of sin, and the repurchase (*redemptio*) for him of the liberty of the Sons of God; in other words, the transfer of man from the servitude of the devil to the liberty of the kingdom of God. In order not to misunderstand this “purchase from the devil at the price of Christ's blood,” we must look upon Satan as a tyrant, holding

unlawful possession of man, whom the Redeemer conquers by destroying the cause that delivered man into his power. The ransom of the slave is not paid to the unjust tyrant, but to the lawful master, as an indemnity for the injustice he suffered.

V. The various elements of the work of Christ which appear in the above analysis, are an exact reflection of the doctrine of Scripture. Scripture calls the work of Redemption a sacrifice, a sacrifice of propitiation, and generally applies to it the sacrificial terminology of the Old Testament: Christ is the High-priest of the New Testament, Who offers Himself as victim (*boſtia*), and His action is termed oblation. Now the bloody sacrifices of the old law were certainly offered as sacrifices for sin: the sinner acknowledged that his life had been forfeited to God, and begged Him to accept, instead, the blood ("in which is the life") of the victim (Lev. xvii. 11). The idea of substitution is especially clear in the laying of hands on the head of the victim, by which rite the victim was made the bearer of the sin of the offerer (Lev. xvi. 21). This idea of atonement, of which the old sacrifices were but symbols, was truly realized in the sacrifice of Christ (Heb. x. 1 sqq.), the only true priest, who not only symbolized, but effected our reconciliation with God. The Epistle to the Hebrews often insists on Christ's priesthood (v. 10; vi. 20; vii. 1-21; ix. 11, 15, and 24-28; x. 1-22). The victim is Himself (Heb. ix. 14-26), His Body and Blood (x. 10; ix. 14), which He offered on the Cross, where the real sacrificial act was completed (ix. 25 sqq.). St. Paul, too, says: "Christ hath loved us, and has delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God, for an odour of sweetness (*παρέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν προσφορὰν καὶ θυσίαν τῷ Θεῷ ὁσμὴν εὐωδίας*)" (Eph. v. 2; cf. 1 Cor. v. 7; Rom. iii. 25). "Jesus Christ is the propitiation (*ἱλασμός*) for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world" (1 John ii. 2; iv. 10). Besides these direct testimonies, we have numerous passages in which to the Blood of Christ (Shed in His death) are ascribed all the effects of the blood shed in the ancient sacrifices. The Blood of Christ is our ransom, *λύτρον, ἀντὶλύτρον* (Eph i. 7; Col. i. 14; 1 Pet. i. 19; Apoc. v. 9); our reconciliation with the Father (Col. i. 20; cf. Eph. ii. 13-15); our justification (Rom. v. 9); the remission of our sins (Matt. xxvi..28); the cleansing of sin (1 John i. 7; Apoc. 1, 5; vii. 14; xxii. 14); the blood of a new testament with God (1 Cor. xi. 25; 1 Pet. i. 2). In the same manner the death of Christ is given as our reconciliation (Rom. v. 10), and our redemption from sin (Heb. ix. 15). The doctrine so clearly set forth in these passages, leaves no doubt as to the sense of the texts where Christ is said to have shed His Blood, or died, "for many," "for all," "for sinners," "for us" (Matt. xxvi. 28; xx. 28; 1 Tim. ii. 6; Rom. v. 6; 2 Cor. v. 14 sqq.; 1 Thess. vi. 10). In most of these places the word *ὑπὲρ* (for) is used (not *ἀντὶ* = in the place of), which, adhering to the letter, may be interpreted "on behalf of," and thus seems to weaken the vicarious import of Christ's sacrifice. *Ἀντὶ*, however, is used in Matt. xx. 28 (*δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν*), and 1 Tim. ii. 14 (*ἀντὶλύτρον*), and this, in connection with the above distinct doctrine, shows that *ὑπὲρ* has the sense of *ἀντὶ*. (See Liddell and Scott, *sub voce*). Then it is not easy to conceive how Christ died "on our behalf" if He did not die "instead of us." The idea of vicarious sacrifice is also to the fore in the testimony of the Baptist calling Christ the Lamb that beareth or taketh away the sins of the world (with reference to Isaiah liii.); in 2 Cor. v. 21: "Christ Who knew no sin, God hath made sin (*ἁμαρτίαν*) for us," *i.e.* treated Him as bearing our sin; and in Gal. iii. 13: "Christ being made a curse (*κατάρα*) for us," *i.e.* the object of the Divine anger which we deserved. The term Redemption itself carries with it a sacrificial notion (Lev. xxvii. 27-33; Num. xviii. 15-17). The prophet Isaiah most distinctly shows the vicarious character of the Redeemer's work: "He hath borne our

infirmities and carried our sorrows . . . He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for our sins: the chastisement of our peace was upon Him, and by His bruises we are healed. The Lord hath laid upon Him the iniquity of us all. He was offered because it was His own will . . . the Lord was pleased to bruise Him in infirmity: He shall lay down His life for sin [Hebrew, 'as an offering for sin'] . . . He hath borne the sins of many, and He hath paid for the transgressors" (Isa. liii., *et passim*).

VI. The possibility and appropriateness of Christ's vicarious satisfaction are objected to upon the ground of difficulties as to each of its three actors: God, Christ, Man.

1. Rationalists object to the idea of a God who takes offence at the acts of a being infinitely below Him; a God who gets angry and remains angry until satisfaction is forthcoming. This objection charges God with mutability, and with a certain pettiness of character. We have sufficiently answered the first part in sect. 55. As to the second, it is not below God's dignity to rule even the minutest actions of His creatures according to His Holiness, Justice, and Mercy. The idea of petty revengefulness is completely excluded by the infinite mercy which God holds out to the sinner in order to facilitate his salvation. The very satisfaction which He requires is His own free gift, the sinner "being justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus" (Rom. iii. 24).

2. "Satisfaction must be given by the offender, and not by a third person: vicarious satisfaction implies the punishment of the just for the unjust." Answer: In the economy of salvation the sinner is bound to give personal satisfaction: if he does not, his lot is damnation. Christ was not punished instead of the sinner, nor against His own will as sinners are punished: by the holiest of free acts He bore the penalties of sin in order to merit for the sinner a means of satisfying which lay beyond human power. His vicarious satisfaction is not the transfer of punishment from the unjust to the just, but the transfer of the merits of the just to the unjust.

On the whole of this section, see St. Thomas, 3, qq. 48 and 49.

## § 152 PERFECTION OF CHRIST'S SATISFACTION

I. St. Paul teaches the "superabundance" of Christ's satisfaction: "Not as the offence, so also the gift; for if by the offence of one many have died, much more the grace of God, and the gift in the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded (*ἐπερίσσευσεν*) unto many . . . where sin abounded, grace did more abound" (Rom. v. 15–20). The sufficiency of Christ's merits to give God an honour not only equal, but superior, to the injury caused Him by sin, is founded upon their infinitude. Sin is an infinite injury merely because its external object, the offended God, is infinite; Christ's actions, on the contrary, are infinite in value because their internal principle, Christ Himself, is infinite. Hence their infinitude belongs to a higher order than that of sin. Again, the sacrificial acts of the God-Man offer to God an infinite homage which He accepts; whereas the insult of sin does not affect God intrinsically. Lastly, the Redemption was accomplished through a whole life of meritorious acts, each one of which was of sufficient value to ransom all mankind.

II. The very idea of man's Redemption through Christ supposes that God agreed to accept the work of the Redeemer as a sufficient ransom for the sins of mankind. The work, then, having been performed with superabundant perfection, God was bound by His promise and His justice to grant the remission of sins to the extent and in the manner intended by Christ.

The acceptableness of the atonement may further be illustrated from the perfection of Christ's mediatorship. He is a more perfect representative of the race than Adam, for whereas Adam is only its source according to the flesh, Christ is its head according to the spirit, establishing a general solidarity by an act of His all-powerful will. On the other hand, He is God, and as such secures the acceptance of His own work.

### § 153 EFFECTS OF CHRIST'S SATISFACTION ON MANKIND

I. The object or fruit of Christ's atonement is the freeing of mankind from sin and its consequences, and the imparting of all the supernatural graces necessary to man's salvation. The work of the Redeemer won back for us the essential prerogative of the state of original justice, *i.e.* sanctifying grace (Rom. v. 12 sqq.). Restoration of the minor prerogatives will take place at the resurrection. In the meanwhile, by a wise dispensation Christ has ordained that His followers should sanctify themselves by bearing the ills of life as He bore them (Council of Trent, sess. v. can. 5).

II. Christ's saving work did not at once blot out every individual sin, and transform every sinner into a saint: it only procured the means thereto. The death on the Cross propitiated God, broke the power of the devil, and founded the kingdom of grace; but the reconciliation to God and the sanctification of the individual are effected by special acts, partly Divine, partly human. This is plainly implied in the language of Scripture speaking of a Redemption already accomplished, and of a Redemption still to come. Natural generation makes us participators of the sin of Adam, because it makes us members of a family spiritually ruined, the head of which has no power over the consequences of his act; it does not make us participators of the grace of Christ, because Christ has not willed that it should. To become members of His kingdom it is indeed necessary to be born of man; but this is not sufficient. Admission under the Headship of Christ—*i.e.* participation in His redeeming work—depends on His will, and is regulated by laws of a freely established supernatural order. Man "puts on" Christ, is incorporated into Christ, by his acts of faith and charity divinely inspired, or by the reception of sacraments divinely instituted, for that purpose. The fact that we must "draw nigh to Christ" (Heb. vii. 19) to become His, accounts for the applicability of His merits to those who lived before the Redemption: they approached Him by faith in the coming of "the Lamb that was slain from the beginning of the world" (Apoc. xiii. 8).

III. As the salvation of individuals depends on conditions which many do not fulfil, a question arises as to the extent of Christ's saving will. On this point the Church teaches that He intended the salvation of all sinful mankind living on earth, without any exception whatever. Those, however, who die in mortal sin, and of course the fallen angels, reap no actual benefit from the Redemption.

1. It is defined that Christ offered His death for the salvation of those who are joined to Him by faith or baptism, and it is a condemned heresy to say that He died only for the predestinated (Pope Innocent X's condemnation of the five propositions of Jansenius). Similar definitions were given against the Predestinarians of the fifth and ninth centuries, and the doctrine is already contained in the Nicene Creed: "Who *for us* and for *our* salvation descended from heaven" (cf. John iii. 14–18; vi. 37–40; Rom. viii. 31, etc.). *Infra*, p. 66.

2. Although not expressly defined by the Church, it is yet of faith—because clearly contained in Scripture, and taught by the Fathers—that Christ died not only for such as actually

come to the faith, but for all men without exception, so that at least a distant possibility of salvation is given to all. Further, the Fathers and theologians teach, as *fidei proximum*, that, as regards adults, this possibility of salvation is such that its non-realization is due solely to their own fault. As regards those who die before attaining the use of reason, God's will to save them must also be considered sincere; *i.e.* the common means of salvation are also intended for them, and God wishes and commands that they should be used. Just as the Divine intention of saving adults is not to be deemed devoid of sincerity because God does not remove the obstacles which through their own fault men put in His way, in like manner the Divine will to save infants must not be thought insincere because God does not remove by miraculous interference the natural obstacles to their salvation. Scripture abounds in texts implying the universality of Christ's saving will: "He is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world (περι ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου)" (1 John ii. 2). The classical text is 1 Tim. ii. 1-4: ". . . God our Saviour, Who will have all men (πάντας ἀνθρώπους) to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth."

IV. Jansenists and Protestants often accuse Catholics of Semi-Pelagianism on account of the above doctrine. The Semi-Pelagians taught: (a) That God (and Christ) grant the means of Salvation only to such as, on their own account, and previous to any Divine motion, desire to be saved. (b) That the Divine will to save is entirely circumscribed and ruled by the independent behaviour of man: it succeeds or fails according to acts of the human will not coming from God. (c) Hence the Divine will to save all men is absolute, God doing all that is necessary to save every individual: failure is due solely to insuperable resistance on the part of man.

The Catholic doctrine is, and always has been, totally different. (a) God's saving will is not subordinate to any independent act of man's will: He is the first mover in the process of salvation. (b) God freely regulates the motions of the human will, assisting it to co-operate with His grace, or permitting it to resist. (c) The will to save all men is not absolute on the part of God, *i.e.* God does not use all His power to save man, but freely allows obstacles to salvation to remain, although He could overcome them.

V. Another article of faith is that any sin, however great, if duly repented of before death, can be forgiven by the merits of Christ. This is a necessary consequence of the universality of God's saving will. There are, however, certain sins which, by their own nature, make repentance very difficult, and even impossible, *e.g.* unbelief in the means of grace, final impenitence, etc. "The blasphemy of the Spirit shall not be forgiven" (Matt. xii. 31), not on account of God's unwillingness, but on account of the nature of the sin which consists in an obstinate resistance to the Light and Grace of God.

VI. The redeeming work of Christ is of no benefit to the devils (defined against Origen in the Second Council of Constantinople, can. 7, 12).

## § 154 THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER IN MANKIND AND IN THE WHOLE OF CREATION RAISED TO HIGHER PERFECTION BY CHRIST AND HIS WORK—POSITION OF CHRIST IN THE PLAN OF THE UNIVERSE

I. The ultimate result of the work of Christ is the restoration of the supernatural order originally instituted for the salvation of mankind. But Scripture also gives as a result the final completion or crowning perfection of man and all things. Thus, Christ not only restored the original order, but raised the whole of creation to a higher standard of perfection.

1. The economy of our salvation received through Christ a new and more powerful basis. What formerly was grace, pure and simple, is now bought at its proper value by the Redeemer's merits; and these same merits are an effective means for preserving grace when obtained, and for recovering it when lost. Moreover, the Divine Principle of Salvation is engrafted upon mankind and made one with us: His titles to heavenly bliss and glory are ours as His co-heirs (Rom. viii. 14–17).

2. The supernatural kingdom of God on earth exists for the glorification of God as the Eternal Father by a people of saints, able to perform that service worthily. In the person of Christ this kingdom possesses a member Who is God, and therefore able to tender to the Father the worship of infinite value due to Him. And as all the saints are one body, whose head is Christ, their worship participates in the perfection of His worship. They constitute not only a kingdom of priests (Ex. xix. 6). but "a royal priesthood" (1 Pet. ii. 9). They are the Temple consecrated with the Blood of the High Priest, in which, without intermission, the all-holy victim burns for the glory of God, and for the good of the people bought with His Blood. The new covenant, therefore, is more perfect than the old, both in the way it was established and in the way it works.

3. Pre-Christian grace established between God and man a union of friendship, akin to the union between members of the same household. Christ has raised the moral union to the highest type of "matrimonial communion." When the Logos wedded our flesh and blood, we were made, in a mystic sense, one person with Him, and through Him organically connected with the Father. Hence our sonship participates in a higher degree in the Sonship of the Logos, both as regards our claims to the inheritance and as to the spiritual life we draw from the Father. We also enter into closer communion with the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the Son and dwells in us as in His temple (1 Cor. iii. 16).

II. The supreme perfection of the communion with God, as re-established by Christ, lies in this, that it makes every justified Christian another Christ. "Christianus alter Christus,"<sup>10</sup> is a favourite saying of the Fathers. As the whole body of the faithful form, with Christ as their Head, one mystical body, so each individual saint is built up after the model of the Head: he is anointed with the same Divine Spirit, made a partaker of the Divine Nature, and transformed into the image and likeness of God. The nobility which is natural to the Divine Son becomes his by adoption. In the simple order of grace, the sanctified are, indeed, the anointed of God, but not in the same manner as sanctified Christians. With the former grace as a quality infused into the soul precedes the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. In Christ and His sanctified members the anointing Spirit is the source of created grace. The sacramental character of Baptism stamps us as members of Christ, for in its innermost essence this character is a copy of the anointing and sealing of the humanity of Christ with the Logos. The characters of Confirmation and Order intensify the membership and increase the flow of the Spirit. The three characters give the Christian a share in the royal and holy dignity proper to Christ—a share in His prophetic office in as far as this consists in being a living witness of the glory of God—and lastly, a share in His priestly and kingly functions.

III. The fulness of perfection achieved by Christ in the supernatural order belongs primarily to mankind. But as Christ is Head also of the Angels, and consequently their Mediator, they too participate in the fruits of His work. The glory of their Head reflects upon themselves;

<sup>10</sup>"The Christian is another Christ." —Ed.



their worship is enhanced by being united to His worship; their graces and privileges are more their own since they rest upon His merits. The material world itself is raised in perfection through the greater perfection of man, for whose service it exists. Christ, then, unites the whole of creation into one sanctuary, of which He is the foundation and the keystone; and all rational beings He gathers into one family, or one body, of which He is the Head.

IV. We are now able to understand the full significance of St. Paul's admirable description of the work of Christ, Eph. i. 9, 10: "That He might make known unto us the mystery of His will, . . . in the dispensation of the fulness of times, to re-establish all things in Christ, that are in heaven and on earth, in Him." The sense of this ἀνακεφαλαιώσις (restoration, rejuvenation, summing up) is that the whole of creation, bound up together and perfected in Christ as its Head, is led back in the most perfect manner to God, its first principle, from whom sin had partly led it away. The influence of Christ on the supernatural order appears here as restoring and perfecting; its reason, form, and effects are indicated, and the organic connection between the whole orders of nature and supernature is set forth. Christ is the Crown, the Centre, and the Foundation of a new and higher order of things; He is the Lord and King of all things, and, next to God, their highest end, according to 1 Cor. iii. 22, 23: "All things are yours . . . and you are Christ's; and Christ is God's."

Whether the Incarnation would have taken place if Adam had not sinned was much discussed between Thomists and Scotists. St. Thomas (3, q. 1, a. 3) holds that it would not; Scotus (In. 3, *dist.* 3) that it would. In favour of this latter opinion, see also Suarez, *De Incarn.*, tom. i. disp. 5; St. Francis of Sales, *Treatise of the Love of God*, bk. ii. chap. iv.

## CHAPTER II

### FUNCTIONS OF THE REDEEMER

OUR NOTION OF THE SUPERNATURAL KINGDOM established by Christ corresponds to some extent with our notions of an earthly kingdom. In order to secure the fruits of Redemption, Christ founded a spiritual society, of which He Himself is the Head—Who *teaches* its members supernatural truth, Who *sanctifies* them by His Sacrifice and Sacraments, Who *rules* and leads them on to supernatural happiness: Who is therefore at once Teacher, Priest, and King. Each of these offices or functions has a holy, or hierarchic, or priestly character, for they are ministrations in the kingdom of God which is holy in its origin, in its growth, and in all its objects. To teach holy things, to make and to dispense holy things, and to lead to the fruition of holy things (*sacra docere, sacra dare et facere, ad sacra ducere et perducere*) is the triple function of the Head of God's kingdom.

Of the prophetic or teaching office of Christ we have already treated in the first book of this Manual. We here add only a few remarks.

The Prophets announced Christ as a Teacher of Divine truth to all mankind; Christ Himself claimed this title repeatedly, and exercised this office in many ways during His life on earth. "Behold, I have given Him for a witness to the people, for a leader and a master to the Gentiles" (Is. lv. 4). "You call me Master and Lord, and you say well, for so I am" (John xiii. 13; cf. Matt. xxiii. 10; John iii. 31). Christ's excellence as a Teacher is supereminent. Even as man He is an eye-witness of all that He reveals, and His truthfulness is founded upon His Divinity. His authority is not by delegation: His human words are the words of a Divine

Person. He has personal power to prove His mission by miracles. His teaching is not merely external: He has power internally to illumine and move the minds of His hearers. He taught by deed as well as by words: His whole life, with all its incidents, natural and supernatural, being a lesson in holiness. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 42 sqq.

## A. CHRIST AS HIGH PRIEST

### § 155 NOTIONS OF PRIEST AND SACRIFICE

I. In Holy Scripture the term “priest” is used in a wide and in a narrow sense. In the wide sense it designates all the members of the chosen people of God, Israelites as well as Christians (Exod. xix. 6, and 1 Pet. ii. 9), as distinct from other nations. In the narrower sense, priests are men chosen from among the chosen people to act as the officials of the house of God. The former are the lay priesthood; the latter the hierarchical priesthood. Both priesthoods imply in general the same characters (cf. Exod. ix. 5 sqq.; Numb. xvi. 5): Divine vocation or election, special appropriation by God (Heb. v. 1), a consecration or sanctification connected and given with the appropriation (e.g. by the imposition of hands or anointing with oil); a consequent qualification to approach God and to offer gifts in His presence. Election, appropriation, and consecration stamp the priest as “priest of God” (יְהוָה, ἱερεύς, *sacerdos Dei*). The offering of gifts to God is his noblest function, from which also is derived his Hebrew name of “approacher” (קָרַב, “to draw nigh”). The priest approaches God when he enters the temple and deposits gifts on the altar, viz. when as a servant, holy and pleasing to God by his consecration, he offers a worship which is itself made holy and pleasing to God by the dignity of the servant: a dignity derived primarily from his vocation and consecration, rather than from his own moral worth.

The hierarchical priest, then, by his special vocation, consecration, sanctification, and nearness to God, stands between God and the people. Yet his qualification for offering a worship more excellent than that of the people, is given him on behalf of the people, viz. in order to act before God on their behalf, by bringing their gifts, and through their gifts the people themselves, nearer to God. His holiness supplements the deficient holiness of his people. “Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins.” Πᾶς γὰρ ἀρχιερεύς, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων λαμβανόμενος ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων καθίσταται τὰ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἵνα προσφέρῃ δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίας ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν (Heb. v. 1). The addition “for sins” expresses a special function of the priesthood among fallen mankind, but by no means the essence of priesthood; the sacrifice for sins being included in the general functions of bringing the people nearer to God by sanctification.

The Hebrew priesthood was little more than a higher degree of lay-priesthood. Originally the people were elected as priests, and then from among the people the family of Aaron was chosen. This is also implied in the Hebrew term כֹּהֵן (see Bähr, *Symbolik*, ii. 15). The Latin term *sacerdos*, and the Greek ἱερεύς, connote a priestly dignity found properly only in the priesthood of the Church. *Sacerdos* connotes a sacred person, who can give holy things (*sacra dans*) by reason of his consecration. He not only offers to God the gifts of the people, but he also dispenses to man the gifts of God (1 Cor. iv. 1). This latter function, however, was not prominent under the Mosaic Law. The chief function of the *sacerdos* is *sacrificare*, i.e. to make sacred, to consecrate, *conficere rem sacram*, to sanctify the gifts of God to man, and of

man to God. The Council of Trent (sess. xxiii. ch. 1) sets forth this character of the Christian priesthood when it describes its power as “a power to consecrate, to offer, and to dispense (*ministrandi*) the Body and Blood of Christ.” Here we have a supernatural power to change a profane thing into a sacred thing, as opposed to the simple power of offering to God anything either profane or sacred. The act of consecrating is intimately connected with that of offering and dispensing or ministering: the priest consecrates in order both to offer and to dispense what he has consecrated. If, then, we give to the term *sacrifice* its full meaning, we may define the priest as one who has the power to offer sacrifice.

The hierarchical priesthood, the only one which exists under the present dispensation, is essentially different from the priesthood which would have existed under the simple law of nature. In the order of nature the priest would be the public and legitimate representative of society for the public worship of God. But neither his social position nor his election would give him a dignity of higher sanctity and power: he would only be the principle or medium of unity and order in public worship. The representation of the people is by no means the chief element in hierarchic priesthood, not even if the representatives were adorned by God with special holiness and dignity, or empowered to promote through their own sanctity the sanctification of the people with more or less perfection. These and similar elements make up the notion of a sacred (hieratic) servant (*διάκονος*, *minister*), possibly of eminent dignity, but after all only a dignitary whose functions are analogous to those of the lay-priesthood. The hierarchic priest is first and foremost rather a representative and plenipotentiary of God. As such he acts formally when consecrating and ministering. When offering he holds up to God a thing which he has appropriated or consecrated for Divine worship; when praying as priest he acts as divinely appointed patron of the people. Thus in all his functions the hierarchic priest, either formally or as a matter of fact, is the representative of God.

II. Sacrifice is an act of worship in which God is honoured as the Beginning and End of man and of all things by the offering up of a visible creature, which, for this purpose, is submitted to an appropriate transformation by a lawful minister. An *intimate* sacrifice is offered whenever man devotes himself to the service of God by either “reforming or giving up” his life for God (Ps. 1. 19). No external sacrifice is perfect without an accompanying internal sacrifice, whereby the soul associates itself with the meaning and object of the external rite (*infra*, Book VII § 123).

1. The object of sacrifice is that of practical religion in general: to acknowledge God as the Beginning and End of man and of all things; that is, to profess in deed our entire dependence on Him, both for existence and for ultimate happiness. Some post-Tridentine theologians have narrowed the idea of sacrifice to mean the expression of God’s dominion over life and death, or of the Divine power to dispose of all things, or of the Divine majesty as exalted above all; and have restricted its primary object to the atonement for sin.

2. So, too, the external form of sacrifice—an appropriate transformation of the creature offered—has been limited by Vasquez and later theologians to the “transformation by destruction.” Neither historical nor theological grounds can justify such limitations; *e.g.* the burning of incense, *θυσία*, which has furnished the Greek name for all sacrifices, is not so much the destruction of the incense as its conversion into “an odour of sweetness,” the symbol of the soul of man transformed by the fire of charity. Similar remarks apply to all sacrifices without exception. In the sacrifice of the Mass, the *immutatio*, as the Fathers technically call the sacrificial act, is not the destruction, but the *production* of the victim.

3. A lawfully appointed minister is necessary to offer public sacrifice in the name of the people. If the sacrifice is to have a peculiar dignity and efficacy as oblation and as action—*i.e.* if it is to be more than the most expressive act of external worship, and of man's earnest desire of sanctification—a consecrated minister is required: for as gift and as action, the value of the sacrifice is measured by the personal dignity of him who offers it. Accordingly, the symbolical sacrifices of Moses obtain the efficacy of sacrifices of the covenant through the sanctification and lay priesthood of all the people; in the Christian dispensation, individual self-sacrifice, and the public sacrifice for the people, derive supernatural sanctity and dignity from the supernatural character of the Christian layman or priest. See St. Thomas, 1<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>a</sup>, q. 102; 2<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>a</sup>, q. 85.

## § 156 CHRIST'S PRIESTHOOD AND ITS FUNCTIONS

The Priesthood of Christ and its functions are set forth in the Epistle to the Hebrews in order to induce the converted Hebrews to abandon the defective Aaronic priesthood and to cling to Christ, the Great High-Priest Who entered heaven. The treatment of the subject is not, however, exhaustive, because it has only one special object in view, *viz.* the superiority of Christ's priesthood over that of Aaron. Hence Protestant theologians are not justified in restricting the attributions of Christ's priesthood to those mentioned therein.

I. Christ's priesthood is eminently hierarchical, and perfect in every respect. Christ "draws nigh to" God on behalf of mankind, and His sacrifice has sufficient virtue to take away the sins of the world. No higher priesthood exists; all other priesthoods, of both the Old and the New Testament, depend on it for their existence and efficacy. It is eminently perfect, because (a) it has all the perfections of other priesthoods without any of their imperfections; (b) it has hierarchical power to accomplish in the most perfect manner whatever any priesthood can accomplish.

1. The priest is made "God's own," and endowed with the honour and power of his ministry through an act of consecration. When an ordinary man is elevated to the priesthood, he is made God's own minister by an accidental unction: Christ is constituted God's Own Son by His substantial unction with the Divine Nature, and so possesses sacerdotal dignity and power by His very Nature. Hence His pre-eminent holiness. The ordinary priest is not made impeccable by his consecration; he requires priestly ministrations for his personal sanctification; his personal holiness is not the source of the holiness which he imparts to others. The consecration of Christ, *i.e.* the Hypostatic Union, makes Him holy, guileless, undefiled, separated from sinners (Heb. vii. 26–28), and makes Him the holder and dispenser of God's own holiness. The ordinary priest "draws nigh to God" in a very imperfect manner; Christ sits at the right hand on the throne of God (*Ibid.* viii. 1). Like other priests, Christ has known the weaknesses and sufferings of our nature (Heb. v. 2), yet without loss to His dignity and holiness: on the contrary, His death was but the road to the never-ending exercise of His priesthood in an eternal life (*Ibid.* vii. 25).

2. As Christ's priestly powers flow from His hypostatic consecration, they also are eminently perfect. Being Himself consecrated with the fulness of Divinity, He can in His turn consecrate and sanctify everything, and bring it nigh to God; He can dispense all holy things, whether they be sanctified offerings from man to God, or gratuitous gifts from God to man. He has power to perform the holiest of sacrifices by which the Covenant between God and

man is established and sealed, and to make the victim of that sacrifice the pledge of the covenant, the bearer and dispenser of the sanctifying power of the Holy Ghost (cf. Heb. ix. 14 sqq., and x. 14).

The nature and power of the Divine Priesthood show its excellence over the imperfect, inefficacious, and transitory priesthood of Aaron (see Epistle to the Hebrews, *passim*). The whole matter may be summed up in a few words: the Levitic priesthood was temporal, earthly, and carnal in its origin, in its relations to God, in its working, and in its power, whereas Christ's Priesthood, in all these particulars, is eternal, heavenly, and spiritual.

II. 1. The things offered to God by the ancient priests were either lifeless, or at best irrational creatures, distinct from the person of the offerer. In Christ, on the contrary, the gift offered up is included in the Person of the offering Priest: it is His living, human flesh, animated by His rational soul, and therefore, in the language of Scripture, it is a spiritual and rational (πνευματικό, λογικόν) offering. Hence the sacrificial victim offered by Christ is not a merely symbolical, but a real and equivalent, substitute for mankind, on whose behalf it is sacrificed. Again, it is a "victim of immaculate holiness," whereas its predecessors were at best but physically spotless or blameless animals. Lastly, the gifts brought to the altar in the Old Testament acquired some consecration by their contact with consecrated persons, altars, and fires. The gift offered by Christ possesses a holiness of its own, before the act of offering, viz. its unction with the Divine Substance of its personal principle. That same unction, by which the Logos anoints His human nature to the highest priesthood, likewise consecrates it as the Altar of the sacrifice, and, moreover, is the spiritual fire which clarifies and vivifies the victim. Hence, at the very moment the Hypostatic Union took place, the High Priest, the Altar of the sacrifice, the victim and the sacrificial fire were consecrated, and the Logos began to offer up a "spiritual and rational oblation" (προσφορά πνευματική και λογική).

2. The power of the Aaronic priests over the victims of their sacrifices was limited to the infliction, by external means, of an irreparable death which their sacrificial intention turned into a religious rite or symbol. The dead victim acquired no new life-giving qualities, and was for ever beyond the power of the sacrificer. In Christ's sacrifice the immutation of the victim is brought about by an internal act of His will: "I lay down my life that I may take it again" (John x. 17); His death is the source of new life to Himself and mankind. The immutation, therefore, is spiritual, accomplished by the Eternal Spirit of the Sacrificer. This spiritual character is manifest in the glorious resurrection of Christ's body, and likewise in the Eucharistic sacrifice. But it is of the bloody sacrifice on the cross that the Apostle speaks in this connection. On the cross, death was indeed inflicted by external agents; the immutation, however, was accomplished neither by these agents, nor by Christ's willing submission to their act: He offered Himself by a direct and positive act of His will which had power to dispose of His own life and death. The inner act of supernatural power allowed the external agencies of death to take effect, to dissolve the animal life of His body—to liquefy, as it were, the inhabiting Divine Life so as to transform the body into food and the blood into drink unto life everlasting.

III. Of Christ as Mediator we have already treated (*supra*, § 137). The perfection of His mediatorship stands out prominently in His priesthood.

1. His sacrifice, being that of a Divine Person, is not only acceptable to God, but carries its acceptance with it. For the same reason the shedding of His blood in the name of mankind is as much a gift of God to man as a sacrifice of man to God. On the other hand, Christ perfectly

represents mankind in His sacrifice. The flesh He offers is a gift from the human race accepted by Him; it is not a symbol or an inadequate substitute, as in the old sacrifices, but the most perfect member of the whole race, and therefore a perfect substitute for His brethren.

2. The sacrifice of the cross is chief amongst the sacerdotal functions of Christ, because it crowned His work on earth, and laid the foundation of His eternal priesthood in heaven. It alone realizes all the aims and objects of the ancient sacrifices. Being at once an offering for sin, a peace offering, and a burnt offering (holocaust), it reconciles man to God by the remission of sins; it establishes and maintains peace between God and man by preserving man in a state of grace; it unites the spirit of man to God, imperfectly on earth, but perfectly in the state of glory, by imparting to him the consuming fire of Divine Charity (St. Thomas, 3, q. 22, a. 2). In other words: the sacrifice of the cross attains the object of the burnt offering or holocaust, which is to arrive at a perfect union with God through acts of worship; and also attains the objects of the offerings for sin and of peace offerings, which were to remove the obstacles to an acceptable worship (sins), and to procure the means thereunto.

3. The sacrifice of the cross is also the central function of Christ's priesthood, inasmuch as all its other functions are based on this, and are only its consummation or perpetuation. It is virtually continued—not repeated—in heaven, where the sacrificial intention of the Priest and the glorified wounds of the Victim live for ever in the Divine Pontiff. One circumstance alone prevents the heavenly sacrifice from being *actually* the same as that of the cross: and that is the absence of any real immutation of the victim.

4. In the whole burnt offerings of the Old Testament the smell of the victim is said to ascend to God "as an odour of sweetness," which expression is also applied to the sacrifice of Christ. The "odour of sweetness" of the Saviour is His glorified Self ascending into heaven, and as the Lamb slain, standing in the midst of the throne before God, as an eternal sacrifice of adoration and thanksgiving (Apoc. v. 6, etc.).

IV. From His heavenly throne Christ through His priestly ministers on earth, continually consecrates and sacrifices in His Church, making Himself the Sacrifice of the Church, and including the Church in His sacrifice. He thus brings down to earth the perennial sacrifice of heaven in order to apply its merits to mankind, and at the same time enables the Church to offer with Him and through Him a perfect sacrifice of adoration and thanksgiving. The Mass, then, like the Eternal offering in heaven, completes the sacrifice of the cross by accomplishing its ends; viz. the full participation of mankind in its fruits. Although the Eucharistic sacrifice is offered on earth and through human hands, it is none the less the formal act of Christ Himself as heavenly Priest. This idea finds expression in the liturgical prayers before and after the Consecration, in which the Church, here acting in her own name, asks the heavenly Priest and Angel of the Covenant to complete and perfect her sacrifice in heaven. In a similar way the layman in the Old Testament asked the priest to accept his offering, and to lay it on the altar before God. See the prayer "Supplices te rogamus," in the Canon of the Mass.

V. The final consummation of Christ's sacrifice is the perfect participation in its fruits, in time and in eternity, by those on whose behalf it was offered. The sanctifying graces thus obtained consecrate the faithful with the Holy Ghost, and transform them into God's holy servants and priests, and make them members of the mystical body of Christ. With Christ they sacrifice and are sacrificed in the universal offering of the Holy City to God. St. Thomas, 3, q. 22.

## B. CHRIST AS KING

## § 157 CHRIST AS KING

I. Christ is hailed by the Prophets, and calls Himself “King of Mankind” (Ps. ii. 6; Isa. ix. 6, 7; Ezech. xxxiv. 23 sq.; xxxvii. 24–28, Jer. xxiii. 3–6; Luke i. 32, 33; John xviii. 37), because, with the power and majesty of God, He procures justice and peace, salvation and beatitude, for his subjects. His kingdom is of a higher order than the kingdoms of this world. It is hierarchic, spiritual, and celestial—in its origin and final object, in its ways and means, and even in its members: for it embraces only such as, through grace, have acquired the title of adopted children of God. The hierarchic character of the kingdom is pointed out by Zacharias (vi. 12, 13) foretelling that the king would build a temple to God—a prophecy fulfilled by Christ when He built His Church upon Peter. He set forth the heavenly character of His Church when He called it “the kingdom of Heaven,” and called the power to rule it “the keys of the kingdom of Heaven.” The exaltedness of Christ’s Kingship as hierarchic, heavenly, and spiritual, shines forth in its first and most solemn act, viz. the sending of the Holy Ghost, through Whom He now performs all the acts of His royal power.

II. The Kingly functions of Christ are the foundation, expansion, and final consummation of God’s kingdom among men. They are not always performed visibly, as in earthly kingdoms Christ acts on the inner man, though ordinarily through visible means, because the kingdom of Heaven on earth is a visible and well-ordered society. He can, however, and often does, exercise His influence on the soul independently of external agencies. The first and the last acts of the kingdom—its constitution and its consummation in the final judgment—are personal and visible acts of the King.

The fundamental function is the distribution of salvation. It is carried out: (1) in the form of *Legislation* regulating the acquisition and use of grace by man, but especially in the constitution and organization of the Church as the continuator of its Founder’s saving work; (2) in the form of administration, government, and development of the kingdom by Christ’s visible organs on earth under His assistance and protection; (3) in the form of judicial functions, meting out rewards or punishment to man according to his right or wrong behaviour in relation to grace and the Law of Christ.

The practical working of the Kingly office of Christ is given in the treatises on the Sources of Revelation, Grace, the Church, the Sacraments, and the Last Things. See Suarez, *De Incarn.*, I, disp. 47 and Knoll, *Theol. Dogmat.*, II, sect. 390 sqq.

## PART IV

## THE MOTHER OF THE REDEEMER

**I**N THIS PART WE DEAL with the personal attributes of the Virgin Mother of the Redeemer, and her participation in the work of Redemption. Other points of doctrine relating to her have been treated of in Part III of this Book. We shall here speak of: (1) Mary the Virgin; (2) Mary the Mother of God; (3) Mary full of grace; (4) Mary co-operating in the Redemption of Mankind. St. Thomas, 3, qq. 27–29; Suarez, *De Incarn.*, tom. ii, *in proem. dist.* 1; Petavius, *De Incarn.* lib. xiv. cc. 1–9; Newman’s *Anglican Difficulties*, vol. ii.

## § 158 MARY THE VIRGIN

In ordinary women maternity excludes virginity, but the woman chosen to be the Mother of Christ through the overshadowing of the Holy Ghost was necessarily consecrated to God alone, not only a virgin among many, but *the virgin* of virgins. The prophet Isaias (vii. 14.; Matt. i. 23) announces that “a virgin shall conceive and bring forth Emmanuel;” and in the Apostles’ Creed, Mary “the Virgin” is associated with the Holy Ghost as the source and origin of Christ. She is the spiritual vessel of election set apart for God.

I. The Christian idea of Mary’s virginity postulates its perpetuity, and its extension to her body, her mind, and her feelings: *Virga perpetua virginitatis mentis et sensus*.

1. Mary, a virgin before, during, and after the birth of her Son: such is the classical phrase for expressing the perpetual integrity of her body.

The Fifth General Council (can. ii.), and the council held in the Lateran under Martin I (can. iii), defined the perpetual virginity of the flesh of Mary, which consequently is of faith. In Part II of this Book we have spoken of Mary’s virginity in the conception and birth of Christ. That she was a virgin before conceiving has never been contested. As to her virginity after bringing forth her first-born, we gather it from her vow (Luke i. 34, of which more below); from the fact that she is always called the Mother of Jesus (never of any other), and that on the cross Christ recommended her to John, there being no son to take His place. Whatever is inadequate in these indications from Scripture, is amply supplied by the unanimous and unbroken tradition of the Church. To all the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers Mary is “The Virgin.” The heretics who impugn this attribute are treated as madmen, blasphemers, criminals, guilty of sacrilege (St. Jerome, *Contra Helvidium*). The reason why Mary should always remain a virgin is by universal consent given in the words of Ezech. xlv. 2, “This gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass through it; because the Lord, the God of Israel, hath entered in by it, and it shall be shut.” St. Thomas (3, q. 28, a. 3) says that Mary’s perpetual virginity was required: (1) by Christ, whose dignity requires that He should be the only-born as well as the first-born Son of His Mother; (2) by the Holy Ghost, who had to preserve His sanctuary inviolate; (3) by Mary herself, who in sacrificing her virginity would have been guilty of the greatest ingratitude; (4) by Joseph, in whom the violation of the sanctuary of the Holy Ghost would have been most culpable arrogance.

Three exegetical difficulties have, from the earliest times, been urged by heretics against the perpetual virginity of Mary. St. Jerome exhaustively discusses and solves them in his book against Helvidius. They are: 1. Matt. i. 25, “And he knew her *not till* she brought forth her first born.” But from the words immediately preceding, “Joseph took unto him his wife,” it is manifest that the Evangelist only intended to lay stress upon the virginal birth of Jesus, without a thought of the relations between Joseph and Mary after that birth. The same intention is equally manifest in ver. 18, “*Before they came together*, she was found with child,” although here the coming together probably simply implies that Joseph “took unto him his wife.” 2. The title of “First-born” is applied to Jesus here; and Luke ii. 7 excludes previous children without necessarily including subsequent ones. The First-born in the Bible is the subject of privileges, rights, and duties: he is consecrated to God. The title is given to Jesus for this and for no other reason. 3. The “brothers of Jesus” in biblical language may be His relatives, or members of the same tribe. Abraham says to Lot, “We are brethren” (Gen. xiii. 8). As a matter of fact, several of the brethren of Jesus are said to be children of another Mary,



the sister of the Mother of Jesus, and wife of Klopas (Matt. xxvii. 56, and John xix. 25). James, who is especially pointed out as the brother of the Lord (Gal. i. 19), is regularly styled the son of Alphæus in the list of the Apostles. Klopas, Cleophas, and Alphæus, are but different forms of the same Hebrew name.

Some Fathers, on the authority of apocryphal gospels, admit that Joseph had children by a former marriage; this admission, however, is not necessary to account for the brethren of the Lord. Origen and Jerome strenuously reject it.

2. That the virginity of Mary includes “the firm intention perpetually to preserve the integrity of her body for the honour of God,” has always been the conviction of the Church.

After conceiving by the Holy Ghost, without detriment to her virginity, Mary could not entertain the thought of desecrating her sanctified body: such an impious desire could not spring up in a soul “full of grace.” As to the time before the conception, when Mary was yet unaware of her exalted vocation, we may safely presume that God prepared her for it by suggesting to her mind the “vow of virginity,” which she mentioned to the Angel of the Annunciation as an accomplished fact: “How shall this be done, because I know not man?” (Luke i. 34.) This text leaves no doubt as to the existence of a vow of chastity. When was it made? Was it unconditional? Considering the ideal love of purity which the Church attributes to the Virgin of virgins on the ground of her being the bride of the Holy Ghost, we are bound to think of this vow as perfect, without any restrictions as to time or circumstances, and that it was made when the question of her future state of life for the first time arose in Mary’s mind.

3. The third peculiarity of Mary’s perfect virginity is her complete freedom from unchaste feelings and sensations both in mind and body. As, however, this aspect of purity comes under the head of the moral perfection and sanctity of Mary’s will, we deal with it in another place.

Her perfect purity of body, mind, and feelings, makes the Mother of Jesus the Virgin of virgins—that is, the ideal Virgin. Her love of purity was in proportion to her eminent fulness of grace and love of God. Her virtue was protected not by human will alone, as other saints, but by the all-holy will of God, who, by reason of His alliance with her, bound Himself to keep her unspotted.

II. St. Thomas (3, q. 29, a. 1) gives twelve reasons why Mary should have been united in marriage to Joseph. The chief ones are, that her marriage shielded herself and her Son from infamy, secured a protector to both, and gave us, in the person of her husband, a trusty witness of the Divine origin of Christ. But was not Mary’s vow of virginity an obstacle to a true marriage? We must, indeed, admit that her marriage differed from the ordinary union between man and wife, inasmuch as her vow debarred Joseph from the exercise of his right over her body. All other duties and rights of both parties in the matrimonial contract remained unaffected. In virtue of his marriage, Joseph had a right to call Mary’s Son his own, and the duty to act to Him as a father; in fact, God had ordained their union for that very purpose. It thus appears that the union between Joseph and Mary has excellences not attained even by Christian matrimony. The fruit of union is Joseph’s own through his “spiritual” union with Mary. The same fruit is not merely an “adoptive Son of God added to His kingdom,” but the natural Son of God Himself. St. Thomas, 3, q. 28 and 29; Franzelin, thes. xv.

## § 159 MARY THE MOTHER OF GOD

I. In Holy Scripture, and still more in the language of the Church, the title “Mother of Jesus” is given to Mary as the distinctive character of her dignity, as the fountain-head of all her other privileges. Who is Mary? “She is, by Divine election, the Mother of the Saviour.” This description defines her personality, accounts for all her exceptional gifts and graces, and marks her unique position in the economy of salvation (*supra*, § 136). Stress must be laid on the Divine election by which Mary was made the Mother of Jesus; for, as maternity presupposes matrimony, the act by which the Logos from all eternity decreed that Mary should be His partner in the work of the incarnation, may be considered as analogous to human marriage: a virgin is chosen to be the Divine Bride, and to become, by Divine operation, the Mother of Him who chose her. The eternal decree is Mary’s eternal title to the dignity of Mother of God. In the fulness of time the Bride is conceived immaculate, and filled with grace in consequence of her eternal predestination; in the Conception of Christ the union is consummated, and Mary is actually invested with a dignity only excelled by that of its prototype, the Hypostatic Union of Christ with the Logos.

II. The grace of Divine Motherhood originates, like all supernatural graces, in election and predestination by God. But, unlike ordinary predestination to glory, it is unconditional and irrevocable. As integral part of the plan of Redemption, the Virgin’s election to Divine Motherhood is antecedent to any act of hers. Her union with God for the purpose of man’s salvation is as indissoluble as God’s purpose itself, and much more so than human marriage. In the Creator’s idea, Mary is “the Mother of the Saviour” as much as Eve, her type, is the “mother of mankind.” Her maternity unites her personally to God after the manner of the Hypostatic Union of Christ with the Logos; not, indeed, so as to constitute one person with God, but so as to elevate her personality to the highest sphere of created perfection and dignity, above and beyond all mere creatures. The *gratia unionis*“ in Christ is a substantial grace, viz. the Logos Himself anointing His human nature with Divinity. Similarly, the grace of Divine maternity is substantial, viz. the Divine Being of the Son infused in the Mother. Again, in Mary, as in Christ, the Substantial grace dwells “corporally,” and in both the union is organic. The grace of maternity existed from all eternity in God’s idea of Mary as an element of her being and a condition of her coming into existence, exactly as the *gratia unionis* in Christ. Lastly, both unions are analogous in their sanctifying effects: both Christ and Mary, although each in a peculiar form, are “consecrated” by the indwelling Divinity. It deifies Christ, it fills Mary with grace, and makes her the *κεχαριτωμένη*, full of grace, and *ἡ Θεόπαις*, the Child of God, in an eminent sense. It also perfects in Mary the antitype of Eve, making her the Bride of the new Adam, and to Him a “helper like himself.” For as Eve came from the substance of Adam, and was endowed with a soul like his and a personality of her own, so Mary receives her supernatural life from the substance of her Divine Son, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the Logos, and is one with Him, dwells in Mary as in His sanctuary, and so gives her a personality analogous to that of Christ. Again, this indwelling of the Holy Ghost constitutes Mary “the type of the Church,” which is “the spouse of Christ,” inasmuch as its members are sanctified, raised to the rank of adopted sons, by the outpouring on them of the Holy Spirit.

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“Grace of union.” —Ed.

III. As the grace of union secures to the humanity of Christ the highest excellence attainable by a created nature, so the grace of Divine Motherhood secures to Mary the highest excellence possible to a created person. It associates her in the closest manner with the Divine persons; without giving her divinity, it draws her to the Divinity as near as the finite can be drawn to the infinite.

1. She is the Daughter of God the Father: first, in common with every rational being; secondly, in common with, but immensely above, all the adoptive children of God through sanctifying grace; thirdly, in common with the humanity of Christ only, as being jointly conceived and jointly willed in the eternal mind, and organically associated in the temporal manifestation, *ad extra*, of the Logos. Hence so many titles properly belonging to Christ are bestowed by the Church, in a duly modified sense, upon Mary: she is our Lady (*Domina*), our Life, our Sweetness and Hope, our Queen, etc.

2. She is, next to Christ, the noblest and most exalted of human beings; through her, mankind is mystically connected with Christ and with God. The Mother of Christ is also, through Him, the Mother of His mystical body, the Church. When she conceived and brought forth Christ, she also conceived and brought forth the Light and Life of the world, wherefore her maternity of the adoptive children of God is not purely mystical, but has an organic foundation in fact.

3. Lastly, having been made a participator in Christ's eternal generation, and in His Fatherhood (Headship) of mankind, Mary in a manner and degree participates in His office of Mediator between God and man. She is the Mediatrix who leads us on to the true Mediator, Christ; for through her Christ received the existence and the flesh in which He carries out His mediation, and is the Head of mankind. Mary's mediation, however, essentially differs from that of her Son: He, being God, gives of His own; she, being but a creature, distributes what she receives.

IV. The peculiar exaltedness of the Mother of Jesus above all that is great and holy in creation (except her Son), entitles her to a peculiar worship, differing in degree and in kind from that due to the Saints. The technical name "hyperdulia" given to this worship implies that it is above the *dulia* (service) offered to ordinary saints.

When we thus honour Mary, we honour in her the gifts of God and Christ. The worship of the Mother implies and completes the worship of the Father and the Son.

### § 157 MARY FULL OF GRACE—HER IMMACULATE CONCEPTION

The "fulness of grace" of the Mother of Jesus began with her Immaculate Conception, defined in the Bull *Ineffabilis* in these terms: "The most blessed Virgin Mary, in the first instant of her conception, was, by a singular grace and privilege of Almighty God, through the foreseen merits of Jesus Christ, the Saviour of mankind, preserved free from all stain of original sin (*ab omni originalis culpæ labe præservatam immunem*)."

I. 1. The subject of the definition is the "person" of the Blessed Virgin; hence, "the first instant of her conception" is the moment in which God united the living soul to the body, *i.e.* the moment Mary began to be a human being; technically, her *nativitas in utero*.<sup>12</sup>

2. The words, "was preserved from *all stain* of original sin," directly express that the habitual sin of Adam, which passed on to all his descendants as an internal stain, did not

<sup>12</sup>"Birth in the womb." —Ed.

touch Mary. Indirectly, the same words imply the doctrine taught by the Church of the Virgin's original sanctity and justice, and the consequent exclusion of the imperfections of our fallen nature. The preservation from sin is but a consequence of a positive infusion of grace.

3. "Through the merits foreseen of the Saviour," is added to show that Mary, like every other child of Adam, was by nature liable to original sin, and that to her, as to others, Redemption from it through her Son was necessary. But whilst Christ frees us from the sin after it has been actually contracted, He freed His Mother from the necessity of contracting it at all.

4. The last words, "by a singular privilege," etc., state that the Immaculate Conception was a gracious and unique exception to the general law. The universality of the law is thus no proof against Mary's immaculateness, nor does her immaculateness create a prejudice against the universality of the law. "This law is not made for thee, but for all others" (Esth. xv. 13).

II. 1. The proof of the Immaculate Conception contained in the formula of St. Anselm, *Potuit, decuit, ergo fecit* ("the Immaculate Conception was possible, it was fitting, therefore God accomplished it"), carries conviction to every faithful mind. When we consider the origin of Mary in the Father's eternal mind, and her close association with the Divinity as described above, we cannot help feeling that God "was bound" to give His daughter every privilege that was possible and becoming: the *ergo fecit*<sup>13</sup> follows with almost metaphysical cogency. The "Holy Virgin, the Daughter of God, the true Eve," must be perfectly stainless.

2. Scripture speaks nowhere in set terms of this dogma. It may, however, be inferred from Gen. iii. 3, 15, compared with the salutation of the Angel and of Elizabeth (Luke i. 28, 42): "I will put enmities between thee and the woman, and thy seed and her seed; she shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for her heel;" "Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee: blessed art thou among women;" "Blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb." The Woman, blessed among women, and her Son are here represented as jointly opposing the power of the father of sin: the victory is a crushing defeat of the enemy which—whether attributed by the text primarily to the Mother or to the Son (cf. *supra* p. 26)—is common to both, and implies that neither of them, even for a single instant, was under the power of sin. The words of the angelic salutation are but an echo of the Proto-evangelium. The woman full of grace and blessed above all women is she who, with her Son, crushed the serpent's head and destroyed its seed.

3. It would be unfair to restrict the proof from tradition to such testimonies of the Fathers as directly assert the Immaculate Conception. To get at the sense of the early Church on this point, we must examine its picture of Mary's general holiness, and of her position in the supernatural order. Two features are prominent and universally pointed out, both of which evidently imply the completest freedom from all stain of sin. They are: (a) Mary's perfect, unqualified purity; and (b) her position as the "new Eve, the mother of regenerate mankind." St. Anselm, in the words reproduced at the beginning of the Bull *Ineffabilis*, sums up the Christian tradition with its motives: "It was fitting that Mary should shine with a purity than which none greater can be conceived except in God. For she is the Virgin to whom God the Father ordained to give His only Son—generated from His heart, equal to Himself, and beloved by Him as another Self—so that He should be the one and selfsame Son of God the

<sup>13</sup>"Therefore, He did it." —Ed.

Father, and of the Virgin. She it is whom the Son chose to be His Mother substantially, and of whom the Holy Ghost willed and effected that He, from Whom He Himself proceeds, should be conceived and born." The idea of the New Eve is thus introduced by St. Ephræm, "Both (Mary and Eve) were established in the same purity and simplicity, but Eve became the cause of our death, Mary the cause of our life."

Besides the general and implicit expressions of the Virgin's Immaculateness—volumes of which can be produced—there exist, from the fourth century onwards, many witnesses testifying to an express knowledge of the dogma in the Church, and even among the common people. In the Eastern Churches the belief constantly existed without any contradiction, and manifested itself in many doctrinal utterances and in the ancient feast of the Conception of St. Anne. In the West we find fewer traces of the doctrine, yet we meet with no contradiction until the twelfth century, when the introduction of the feast of the Immaculate Conception gave rise to controversies closed only by the definition of 1854. (For details, the reader may consult Perrone, Passaglia, or Malou, *De Imm. Conc.*; Newman. *Angl. Diff.* vol. ii).

III. The proofs from reason, Scripture, and Tradition which establish Mary's freedom from original sin, likewise establish her freedom from concupiscence and from actual sin. As to the fact that Mary never experienced the motions of concupiscence, there exists an almost absolute unanimity among the Fathers, at least since the fifth century. Moreover, concupiscence is but a consequence of that original sin which never had power over the Mother of Jesus; hence her perfect freedom from it, although not expressly defined (*de fide*), is *fidei proximum*. The universal doctrine of her complete exemption from actual sin is confirmed by the Council of Trent (sess. vi. can. 23): "If any one say that man once justified can during his whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, as the Church holds that the Blessed Virgin did by special privilege of God, let him be anathema." Theologians go a step further, and assert that Mary was "impeccable," *e.g.* unable to commit sin; not indeed, like Christ, by the essential perfection of her nature, but by that special Divine privilege which assimilated her as far as possible to her Son.

## § 15ε MARY'S DEATH, INCORRUPTIBILITY, AND ASSUMPTION INTO HEAVEN

I. There are two methods of treating of the end of Mary's life on earth—the historical and the theological. Death, incorruption of the body, and resurrection, are facts observable by eye-witnesses, and therefore matters of history and tradition. But in the case of the Blessed Virgin, as in that of our Lord, these facts may also be studied from theological sources of knowledge. Since the Vatican Council was petitioned to define the bodily assumption of Mary into heaven, a vast amount of literature, historical and theological, has been produced on the question. The outcome of the historical researches has proved unsatisfactory to the defenders of the traditional view; no contemporary evidence, no reliable testimony connecting later traditions with the facts, is forthcoming. From purely historical sources the current belief in Mary's bodily assumption cannot be proved. This belief, however, has in theological principles so solid a foundation, that many theologians think it ripe for dogmatic definition. "Did Mary in her bodily life share the common lot of mankind, or did she in this, as in her spiritual life, participate in the privileges of her Son?" Such is the question which theology has to solve.

II. That Mary underwent death is a universal belief in the Church. Yet her death is less certain than her glorification. For this latter admits of positive proof from revelation, whereas the former cannot be proved convincingly either from history or revelation. In fact, the law of death as revealed only punishes fallen mankind; but Mary was exempted from original sin, therefore also from its penalty, death. Again, her death cannot be proved as a consequence of her mortal nature, for in her case the claim of nature is superseded by a supernatural claim to immortality. The same would have been true of Adam, had he not sinned. Mary's claim to a life unbroken by death rests upon her Divine Motherhood; but as she is the Mother of Him who died for us, it was fitting that she should die also, lest her and her Son's human natures should be thought unreal, and the Mother privileged above the Son. Mary, then, died because Jesus died; but her death was not necessarily the effect of violence—it being undergone neither as an expiation or penalty, nor as the effect of disease from which, like Jesus, she was exempt. Since the Middle Ages the view prevails that she died of Love, her great desire to be united to her Son either dissolving the ties of body and soul, or prevailing on God to dissolve them. Her "passing away" is a sacrifice of Love completing the dolorous sacrifice of her life; it is the death in the kiss of the Lord (*in osculo Domini*), of which the just die.

III. Death is an evil not degrading in itself; nay, under certain circumstances it is even honourable. Corruption of the body, on the contrary, is of itself associated with ideas of dishonour: even in the body of the just it is looked upon as a result of God's curse on sin. Hence, corruption of the body is incompatible with the dignity and position of Mary. The body of the Mother of Christ and Bride of the Holy Ghost could not be allowed to fall a prey to vile corruption. To the Virgin, who conceived without knowing man, who brought forth without lesion, whose flesh without concupiscence had encompassed Divinity, the words of the Psalmist may be applied: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; nor wilt Thou give Thy holy one to see corruption" (Ps. xv. 10). The Fathers love to connect Mary's incorruption after death with her virginal integrity during life. No theologian impugns this privilege. Mary's incorruptibility is theologically so certain that it may be used as an argument for her speedy resurrection.

IV. A lifeless body, however incorrupt, is still under the dominion of death. If, then, Mary's body was preserved intact because though dead it was not under the law of death, its separation from the soul could only last a short time. The words (Ps. xv. 10) quoted by St. Peter (Acts ii. 24) to prove the resurrection of Christ, have likewise force to prove the resurrection of Mary, inasmuch as she shared with Him the privilege of incorruptibility. As from the beginning she was associated with her Son in the conflict against sin and evil (Gen. ii. 15), so must she also be associated with Him in the final victory and triumph. Further theological considerations, based upon the grace of Motherhood, may help to strengthen this proof. 1. Protracted death would be an unbecoming interruption of Mary's Motherhood, since she is Mother by her body. 2. The Bride of Christ ought not to be separated from her Bridegroom beyond the term required by the object of the union. If "husbands must love their wives, as Christ loved the Church and delivered Himself up for it" (Eph v. 25), and if Mary is the type, and the first member of the Church, and if she enjoys the first and greatest love of the Head of the Church, how can her body be dead to Him? 3. The commandment to honour father and mother, the promises made to the Saints of a participation in the Divine nature, the act that Mary's substance formed the substance of her Son—all these require the

completest honour to the body of Mary. Other proofs from types in the Old Testament are current among the Fathers; especially the incorruptible wood of the Ark of the Covenant.

V. Mary's corporeal assumption into heaven is so thoroughly implied in the notion of her personality as given by Bible and dogma, that the Church can dispense with strict historical evidence of the fact. Again, whatever traditional evidence there is, *e.g.* the early celebration of the feast of the Assumption, acquires increased force from the theological arguments, and *vice versa*.

## § 160 MARY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WORK OF REDEMPTION

I. Work necessarily bears the stamp of the worker: its worth or worthlessness, its meritoriousness or demeritoriousness, are commensurate with the qualities of the agent who produces it. Hence, correctly to estimate Mary's co-operation in the work of Redemption, we must keep before our eyes her personal character, especially its analogy with the personal character of Christ. The peculiar dignity and power of her work are derived from the Holy Ghost, Who acts in and through her in a union by grace, as the Logos acts in and through the humanity of Christ in personal union.

II. As Mother of Christ, Mary cooperated "physically" in the Incarnation. This privilege she shares with no other creature. Ministers of the sacraments act as mere vehicles of God's power; Mary gives to Him of her own substance. Without having the sacramental power of the priest, she in the conception, formation, and birth of the Saviour, presents the most perfect type of the priest's functions. Moreover, her organic participation in the beginning of Christ's life, organically connects her with the whole course of that life.

III. Mary's actions had a singular moral value in themselves as being personal services rendered to God, and tending to further the great object of the Incarnation. But they acquire a special excellence from the personal excellence of their authoress: they flow from the "Bride of the Logos, and Bearer of the Holy Ghost," and have the stamp of their origin. If the soul of the just is a temple in which the spirit "asketh with unspeakable groanings in order to help our infirmity" (Rom. viii. 26), we are justified in assuming that in the sanctuary of Mary's soul His sanctifying influence attains the highest degree. He inspires acts, moves the will to carry them out, and assists in the work, so as to make it almost wholly His own. From this point of view the actions of the Blessed Virgin are seen to possess, like those of Christ and of the Church, a supernatural, moral, and legal efficacy, benefiting not herself only, but all mankind. There is, however, between the merits of Christ and those of Mary, an essential difference in their manner of benefiting others. The merits of Christ, infinitely perfect in themselves, are applied authoritatively to whom and in what measure He wills. What Mary does for us is neither infinitely perfect nor applied on her own authority; her work, however excellent and pleasing to God, is but "impetratory," viz. of its kind it is a prayer.

IV. The titles given by the Church to Mary, "the new Eve, the Bride of the new Adam, the Sanctuary and Organ of the Holy Ghost," clearly contain the idea that her work is associated with the work of Christ by a special ordinance of God; that it enters into the plan of Redemption, and forms a subordinate but integral part of Redemption. Hence the attributes of the Saviour are often bestowed upon His Mother. She is called *Salvatrice*, *Reparatrix*, even *Redemptrix*<sup>14</sup>; the destruction of sin and the victory over the devil are ascribed to her.

<sup>14</sup> "Savioress," "Repairer," and "Redeemer." —Ed.

The meaning of these titles and attributes when applied to Mary is not the same as when applied to Christ; to the former they only apply as to the "Handmaid of the Redeemer in the work of Redemption." The Fathers find a proof for, and an illustration of, the Divine preordination of Mary's co-operation with her Son, in the fact that the Redemption was the exact counterpart of the Fall: the subordinate part acted by Eve for evil is counteracted by the subordinate part acted by the new Eve for good (Newman, *Angl. Diff.*, II. p. 31 sqq.).

1. The first act of Mary's co-operation in the work of Redemption is her consent to become the Mother of the Redeemer. As Eve, through disobedience and disbelief, became the handmaid of the devil in the work of destruction, even so Mary, through obedience and faith, becomes the handmaid of God in the work of restoration. And as Eve's consent to the temptation became fully co-operative in the fall when Adam added to it his own consent, so Mary's consent became a full co-operation when Christ united to it His first act of obedience.

2. This initial consent, the fervent prayers which preceded and followed it, the continued maternal services, the uttering of Jesus in the Temple and on the Cross, the complete union of her will with His in the work of Redemption, place Mary by the side of her Son as a deaconess by the side of the sacrificing priest. The deacon is both the representative of the people and the consecrated assistant of the priest: in the first capacity he hands to the priest the elements of the sacrifice; in the second he supports him in the oblation of the chalice, and, when the sacrifice is complete, assists him in the distribution of the Sacred Food. In the same manner Mary takes an active and integral part in the sacrifice of Christ, without in the least interfering with His self-sufficiency and supremacy.

3. The association of the Mother of Jesus with her Son in acquiring the redeeming merits, is maintained in their distribution, and is of the same nature, viz. what Christ effects by His own authority and power, Mary obtains by intercession and prayer. She, of all human persons the most excellent and the nearest to God, the organ of the Holy Ghost and the Mother of the Church, received at the foot of the Cross the fulness of salvation in the name of mankind. In the Apostle St. John she beholds the spiritual sons committed to her motherly care; in the upper chamber she sat and prayed with the Princes of the infant Church; in heaven she reigns as a Queen all-powerful because her prayer knows no refusal. May we not say, with some theologians, that God grants no grace except on the intercession of Mary? It would certainly be an anomaly in the Divine dispensation if a work begun and carried on with the co-operation of the Virgin-Mother was concluded without her: "the gifts of God are without repentance." We must, however, be careful to fix accurately the sense of our statement. It does not imply that we can obtain no grace except by expressly and explicitly praying for it to Mary, or that her intercession is always required in order to dispose her Son in our favour. The true and only defensible meaning is that "in the Dispensation established by God and by Christ, the merits and the intercession of the Saviour Himself are applied to nobody without the concurring intercession of Mary, and consequently, that every grace given is co-impetrated by Mary."

*Scholion.* The doctrine of the Invocation of Saints is thus described by the Council of Trent (sess. xxv.): "The Saints, who reign together with Christ, offer up their own prayers to God or men. It is good and useful suppliantly to invoke them, and to have recourse to their prayers, aid, and help for obtaining benefits from God, *through His Son Jesus Christ, Who alone is our Redeemer and Saviour.* Those persons think impiously who deny that the Saints, who enjoy eternal happiness in heaven, are to be invocated; or who assert either that they do



not pray for men; or that the invocation of them to pray for each of us even in particular, is idolatry; or that it is repugnant to the word of God, and is opposed to the honour of the *one Mediator of God and men*, Christ Jesus.”

“Prayer,” says St. Thomas, “is offered to a person in two ways—one as though to be granted by himself, another as to be obtained through him. In the first way we pray to God alone, because all our prayers ought to be directed to obtaining grace and glory which God alone gives, according to those words of Psalm lxxxiii. 12: *The Lord will give grace and glory*. But in the second way we pray to holy angels and men, not that God may learn our petition through them, but that by their prayers and merits our prayers may be efficacious. Wherefore it is said in the Apocalypse (viii. 4): *The smoke of the incense of the prayers of the Saints ascended up before God from the hand of the Angel*” (*Summ. Theol.* 2<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>æ</sup>, q. 83, a. 4).



BOOK VI

GRACE



**T**HE SUBJECT OF THIS BOOK IS THE SALVATION of mankind as worked out in each of its members by the saving grace of the Redeemer. The Sixth Session of the Council of Trent on justification, the dissertations of the Fathers on the grace by which we are justified, and the theological treatises on the grace of the Saviour, deal with the same subject-matter. In Book III we have said all that is necessary on the supernatural order and habitual grace; here we are concerned with the actual working of grace unto salvation. The first chapter treats of grace as the principle of regeneration; the second of the order and economy of justification and salvation in man; the third of the order and economy of grace in God's providence.

Peter Lombard, l. ii. dist. 26–29, with Comment. of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Estius; St. Thomas, 1, 2, qq. 109–114, with Comment. of Sylvius, Gonet, Gotti, Billuart, Suarez, Vasquez, etc.; Kleutgen, *Theol. der Vorzeit*, vol. ii.; Satolli, *De Gratia Christi*; Einig, *De Gratia*.

Scheeben's great work, which we have hitherto mainly followed, was broken off in the middle of the treatise on Grace (book vi.).

## CHAPTER I

### GRACE THE PRINCIPLE OF REGENERATION

#### § 161 SOME GENERAL NOTIONS

I. The primary object of the saving grace of Christ is to restore and to foster in man that life of holiness and justice which was lost through original sin, and thereby to enable him to secure his supernatural end, the beatific vision of God. Whatever was essential to holiness of life in Adam, must be restored to us by this saving grace of Christ, lest His Incarnation be in vain. From our fallen state we must be raised to a new, higher, and godlike life; our will, weakened and impaired in the fall, must be healed and strengthened, and receive back its supernatural rectitude. Unlike the human physician, whose skill consists in enabling the existing principle of life to accomplish its natural functions, Christ, the heavenly physician, infuses into the soul a new principle of a new life; He removes sin, heals the wounds inflicted by it, and renovates the interior—that is, the spiritual—man. “Even when we were dead, (God) hath quickened us together in Christ, by Whose grace you are saved, and hath raised us up together, and hath made us sit together in the heavenly places through Christ Jesus” (Eph. ii. 5–7).

II. The renovation of the “interior man” is not the complete restoration of that state in which God created Adam, but only of a part, viz. supernatural sanctity. Even after the new birth in the “laver of regeneration,” free will remains bent towards the earth and weakened in its power for good. On this infirmity the grace of Christ acts like wholesome medicine on a convalescent; without restoring health altogether and at once, it prevents relapses, and helps the invalid to go through his duties until he reaches his final goal. The power of Christ's grace is made perfect in this infirmity (2 Cor. vii. 9), inasmuch as greater power and efficiency are required to save the weak than the strong. This special power comes to the new-born man through his ingrafting on Christ as a member of His spiritual body, partaking of the life of the Head. The new life is given in the Sacrament of Baptism, the strengthening power

is communicated, though in various ways, in Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Holy Eucharist.

III. Scripture attributes to the Holy Ghost the diffusion or distribution of the graces merited by Christ (Rom. v. 5). The sending of the Holy Ghost was promised by Christ as a fruit of His saving work on earth. The third Person of the Trinity is the principle of our supernatural life, not separately, but conjointly with the Father and the Son, since all external works are common to the three Divine Persons (§ 8୧). The distribution of grace is specially attributed to the Holy Ghost because He is the Breath of the Divine Love, which Love is the source of all God's gifts. Again, He is the "vivifying Spirit, proceeding from God," and thus represents a principle which can be communicated to creatures, and act in them as an immanent principle of higher life. He comes to man as a cloud of light (cf. 1 Cor. x. 2), and as a fountain of water springing up into life everlasting (John iv. 14); as the Spirit of Life in the mystical body of Christ, diffusing, from the Head, new life into each member. As the mother is the principle of the life of the child still growing in her womb—or, to use a better analogy, as the spiritual essence of the human soul influences the vital functions of the vegetative life in the body—so does the indwelling Holy Ghost influence man's spiritual life. As the spiritual essence of the soul supplies its energy to the principle of vegetative life, so the Holy Ghost supplies energy to the principle of man's sanctified life, viz. to his reason and free will.

IV. Dealing with the saving grace of Christ specifically as the source of the new moral life in man, we consider it chiefly as "actual grace;" differing from "habitual grace" as a passing act differs from an habitual state. This treatment is commonly followed by modern theologians; the Fathers and the Schoolmen, on the contrary, do not emphasize the difference, and frequently speak of habitual and actual grace as of one whole. Controversial reasons account for this discrepancy, which readers of the older theologians should constantly bear in mind.

## § 162 ACTUAL GRACE

I. Actual and habitual grace are the two species of the genus "grace." Both are free gifts of God to man. But whereas habitual grace connotes an enduring state of the soul, actual grace connotes a passing act produced in it by the gratuitous operation of God. In this wider sense, all supernatural acts, the free acts of our will included, are gifts and acts of God, and may be styled actual graces. In a narrower sense, however, actual grace is a gratuitous Divine operation, entirely or partly different from habitual grace, by which God so influences the moral acts of the soul that they come into existence as His own gifts and operations. Actual grace enables and causes the will to perform salutary acts. Technically, it is defined as *gratuitum principium proximum agendi*, and *donum per quod et in quo præstatur nobis ut agamus*, that is, the Divine gift by which we are led to act. Habitual grace, indeed, enables us to perform salutary acts, but the actual impulse, the motive power that determines each particular act, is actual grace.

II. Since the introduction of the term "actual" grace to designate all graces other than habitual grace, it has become customary to use the older designations in the same sense. Thus the terms, "operating," "co-operating," "helping," "assisting," "moving," "awakening" graces, all directly and specifically imply certain Divine operations in the soul whereby God furthers its natural activity. Like wise "interior grace" is used for actual grace, as opposed to

the external influence of God or other Creatures, on the soul. This is a correct theological use of the term. We must, however, bear in mind that the Schoolmen, and especially the Fathers, did not always use these terms as co-extensive with what is now called “actual” grace. With them, oftener than not, the terms serve to describe the working and work of God in the soul as distinct from habitual grace. Thus to the *gratia auxilians* (helping grace) they ascribe the remission of sins and the regeneration of man, and not unfrequently they speak of it in the same terms as of sanctifying or habitual grace.

III. When the soul receives the touch of helping grace, it answers by moving itself towards the object for which it was bestowed. The reception of the “touch” is a vital act of the soul, which prepares and disposes it to further operation in the order of grace. Theologians say “grace *excites* (awakens) the act in the soul.” These expressions imply (1) that the impression made by grace is a vital act—cognition or affection—of the soul; (2) that it disposes the soul to exert its own free activity in a given direction. In modern language the grace in question is a God-given vital energy, furthering acts of spiritual life.

IV. The first elements of the “energy” of actual grace are those acts of the intellect which apprehend the object, the motive, and the means of the good deed to be performed by the will. For every voluntary action depends on a judgment of the intellect as to its advisability. The knowledge of the principles, the terms and the consequence which lead to such conclusion, are the illumination of the mind (*illustratio mentis*), which is the first actual grace. Knowledge, however, only disposes to the good deed without administering the necessary energy. The “energetic” disposition is produced by God in the form of affections, feelings, motions of the will, which fecundate its freedom and lead it to act rightly. These sensations of the soul (*motus, affectus, sensus cordis*) are not originated by the free will; they are not free or voluntary acts, but instinctive workings of the mind or heart, leanings and inclinations preparing the free will for action. They are inspired or awakened (*excitati*) by God; they touch and impel the will before it determines on its free action, and are thus the true “actual, helping, disposing grace.” Even when the will has acted under the impulse of an involuntary inclination, *e.g.* when it has consented to work out the salvation to which it feels attracted—the inclination is, or may be, maintained by God to support and advance the free working of the will. In this case the former indeliberate sense becomes a deliberate act, without losing the character of actual grace.

V. The process by which God’s grace works out the salutary act of the soul may fitly be compared with the process of generation. God is, as it were, the father, our soul the mother, of the fruit of life. God’s fecundating grace enters the soul, stirs up its natural energy, is received and developed by that same energy, *i.e.* the free will, until the good deed is brought forth, the common product of grace and free will.

VI. Grace acts on the soul both negatively and positively. Its negative action consists in preventing the evil suggestions of the world, the flesh, and the devil from taking effect upon the mind. This gracious protection often implies the strengthening of the soul by positive Divine influence. Positively, grace acts in two ways: (1) it externally proposes to the soul objects the knowledge of which is apt to lead to salutary actions; (2) it internally supplies the necessary spiritual energy for performing such actions. The preaching of the Church, the words and deeds of good men, certain clear manifestations of God’s providence, the suggestions of our Guardian Angels, are examples of the first manner; to which, since the sixteenth century, has been applied the technical term of *motio moralis*—that is, motion by

suggestion, advice, command, persuasion, or any other means in the power of mere creatures to induce a free will to act. The second, or energizing action, is termed *motio physica*. It is the *tactus cordis*, the touch of the heart of the creature by the Creator; it is the touch of the inmost spring of life by the indwelling Author of life. It belongs to God alone, and is as incomprehensible as the action of our mind on the body, which is analogous to it. In 1 Cor. iii. 6, St. Paul compares the factors of spiritual life with those of the growth of a plant: "I have planted, Apollo watered; but God gave the increase." The planting and watering represent the external or moral motion; the life-power or vital energy of the plant is likened to the internal or physical motion.

VII. 1. Both of these motions act on the mind in order to generate knowledge conducive to moral actions. The former, however, only brings the mind in contact with its object; whereas the latter confers the power by which the object is illumined, and actually seized upon by the mind.

2. The moral motion directly touches the intellect only, and acts on the will only through the intellect. The physical motion, on the contrary, embraces both faculties, giving warmth and energy to the affections of the will as well as light to the intellect.

3. The moral motion is more like an instantaneous impulse; it does not accompany the action which it determines. But the physical motion acts continuously, conferring and upholding the working energy until the act is completed. The first "waters" the good deed; the second gives it life.

4. A last and most important difference between the two motions lies in the extent of their efficacy. God can supply the will with an unlimited amount of energy according to His own pleasure; He can thus enable it to perform acts of the highest moral worth; and, what is more, He can determine what each act shall be. In other words: the moral motion has an uncertain effect; the physical motion has an infallible effect.

VIII. God has not only the power of moving the will after the manner of created agents, *i.e.* from without; He also possesses, in an eminent way, that same power by which the will moves itself. Hence, when He, as the first cause, co-operates with the created free will, His cooperation is "a willing," more powerful than the soul's own. As the strong hand of the rider trains the wild horse to obey all its master's wishes, so the Divine hand, mightily and sweetly, trains the human will to find pleasure in doing His will.

## § 163 HERESIES CONCERNING GRACE—THE CORRESPONDING DOGMAS

I. 1. Against the Manichæans the Church had upheld the principle that sin, inasmuch as it implies guilt, is avoidable. Starting from this, Pelagius and his disciples taught (1) that the notion of sin excludes every necessity which is not a consequence of former sins, and even this necessity was only admitted in a limited sense (St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, op. imp. vi. 19); (2) that the notion of our free will implies the power of avoiding every infraction of the moral law, and the power of fulfilling the moral law perfectly in its entirety. The power of avoiding all evil and doing all good being inherent in man's nature, the children of Adam are born as perfect as their first parent; hence there is no original sin, and consequently no need of redemption. The Church had taught, against the Manichæans, that there is but one source of both good and evil deeds, *viz.* our free will, which is of itself indifferent to good or evil, but



becomes the principle of good and meritorious actions when energized with Divine grace. The power for good, which the Church attributed to grace, Pelagius attributed to nature. As St. Augustine pointed out, in the Pelagian system God was no more the author of good than of evil, and was as much the author of evil as of good. Internal grace, habitual or actual, found no place in Pelagianism. In fact, the influence of internal grace on free will was declared impossible, as being contrary to the very essence of the latter. Nothing but external action, such as the devil may have in his power, was allowed to God!

Jansenius indicates four stages in the evolution of Pelagianism: (1) Pure heathenism, when no mention is made of grace; (2) semi-heathenism, when nature is called grace; (3) Judaism, when the positive law and doctrine are added as graces; (4) semi-Christianity, when the teaching and example of Christ, the forgiveness of sins, the adoption obtained through Baptism, are brought forward as auxiliary graces. From first to last, however, its fundamental tenet is the natural and essential power of free will to do good or evil independently of any help or interference.

Hence, if man's free will is the only principle of good actions, man is able to merit, of himself, whatever reward or favour or grace is promised by God to such actions, *e.g.* eternal life, the "good will" of the Author of life, the forgiveness of sins, the aid of revealed doctrine and precepts. An exception was made for the *regnum calorum*, the kingdom of heaven (distinguished from "life eternal"), which was a special reward for the dignity of children of God conferred in baptism. That dignity was considered as a grace completing the meritorious action of the will.

Again, all the aids (= graces) which free will requires or receives in order better to avoid evil and do good, are granted by God on the initiative taken by man: as God punishes evil, so He rewards good, *viz.* according to every man's personal merit or demerit. There is no favour, no election, no predestination. In short, the creature is emancipated from the Creator in all things moral.

2. Between the years 412 and 418 several African Synods examined and condemned the new doctrines of Pelagius and his disciples. Their decrees were submitted to and approved by the reigning Popes, and consequently they contain the authoritative teaching of the Church. From the various canons we gather the following points:

(a) Through original sin human nature loses its original freedom and power to lead a righteous life (*bene et recte vivendi*), in the sense of not being able to fulfil the *whole* moral law. The new birth, new life, and infusion of charity by the Holy Ghost in Baptism are necessary to restore to man his original power of doing good. This power, however, is not an empty possibility like that claimed by Pelagius; it is a new power, a new and nobler faculty to bring forth new and salutary works.

(b) The new-born man still retains his natural weakness, and is subject to internal and external temptations. Hence he constantly requires the assistance of actual Divine grace not to be led into temptation and sin.

(c) Sanctifying grace obtained in baptism, and the actual graces freely bestowed by God or obtained by prayer, as a matter of fact do not enable man to fulfil the law with the perfection possible in the original state. Hence he always remains subject to a sort of necessity of falling into sins or imperfections.

(d) The decrees asserted the necessity of grace for leading a life of righteousness; in other words, the necessity of charity in order to perform acts meritorious of eternal life. They were

silent as to the “preparatory acts” of faith and prayer, and thus afforded a pretext for new controversies and the new heresy of Semi-Pelagianism.

(e) Grace was explained as the vivifying and energizing working of the Holy Ghost on the soul, especially on the will, giving man a kind of participation in the Divine nature, and conforming the human will to the Divine, and thus constantly directing it to will and accomplish what is pleasing to God.

(f) Grace is an essential element of the power of performing salutary actions. It gives our will the perfect freedom of the children of God, inasmuch as this freedom consists in the power of doing good. The Pelagian freedom claims the power for evil as well as for good; the true freedom of God and of His children is for good only.

II. 1. Taking a middle course between the Pelagians, who ascribed the whole work of salvation to the powers of human nature, and the Predestinarians, who ascribed it entirely to God alone, the Semi-Pelagians held that the initial or preparatory acts were in the power of man unaided by grace; and further, that these acts merited the subsequent Divine graces. They thus denied the complete gratuity of grace. In the words, “Believe in the Lord Jesus, and thou shalt be saved” (Acts xvi. 31), they saw a kind of covenant between God and man: “Give Me thy faith, and My salvation shall be thy reward.” The faith required was, however, nothing but a pious willingness to believe, a simple beginning of faith; it was the act of the soul weakened by sin calling in the Divine Physician.

2. St. Augustine and his disciple Prosper took up arms against this new error. It was condemned in the *Indiculus Capitulum*, ascribed of old to Pope Celestine I; by the popes Gelasius and Hormisdas; and lastly, by the Second Council of Orange. The canons of this council set forth the doctrine of the Church as follows: Grace is not given simply because we ask for it—it is really the cause of our asking for it; in order to free us from sin, God does not expect an act of our will, but the desire to be freed is wrought in us by the infusion of the Holy Ghost; the beginning of faith, the pious willingness to believe, is not in us naturally, but is itself a gift of grace; to the inspiration of the Holy Ghost are also due the initial acts of believing, willing, desiring, striving, seeking, asking; by the mere forces of nature nothing positively leading up to eternal life can be thought of or chosen without the illumination of the Holy Spirit; not only a few, but all require Divine mercy to come to the grace of baptism (canons 3–8). See also §§ 47, 48. The Scripture proofs are clear. “Who distinguisheth thee? or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?” (1 Cor. iv. 7). Faith is expressly set down as a gift of grace. “For by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not of works, that no man may glory” (Eph. ii. 8). “This is the work of God that you believe in Him Whom He hath sent” (John vi. 29).

III. 1. The starting-point of the Reformers’ doctrine on grace is the erroneous principle that original sin destroyed man’s free will. According to Luther, free will was altogether destroyed; according to Calvin, it was so thoroughly vitiated that it is utterly incapable of any spiritual act or aspiration, or of receiving any spiritual impressions; original sin is an evil principle in the soul which infects every thought and action of man, and makes them to be sinful and unfit to contribute either to the justification of the sinner or the sanctification of the just. Hence Calvin taught: “God does not move the will in the manner handed down and believed for many centuries, viz. so that it remains with us to either follow or resist the motion” (*Inst.* ii. 3). And Scharpius: “We say (in opposition to Bellarmine and the Council

of Trent) that after the fall God moves and bends the will of man with such efficacy that when He wills man's conversion, man must needs follow the Divine will, not indeed compulsorily, but spontaneously" (Scharpius, *De Lib. Arb.*, ii. 3). Luther writes: "Free will (*liberum arbitrium*) is a fiction . . . for no one has it in his power to think anything good or evil, but all things, as Wyclif's article condemned at Constance rightly teaches, come to pass by absolute necessity . . . There is no doubt that it was by the teaching of Satan that the name of free will was introduced into the Church" (*Assert.*, art. 36). Again, "Man stands as a beast of burden between God and the devil: if God rides it, it goes whither God wills; if Satan rides it, it goes whither Satan wishes it to go. Nor is it in man's power to choose his rider; the riders, on the contrary, fight for his possession" (*De Servo Arbitrio*). This doctrine of the original Reformers was afterwards, like so many others, modified, and by degrees completely abandoned. At the present day the orthodox Lutheran teaching differs little, if at all, from the Catholic doctrine.

Working on a will without freedom and totally depraved, grace produces its own fruit without any co-operation on the part of man: it is likened unto a good tree planted in a bad soil. Side by side with it, depraved nature brings forth its own evil fruit. Man is thus half sinner, half saint, unable to fulfil the law and to please God—even when regenerated through grace. The new life is not justice, but only a striving after justice. No difference is made between the two stages of spiritual life, viz. the preparatory stages of faith, and the perfect life of charity; none between venial and mortal sin, or between simple mortal sin and total falling away from God. Man is made responsible for his acts although he is unable to choose. This repulsive doctrine was early abandoned by the followers of Luther; disciples of Calvin, however, seem to uphold it to this very day.

2. The canons appended to the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent frequently reproduce (for condemnation) the heresies of the Reformers in their own wording. The few we translate here serve the double purpose of throwing a clearer light upon the reformed teaching, and of setting forth the Catholic dogma in its most authentic formulas.

"If any one saith that man's free will, moved and awakened (*excitatum*) by God, does in no manner (*nihil*) co-operate when it assents to God, Who excites and calls it, thereby disposing and preparing itself to receive the grace of justification; and (if any one say) that it cannot dissent if it wished, but that, as some inanimate thing, it does nothing whatever and only remains passive, let him be anathema" (can. 4).

"If any one saith that, after the sin of Adam, man's free will was lost and extinguished, let him be anathema" (can. 5).

"If any one saith that all works done before justification, in whatever way they may be done, are truly sins, or deserve the hatred of God; or that, the more vehemently one strives to dispose himself for grace, the more grievously he sins, let him be anathema" (can. 7).

"If any one saith that the commandments of God are impossible to be observed by man, even when justified and constituted in grace, let him be anathema" (can. 18).

"If any one saith that man, once justified, can sin no more nor lose grace . . . ; or, on the contrary, that he can during his whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, except by a special privilege of God, as the Church holds of the blessed Virgin, let him be anathema" (can. 23).

"If any one saith that the just, in every good work, sins at least venially, or, what is more intolerable, mortally, and therefore deserves eternal punishment; and that, if he is not damned, it is only because God does not impute to him these works unto damnation, let him

be anathema” (can. 25).

“If any one saith that, when grace is lost through sin, faith also is always lost with it; or that the faith which remains is not a true faith, although it be not living; or that he who has faith without charity is not a Christian, let him be anathema” (can. 28).

“If any one saith that the justified man sins when, for the sake of an eternal reward he performs good works, let him be anathema” (can. 31).

IV. The errors of the Reformers were partly reproduced by some Catholic theologians unwilling to break with the Church. Baius (Michael Bay, of Louvain) admitted free will in man, and taught that grace enabled him to perform good and meritorious works. But in many other points he followed the Reformers. We subjoin some of the seventy-nine propositions extracted from his writings and condemned by Pius V (*Bulla, Ex omnibus afflictionibus*, Oct. 1, 1567), by Gregory XIII (1579), and by Urban VIII (1641).

25. “All the works of infidels are sins, and all the virtues of philosophers are vices.”

27. “Free will (*liberum arbitrium*), without the help of God’s grace, has only power for sin.”

28. “It is a Pelagian error to say that free will has the power to avoid any sin.”

35. “Every action of the sinner or the slave of sin is a sin.”

46. “A sinful act is not necessarily a voluntary act (*Ad rationem peccati non pertinet voluntarium*).”

67. “Man sins, even unto damnation, in actions which he performs by necessity.”

70. “Man in the state of mortal sin and under the penalty of eternal damnation, may have true charity; and even perfect charity is consistent with the guilt (*reatus*) of eternal damnation.”

74. “Concupiscence in the regenerated, who all back into mortal sin, and in whom it dominates, is a sin, as also are other bad habits.”

V. Jansenius went a step beyond Baius, by trying to introduce Calvin’s errors in a more refined form. We must limit ourselves to giving the famous five propositions taken from the *Augustinus* of Jansenius, and condemned by Innocent X (1653), Alexander VII (1656), and Clement XI (1705). *Supra*, p. 90.

1. “Some of God’s precepts are impossible to the just, who wish and strive (to keep them), considering the powers (*vires*) they actually have; the grace by which they may be made possible is also wanting.”

2. “In the state of fallen nature one never resists interior grace.”

3. “In order to merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature, freedom from necessity (liberty to choose) is not required in man, but freedom from external compulsion (*coactio*) is sufficient.”

4. “The Semi-Pelagians admitted the necessity of a prevenient (*prævenientis*) interior grace for each act, even for the beginning of faith; they were heretics because they pretended this grace to be such that the human will could either resist or obey it.”

5. “It is Semi-Pelagian to say that Christ died or shed His blood for all man without exception (*omnino omnibus*).”

VI. Jansenius had published his doctrines in a strictly scientific form; Quesnel brought them before the public in the attractive garb of popular writings, occasionally reverting to the harsher errors of Baius, which Jansenius had tried to soften down in his system. One

hundred and one propositions taken from Quesnel's works were condemned by Clement XI in the Bull *Unigenitus* (1713).

VII. The last manifestation of Jansenism censured by the Church was the pseudo-synod of Piŝtoja. Eighty-one propositions of the Synod were condemned by Pope Pius VI in the Bull *Auctorem fidei* (1794).

## § 164 NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE

I. The sphere in which grace works is the spiritual life of man, whose leading faculties are the intellect and the will. The existence of these powers is a fact testified to by our consciousness, but the determination of their limits is among the difficult problems of philosophy. Can we know anything with certainty? Can we know anything beyond what our senses teach us? Is not even this knowledge an illusion? Is the moral law, or the existence of God, within the grasp of our unaided faculties? These and similar questions have been met by sceptics, agnostics, ontologists, traditionalists, idealists, and others, with contending systems ranging from universal doubt to universal belief. Is our will really free, or are we the playthings of unknown, subconscious motives which determine our actions, leaving us under the impression that we act from choice? What impels us so often to act against our better knowledge? The teaching of the Church on these points may be expressed in the two following propositions:

(1) The human intellect is endowed with the physical power to know the truths of the natural order; (2) the free will of man is endowed with the physical power of performing actions morally good, although in the state of fallen nature this power is not sufficient to overcome always and in all things all the difficulties which beset its exercise.

1. That the human mind is able to grasp some truths and to know them with certainty, is an axiom which cannot be demonstrated without begging the question. It must be admitted as a primary and fundamental fact in all teaching. But if the mind is able to know some truths, it is able to know all the truths of the same order, provided they be properly brought to its notice. A knowledge of God, the Author of nature and of the moral law, is within the reach of our natural powers (see *Wisd.* iii. 5; *Rom.* i. 19 sq.; ii. 14, etc.; vol. i.).

2. The physical power of willing and performing good actions in the natural order is also self-evident. We know what is good and what is evil; we instinctively incline to what is, or appears good to us, and likewise decline from evil; lastly, we command the means to give effect to our inclinations. Thus we know, without the aid of revelation, that the Author of nature is worthy of praise, thanksgiving, and love; we feel in our innermost being, that is, in our conscience, an impulse to give God His due, and in word and action to praise, thank, and love Him. Such is the teaching of St. Paul (*Rom.* ii. 14): "When the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law; these, having not the law, are a law to themselves . . . their conscience bearing witness to them," etc. (*cf.* *Matt.* v. 46). God even rewards such actions of the Gentiles (see *Exod.* i. 21; *Ezech.* xxix. 18). It must, however, be acknowledged that in its exercise the power of doing the right thing is beset with countless difficulties. In the original fall, our will suffered more than our intellect. St. Paul only confirms every one's own experience when he says (*Rom.* vii. 23), "But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members." And (*ibid.* 25), "I myself with the mind serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin."

II. Having sufficiently vindicated the powers of man in the sphere of nature, we ought now to consider what these powers are capable of in the sphere of supernature. This task, however, has been performed in our treatise on the Supernatural (§ ੬੬), to which we beg the reader to refer. See also the definitions of the Church against Pelagianism, in § 163.

The necessity of grace for the performance of salutary acts, either before or after justification, is physical, absolute, and unconditional. It is necessary to man while yet in the state of nature, to elevate him to the plane of supernature. It is necessary to the sinner, in order to cancel the guilt of mortal sin, to reconvert his mind and will to God, and to obtain the remission of eternal punishment. It is also necessary to the just in order to perform salutary acts. For although the just is endowed with habitual grace, he remains subject to the general law that no creature can act without the concurrence of God. Hence, when the habit passes into acts, God concurs according to the nature of the habit, viz. supernaturally, or by giving actual grace. Besides, there is a special necessity arising from the weakened condition of human nature, even in the children of adoption. They, too, must pray, "Lead us not into temptation," for "the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh weak" (Matt. xxvi. 41).

### § 165 FINAL PERSEVERANCE

I. Final perseverance in grace implies two factors: one internal, viz. the conservation of grace; and the other external, viz. death overtaking the individual when he is in the state of grace (Matt. x. 22; Apoc. ii. 10). Such preservation of grace until the moment of death is a special privilege or gift of God, distinct from the Divine concurrence in either the natural or supernatural order, and likewise distinct from the sum total of common graces connected with the state of justice given to all the just. Yet it is not an actual or habitual grace more efficacious than the rest, but a special care of Divine Providence so disposing matters that death shall overtake the just when he is in the state of sanctifying grace. This happy result is attained in various ways: life may be shortened to prevent a fall into mortal sin, or lengthened to afford time for repentance; temptations may be removed, or additional help conferred to overcome them.

II. The Church, in the Second Council of Orange, defined against the Semi-Pelagians the necessity of a special Divine assistance for final perseverance. "The reborn and the sanctified (*sancti*), in order to come to a good end, and to persevere in goodness, have need always to implore the help of God" (can. 3). The Council of Trent (sess. vi. can. 22) anathematizes any one who says that "the justified is able, without a special help of God, to persevere in the justice received; or that, with such help, he is not able to persevere." Reason supports the teaching of the Councils. The will of man is unsteady, and constantly wavers between good and evil. The infused habits of virtue, though they add strength to the will, do not limit its inclinations to good alone. In order, therefore, to secure constancy in goodness, a *special* Divine assistance is necessary. Hence also Scripture admonishes us to "work out our salvation with fear and trembling" (Phil. ii. 12); "to watch and pray, lest we fall into temptation," for "we have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency may be of the power of God, and not of us" (2 Cor. iv. 7). But we may be "confident that He who hath begun a good work in us will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus" (Phil i. 6). And He will also fix the right time of our death: "He pleased God and was beloved, and living among sinners he was translated. He was taken away, lest wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul" (Wisd. iv. 10-15). See Vol. I.

I. Another point in connection with the life of grace remains to be elucidated. The Pelagians maintained that a perfect, sinless life was possible by the mere powers of our nature. They considered the "perfection of justice" to consist in impeccancy or sinlessness and freedom from concupiscence. That doctrine was assailed by St. Augustine, and condemned by the Second Council of Milevis, and again by the Council of Trent. "If anyone saith that man, being once justified, is able to avoid all sins, even venial, during all his life, without a special Divine privilege such as the Church holds was granted to the Blessed Virgin, let him be anathema" (sess. vi. can. 23).

II. The sins which even the just cannot always avoid, are not those known as mortal, or destructive of the life of grace. They are the slight aberrations of the will from the strict and narrow path of perfection, sufficient to incline the mind for a moment towards the creature, but insufficient to turn it away from the love of God and one's neighbour, *e.g.* idle words, vain thoughts, and such-like. Some sins, of themselves mortal, become venial on account of the want of deliberation; for no sin, however grave materially, can be mortal if committed with imperfect knowledge or will. The words "all sins" in the above definition refer to all sins taken collectively. Taken separately, there is no venial sin that cannot be avoided. Again, the impossibility of avoiding all venial sins collectively, is not physical, but moral; in other words, the avoidance is of such difficulty that, knowing the ways (*mores*) of man, we feel sure that man will fail if left to himself.

1. All sins, mortal and venial, may only be avoided by a "special privilege," distinct from the forces of nature to which Pelagius attributed such power; distinct from habitual grace, which does not make the just impeccable; distinct from the usual supply of habitual grace and from the grace of perseverance, both of which are compatible with venial sin. What is "special" about this privilege is that it constitutes an exception to the general rule: no man leads a perfectly sinless life.

2. The reason for the moral impossibility of a life entirely free from sin is to be found in the weakness of our nature and in the multitude of occasions of sin which surround us. It certainly passes the power of our mind to be so constantly on the watch against these occasions, as never to be caught unawares. And besides, we cannot help a certain feeling that the result to be obtained by such strained watchfulness is not commensurate with the labour it involves. Venial sins do not entail the loss of habitual grace or eternal punishment, and they are easily forgiven. Einig, *De Gratia*, thes. 10.

## CHAPTER II

### JUSTIFICATION

**I**N THE PRESENT CHAPTER WE SHALL endeavour to show how grace, the principle of new life, takes possession of the soul of man, and transfers him from the slavery of sin into the kingdom of the adopted sons of God. "Justification" is the term applied to this process by the Council of Trent and by theologians. Its etymological meaning is "making just," that is, putting man in the right with God and with himself, or re-establishing the order originally established between God and man. Of this primitive order sanctifying grace was

the foundation and the life-spring. Hence the question of “How man is justified” resolves itself into this: “How is sanctifying grace conferred upon man?” If the reader has mastered Book III, Part II, and especially § 105, he can solve that question for himself. We have only to add the teaching of the Church (a) on the preparation for justification; (b) on its essential character, as opposed to the innovations of the Reformers; (c) on some of its effects; and (d) on the meritoriousness of the works of the justified. The Sixth Session of the Council of Trent is our guide throughout.

### § 167 ACTS PREPARATORY TO JUSTIFICATION

I. The early Reformers denied the necessity of any disposition on the part of the adult to fit him for the reception of habitual grace. To them the enslaved will is but a lifeless instrument in the hands of God. Faith they require, not as a disposing or preparing act, but as the instrument, or the hand, by which man seizes upon justification. Luther even went so far as to assert the sinfulness of acts intended by man to fit him for the reception of grace. He, as well as Calvin, held that such acts interfered with the essential gratuity of God’s gifts. Against these errors the Council of Trent defined that “they who through sin were turned away from God, through His awakening (*excitantem*) and helping grace, are disposed to turn themselves to their own justification by freely assenting to and co-operating with that same grace” (sess. vi. chap. 5). “If any one saith that the impious is justified by faith alone, meaning that nothing else is required to co-operate in order to obtain the grace of justification, and that he (the impious, or sinner) need in no way be prepared and disposed by the action (*motu*) of his own will, let him be anathema” (*ibid.*, can. 9).

II. Free will is the chief faculty to be influenced in the process of justification. But God, acting with or upon His creatures either in the natural or the supernatural order, always acts in harmony with the laws of their nature. A Divine action out of harmony with these laws could only be useless or hurtful. Hence, when God draws unto Him the free will of man, He draws it by its own free motions (§§ 104, 105).

1. Whenever Scripture holds out justification to man, it requires of him some personal acts as a preparation: “But if the wicked do penance for all his sins . . . and keep all My commandments, and do justice and judgment, living he shall live and shall not die” (Ezech. xviii. 21). “Behold, I stand at the gate and knock. If any man shall hear My voice, and open to Me the door, I will come in to him” (Apoc. iii. 20). “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved” (Mark xvi. 16), etc.

2. The tradition of the Church on this point is summed up in the words of St. Augustine: “He Who made thee without thee, does not justify thee without thee” (Serm. 15, 13, *De Verb. Apost.*).

III. Infants are justified by simple “information” of the soul: grace reaches them, in harmony with their undeveloped nature, without their co-operation, by the virtue of Baptism. The same is true of the insane, who have never had the use of their free will. Such as have lost their freedom profit by the sacraments only if, before the loss, they desired to receive them.

The rule that God acts on free will without diminishing its freedom shares a criterion for testing His influence on persons in the state of ecstasy or hypnotic trance. Whenever the liberty of the subject is suspended, the finger of God is not there.



## § 168 FAITH AS A DISPOSITION FOR JUSTIFICATION

I. The Reformers, distinguishing between (1) historical faith by which we believe the truths revealed in Scripture, (2) faith by which miracles are wrought, and (3) faith in God's promises by which we "believe that He remits our individual sins," affirm that this last is the true justifying faith. A firm confidence or trust that our sins are forgiven, would be a better name for it than faith. Further, they say that this faith alone, unassisted and unaccompanied by any other act of the soul, is sufficient to justify man.

II. The Catholic doctrine is contained in sess. vi. chap. 6, cans. 12 and 9 of the Council of Trent: "They (adults) are prepared (or disposed) to (receive) justice when, awakened by Divine grace, and conceiving *faith* by hearing (*ex auditu*), they are freely moved (*moventur*) towards God, *believing* the truth of what He has revealed and promised—and chiefly that the sinner is justified by the grace of God, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus; and when, being conscious of their sins, they turn from the fear of the Divine justice which profitably agitates them to the consideration of God's mercy, and thus are raised to hope, trusting that God, for Christ's sake, will be propitious to them; and they begin to love Him as the source of all justice, and are moved (*moventur*) against sin with a certain hatred and detestation—that is, with that penance which is required before baptism; lastly, when they resolve to receive baptism, to begin a new life and to keep the Divine commands." "If any one saith that justifying faith is nothing but confidence (*fiducia*) in the Divine mercy remitting sins for Christ's sake, or that by this confidence alone we are justified, let him be anathema" (can. 12; can. 9 is given above, § 167).

III. The conversion of the sinner consists in turning his mind and heart away from sin unto God. Now, it is impossible to turn the mind to God if God's existence is not known, and it is impossible to turn the heart to God if He is not known as good. In the supernatural order this twofold knowledge comes by faith. Hence the Apostle says, "Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe that He is and is a rewarder to them that seek Him" (Heb. xi. 6).

1. The "saving faith," which Luther invented to make salvation easy, is as unknown to Scripture as it was to the Church before the Reformation. Not one of the texts quoted for it implies a faith equivalent to a trust that one's sins are forgiven. When Christ says to some, "Thy faith hath made thee whole" (Matt ix. 22; Luke xvii. 19, and xviii. 42), He evidently alludes to faith in His healing power. In the case of the woman with an issue of blood (Matt. ix. 22), Christ Himself makes a distinction between the faith which the woman already possessed and the confidence to which He exhorts her. Of the two blind men (Matt. ix. 28–30), He expressly requires faith in His power: "Do you believe that I can do this to you?" The faith which was "reputed unto justice to Abraham" (Rom. iv. 3), is that by which "against hope he believed in hope, that he might be made the father of many nations, according to that which was said to him: So shall thy seed be" (Rom. iv. 18).

2. The faith which Scripture connects with our salvation is expressed by the Greek word *πίστις*, which chiefly and generally means "assent of the mind," although occasionally it may also imply "trust of the heart," or confidence (*fiducia*). It implies "assent of the mind" wherever the act of faith is further explained by the verbs "to believe," "to assent," "to know," used with it (cf. Heb. xi. 3, *πίσται νοοῦμεν*, "by faith we understand"); when the faith is founded upon past benefactions (John iv. 53 and ix. 38); when the object of the faith is such

that it cannot be also the object or trust (*e.g.* Matt. ix. 28, John vi. 70; 1 Cor. ii. 18); lastly, when Scripture expressly describes justifying faith as an assent of the mind to revealed truth. "Preach the *Gospel* to every creature. He that *believeth* and is baptized shall be saved" (Mark xvi. 15, 16). "God so loved the world as to give *His only begotten Son*, that whosoever *believeth in Him* . . . may have life everlasting" (John iii. 15; see also John xx. 31; Rom. i. 16, and x. 8 sq.; Acts viii. 35).

The nature of justifying faith and its necessity are professedly expounded by St. Paul in the classical text (Heb. xi. 1–6). We have dealt with this text in § 32 ("Nature of Theological Faith"), and in § 41 we have said all that is needful on the "Necessity of Faith." We invite the student to read these two sections here.

3. The proofs from Scripture brought forth by Protestants to support their doctrine "most wholesome and very full of comfort" (Art. XI, Church of England), that we are justified by faith alone, may be divided into two classes of texts: (a) texts *affirming* that we are justified by faith (Rom. v. 1; i. 17; Gal. iii. 11; Heb. x. 38; Acts xv. 9); (b) texts which apparently exclude the necessity of works distinct from faith (Rom. iii. 28; Eph. ii. 8; Acts x. 43; xiii. 39). The famous verse (Rom. iii. 28), "We account a man to be justified by faith, without the works of the law," was strengthened by Luther through the addition of the word "alone" after "faith." He justified the change in his characteristic way: "Doctor Martin Luther will have it so, and says, 'Papist and ass are the same thing; *hoc volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas.*'" In the same off-hand way he removed the "straw epistle" of St. James from the canon of Scripture. Such tactics are alone sufficient to discredit the system they are meant to uphold. The Council of Trent (sess. vi. chap. 8) gives the "sense of the Church" on the above texts as follows: "When the Apostle says that man is justified by faith and gratuitously, his words must be understood in the sense which the Catholic Church always held and expressed, viz. We are said to be justified by faith because faith is the beginning and the foundation of man's salvation, and the root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God, and to come to the society of His sons; we are said to be justified gratuitously, because nothing which precedes justification, be it faith or works, merits the grace of justification."

IV. Where many partial causes combine to produce an effect, this effect is often spoken of as the result of one or other of them, no mention being made of the rest. This usage is a necessary consequence of the narrowness of our knowledge. We do not know all; do not think of all we know; we cannot or will not express all we think. The sentences we utter represent our thoughts, as it were, in shreds; the listener must put them together to arrive at a full knowledge of our meaning. This rule is universal. Hence, when Scripture tells us that faith is necessary to salvation, we must not conclude that nothing else is necessary.

1. The dispositions which, besides faith, are set forth by the Council of Trent as either necessary or helpful to justification, are mentioned in various parts of Scripture: the Fear of the Lord (Eccl. i. 27 sq.); Love (John iii. 14; Luke vii. 47); Penance and its external acts (Acts ii. 38; Joel ii. 12); Almsgiving (Job xii. 9); the Sacrament of Baptism (Tit. iii. 5).

2. "Come, ye blessed of My Father . . . for I was hungry, and you gave Me to eat, etc. . . . Depart from Me, ye cursed, . . . for I was hungry, and you gave Me not to eat" (Matt. xxv. 34 sqq.). "By works a man is justified and not by faith only" (James ii. 24). "Faith without works is dead" (*ibid.* ii. 26). "God will render to every man according to his works . . . for not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified" (Rom. ii. 6–13). "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor

uncircumcision, but faith that worketh by charity” (Gal. v. 6).

Questions of supernatural facts are to be settled by the dictates of authority. Scripture and tradition reveal them to us. But Luther vilifies tradition; he corrupts and curtails Scripture, and arrogantly proclaims that the only foundation for his teaching is his own words. Against such an antagonist, logic is of no avail. The Fathers and the Schoolmen, starting from the idea that justification is a change from bad to good, and an elevation from the natural to the supernatural order, argued that the process required two sets of free acts: the one summed up in detestation of sin, the other in putting on the new man. But Luther meets them with a twofold denial: sin is not remitted, but only covered; the “new man” is Christ imputing His own justice to the still sinful man! With such an opponent, controversy on the basis of theological science is impossible. Moreover, it is not necessary. For as the leading Protestant theologian of our time, Al. Ritschl, says of the German Lutherans: “Hardly anywhere, even in the most orthodox sermon (*bekennnistreu* = faithful to the confession of faith), do we find a complete agreement with the proposition of the Formula Concordiæ (A.D. 1577), that salvation is dependent on faith alone” (*Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, v. iii. p. 463).

### § 169 WHAT JUSTIFICATION IS

Our treatise on the supernatural order and grace (Book III Part II) deals fully with the transforming, elevating, and deifying effect of grace on the justified soul. The sublime depth of the old doctrine of the Church stands in singular contrast to the shallow innovations of the pretended Reformers. The old excels the new as much as the adopted Son of God, the heir of the kingdom and partaker of the Divine nature, excels the prodigal who “is accounted righteous before God; God, overlooking man’s sins and crediting him with the merits of Christ.” We have not the heart, nor do we think it worth our while, to follow the maze of Protestant variations on the intrinsic character of justification. Osiander († 1552) enumerates twenty divergent systems current in his time. We give the Catholic dogma as formulated at Trent. The reader must turn to Book III Part II for the speculative theology bearing on the subject.

The seventh chapter of the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent is headed “What the Justification of the Sinner [*impii* = lit. ‘a man not in due relation to God’] is, and what are its causes [viz. the several agents which influence its coming into existence].”

“Upon this disposition and preparation follows justification, which is not merely the remission of sin, but, moreover, the sanctification and renovation of the interior man by his voluntary acceptance of graces and gifts; whence the unjust is made just, the enemy a friend, that he may be heir according to hope of life everlasting (Tit. iii. 7).

“The final cause of this justification is the glory of God and of Christ, and life everlasting.

“The efficient cause is the merciful God, Who gratuitously washes us and sanctifies us, signing and anointing us with the Holy Spirit of promise (1 Cor. vi. 11; Tit. iii. 5; Eph. i. 13), Who is the pledge of our inheritance.

“The meritorious cause is the Beloved Only-begotten Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, Who, when we were enemies, for the exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, by His most holy passion on the wood of the cross merited justification for us, and atoned for us to His Father (Rom. v. 10; Eph. ii. 4).

“The instrumental cause is the sacrament of baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, without which (faith) no man was ever justified.

“Lastly, the only formal cause is the justice of God, not that by which He is Himself just, but that by which He maketh us just, by which, being enriched by Him, we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and are not only reputed just, but are so in name and in fact, receiving in ourselves, every one according to his measure, the justice which the Holy Ghost divideth to every one according as He will (1 Cor. xii. 11), and according to every one’s disposition and co-operation. For although no one can be just unless the merits of the passion of Christ be communicated to him, yet this (communication) takes place in the justification of the sinner. When, by the merit of the said most holy passion, the charity of God is diffused by the Holy Ghost in the hearts of those who are justified, and is inherent (*inherent*) in them. Whence in the act of justification, with the remission of his sins man receives all at once, through Christ, on Whom he is ingrafted, the infused gifts of faith, hope, and charity. For faith without hope and charity neither unites man perfectly with Christ, nor makes him a living member of His body. . . .”

### § 167 SOME EFFECTS OF JUSTIFICATION

I. Justification elevates man to the dignity of adopted son of God, and confers upon him a personal nobility and worth which ennoble all his subsequent acts (read § 101, vol. i.).

II. Sin, being an aversion from God, is absolutely incompatible with that participation in the Divine Life of Love and Holiness to which the justified are admitted. All, therefore, grant that justification remits sin. But Protestants reduce the remission to non-imputation; the sinner, according to most of them, is credited with the merits of Christ, and his sins are thus covered in some way, and no longer imputed to him; he is “accounted righteous,” or justified only in a legal sense, viz. the Judge considers him righteous without really making him so. The Catholic doctrine is that sin is completely blotted out as to all its effects. Of course, the sinful act cannot be undone; but the stain of guilt and the liability to eternal punishment disappear when grace is infused.

1. The notion that God does not impute a sin which really exists, is a contradiction in terms. We cannot conceive the all-knowing, all-holy, and all-just Being as ignoring or overlooking the rebellious position taken up against Him by a creature; as favouring with His friendship a soul turned away from Him; as allowing moral disorder to exist in the heirs of His kingdom. Whatever guilt there is in man lies bare before the eye of God, and must be dealt with by either His justice or His mercy. And even Divine mercy cannot forgive the punishment without first destroying the guilt, of which the liability to punishment is but a consequence.

2. As Bellarmine remarks (*De Justif.*, ii. 7), Scripture uses all the terms which it is possible to think of in order to express a true remission of sin. Sins are said to be *taken away* (2 Kings xii. 13; and 1 Paral. xxi. 8); *blotted out* (Isa. xliii. 25; Acts iii. 19); *exhausted* (Heb. ix. 28); *removed from us* as far as the east is from the West (Ps. cii. 12); to be put away and be *cast into the bottom of the sea* (Mich. vii. 19). Where sin is considered as a stain or an impurity, it is said to be cleansed, washed, made whiter than snow (Ps. l. 9; Isa. i. 16–18; Jer. xxxiii. 8; Ezech. xxxvi. 25; 1 Cor. vi. 11). Where sin is spoken of as a wound or a sore, it is said to be *bound up and healed* (Isa. xxx. 26). If sin is mentioned as the death of the soul, justification from it is treated as a *resurrection, a new birth, a gift of new life* (John iii. 5; Rom. vi. 4 sq.).

3. “Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are *covered*. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath *not imputed sin*, and in whose spirit there is no guile” (Ps.

xxxi. 1, 2; quoted Rom. iv. 7). On the surface, the words of this text are an exact statement of the Protestant theory. But, according to a common rule of interpretation, it must be read in harmony with the other texts bearing on the same subject, and with the “mind of the Church.” The Psalm quoted is David’s thanksgiving for having had his sin “taken away” from him (2 Kings xii. 13); it is a poetical effusion of the heart, and not a scientific statement of the process of justification. Of a stain blotted out by the power of God, the poet may well say that it is “covered,” and it is “not imputed.” In fact, the parallelism of the first verse requires that the second half should have the same sense as the first. But in the first hemistich sins are spoken of as “forgiven” (ἀφιέναι, ἄψιν, *oblata*), therefore in the second hemistich the word “covered” (ἠπάει, ἐπικαλύπτειν, “to hide”) has the same sense. Lastly, what is “covered” from the eyes of God does not exist (see above, 1).

III. Grace and mortal sin are opposed as a quality and its privation, e.g. as light and darkness, heat and cold, motion and rest. Hence they cannot coexist in the soul. Again, the remission of sin or the removal of the privation is effected by the very appearance of grace. Thus darkness ceases to be when light appears. Venial sin, however, may coexist with grace, because it is not an aversion from God as our last end, but only a inordinate attachment to the creature (cf. § 103, ii 4, and iii).

### § 16ε MERITORIOUSNESS OF THE GOOD WORKS OF THE JUSTIFIED

In the kingdom of God on earth the children of God lead that supernatural life which is to terminate in the Beatific Vision. The same Divine Spirit worketh in all, but to every one He divideth His gifts according to His will and to the measure of their receptivity. With Him the justified freely co-operate, and thus works are performed meritorious of eternal life. We have now to inquire into the nature of merit, and to prove the existence of meritorious works.

I. An act is said to be “worthy of praise or of blame” when it comes of free will; “right or wrong” when viewed in connection with its object; “meritorious or demeritorious” in connection with the reward which it deserves. Hence the notion of merit implies a quality of the work by virtue of which some retribution is connected with it; and a meritorious work may be defined as “a work done in the service of another person, and entitled to a retribution of some kind.” If the quality of the work done claims a reward as a matter of strict justice, its merit is termed *de condigno*; if it only claims a reward as a matter of liberality or fittingness, its merit is *de congruo*. The soldier who has fought well in battle merits his pay *de condigno*, and a decoration *de congruo*.

1. In order to be meritorious, an act must be (a) free. (b) good, (c) supernatural.

(a) We constantly and necessarily associate the notion of meritoriousness with that of freedom: no man is deemed worthy of reward or punishment for acts which he does not perform “knowingly and willingly,” i.e. freely. For only free acts are properly human or *man’s own*, and these only can he hold out for reward or have imputed to him for punishment.

(b) That only “good actions” can be meritorious is self-evident. To be good, an act must have a good object and a good subject-matter, and must not be vitiated by bad circumstances, according to the axiom: *Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocunque defectu*.<sup>15</sup> To make a good action bad, adverse circumstances must change either its object or its subject-matter; if

<sup>15</sup>“Good is from the whole cause, evil is from some defect.” —Ed.

they are merely concomitant, as *e.g.*, involuntary distractions in prayer, the action remains good, though in a less degree.

(c) Works which aim at a supernatural retribution must belong to the supernatural order; that is, they must be vital acts of the life of grace (cf. § 11).

2. To be able to perform meritorious works, a person must be (a) in the “wayfaring state” (*status via*), that is, here on earth; and (b) to merit *de condigno*, he must be in the state of grace.

(a) The present, or wayfaring state, is a state of imperfect participation in the Divine Life. “While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord,” ἐνδημοῦντες ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἐκδημοῦμεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου (2 Cor. v. 6); whereas in the final state (*status termini*) the participation perfectly fills the measure of happiness of which each saint is capable. Hence, in the final state merit has no object, and therefore no existence. But to the present state, longing and working for more perfections are natural. The wayfaring state ends with life on earth. Such is the now universal sense of the Church, founded upon Scripture (Ecclus. xiv. 17; xi., iii.; and John ix. 4).

(b) A claim in strict justice requires a due proportion between act and reward, and therefore in the agent, as well as in the act, a supernatural dignity is required. The propositions in which Baius denies this were condemned by the Holy See (propp. 12, 13, 17, 18). “As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you unless you abide in Me” (John xv. 4). But we abide in Christ by grace. St. Paul argues (Rom. viii. 16, 17), “. . . We are the sons of God, and if sons, heirs also,” thus resting our claim to eternal life on our adoptive sonship, or grace.

3. God must be willing to accept the work as meritorious.

Even from other men we cannot in strict justice claim a reward for services done, unless they have expressly or by implication agreed to remunerate them. So Christ’s saving work owes its sufficiency to God’s acceptance (§ 152, ii.). We cannot benefit God by our service, for our very existence, with all its modes and modifications, is His gift. “We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do” (Luke xvii. 10). In the matter of merit, God is bound to us by His own promises and decrees, which He keeps as faithfully as the laws which He has made for the natural order of the universe.

II. The notion of the total depravity of human nature after the Fall, led the Reformers into many errors concerning good works. With the negation of free will in man Luther removed an essential element of meritorious works; he was driven to ascribe to God alone all the good done in us, and to God working through or with us all our evil deeds. His more moderate followers allow some freedom to the will after the reception of grace. Again, if nature is totally depraved, if the motives and promptings of concupiscence are sins, and if it is impossible to fulfil the law of charity, it follows that no work good in itself can proceed from man—that there is in him no righteousness, and much less any merit before God.

The Reformers’ startling innovations were condemned by the Council of Trent. If any one say “that the Divine commands are impossible of observance, even to man justified and established in grace (can. 18); that in the Gospel nothing is commanded except faith; that all the rest is indifferent, neither commanded nor prohibited, but free; or that the ten commandments do not bind Christians (can. 19); that Christ Jesus was given by God to man as a Redeemer to be trusted, and not also as a Legislator to be obeyed (can. 21); that the justice once received is not preserved, and also increased before God through good works, but that

the said good works are only signs of justification obtained, and not causes of its increase (can. 24); that in every good work the just man sins at least venially, or what is more intolerable, mortally, and therefore deserves eternal punishment, and that for this only he is not damned, because God does not impute his sins to damnation (can. 25); that the just, in return for the good works they may have done in God, ought not to expect or to hope for an eternal retribution from God, through His mercy and the merits of Christ, if living well and keeping the Divine commands they persevere to the end (can. 21), that the just sins when he does good in view of an eternal reward (can. 31); that the good works of the justified are the gifts of God in such a way that they are not also the good merits of the just, or that the just by the good works he does through the grace of God and the merits of Christ, whose living member he is, does not truly merit an increase of grace, life everlasting, and if he die in grace, the possession of life everlasting, and an increase of glory (can. 32), let him be anathema!”

These various definitions may be brought under three heads: Good works are (1) possible; (2) necessary; (3) meritorious of increased grace and of life everlasting.

1. We need not tarry to prove the possibility of good works in the justified. All the conditions required to make a human action good and meritorious before God are present in works done by grace. Besides, God, Who does not command the impossible, commands good works, as will be fully shown below.

2. Motion, exercise, or action is of the very essence of life. Rest means death, and unsuitable motion means disease. The supernatural life, on earth as well as in heaven, must be as active as the natural, under pain of extinction. Evolution or gradual progress is equally essential to life: the life-sap of the tree evolves into leaves, flowers, and fruit; the soul of man gradually builds up his body, and develops by successive stages all his faculties. In like manner the justified man expands the life received in baptism into faith, hope, charity, and the moral virtues into the works of spiritual and corporal mercies. Without these works faith is dead, man is an unprofitable servant who buries the talent entrusted to him, and at last is cast into exterior darkness with the curse of the Judge upon him: “Depart from Me into everlasting fire . . . for I was hungry, and you gave Me not to eat . . .” (Matt. xxv. *passim*; cf. Matt vii. 21; xix. 17; Apoc. ii. 4, 5; 1 Cor. ix. 24, 26, 27; Rom. ii. 6, 8, 9, etc.). These texts tell us in plain terms that though we may have faith in Jesus Christ, and continually have the Lord Jesus in our mouth, there is no salvation, no kingdom of heaven for us unless we do the will of God and keep His commandments, and keep the works of Christ unto the end (Apoc. iii. 5); unless we bring forth worthy fruits of penance: unless we strive in good earnest, like men running or fighting for the prize; and thus, like St. Paul, chastise our bodies and bring them into subjection. For it is only the doers of the law that are justified; and on the day of Judgment Christ will assign no other reason for the condemnation of the reprobate than that they have neglected good works.

3. The meritoriousness of good works is a consequence of their necessity. Life naturally produces vital acts; these naturally add to the perfection of life. Make your intellect, your will, your memory, or your hand do “good work,” and the good work done will add power to these faculties. In the same way the supernatural work of the soul is its own reward in the form of increased supernatural life. For the elevation of our nature to higher life does not alter the laws of its working: it only ennobles them. Faith, hope, and charity are but ennobled knowledge, trust, and love; whether they move on the natural or on the supernatural plane, they gather momentum in moving. There is only one difference—if difference it is: in the natural order

the momentum or increase of vital force arises from the essence of things fixed by God from the beginning; in the supernatural order the merit arises from the co-operation of the human with the Divine will. This, however, rather discriminates the two orders than the law of their working. We are, then, entitled to conclude that the practice of the life of grace naturally tends to the increase of grace, and ultimately to the crowning grace, which is the participation in the Divine Life through the Beatific Vision. Does this natural tendency establish a claim in strict justice, is it merit *de condigno*? Yes, because God owes to Himself the preservation of an order founded upon His gracious promises, even more than the preservation of the natural order founded upon His creatorial decrees.

“Godliness is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come” (1 Tim. iv. 8). “For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us as above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory” (2 Cor. iv. 17). “Sell what you possess and give alms; make to yourself bags which grow not old, a treasure in heaven which faileth not” (Luke xii. 33; cf. xiv. 9; and xiv. 13, 14). “Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life” (Apoc. ii. 10; cf. *ibid.* iii. 5 and 21). “Labour the more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election” (2 Pet. i. 10). “Therefore let us consider one another to provoke to charity and good works. For patience is necessary for you, that, doing the will of God, you may receive the promise: for He is faithful that hath promised” (Heb. x. 23, 24, 36). “And God is not unjust that He should forget your work” (Heb. iv. 10).

III. The above-cited passages, and a hundred more quite as explicit, are met with the objections: (1) that eternal life is our inheritance; (2) that it is a grace or free gift; (3) that when we have done all, we are unprofitable servants (Luke xvii. 10); and (4) that the merit of good works is derogatory to the merit of Christ.

1. Eternal life is indeed the inheritance of the Adopted Sons, but it is also their reward. We enter into it not by the right of natural filiation, but by the right and on the terms of our adoption. These terms, or conditions, are contained in the same title-deed which also contains the deed of our adoption: “You shall receive the *reward of inheritance* (τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν τῆς κληρονομίας). Serve ye the Lord Jesus Christ” (Col. iii. 24).

2. Eternal life is a grace and the crown of all graces. Therefore it is the “natural term,” that is, the term “according to the nature of things,” of the life of grace on earth. As the exercise of our natural powers works out and merits temporal happiness, so the exercise of our supernatural powers works out and merits eternal beatitude. “When God crowns our merits, He but crowns His own gifts” (St. Augustine, *Ep.*, cxciv. 19). In short, the fact that eternal life is a grace, only proves that grace is necessary to merit it, but not that it cannot be merited at all.

3. Those who quote Luke xvii. 7, against the Catholic doctrine, forget that Christ promises to do the very thing which the master in the parable does not do: “Blessed are those servants whom the Lord, when He cometh, shall find watching. Amen, I say to you: He will gird Himself and make them sit down to meat, and passing will minister unto them” (Luke xii. 37).

4. There is something comical, perhaps tragical, in the way the Reformers stand up for the merits of Christ, as if these were endangered or interfered with by our doctrine on the merit of good works and the intercession of the saints. We hold fast that Christ is the vine of which we are the branches: is it derogatory to the vine if the branch bears good and valuable fruit?



Not only do we highly value the merits of Christ, but we also recognize in them the property of overflowing into us, and of elevating us to the dignity of adoptive sons. We do not insist upon the necessity of good works as if Christ's merits were insufficient to save us. On the contrary, we consider His merits so excellent and so efficacious, that they merited for us both eternal life and the power of working up to it from the first moment of our justification (cf. Einig, *De Gratia*, Pars. III.).

## CHAPTER III

# ORDER AND ECONOMY OF GRACE IN GOD'S PROVIDENCE

### § 170 THE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTUAL GRACE

I. The unknown author of the book *De Vocatione Gentium*, who lived in the fifth century, and was called by Pope Gelasius "an approved teacher of the Church," puts the question as to the distribution of grace as follows: "As it cannot be denied that God wishes all men to be saved, we inquire why the will of the Almighty is not carried out. If we say it is the fault of man's free will, we seem to exclude grace; for if grace is given according to merit, it is no longer a gift, but a debt. Hence we ask again: Why is this gift, without which nobody can be saved, not given to all by Him Who wishes to save all?"

The same author solves the problem, as far as it can be solved, by distinguishing between God's general benevolence and His special mercy. "*It pleased God* to give His special mercy to many, and to deprive nobody of His general benevolence." In other words, the solution is to be sought in the inscrutable decrees of God, which lie far beyond human ken, and can only be known darkly by Divine revelation. This "mystery of predestination" neither Augustine nor any other theologian has ever penetrated. The deposit of revelation enlightens us on the following points:

1. The infinite goodness of God and His revealed word (1 Tim. ii. 7–6) leave us no doubt that "God will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth . . . through Christ Jesus, Who gave Himself a redemption for all." If, then, salvation is impossible without grace, God, Who wills the end, does provide the means, viz, sufficient grace to each and all for the salvation of their souls.

2. Grace barely sufficient for men is not sufficient for God's benevolence. Hence we are assured by the Apostle (Rom. v. 15) that, "not as the offence (the sin of Adam bringing death to all), so also is the gift. For, if by the offence of one many died, much more the grace of God, and the gift, by the grace of one man, Christ Jesus, has abounded unto many" (= all who sinned in Adam) (cf. John iii. 16).

3. "God is the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful" (1 Tim. iv. 10). Some die young that they may die in grace (Wisd. iv. 11). Tyre and Sidon did not receive the same graces as the Jews (Matt. xi. 21). It can hardly be doubted that people are lost whose sins are not equal to those of Mary Magdalen or the Penitent Thief.

II. Luther, Calvin, and Jansenius held that even the just are unable to keep the whole law of God, which amounts to saying that God withholds His grace from them. The Council of

Trent meets this doctrine with an anathema against any who say “that the Divine precepts cannot be observed even by man justified and endowed with grace” (sess. vi. can. 18). And, indeed, what would become of God’s wish to see all men saved, if He withheld the means of salvation even from His adopted sons? and of His justice, if He punished the helpless transgressor of an impossible law? and of His sanctity, if by withholding sufficient grace He led man into sin? No; “God does not forsake those once justified by His grace, unless they first forsake Him” (sess. vi. chap. 11). He does not allow them to be tempted beyond their power: “God is faithful, Who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able; but will make also with temptation issue, that you may be able to bear it” (1 Cor. x. 15). In fact, His yoke is light (Matt. xi. 30), and “His commandments are not heavy, for whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world” (1 John v. 3. 4).

But if the sinner’s mind is obscured and his heart hardened so as to offer obstinate resistance to the operation of grace, does God still give him a chance of conversion? Calvin goes so far as to say that God Himself hardens those whom He wishes to damn, and entirely deprives them of grace. Catholics call Calvin’s doctrine blasphemous. The majority of Catholic theologians hold, with good reason, that as long as the sinner lives, be he ever so obstinate, the helping hand of God is stretched out to him, if not constantly, at least at certain times. This doctrine is based upon the Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 1: “Because God, rich in mercy, knoweth our frame (*figmentum nostrum*), He hath given the remedy of life also to those who afterwards (*i.e.* after baptism) have given themselves up to the servitude of sin, and to the power of the devil.” The Council only sums up the teaching of Scripture: “Thou hast mercy upon all because Thou canst do all things. and overlookest the sins of men or the sake of repentance. For Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made. . . . Thou sparest all, because they are Thine, O Lord, Who lovest souls” (Wisd. xi. 24–27). “O how good and how sweet is Thy Spirit, O Lord, in all things! And therefore Thou chastisest them that err, little by little; and admonishest them, and speakest to them concerning the things wherein they offend, that leaving their wickedness they may believe in Thee, O Lord!” (Wisd. xii, 1, 2; Ezech. xviii. 23; xxxiii. 31; Luke v. 32; 2 Pet. 3, 9). All these texts and many more breathe a tenderness of Divine mercy which seems to increase with the wickedness of the sinner. Christ came to save, not the just, but sinners; to leave the ninety-nine and go after the sheep that is lost; and none is too obstinate for His loving-kindness.

III. Infidels, to whom the faith was never preached, are not left without sufficient grace to secure the salvation of their souls. Luther does not hesitate to sentence all infidels—Gentiles, Turks, and Jews—to eternal hell-fire; and Jansenius is not much more lenient. But the Catholic Church condemned their doctrines. Thus Alexander VIII (7 Dec. 1690) condemned the proposition: “Pagans, Jews, heretics, and others of this kind, receive no influence whatever from Christ; hence their will is entirely bare and unarmed, and entirely without sufficient grace” (see also the propositions 26, 27, and 29, condemned by Clement XI). Pius IX sums up the teaching of the Church on this point in his Encyclical of August 10, 1863, to the Italian bishops: “It is known to us and to you that they who labour under invincible ignorance of our holy religion, and yet diligently keep the natural law and its precepts written by God in the hearts of all, and are ready to obey God and to lead an honest and righteous life, are enabled by the power of Divine light and grace to obtain eternal life. For God, who plainly beholds, examines and knows the minds and hearts, the thoughts and habits or all, in His

sovereign goodness and clemency will not allow that any one suffer eternal punishment who is without the guilt of a wilful sin.” The teaching of the Popes is not less in accordance with Scripture than with reason. Christ is the Light of the world that enlightens “all men,” and God wills that “all men come into the knowledge of truth” (1 Tim. ii. 4). See § 39.

The ways by which grace reaches the soul of the infidel are known to God alone. St. Thomas (*De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 11, ad. 1) is certain that the untutored savage, who follows the dictates of his conscience, receives from God, either by an internal revelation or an external messenger, the faith necessary to his salvation. As we live in the supernatural order, we may well hold with Ripalda that every effort to do good proceeding from human nature is accompanied and assisted by some supernatural grace, and thus works for salvation.

### § 171 ON PREDESTINATION (AFTER ST. THOMAS, I P. Q. 23)

I. Predestination is Divine Providence (cf. § 98), leading rational creatures to their supernatural end, the Beatific Vision. Things in general attain their natural end by the working of the power that is proper to each of them; but man has not in him power sufficient to attain to the vision of God. He is made to reach his destination by a special assistance from his Maker. The way and manner of this special assistance pre-exist in the Divine mind, and constitute predestination. Predestination, then, is not a quality or an accident of the creature, but an idea of the Eternal mind, like Providence. It is carried into effect, in time, by the vocation and glorification of the predestinated. “. . . And whom He predestinated (*προώρισεν*), them He also called. And whom He called, them He also justified. And whom He justified, them He also glorified” (Rom. viii. 30).

II. Not all rational creatures attain the supernatural end to which they are called. It is in the nature of Providence to allow defects and shortcomings in particular parts of the universe, so as to make them conducive to the perfection, and subservient to the final object, of the whole. When God allows individuals to fall away from Him, He is said to “reprobate” them. Reprobation, therefore, implies, on the part of the Divine Providence, the will—first, to allow some to fall into sin; and secondly, to restore the disturbed order by adequate punishment of the sinner.

III. The two aspects of Providence called predestination and reprobation differ greatly in their way of influencing man. Predestination is the cause both of eternal glory and of the graces which lead to it. Reprobation is not the cause of sin, but this latter causes the sinner to be abandoned by God, and to be eternally punished. The cause of sin is man’s imperfect free will (cf. § 96, ii.).

IV. “He chose us in Him (= God in Christ) before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight in charity. Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children . . .” (Eph. i. 4, 5). Here, and in other places, Scripture speaks of choice (election) and of predestination as synonymous. As a matter of fact, all the predestinated are elected, and specially beloved by God, for predestination follows upon election, and election upon love. The act by which God wills the eternal salvation of some is an act of love, for it confers the greatest good upon the creature. It is also an act of election, or choice, because whilst given to some it is withheld from others. To our finite minds it appears as an act of most gratuitous benevolence (*dilectio*), choosing some rational creatures, in preference to others, to be made partakers of eternal salvation.

V. This eternal act of the Divine will has no cause but the Divine goodness. But if no cause can be assigned to it in itself, a cause or causes may be assigned to its effects, inasmuch as God wills one effect to be the cause of another. Taking the effects separately—grace, good works, beatific vision—we may say that the volition of the beatific vision causes the volition of good works and grace; and that grace and good works are the meritorious cause of the beatific vision. But if we take the effects of predestination as one whole, they cannot have any cause in ourselves, or whatever in man makes for salvation is itself an effect of his predestination. The whole process has its reason in the Divine will, from which it receives its first impulse and its final completion.

VI. The above doctrine is laid down with great clearness and stress by St. Paul. Having stated that predestination is not “of works, but of Him that calleth,” he raises an objection: “What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God?” And he answers, “God forbid!” and restates the same doctrine and rebukes the objector in these terms: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it: Why hast Thou made me thus?” (Rom. ix. 12–20). Now, in the Divine goodness itself may be found a reason for the predestination of some and the reprobation of others. God made all things that they should be some expression of His goodness. But a Divine attribute, one and simple in itself, can only be represented by multiple and inadequate expressions: created things do not attain the Divine simplicity. And hence, in the universe there must be creatures of high and of low degree, and to this end God permits some evil in order that much good may come of it. In mankind, from this point of view, God willed that His goodness should be expressed as mercy and pardon in the predestinated, and as justice in the reprobate. This is the reason given by the Apostle: “God, willing to show His wrath (= vindictive justice) and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory” (Rom. ix. 22, 23; cf. 2 Tim. ii. 20). No reason, however, other than the simple Divine will, can be given for the election of the vessels of mercy and the rejection of the vessels of wrath. Nor does this imply an injustice on the part of God. If He was bound to give the same grace to all, grace would not be a free gift. Being a free gift, God distributes it freely, as did the householder of the parable: “Take what is thine, and go thy way: I will also give to this last, even as to thee” (Matt xx. 14).

VII. A large number of Jesuit theologians, known as Congruists, hold like the Thomists, an absolute predestination to glory, irrespective of merits foreseen. God gives to the predestinate the same grace as to the reprobate, but to the former in circumstances under which He foresees they will accept it, to the latter in those under which He foresees they will not do so. Such was the opinion of Suarez (after his return to Spain), of Bellarmine, Antoine, and many others. Another large number of Jesuits, *e.g.* Toletus, Maldonatus, Lessius, Vasquez, Valentia, and Suarez (while he taught at Rome), admit that predestination to grace, but deny that predestination to glory, is irrespective of merit foreseen. God decrees, they say, to give grace to all, and predestinates those who, as He foresees, will correspond to it, the rest being reprobate (*Cath. Dict.*, art. “Predestination”). The mind of St. Thomas on this subject is expressed in the passage we are analyzing in this section. “Some have said that the merits consequent upon the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination, meaning that God gives grace, and decrees to give it, to such as He foresees will make good use of it—after the manner of a king who gives a horse to the soldier of whom he knows that he will use it

well. But these (theologians) seem to have made a distinction between what comes of grace and what comes of free will, as if the same (act) could not proceed from both grace and free will. It is, however, manifest that whatever is owing to grace is an effect of predestination, and cannot be its reason (or cause). If something of ours be the reason of predestination, this something must not be an effect of the same. But there is no distinction between the work of free will and that of predestination, any more than between the work of the second (created) cause and the first. For Divine Providence produces effects through the operation of second causes. Hence whatever is done through free will is done through predestination" (1 q. 23, a. 5 c.; cf. § 74).

VIII. Predestination infallibly attains its object, viz. the eternal salvation of the predestinated, yet not so as to deprive them of their free will. It is but a department of Divine Providence which rules the world of spirit and matter with an infallible hand, working freely in the free, and on unbending lines in the unfree: always according to the nature of each cause (cf. § 74).

IX. Can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the just? Some have thought that prayers and good works are useless to the predestinate as well as to the reprobate, on account of the infallibility of the Divine decree. But God in the Scriptures constantly exhorts us to prayer and good works. On the other hand, the opinion has been advanced that sacrifices and prayers have the power to change the Divine purpose. Against this, too, we have the authority of Scripture: "The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance" (Rom. xi. 29); "the triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance: for He is not a man that He should repent" (1 Kings xv. 29). Two things must be distinguished in predestination: the Divine decree, and its effects. The Divine decree is not influenced by the prayers of the saints. But its effects, viz. the distribution of grace, good works, eternal glory, are so influenced, because Providence works with and through created causes to which prayers and good works belong. Although many gifts are received that have not been prayed for, yet others are not given except in answer to prayers. Hence we read: "Ask, and it shall be given unto you" (Matt. vii. 7); "Brethren, labour the more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" (2 Pet. i. 10); and St. Augustine rightly says, "If Stephen had not prayed, the Church would not have Paul."

## § 172 SYSTEMS ON THE EFFICACY OF ACTUAL GRACE

Free will and grace are, according to Catholic doctrine, the two factors which cooperate in the production of every salutary act. The beginning is made by grace, which enlightens the mind and moves the will. Under its continued influence the will is endowed with supernatural freedom, and freely gives its consent to the Divine inspiration. The adequate principle of salutary acts is, therefore, neither grace alone nor the will alone, but the will supernaturalized by and freely co-operating with grace. "Whenever we perform salutary works, God works in us and with us in order that we may work (*Quoties bona agimus, Deus in nobis atque nobiscum, ut operemur, operatur*) (Council of Orange, ii. c. 9). St. Bonaventure says, "The will is so moved by God that it is also moved by itself, and hence every meritorious work is attributed to grace and to free will" (in 2 *Disl.* 26, q. 6). Such is the dogma. The Church has left it to the wit of theologians to explain how the human will, moved by grace, retains its freedom, and how grace attains its object, the will remaining free.

I. The various theories may ultimately be reduced to two: (1) those which take the efficacy of grace as their starting-point and main principle, and then go on to explain how the will is still free; and (2) those which start with free will, and then explain the efficacy of grace. The former appeal chiefly to the authority of St. Paul; the latter to such passages as Matt. xi. 20; xxv. 34, etc.

1. In the controversies on grace an important part is played by the distinction of grace into "sufficient" and "efficacious." If the effect of grace is considered, it is clear that the good act is not always performed. Hence the distinction: grace which is followed by the act, is called efficacious; grace which is not so followed, is called sufficient. How it comes to pass that the act is or is not performed—in other words, whether there is an intrinsic difference between efficacious grace and sufficient grace, and, if so, what is the difference—is the great question. Those who insist on our freedom of choice will naturally tend to attribute the performance or non-performance of the action to the determination of our will, and will thus be inclined to deny any intrinsic difference. The other party, who insist on the internal (or *ex sese*) efficacy of grace, will maintain that there is an intrinsic difference, to which the result (performance or non-performance) is ultimately due. These will find it hard to explain how a grace can be called sufficient without producing any result; whereas the former will have their difficulty in showing wherein the efficacy of grace consists. If the grace is sufficient, why has it no effect? If the grace is efficacious, how can the result be free? The Reformers and Jansenists, who denied man's power to resist grace, left no room for graces merely sufficient. That these exist is but a corollary of the Catholic doctrine, that all men receive sufficient grace to be saved, but retain their freedom under the influence of grace: as often as they commit sin, the proffered grace remains inefficacious, or merely sufficient.

2. Another point which Catholic theologians admit, is the power of grace to attain its object with certainty. Whatever activity is displayed by second causes, especially in the supernatural order, is directed by Divine decrees, and supported by Divine co-operation (*concursus*). No creature can frustrate the will of God. If He wills that a salutary act shall follow upon a given grace, He so disposes the free will that the act infallibly follows. The connection between grace and the act exists both in the order of things and in the order of knowledge: viz. the act follows infallibly, and God knows, from all eternity, that it will follow. Yet the Divine foreknowledge does not prevent the liberty of the act, any more than does the after-knowledge which exists in our memories. The free act is the subject-matter of memory as well as of prevision; its nature is affected by neither (§§ 68, 74).

II. St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Bossuet, and the whole Thomistic school, say that God "moves the will to act according to its own nature, that is, freely." With this single principle St. Thomas meets and solves all objections. God willed that there should be free agents, filling their own place in the universal order of things, and contributing to the perfection of the whole. That free agents exist, is a fact of our consciousness; that their freedom and its exercise are dependent—entirely dependent—on God, is an elementary theological truth; that we are unable to understand how the First Cause moves the free agent without prejudice to its freedom, is to be expected from minds as imperfect as ours. Our knowledge of "force" is very limited. We know but obscurely how created causes produce their effects, *e.g.* how the mind moves the body. The way in which the First Cause moves second causes lies beyond the sphere of human knowledge.

St. Thomas, or at least the Thomistic school, explains the infallible efficacy of grace by

“physical premotion.” The Rev. J. Berthier, O.P. of Fribourg University, thus describes this process in the natural order: “Physical premotion is a Divine action, virtually transient, by which God as First Cause confers in each individual case on the second causes, already endowed by Him with the power of acting, the actual performing—free or necessary, according to the proper nature of each agent—of what He has decreed.”<sup>16</sup>

Dr. Manser, Berthier’s pupil and disciple, expands this definition as follows: “*An action virtually transient;*” that is, different from the eternal premotion immanent in and identical with the Divine essence. “*On second causes already endowed by Him with the power of acting;*” these words discriminate premotion from other Divine actions virtually transient, viz. creation and conservation. “*By which God confers the actual performing;*” these words give the *ratio formalis* (the essence) of premotion. For the giving the actual performing of an act implies an immediate motion of the will, by virtue of which the will from non-acting becomes acting—passes from the mere power to act into actual exercise of the act. Again, this immediate Divine motion and application of the will to its proper exercise implies that the motion precedes the act as its cause. Hence it is called “previous” motion, or premotion. And as the Divine motion is an *active* motion, working as an efficient cause, it is “physical,” and plainly different from moral (or persuasive) motion. All this is contained in the words of the definition, “*by which God as First Cause confers on the second causes.*” The clause “. . . performing what He has decreed . . . in each individual case,” points out the infallibility of the effect, both as to the exercise of the will and as to its specific object; that is, the will acts and does exactly what God moves it to do. Lastly, the terms “*free or necessary according to the nature of each agent,*” differentiate two species of promotion, the one given to free, the other to necessary, agents (cf. *Possibilitas Promotionis Physica Thomistica*, etc., by J. A. Manser, Friburgi Helvetiorum, 1895).

The idea of the First Cause working out His decrees unfailingly, yet in harmony with the nature of each created agent, possesses a sublime grandeur which has commended it to the best intellects, obvious difficulties notwithstanding. Among these, the safeguarding of man’s freedom of will appears as the greatest to those theologians who make the dogma of human liberty the starting-point of their speculations. The Thomists, however, have a ready answer—if answer it be: God moves man to act *freely*, according to his free nature. To this the reply is: Premotion, as described, is destructive of free will. For, as St. Thomas himself lays down (*C. Gentes*, iii. 68): “The control which the will has over its acts, and by which it has the power of willing or not willing, excludes the determination (or limitation) of its power to one act or object.” It is the very essence of a free will to be left free to choose: whosoever or whatsoever inclines it to one object or act without choice of another, destroys its freedom. Wherefore, if the will be moved according to its nature, it must be moved without physical predetermination to one thing. To this the Thomists rejoinder is the subtle distinction between freedom of will *in sensu composito* and *in sensu diviso*. Once the will has acted and chosen its object, its liberty ceases as to the present act and its object; for these are facts which cannot be undone. *E.g.* I will write, and do write. Now, it is evident that if I actually will, and actually write, I cannot at the same time (*in sensu composito*) be actually not willing and not writing. As, however, the particular act and its object do not absorb

<sup>16</sup>“*Actio divina virtualiter transiens, qua Deus tanquam causa prima causis secundis potentia agendi prius ab eo instructis, ipsummet actu agere vel libere vel necessario pro modo singulis proprio, ea quae ipse decrevit, hic et nunc confert.*”

the whole activity of the will or satisfy all its aspirations, the will remains free to turn itself upon other objects, or free *in sensu diviso*. Technically, “The free agent, in the act which is proper to it, limits (or determines) itself to one thing (act and object) *in the composite sense*, but it preserves its free power as regards other acts and objects *in the divided sense*.” The opponents, however, urge that “liberty in the divided sense” is a useless abstraction, since the actual exercise of liberty, according to the Thomists, always implies premotion, and hence implies the “composite sense” in which freedom of choice ceases. This thrust is parried by the Thomistic axiom, “God can and does move the human will according to its free nature;” that is, God moves the will to act, yet so that the created will, under the Divine motion, determines itself to act. Thus the rights of the First Cause as well as those of the free agent are safe: God is the determinant cause and the total cause of all that has positive being in the act; and the created will, although moved by God, is, after its limited manner, viz. under God, likewise the total cause and the master of its operation. It may be well to quote here St. Thomas’s idea of free will: “We say that free will (*liberum arbitrium*) is the cause of its own motion, because man by free will moves himself to act; but it is not essential (*necessarium*) to freedom that it be the *first cause* of the free act, any more than in order to be the cause of something else it is essential to be its first cause. God, then, is the First Cause moving both natural and voluntary causes. And as by moving the natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not prevent them being voluntary; on the contrary, He makes them voluntary; for He works in each cause according to its nature (*proprietatem*) (*Summa*, I, q. 83, a. 1, ad. 3.).

III. The theologians who claim that they follow closely in the footsteps of St. Augustine, chief among these being Laurentius Berti, propose the following system for conciliating the efficacy of grace with free will. Grace, they say, chiefly consists in “delectation.” Free will performs no good action if not inclined and determined to act by “victorious” grace (*gratia victrix*). They only admit such a “sufficient grace” as gives the power but not the actual will, or at most a will so weak and imperfect that it is unable to overcome the flesh and its concupiscence. Now they deem grace “victorious,” and hence efficacious, not on account of the cooperation of free will or of suitable circumstances, but of itself and intrinsically. The necessity of a grace of itself efficacious is derived, not as in the Thomistic system, from the subordination of the Creature to God, but from the weakness of the human will induced by the Fall. Free will is safeguarded, in their opinion, because man always retains the power of refusing consent—his judgment remaining indifferent—although, in fact, he never exercises that power. Thus a man has the power of taking his own life, yet as long as he is of sound mind he does not exercise that power. In this point the Augustinian system closely resembles Jansenism. Thomassin adopted the above views with but a slight modification. What the Augustinians attribute to a single grace, he attributes to an aggregate of graces, “of which,” he says, “each taken apart may be frustrated, but which, taken together, wear out the resistance of even the most obstinate, and by their number, co-operation, and untiring attacks, bring about consent.”

It is an unwarranted assumption that the nature of all grace is delectation, delight, or pleasure. Fear is as potent a factor in human acts as pleasure. Nor are we always prompted to do what promises the greatest pleasure; in fact, the practice of most virtues consists in renouncing the more attractive pleasures of the world for motives of fear or love. But, what is more to the point, the system leaves unsolved the very question at issue. For, either the



victorious delectation acts on the will morally (by way of persuasion), leaving it physically free to resist, or it acts physically, determining the act and action of the will; in the first case the efficacy of grace is not explained; in the second, free will is abolished. The modification introduced by Thomassin labours under exactly the same difficulty.

IV. They who derive the efficacy of grace from the consent of the will, have received the name of Molinists (from Ludovicus Molina, S.J.). These teach that the will is moved by God physically both in the order of nature and of grace; that without this Divine help the will cannot act; that whatever reality is in the act is attributable to God; and that all things happen as God foreknows and decrees. But they do not admit a Divine concursus or grace so efficacious as to be irresistible and infallibly connected with the act. On the contrary, they hold that grace may retain all its intrinsic efficacy, and yet remain without effect for the want of free assent on the part of man. The Molinists further assert that grace has a true intrinsic and physical efficacy, as it is the physical principle of the act. They concede that the motive of grace is “previous” to the act, inasmuch as it is identical with the Divine substance creating the will, decreeing to co-operate with it, and awakening those indeliberate motions of intellect and will which induce us freely to will good deeds. But all this only constitutes an efficacy of *power*: the *effect*, *i.e.* the actual connection of grace and good work is established by the free consent of the will prepared and assisted by grace. The infallibility of the connection is secured by the *scientia media*, or the knowledge of things that would exist under given conditions; in the present case, the knowledge that man will freely consent if such and such a grace is held out to him. Congruism and Molinism do not differ, at least in the main lines. In both systems grace is apportioned to man in such wise as to be truly sufficient to obtain its effect, and is given under those circumstances in which God foreknows that man will consent.

Molinism owes its origin to the difficulty of defending free will in the Thomistic system. It is an ingenious hypothesis for the conciliation of efficacious grace and free will. But its supporters claim almost theological certitude for it. They quote Matt. xi. 20 (“Woe to thee, Corozain . . .”), and a long array of similar texts, to prove that in the deposit of faith grace is represented as ineffectual without the consent of man. Then the Council of Trent (sess. vi. c. 5) sets forth with unmistakable clearness that man is able to resist and to reject the grace of God; hence the legitimate conclusion that the efficacy of grace is dependent on man’s free co-operation, This being so, we have only to find out how grace may infallibly obtain the consent of free will. Scripture and councils fail to help us here. But theological speculation suggests an easy solution. God knows what each man will do under given circumstances. When, therefore, He wishes a grace to have an infallible effect, He offers it to man at the right moment, *i.e.* when He knows that man will consent.

The weak point of the system is that it seems to make God dependent on the creature. It lacks the majesty of the Thomistic conception, in which indeed “the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will, He shall turn it” (Prov. xxi. 1); and His wisdom “reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly” (Wisd. viii. 1). Bossuet criticizes the system in the following words: “A single question put to the authors of this system will show its weak point. Presupposing that God sees what man will do at a certain time and in a certain state, we ask: Does He see it in His decree and because He has so ordained it, or does He see it in the object itself considered outside God and independently of His decree? If you admit the latter alternative, you suppose future things under certain conditions before God has ordained them; and you also suppose that God sees them apart

from His eternal decrees—which is an impossibility. If you say that the things are to happen under such conditions because God has so decreed, you leave the difficulty intact; you still have to explain how, what God has decreed is done freely. Moreover, conditional knowledge (the *scientia media*) can only be attributed to God by that figure of speech which attributes to Him what really belongs to man alone; and all exact science reduces conditional propositions to absolute ones” (*Traité du Libre Arbitre*, ch. vi.).

V. Between the years 1598 and 1607, under Popes Clement VIII and Paul V, were held the famous *Congregationes de Auxiliis Gratia*, in which representative theologians of the two contending parties were invited to propose and defend their views. No positive conclusion was arrived at. The papal decree, which closed the acrimonious controversy without deciding it, forbade the opposing parties to inflict “censures” upon one another. Hence a Catholic is free to adopt either Thomism, or Molinism, or Augustinianism, provided he condemns none of the other systems as heretical, dangerous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and the like. “Grace is grace, despite of all controversy.”<sup>17</sup>

The history of the Congregation *de Auxiliis* was written, on the Dominican side, by Hyacinthus Serry, O.P., under the name of Augustinus Le Blanc (A.D. 1699); and later, on behalf of the Molinists, by Livinus de Meyer, S.J., under the name of Theodorus Eleutherius.

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<sup>17</sup> *Measure for Measure*, act i., sc. 2.

BOOK VII  
THE CHURCH AND THE  
SACRAMENTS



The means appointed by the Redeemer for the continuation of His work among men are: (1) the Church, which is His mystical body; and (2) the Sacraments, which are the channels whereby His saving grace is conveyed to our souls.

## PART I

### THE CHURCH

“THE ETERNAL SHEPHERD AND BISHOP of our souls, for the purpose of perpetuating the saving work of Redemption, decreed to found the Holy Church, in which, as in the house of the living God, all the faithful might be united by the bond of one faith and charity. For this reason He asked the Father, not for the Apostles only, but for them also who through their word should believe in Him, that they all might be one, as He and His Father are one. And just as He Himself was sent by the Father, so sent He His Apostles whom He had chosen out of the world; so again did He will that there should be in His Church pastors and doctors even unto the consummation of the world. In order that the episcopate might be one and undivided, and that by means of a closely united priesthood the whole multitude of believers might be preserved in the unity of faith and communion, He set the Blessed Peter over the other Apostles, and in him He established a perpetual principle of both of these unities, and a visible foundation upon the firmness of which an eternal temple should be raised” (Vatican Council, sess. iv.).

We shall treat of the Preparation for the Church (Chap. I); the Institution and Constitution of the Church (Chap. II); the Primacy of St. Peter (Chap. III); the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff (Chap. IV.); the Properties and Marks of the Church (Chap. V.).

Authorities: Franzelin, *De Ecclesia Christi*; Palmieri, *De Eccl. et De Romano Pontifice*; Stapleton, *De Principiis Fidei Doctrinalibus*; Bellarmine, *De Controversiis*, etc., ii.; Vacant, *Études Théol. sur les Constitutions du Concile du Vatican*; Turmel, *Hist. de la Théol. Positive du Concile de Trent au Concile du Vatican*; Billot, *De Ecclesia*, etc.

## CHAPTER I

### THE PREPARATION FOR THE CHURCH

OUR ENGLISH WORD “CHURCH” (Old English *cyrice*, *cirice*; Germ. *kirche*), is derived from the Greek *κυριακός*, “belonging to the Lord” (1 Cor. xi. 18, 22). It is used to denote: (1) a building set apart for God’s service, and also the service itself; (2) the faithful themselves, “Ye are God’s building” (1 Cor. iii. 9); “Ye are the temple of the living God” (2 Cor. vi. 16); (3) the clergy as distinguished from the laity (Matt. xviii. 17). The corresponding word in the New Testament, *ἐκκλησία* (*ecclesia*), in its original profane use, means “an assembly of the citizens summoned (*ἐκκλέω*) by the crier;” and hence it was suited to designate the assembly of the faithful called by God’s grace and His ministers (“To the Church [τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ] that is at Corinth . . . to them that are called to be saints (*κλητοὶς ἁγίοις*),” (1 Cor. i. 2). Except, perhaps, in one or two instances, the word *συναγωγή* (*synagoga*, “a bringing or driving together,” *συνάγω*) is never used for Christ’s Church.<sup>18</sup> “There is a

<sup>18</sup>The apparent exceptions are James ii. 2 and Heb. x. 15, in the latter of which the word *ἐπισυναγωγή* is used. But the context in both passages shows that Christ’s Church is not referred to.

difference," says St. Augustine, "between *synagoga* and *ecclesia*: the former means a gathering together, the latter a calling together; even beasts are said to be gathered together, whereas calling together is properly applied to reasonable beings" (*In Ps.* lxxxii.; see also *Catechism of the Council of Trent*, Part I. ch. x. n. 3).

A complete definition of the Church is not possible at this stage of our inquiry. The various elements which go to form it will be gathered as we proceed. At present it will be sufficient to say that by the Church we mean the society or union of all who cleave to God by true supernatural worship.

### § 173 THE CHURCH OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

In the Divine economy of Revelation and Redemption, three stages can be distinguished: the Patriarchal, the Mosaic, and the Christian (*supra*, § 6). Hence in the Church, too, which is the organ of revelation, and the means of applying the fruits of redemption, the same three stages can be distinguished.

I. We read in the early chapters of Genesis of a religious society, "the sons of God," distinct and separate from the impious "sons of men." These "sons of God" possessed a supernatural revelation of God's existence and attributes, of His law and worship, of the angels and a future life, and especially of a coming Redeemer. So, too, the supernatural gifts of grace, and the theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity, were conferred on those who did what was required on their part. Moreover, they professed their faith not only with the heart, but with the mouth (Rom. x. 10); and not only by word, but also by act—by sacrifices and sacraments (see St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xvi. 9, 10). But just as Revelation in those primitive times was scanty and vague, so, too, the bond of union among the members of the Church was not close. The functions of sacrificing, ruling, and teaching were indeed carried on; but much was left to be determined by individual Patriarchs or heads of families. It may therefore be said that the union, such as it was, consisted in the profession of the same true faith, and the worship of the same true God. With the call of Abraham we have the promise of a fuller revelation and a closer union, which, although far inferior to the revelation and the society which were ultimately to come, were yet a marked advance upon the Patriarchal stage.

II. Under the Mosaic dispensation God chose a people, the Israelites, to be His own peculiar people, and made to them a revelation gradually increasing in extent as the time went on, and also a more definite form of Church. The worship of God was to be observed by certain determinate sacrifices, sacraments, rites, and solemnities; and the unity of this society was symbolized and secured by permitting only one single tabernacle or temple in which sacrifice could be offered up. The priesthood, too, was restricted to the members of a certain family, the lower ministry to the members of a certain tribe, by whom the whole people were to be governed in all sacred matters. "If thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter . . . arise, and go up to the place which the Lord thy God shall choose, and thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time; and thou shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the truth of the judgment; and thou shalt do whatsoever they shall say that preside in the place which the Lord shall choose, and what they shall teach thee, according to His Law; and thou shalt follow their sentence: neither shalt thou decline to the right hand nor to the left hand. But he that will be proud and refuse to obey the commandment of the priest, who ministereth at the time to the Lord thy God, and the decree of the judge, that man shall die, and thou shalt take away

the evil from Israel” (Deut. xvii. 8, sqq.). Moreover, the priests possessed teaching authority to preserve and interpret the Divine Law. “The lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the Law at his mouth, because he is the angel [the minister and messenger] of the Lord of hosts” (Mal. ii. 7, cf. Lev. x. 10, 11).

III. Nevertheless, even this Mosaic dispensation was only a preparation for a higher dispensation which was to come. “The Law was our pedagogue in Christ (παιδαγωγός εἰς Χριστόν)” — a tutor to bring us unto Christ (Gal. iii. 24); “The Law brought nothing to perfection, but was the bringing in of a better hope” (Heb. vii. 19); “You have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit of adoption of sons” (Rom. viii. 15). It was imperfect in all three of the functions which a Church should fulfil. “The Law having a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things, by the self-same sacrifices which they offer continually every year, can never make the comers thereunto perfect. . . . But Christ, being come a high priest of the good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle not made with hand . . . neither by the blood of goats or of calves, but by His own blood entered once into the Holies, having obtained eternal redemption” (Heb. xi. 1; ix. 11, 12). So, too, their government was concerned with “the works of the Law,” “the law of a carnal commandment” (Heb. vii. 15); and their teaching was necessarily meagre and obscure in comparison with the full and definite teaching of the Gospel: “called out of darkness into His marvellous light” (1 Pet. ii. 9). Hence the priesthood which exercised these imperfect functions was itself imperfect and preparatory. “If perfection was by the Levitical priesthood . . . what further need was there that another priest should arise according to the order of Melchisedech, and not he called according to the order of Aaron? For the priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law” (Heb. vii. 11, 12). Only in the Church of Christ, “which is the fulness of Him who is filled all in all” (Eph. i. 23), are these functions and this priesthood found perfect. Even while yet militant on earth, she teaches and believes in faith, she rules and obeys in hope, she sanctifies and is sanctified in charity: “a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people” (1 Pet. ii. 9). See St. Leo, *Serm.* lix. (al. 57), c. 7; *Serm.* lxvi. c. 12; St. Thomas, 1<sup>a</sup>, 2<sup>æ</sup>, q. 101; Franzelin, *De Ecclesia*, thes. iii., iv.

## § 174 THE CHURCH OF CHRIST FORETOLD AND PREFIGURED IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

The Church of the Old Testament was not only itself a preparation for, and a figure of, the Church of Christ; it also announced prophecies, and contained types and figures of this latter and more perfect Church. As Christ’s person and work were foretold and prefigured with ever-increasing distinctness, so too was His Church, which is the mystical prolongation of His existence on earth. We have already (Book V, § 116) traced the course of prophecy concerning our Lord, and in doing so we observed how commonly the Prophets speak at the same time of His Church. Here, instead of following the chronological order, it will be better to consider in turn the various images and expressions used to describe this permanent work of Christ’s hands.

I. The Prophets announced that when Christ came He would found a kingdom, which should be (1) universal, (2) never-ending, and (3) one.

Its universality is contrasted with the narrowness and exclusiveness—its perennial character and unity with the temporariness and divisions—of the older covenant. “All the ends of

the earth shall remember and be converted to the Lord, and all the kindreds of the Gentiles shall adore in His sight. For the kingdom is the Lord's, and He shall have dominion over the nations" (Ps. xxi. 28, 29). "In His days shall justice spring up, and abundance of peace till the moon be taken away; and He shall rule from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth" (Ps. lxxi. 7, 8). "In the days of those kingdoms the God of heaven will set up a kingdom that shall never be destroyed; and His kingdom will not be delivered up to another people, and it shall break in pieces and shall consume all these kingdoms, and itself shall stand for ever" (Dan. ii. 44; cf. vii. 13, 14, 27; Agg. ii. 7, 8, 22, 23). "The Lord hath prepared His holy arm in the sight of all the Gentiles, and all the ends of the earth shall see the salvation of our God" (Is. lv, 10; cf. lx. 1 sqq.; Ps. xcvi. 3; Mich. iv. 1 sqq.). "It shall come to pass in that day that living waters shall go out from Jerusalem: half of them to the east sea, and half of them to the last (west) sea; they shall be in summer and in winter, and the Lord shall be King over all the earth; in that day there shall be one Lord, and His Name shall be one" (Zach. xiv. 8 sqq.).

II. This new people of Israel, this new Jerusalem, this new city of the Lord, this new Sion, promised by the Prophets, is to receive its ruling power, its teaching authority, and its priesthood from Christ the Supreme King, Teacher, and Priest.

1. Christ is to be the Supreme King in this supernatural kingdom of peace; but as this kingdom is to last visibly on earth as long as the earth shall last, so there are ever to be shepherds and princes to rule God's people in Christ's Name and by His power. "I am appointed King by Him over Sion, His holy mountain, preaching His commandment. The Lord hath said to Me: Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee. Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth or Thy possession" (Ps. ii. 6-8). "For a Child is born to us, and a Son is given to us, and the government is upon His shoulder, and His name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, God, Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of peace; His empire shall be multiplied, and there shall be no end of peace; He shall sit upon the throne of David and upon His kingdom, to establish it and strengthen it with judgment and justice from henceforth and for ever" (Isa. ix. 6, 7). "I will set up one Shepherd over them (My sheep), and He shall feed them, even My servant David; He shall feed them, and He shall be their Shepherd. And I the Lord will be their God, and My servant David the prince in the midst of them; I the Lord have spoken it" (Ezech. xxxiv. 23, 24). "I will gather the remnant of My flock out of all the lands . . . and I will set up pastors over them, and they shall feed them. . . . Behold, the days shall come, saith the Lord, and I will raise up to David a just Branch, and a King shall reign and shall be wise, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth" (Jer. xxiii. 3-5; Ps. xlv. 17).

2. This same King and Shepherd is also foretold and promised as a Faithful Prophet; so that His kingdom is to be not only a kingdom of peace, but also a kingdom of truth and justice. "You, O kingdom of Sion, rejoice and be joyful in the Lord your God; because He hath given you a teacher of justice, and He will make the early and the latter rain to come down to you as in the beginning" (Joel ii. 23). "The Law shall go forth out of Sion, and the Word of the Lord out of Jerusalem" (Mich. iv. 2). "All thy children (Jerusalem) shall be taught of the Lord, and great shall be the peace of thy children; and thou shalt be founded in justice" (Isa. liv. 3; xi. 12; Jer. xxxi. 33, 34; xxxii. 38-40). "I will give you pastors according to My own heart, and they shall feed you with knowledge and doctrine. . . . At that time Jerusalem shall be called the throne of the Lord, and all the nations shall be gathered together to it,



in the name of the Lord to Jerusalem, and they shall not walk after the perversity of their most wicked heart” (Jer. iii. 15–17). Hence, the name of the city shall be “the City of Truth,” and Sion shall be called “the Mount of Holiness.” “I will dwell in the midst of Jerusalem, and Jerusalem shall be called the City of Truth, and the Mountain of the Lord of Hosts, the Sanctified Mountain [Heb. ‘the Mount of Holiness’] . . . Behold, I will save My people from the land of the east, and from the land of the going down of the sun . . . they shall be My people, and I will be their God in truth and in justice” (Zach. i. 3, 7, 8).

3. Just as the Church was to be a kingdom of peace and truth, ruled over by Christ as King and Teacher, so was it also to be a priestly kingdom with Christ as its High Priest, and men under Him exercising a ministerial priesthood. The son of Josedec, Jesus the high priest, is distinctly spoken of as a type of the Messiah: “Hear, O Jesus, thou high priest, thou and thy friends that dwell before thee, for they are portending men [men who are for a sign, men who by words and deeds are to foreshadow wonders that are to come]; for behold I will bring My Servant the Orient” (Zach. iii. 8; *supra*, p. 27). The Prophet is ordered to unite in this “portending man” the sacerdotal with the royal crown, that there may always be the counsel of peace between them both. “And thou shalt take gold and silver, and shalt make crowns, and thou shalt set them on the head of Jesus the son of Josedec, the high priest, and thou shalt speak to him, saying: Thus saith the Lord of hosts, saying: Behold a man, the Orient is His name . . . He shall build a temple to the Lord, and He shall bear the glory, and shall sit, and rule upon His throne, and He shall be a Priest upon His throne, and the counsel of peace shall be between them both. . . . And they that are afar off shall come and shall build in the temple of the Lord” (Zach. vi. 11–15; cf. St. Epiph., *Heres.*, xxxix. nn. 2–4). So, too, Christ is promised as a Priest who will acquire His Church by the sacrifice of His own blood. “He was offered because it was His own will, and He opened not His mouth; He shall be led as a sheep to the slaughter . . . if He shall lay down His life for sin, He shall see a long-lived seed . . . by His knowledge shall this My Servant justify many, and He shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I distribute to Him many, and He shall divide the spoils of the strong, because He hath delivered His soul unto death” (Isa. liii.). This priesthood is not to be temporary and Levitical, but “for ever, according to the order of Melchisedech” (Ps. cix. 4; Gen. xiv. 18; Heb. v., vii., ix.; see also *supra*, § 156). Hence it is to continue in Christ’s Church, having, of course, its origin from Him. “I come that I may gather them together with all nations and tongues [Heb. ‘gather together all nations and tongues’], and they shall come, and they shall see My glory. And I will set a sign among them, and I will send of them that shall be saved to the Gentiles into the sea, into Africa, and Lydia them that draw the bow; into Italy and Greece, to the islands afar off, to them that have not heard of Me, and have not seen My glory. And they shall declare My glory unto the Gentiles. . . . And I will take of them to be priests and Levites, saith the Lord. For as the new heavens and the new earth . . . so shall your seed stand and your name” (Isa. lxvi. 18–22; cf. Jer. xxxiii. 15 sq.).

These passages are enough to show that a clear promise was made of Christ’s kingdom, which was to last for ever with its own ruling power, teaching authority, and priesthood—a kingdom to be acquired by Christ the Redeemer with His own Precious Blood—a kingdom composed of all the Gentiles, and founded for their eternal salvation. Indeed, the foundation of this eternal and universal kingdom is one of the marks of the Messiah who was to come. (Cf. Isa. xi. 1, 11, 12; xl. 2, 9; xlii. 6, 10; li. 3–7; liv.; lxii.; lxv. 16 sqq.; Osee ii. 16 sqq.; iii. 5; Joel ii. 27–32; iii. 16–21; Amos iii. 16 sqq.; ix. 11; Soph. iii. 14; Zach. ii. 10; xiv. 8, 9.) How far these

various passages refer to Christ and His Church, may be gathered from St. Paul's manner of citing them (Rom. xv. 8–12). See Franzelin, *l.c.* th. vi.

## § 175 THE CHURCH OF CHRIST DESCRIBED IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

I. When we turn to the New Testament, we are told that Christ came to found a kingdom, which is described as the "Kingdom of God," the "Kingdom of Heaven," the "Kingdom of Christ." These expressions, especially the two former, are used in various meanings. The "Kingdom of God," "Kingdom of Heaven," sometimes mean the whole of creation (Ps. xxiii, 1; xlix. 12; cii. 19, 22; cxliv. 11, etc.); but in the New Testament they mean the supernatural kingdom purchased by Christ's Precious Blood. In this latter sense they denote: (1) Internal gifts and graces (Luke xvii. 20, 21; cf. xii. 31; Rom. xiv. 27, etc.); (2) Heaven, where God reigns with His Saints, and His Saints reign with Him (Matt. viii. 11; Luke xiii. 28, etc.); (3) the visible kingdom of Christ here on earth among men and composed of men.

1. The Angel Gabriel, when announcing the Incarnation of our Lord, foretold to the Blessed Virgin: "He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High; and the Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of David His father; and He shall reign in the house of Jacob for ever; and of His kingdom there shall be no end" (Luke i. 32, 33; cf. Dan. viii. 14, 27; Mich. iv. 7). Here it is clear that Christ was to reign over a visible kingdom on earth—the kingdom prefigured and foretold in the old dispensation. His kingdom was to last on earth as long as the world should last, and was to last absolutely for ever in heaven.

2. The preaching of the Baptist, sent "to prepare the way of the Lord," was: "Do penance (μετανοεῖτε), for the kingdom of heaven is at hand" (Matt. iii. 2). And our Lord Himself declared: "The Law and the Prophets were until John; from that time the kingdom of God is preached" (Luke xvi. 16).

3. The Jews, whether carnal or spiritual, expected that the Messiah would found a kingdom upon earth, as the Prophets had foretold; in their minds the expectation of the Messiah coincided with the expectation of His kingdom. One of the marks by which He was to be known was that He should be "the Son of David," "the King of Israel" (John i. 49; Matt. ii. 2, 6; xxvii. 11; John xix. 19, 22). Hence, those who recognized that the prophecies had been fulfilled in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, hailed Him as "King of Israel" (John xii. 13–16; Luke xix. 38), and "Son of David" (Matt. xxi. 9): they cried out, "Blessed be the kingdom of our father David that cometh" (Mark xi. 10).

4. Our Lord Himself, when about to offer the sacrifice of His own blood, by which He was to purchase His kingdom, declared that He was a King, and that He had a kingdom in this world. Both the Jews who accused Him, and Pilate who judged Him, spoke of a visible kingdom here on earth. This kingdom which they denied Him He claimed for His own, though at the same time He explained that it was of a supernatural order. "Art thou the king of the Jews? . . . My kingdom is not of this world (ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου) . . . but now My kingdom is not from hence (ἐντεῦθεν)" (John xviii. 33, 36). "He does not say," observes St. Augustine, "My kingdom is not *in* this world, but is not *of* this world. . . . He does not say, My kingdom is not *here*, but is not *from hence*; for His kingdom is here as long as the world shall last" (*In Joan.*, Tract 115, n. 2). This expression "of this world" occurs elsewhere in St. John's record of our Lord's discourses, and does not exclude the fact of being *in* this world. "Having loved His own who were in the world (ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ), He loved them unto

the end. . . . If you had been of the world (ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου), the world would love its own; but because you are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world (ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου), therefore the world hateth you" (John xiii. 1; xv. 19; xvi. u, 12, 16).

II. This kingdom of Christ upon earth is described by Him under various figures.

1. In the Old Testament God's chosen people are called the flock of His sheep. "The sheep of Thy pasture" (Ps. lxxiii. 1); "We Thy people, and the sheep of Thy pasture" (Ps. lxxviii. 13); "He is the Lord our God, and we are the people of His pasture and the sheep of His hand" (Ps. xciv. 7; cf. Ps. xcix. 3; Jer. xxiii.; Ezech. xxxiv.; Mich. vii. 14). God rebukes the shepherds of this flock for their neglect to feed the sheep, and promises that He will form a new flock, over which He "will set up one Shepherd, even His servant David," who "shall feed them and shall be their Shepherd" (Ezech. xxxiv. 23; xxxvii. 24, 26; Zech. xi. 7). And under this Shepherd He will set up pastors over them, "and they shall feed them, they shall fear no more, and they shall not be dismayed" (Jer. xxiii. 4); "I will give you," He says, "pastors according to My own heart, and they shall feed you with knowledge and doctrine" (*ibid.* iii. 15). Accordingly, in the New Testament He declares that He is this promised Shepherd, and that His sheep are the promised flock. "I am the good Shepherd; the good Shepherd giveth His life for the sheep. . . . I lay down My life for My sheep. . . . I give them life everlasting" (John x. ii, 15, 28). He gathers them together; He feeds them with His doctrine; He rules them by His authority. "You do not believe, because you are not of My sheep; My sheep hear My voice, and I know them, and they follow Me" (*ibid.* 26, 27); "I am the good Shepherd, and I know Mine, and Mine know Me" (*ibid.* 14). And this flock is to be composed not only of the children of Israel, but of all the nations. "Other sheep I have, that are not of this fold, and them also I must bring, and they shall hear My voice, and there shall be one fold [or, 'flock,' ποίμνη] and one Shepherd" (*ibid.* 16). As, however, this fold upon earth is to last till the end of time, He appointed other shepherds under Himself, the one Divine Shepherd, to feed His flock: one chief shepherd, Peter and his successors, "Feed My lambs, feed My sheep" (John xxi. 15-17); and others, who should be subordinate to this one, and to whom St. Peter says, "Feed the flock of God, which is among you, taking care of it (ποιμάνατε ἐν ὑμῖν ποίμνιον τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπισκοποῦντες)" (1 Pet. v, 2).

2. In the Old Testament the kingdom of God is also spoken of as a vineyard. "Thou hast brought a vineyard out of Egypt; Thou hast cast out the Gentiles, and hast planted it . . . Thou plantedst the roots thereof, and it filled the land" (Ps. lxxix. 9, 10; Isa. v. 1 sqq.; Jer. ii. 21; xii. 10; Ezechr. xix. 10 sqq.). This figure is likewise used by our Lord in describing His Church. "There was a man, an householder, who planted a vineyard, and made a hedge about it, and dug in it a press, and built in it a tower, and let it out to husbandmen," etc. (Matt. xxi. 33-46; Mark xii. 1-12; Luke xx. 9, 19; cf. Isa. v. 2).

3. Closely connected with this figure is another, which compares the kingdom of God to a marriage-feast, or wedding (Matt. xxii. 2-14; cf. Osee ii.). The parables of the Grain of Mustard-seed and the Leaven bring out the growth and influence of the Church. The Church as a "building" ("I will build my Church;" "You are God's building," 1 Cor. iii. 9) will be spoken of when we treat of the primacy of St. Peter. But now we are touching on the constitution of the Church, a subject which belongs to the next chapter.

## CHAPTER II

# THE INSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH

**A**LL THROUGH HIS LIFE ON EARTH OUR LORD proclaimed Himself to be the Messias foretold by the Prophets and expected by the Jews: sent by His heavenly Father with supreme authority, and exacting complete obedience of faith in His doctrine and precepts (cf. *supra*, § 157). The exercise of this authority, and the corresponding duty of obedience, were not to be restricted to the short period of His sojourn here below. They were to continue for all days, even to the consummation of the world. Hence no small portion of His teaching and work was devoted to the description and formation of the body which was to be invested with His authority, and to carry on the saving work of Redemption.

This subject has already been dealt with in Book I, Part I. We shall here treat briefly, first, of our Lord's teaching during His Public Life; next, of His teaching during His Risen Life; and, lastly, we shall speak more particularly of the Visible Headship which He conferred upon St. Peter and his successors, the Bishops of Rome.

### § 176 OUR LORD'S TEACHING ON THE CHURCH DURING HIS PUBLIC LIFE

I. From the very first, as soon as He began to preach "the Kingdom of God," which He came to found, our Lord called to Himself disciples (*μαθηται*), who had the privilege of sharing His blessed company, hearing His discourses, and witnessing the wonders which He wrought. From among these, after the Second Passover, He selected twelve to be in a more special manner His associates, and the depositaries of His authority. "And it came to pass in those days that He went out into a mountain to pray, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God. And when day was come, He called unto Him His disciples (*μαθητάς*), and He chose twelve of them, whom also He named apostles (*ἀποστόλους*)" (Luke vi. 12, 13). These twelve are constantly spoken of as constituting a single moral body. They are "The Twelve (*οἱ δώδεκα*)" (Matt. x. 1; xx. 17, 24; xxvi. 14, 20, 47; Mark iii. 14; iv. 10; vi. 17; ix. 34; x. 32; xi. 11; xiv. 10, 17, 20, 47; Acts vi. 2). They are even so styled when their number was reduced to eleven by the death of the traitor Judas (John xx. 24; 1 Cor. xv. 5, in the Greek text); and when increased to thirteen by the addition of Matthias and Paul (Matt. xix. 28; Apoc. xxi. 14). That their office was a higher one, is clear not only from the very fact and manner of their election, and from the name "Apostles" (messengers, ambassadors) bestowed upon them, but also from various passages, drawing an express distinction between them and the rest of the disciples and the faithful (*e.g.* Luke xxiv. 9, 33). Moreover, their special function of being authentic witnesses is expressly pointed out. "Of those men that have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus came in and went out among us . . . one of these must be made *a witness with us* of His resurrection. . . . Show whether of these two Thou hast chosen to take the place of the ministry and apostleship (*ἰκλήρον τῆν οἰκονομίας ταύτης καὶ ἀποστολῆς*) . . . and he was numbered with the eleven Apostles" (Acts i. 21–26). Hence our Lord took care to instruct them above all the others in the mysteries of the kingdom of God. They were the chosen companions of His missionary journeys, and were sent by Him, armed

with His authority and power, to announce the same message that He announced. "These twelve Jesus sent, commanding them . . . Going, preach, saying: The kingdom of heaven is at hand. Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out devils. . . . And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words . . . Amen, I say to you, it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of judgment, than for that city" (Matt. x. 5-15; Luke ix. 1-6; cf. Matt. xi. 20 sqq.). In addition to the twelve, "the Lord appointed also other seventy-two; and He sent them two and two before His face into every city and place, whither He Himself was to come" (Luke x. 1). These, however, were in no way equalled to the Apostles, though as they were sent in His Name He could also say to them: "He that heareth you heareth Me" (Luke x. 16).

II. So far confining ourselves to Our Lord's teaching before His Passion and Death, we observe that He drew a clear distinction between (1) the body of the faithful, (2) the seventy-two disciples, and (3) the twelve Apostles. As long as He remained upon earth, He Himself was the visible Head of this Apostolic College. But as His stay was to be brief, He took care on every occasion to declare that after His departure one of their number was to preside over them and over the whole Church, in His stead; and that that one was to be Simon, whom He surnamed Peter. This privilege of St. Peter will be treated of later on in a separate chapter.

## § 177 OUR LORD'S TEACHING ON THE CHURCH DURING HIS RISEN LIFE

After having completed the work of our Redemption by the Sacrifice of the Cross, having paid the price of the Church, and having risen in triumph from the dead, Our Lord "showed Himself alive," "to the apostles whom He had chosen," "for forty days appearing to them and *speaking of the kingdom of God*" (Acts i. 2, 3). His object in appearing to them so often was not only to strengthen their faith in the fact of His resurrection, but to complete the institution and constitution of His Church. Just as in other periods of His life, so also in this especially, many of His words and deeds are not recorded in Scripture (John xx. 30; xxi. 25); nevertheless, as might be expected, there are striking passages concerning the Church, "the kingdom of God," clearly proving the mission of the Apostles, and the establishment of the supremacy of Peter.

I. In the first apparition to the Apostolic College recorded by St. John (xx. 19. 29), our Lord conferred upon them the same authority which He Himself possessed and had exercised: "As the Father sent Me, I also send you," "As Thou hast sent Me into the world, I also send them into the world" (*ibid.* xvii. 18). These words are not a mere statement or promise; they actually constitute the Apostles as Christ's successors. "Receive ye the Holy Ghost," He added, for this work to which He appointed them. Hence, in virtue of the powers there and then bestowed upon them, He continued: "Whose sins ye shall forgive, they are forgiven them." The mission is not, however, restricted to the forgiveness of sins, but is universal, as was His own mission from the Father; and it is confided to the Apostolic College and their successors (cf. "And after that He was seen by the eleven," 1 Cor. xv. 5; cf. "the eleven disciples," Matt. xxviii. 16). Later on, in Galilee, He renewed this commission, appealing to the supreme authority in virtue of which He sent them, and which was ever to abide with them. "And *the eleven* disciples went into Galilee unto the mountain where Jesus had appointed them . . . and Jesus coming, spoke to them, saying: All power is given to Me in

heaven and in earth. Going, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.” In His last discourse at Jerusalem, before His ascension, He for the third time conferred upon the Apostles the office of continuing His work in His Name and with His authority. “He appeared to *the eleven* as they were at table (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 7) . . . and He said to them: Go ye into the whole world and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth [your preaching] and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned. And these signs shall follow,” etc. (Mark xvi. 14–20). “You shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you: and you shall be witnesses unto Me in Jerusalem, and in all Judæa, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost part of the earth” (Acts i. 8; cf. “and you are *witnesses* of these things.” Luke xxiv. 48; “one of these must be a *witness* with us of His resurrection,” Acts i. 22). Thus in St. Mark the mission of the Apostles is endowed with the same evidences of power which accompanied our Lord’s mission (cf. Matt. xi. 20, 24; xii. 41; Mark iv. 40; Luke iv. 36; vii. 16; John ii. 23; v. 36; x. 25, 38; xii. 37; xiv. 12; xv. 24).

II. To understand the nature of the mission entrusted to the Apostles and their successors, we must call to mind the nature of our Lord’s own mission.

1. Christ continually declares that His doctrine, His works, His authority and power are derived from His heavenly Father. “I am not come of Myself, but He that sent Me is true . . . I know Him because I am from Him, and He hath sent Me” (John vii. 28, 29). “My doctrine is not Mine, but His Who sent Me” (*ibid.* vii. 16); “He that heareth My word, and believeth Him that sent Me, hath life everlasting. . . . For as the Father hath life in Himself, so He hath given to the Son also to have life in Himself; and He hath given Him power to do judgment. . . . I cannot of Myself do anything: as I hear, so I judge; and My judgment is just, because I seek not My own will, but the will of Him that sent Me. . . . The works which the Father hath given Me to perfect, the works themselves which I do, give testimony of Me, that the Father hath sent Me. . . . And you have not His word abiding in you, for Whom He hath sent, Him you believe not” (*ibid.* v. 24–38). The functions or offices of Christ’s mission were threefold: He came to govern, to teach, and to sanctify: to be King, Prophet, and Priest (see Book V, Part II, Ch. II). It was in the exercise of these functions, and to provide for their continuance, that He founded His Church. “I lay down My life for My sheep, My sheep hear My voice, and I give them eternal life;” “I will build My Church;” “to thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven;” “Christ also loved His Church, and delivered Himself up for it, that He might sanctify it . . . that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church;” “the Church of God which He hath purchased with His own blood.” “Christ is the Head of the Church; He is the Saviour of the body (σωτήρ τοῦ σώματος).” “I have finished the work which Thou hast given Me to do” (John xvii. 2 sqq., etc.).

2. Hence, in confiding His mission to the Apostles, He expressly refers to His own mission from the Father: “As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you.” And He communicates to them His threefold function of ruling, teaching, and sanctifying. “As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you. By these words our Lord Jesus Christ ordained the rulers of the world, and teachers and dispensers of His Divine mysteries (Χειροτονήκε μεν ἐν τούτοις ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός τοὺς τῆς οἰκουμένης καθηγήτας τε καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ τῶν θειῶν αὐτοῦ μυστηρίων οἰκονόμους).” (St. Cyril Alex., t. iv. pp. 1093–1095; for the continuation of the passage, see Franzelin, *l.c.* 119). He had already said to His Apostles, “If he will not hear the

Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican,” “whatsoever you shall bind on earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven.” Now, after His resurrection, He actually confers this power and authority upon them as the rulers of His kingdom. “All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore,” etc. Hence, St. Paul declares that his jurisdiction derives its authority from the power of Christ, and that he exercises it in virtue of the mission conferred upon him by our Lord. “In the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ, you being gathered together, and my spirit, *with the power of our Lord Jesus*, to deliver such a one to satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved” (1 Cor. v. 4, 5). “If I come again, I will not spare. Do you seek a proof of *Christ that speaketh in me?*” (2 Cor. xiii. 2, 3). Our Lord’s office as Teacher is even more expressly imposed upon His Apostles. “Teach [μαθητευσατε, ‘make to yourselves disciples’] all nations;” “Preach the Gospel to every creature;” “Ye shall be witnesses to me” (cf. Vol. I § 9). His office of Priest He imparts to them in the general mission which He gives them; for He was sent by His Father to save the world by the oblation of His body and blood once for all (ἕφαπαξ); and He in turn sends them to apply His merits by the unbloody Sacrifice of the Mass and the Sacraments. This sacrifice and these sacraments are not theirs, but Christ’s; and their power to perform and administer is His, not theirs. “Let a man so account of us, as the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God” (1 Cor. iv. 1). “Was Paul, then, crucified for you? or were you baptized in the name of Paul? . . . What, then, is Apollo, and what is Paul? The ministers of Him whom you have believed” (*ibid.* i. 13; iii. 4, 5). “All things are of God, Who hath reconciled the world to Himself by Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation” (2 Cor. v. 18).

Billot, *De Ecclesia*, p. 72 sqq.; Atzberger, *Kath. Dogmatik* (continuation of Scheeben’s work), sect. 327.

## CHAPTER III

### THE PRIMACY OF ST. PETER

**A**S LONG AS CHRIST, “the Master and the Lord (ὁ διδάσκαλος καὶ ὁ Κύριος)” (John xiii. 13), remained visibly on earth, there was no room or need for any other visible head. But since He willed that His kingdom should be visible, He was obliged, when He ascended into heaven, to designate a vicegerent on earth. “Should any one say that Christ is the one Head and the one Shepherd, the one Spouse of the one Church, he does not give an adequate reply. It is clear, indeed, that Christ is the author of grace in the sacraments of the Church; it is Christ Himself who baptizes; it is He who forgives sins; it is He who is the true Priest, who offered Himself upon the altar of the Cross; and it is by His power that His Body is daily consecrated upon the altar; and, still, because He was not visibly present to all the faithful, He made choice of ministers through whom the aforesaid sacraments should be dispensed to the faithful. . . . For the same reason, therefore, because He was about to withdraw His visible presence from the Church, it was necessary that He should appoint some one in His place to have the charge of the Universal Church. Hence, before His ascension He said to Peter, ‘Feed My sheep’” (St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, lib. iv. cc. 74, 76).

## § 178 THE PRIMACY PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE

I. From the very time when our Lord called St. Peter to follow Him, He indicated the dignity to which the Apostle was afterwards to be raised. "Jesus looking upon him said, Thou art Simon the son of Jona: thou shalt be called Cephas (Κηφᾶς, 897), which is interpreted Peter" (John i. 42). In the election of the Apostles, and again in their mission, he is mentioned the first; and this surname is expressly spoken of: "He chose twelve of them, whom also He named Apostles; Simon, whom He surnamed Peter, and Andrew his brother, James and John," etc. (Luke vi. 13, 14). "The names of the twelve Apostles are these: the first, Simon (πρῶτος Σίμων), who is called Peter, and Andrew his brother," etc. (Matt. x. 2; Mark iii. 16). And whenever he is named together with any of the other Apostles, he is always named first. Moreover, our Lord always treats him as the leader and representative of the rest, and he in turn always acts as their spokesman. At the raising of Jairus' daughter "He admitted not any man to follow Him but Peter, and James, and John" (Mark v. 37; Luke viii. 51). When He was to be transfigured "He took Peter, and James, and John. . . . But Peter and they that were with him [Πέτρος καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ, cf. 'Peter and they that were with him,' Luke viii. 45; 'Peter standing with the eleven,' Acts ii. 14; 'Tell His disciples and Peter,' Mark xvi. 7] were heavy with sleep. . . . Peter saith to Jesus, Master, it is good for us to be here," etc. (Luke ix. 28-33; Matt. xvii. 1 sqq.; Mark ix. 1 sqq.). So, too, in His agony in the garden, "He taketh Peter, and James, and John with Him. . . . And He cometh and findeth them sleeping, and He saith to Peter, Simon, sleepest thou? Couldst thou not watch one hour? Watch ye and pray" (Mark xiv. 33-38; Matt. xxvi. 37-40). "He saw two ships standing by the lake . . . and going into one of the ships that was Simon's . . . He taught the multitudes out of the ship. . . . He said to Simon, Launch out into the deep for a draught. And Peter answering, said to Him, Master, we have laboured. . . . He (Peter) was wholly astonished, and all they that were with him (πάντας τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ) . . . and so were also James and John. . . . And Jesus saith to Simon, Fear not, from henceforth thou shalt catch men" (Luke v. 2-10). When the Apostles, seeing our Lord walking upon the sea, were troubled, "Peter, making answer (to our Lord's assurance, 'Be of good heart; it is I; fear not'), said, Lord, if it be Thou, bid me to come to Thee upon the waters. And He said, Come. And Peter, going down out of the boat, walked upon the water to come to Jesus" (Matt. xiv. 22-33). "They that received the didrachmas came to Peter and said to him, Doth not your Master pay the didrachmas? . . . Jesus said to him . . . Go to the sea and cast in a hook, and that fish which shall first come up, take; and when thou hast opened its mouth, thou shalt find a stater: take that and give it to them *for Me and thee* (ἀντὶ ἑμοῦ καὶ σοῦ)" (Matt. xvii. 23-26).

II. Not content with these repeated indications of Peter's pre-eminence, our Lord on three several occasions spoke of it in such express terms as to leave no possibility of doubt.

1. The first of these is recorded by St. Matthew (xvi. 13-19; cf. Mark viii. 27, 28; Luke ix. 18-20). It was during the last period of our Lord's ministry, when He devoted Himself especially to the training of His Apostles. They had now recognized Him as the Messiah; but they still had worldly notions of the kingdom which He came to found. Henceforth His aim was to correct their false notions, and to prepare them for His passion and death. Taking occasion of the absence of the multitudes, He asked them, "Whom do men say that the Son of Man is?" And after receiving their various answers, He continued, "Whom do *you* say that I am?" Peter at once replied, "Thou art Christ, the Son of the Living God" (cf. John vi.



67–71). “And Jesus answering, said to him, Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona, because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but My Father Who is in heaven. And I say to thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven.”

(a) On this solemn occasion our Lord addresses St. Peter by his own proper name, “Simon, son of John;” as He likewise did when He entrusted to his care the lambs and the sheep of His flock (John xxi. 15–17). He does so to bring out more clearly the dignity to which the Apostle was to be raised, and which was indicated by the surname imposed upon him. “As My Father hath manifested to thee My Godhead, so do I make known to thee thy pre-eminence (*excellentiā*)” (St. Leo, *Serm.* iv. 2). In former times considerable stress was laid by Protestants upon the difference of gender in the words Πέτρος, πέτρα.<sup>19</sup> But our Lord spoke Aramaic, and in that language the same word *kepha* is used in both places.<sup>12</sup> The metaphor which He makes use of is plain enough. Christ, the Master Builder, is about to found His Church, the house of God (“You are God’s building,” 1 Cor. iii. 9); and in order that it may be able to withstand the tempests by which it will be assailed, He, like the wise man, determines to found it upon a rock (Matt. vii. 24). That rock is Simon, who henceforth is to be called Rock, because on him the Church is to be built. “Thou art Rock, and on this rock (that is, on thee) I will build My Church.” And it is Peter, not the other Apostles, who is to be this Rock: “I say to *thee*, *thou* art Peter,” etc. Now, the foundation is that which gives a building its strength and stability; which holds the parts together; outside of which any part will collapse. Hence it is from Peter that the Church derives her strength and stability: he it is who keeps all her members together; and all who cleave not to him will perish. It is not simply Peter’s confession that is the Rock of the Church, but Peter’s authority; for it is authority which is the basis which holds a moral building or society together.

(b) Inasmuch as the Church is to be built upon Simon Peter as a secure foundation, “the gates of hell shall not prevail against it (πύλαι ἁδου οὐ κατισχύσουσιν αὐτης).” Whether we understand the word “hell” (Αἴδης, Ἥϊνψ) as the abode or the demons and the damned, or simply as the realm of death, the meaning of the passage is much the same (§ 144). The powers of darkness or death shall not be able to destroy the Church built on the rock. Hell may do its worst; death, the conqueror of all else, may strive its utmost; the Church of Christ shall withstand all their attacks, and last for ever.

(c) Simon is to be not only the foundation of the Church; he is also to have complete

<sup>19</sup>Even now in the Revised Version this difference is noted.

<sup>12</sup>It has often been urged that Peter does not mean ‘rock,’ but ‘stone,’ πέτρα being the word for ‘rock.’ Sound scholarship will not support this distinction, or the inference drawn from it. Christ calls Simon Πέτρος, not πέτρα, simply because πέτρα could not stand as a man’s name. This is fully admitted by Meyer, one of the most eminent of New Testament scholars. . . . He quotes to show how commonly Πέτρος occurs in the Classics with the meaning ‘rock,’ Plato, *Ax.*, p. 371; Soph., *Phil.*, 272; *O.C.*, 19, 1591; Pind., *Nem.*, iv. 46; x. 126. ‘Christ,’ he says, ‘declares Peter a rock because of his strong faith in Him;’ and again, ‘The evasion often taken advantage of in controversy with Rome—viz. that the “rock” means, not Peter himself, but the firm faith and the confession of it on the part of the Apostle—is incorrect since the demonstrative expression, “on *this* rock,” can only mean the Apostle himself.’ We may add that Cephās (κεφᾶς), is a common word in the Chaldee Targums for ‘rock.’ . . . In the Syriac form it occurs frequently in the Peshito, when it means: (1) rock; (2) stone; (3) Peter. Thus, in the text before us (Matt. xvi. 18) we have the very same word for Πέτρος and πέτρα: “Thou art Cephās (κεφᾶς), and on this Cephās I will build My Church” (Addis and Arnold’s *Catholic Dictionary*, ed. iv. POPE).

control and jurisdiction over it: “To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” We have already seen (*supra*, p. 120) that “the kingdom of heaven” is used to denote the Church, Christ’s spiritual, heavenly kingdom here on earth. “The keys” is a common Oriental<sup>16</sup> expression for control: as “the gates” denote power, so “the keys of the gates” denote control of this power. “I will lay the key of the house of David upon his shoulder; and he shall open, and none shall shut; and he shall shut, and none shall open” (Isa. xxii. 22), where Eliacim is appointed over the palace in the stead of Sobna. “I am the first and the last . . . and have the keys of death and of hell” (Apoc. i. 18). “The holy one and the true one, he that hath the key of David: he that openeth, and no man shutteth; shutteth, and no man openeth” (*ibid.* iii. 7). Hence, Christ, by giving Peter the keys, makes him his vicar and representative: delegates to him the power which He Himself possesses.

(d) This jurisdiction is further denoted by the words, “whatsoever thou shalt bind,” etc. Binding and loosing signify, in Rabbinical language, “prohibition and permission,” with reference to the various questions submitted to the Rabbis for solution. Hence, it here means much the same as the power of the keys, but with special reference to teaching authority; and Christ promises that the exercise of this authority shall be ratified in heaven—a proof that it must be infallible.

2. Among the warnings given to the Apostles at His Last Supper, there was one especially addressed to Peter, but having reference to the others as well: “Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired to have you [ὑμᾶς, plural = you Apostles], that he might sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for thee [σοῦ, singular = thee, Peter], that thy faith fail not; and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren” (Luke xxii. 31, 32). “The danger from the trial of fear was common to all the Apostles, and they stood equally in need of the aid of the Divine protection . . . and yet of Peter special care is taken by the Lord, and for the faith of Peter in particular does He pray, as though the condition of the rest would be more secure, provided the mind of their chief were not subdued. In Peter, therefore, is the strength of all defended, and the aid of Divine grace is so disposed as that the firmness which is bestowed upon Peter by Christ may be conferred by Peter on the Apostles (*Ut firmitas quæ per Christum Petro tribuitur, per Petrum apostolis conferatur*).” (St. Leo, *Serm. iv., in Natal. Ordin.*, c. 3.)

Our Lord tells St. Peter that Satan has asked and obtained (ἐξήτησατο) permission to put the Apostles to trial, as he did of old the patriarch Job. As in that former case, so also here, God will prove and purify those whom Satan intended to vex and destroy. To defeat the machinations of the Evil One, Christ prays, not for all, but for Peter, the Man of Rock, and it is Peter who is then to strengthen the rest of his brethren. “And thou being once converted (ἐπιστρέψας, when thou hast turned to Me from thy sin, or, do thou in thy turn) confirm thy brethren.”<sup>20</sup> “This whole speech of our Lord,” says Bengel, “presupposes that Peter is the first of the Apostles, on whose stability or fall the less or greater danger of the others depended.”<sup>21</sup>

<sup>16</sup>That is, Eastern; the word had no racist connotation at that time, and stems from the Latin word *orientalis*, meaning “east” (lit. “where the sun rises.” —Ed.

<sup>20</sup>It should be noted that the word *στηρίζω*, “confirm,” “strengthen,” occurs thrice in St. Peter’s Epistles. “After you have suffered a little, (God) will Himself perfect you, and confirm you (*στηρίξει*), and establish you” (1 Pet. v. 10). “You are confirmed (*ἐστηρικμένοις*) in the present truth” (2 Pet. i. 12). “Take heed, lest being led aside by the error of the unwise, you fall from your own steadfastness (*στηρικμοῦ*)” (2 Pet. iii. 17). In the first passage the connection with temptation is remarkable.

<sup>21</sup>“*Senserat magnam in Petro fidem et tamen etiam labilitatem Satanas, eoque victo putabat omnes victos fore: at Jesus, servato Petro, cujus ruina ceteros traxisset, omnes servavit. Totus sane hic sermo Domini presupponit*

Not that Peter's need was greater than theirs, but that their faith depended upon his, just as the Church is "the pillar and ground of the truth (στῦλος καὶ ἐδραῖωμα τῆς ἀληθείας)" (1 Tim. iii. 15); in like manner Peter is the strengthener (ὁ στηριζών) or foundation (τὸ στηριγμα) of the faith (*i.e.* the truth) of his brethren (the Church); and so the Church is the pillar of the truth, because it rests upon Peter, its foundation. Hence it is clear that the promise here made to Simon corresponds with that already made to him at Cæsarea Philippi. Here it is Satan who is to attack: there it is "the gates of Hell;" here Simon is the strengthener of his brethren: there he is the rock of the Church; here the brethren shall be safe against Satan, because they are strengthened by Simon: there the gates of Hell shall not prevail against the Church, because it is founded upon the Man of Rock. See Palmieri, *l.c.*, p. 287.

3. After the Resurrection our Lord fulfilled these promises by actually conferring upon Peter the primacy over His Church. "Jesus saith to Simon Peter, Simon, son of John [cf. βαριώνα, Matt. xvi. 17], lovest thou (ἀγαπᾶς) Me more than these? He saith to Him, Yea, Lord, Thou knowest that I love (φιλῶ) Thee. He saith to him, Feed My lambs (βόσκει τὰ ἀρνία μου). He saith to him again, Simon, son of John, lovest thou (ἀγαπᾶς) Me? He saith to him, Yea, Lord, Thou knowest that I love (φιλῶ) Thee. He saith to him, Feed My lambs (ποιμαίνει τα πρόβατα, *al.* πρόβάτια). He said to him the third time, Simon, son of John, lovest thou (φιλεῖς) Me? Peter was grieved because He said to him the third time, Lovest thou Me? And he said to Him, Lord, Thou knowest all things: Thou knowest that I love (φιλῶ) Thee. He said to him, Feed My sheep (βόσκει τὰ πρόβατα, *al.* πρόβάτια).<sup>22</sup> (John xxxi. 15–17). Our Lord's object is not to reinstate St. Peter in the Apostleship; for this, if needed, had already been done to him as well as to the others: "As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you" (John xx. 21). Here it is a question of conferring a special charge upon Peter as distinct from his brethren. The threefold question is directed to give him an opportunity of a threefold profession of love to atone for his threefold denial; and the threefold charge is intended to express the plenitude of the charge entrusted to him—he is made to be the shepherd of the whole flock. We have already seen that the flock is the Church, and that Christ is its Chief Shepherd (p. 121). The powers which He possess He here clearly delegates to Peter.

III. To understand more fully that Christ made St. Peter His vicar and representative, we must bear in mind that the above-mentioned titles and offices conferred upon the Apostle are those very titles and offices foretold of the Messiah by the Prophets, claimed by our Lord for Himself, and attributed to Him in the Acts and Epistles.

1. "The rock was Christ" (1 Cor. x. 4). He is "the stone which the builders rejected," but which "became the head of the corner" (Matt. xxi. 42; Ps. cxvii. 27; Acts iv. 11). "The chief corner-stone, in Whom all the building being framed together, groweth up into a holy temple in the Lord: in Whom also you are built together into a habitation of God in the Spirit" (Eph. ii. 20, 22). "Unto Whom (the Lord) coming as to a living stone . . . be ye also as living stones built up, a spiritual house. . . . Wherefore it is said in the Scriptures: Behold, I lay in Sion a chief corner-stone, elect, precious. And he that shall believe in Him shall not be confounded,

*Petrus esse primum Apostolorum quo stante aut cadente ceteri nut minus sui magis periclitarentur*" (*Gnomon*, Ed. 8, Stuttgart, 1887, p. 302).

<sup>22</sup>It cannot be doubted that some gradation is intended in the threefold charge made to Peter, though the present state of the Greek text makes it difficult to specify the nature of this gradation. Some (*e.g.* St. Ambrose, *In Luc.*, lib. x. n. 175) have suggested: "lambs" (ἀρνία, "little sheep" (πρόβάτια, *ovículas*), "sheep" (πρόβατα, *oves*). Others, "lambs," "sheep," "beloved sheep" (πρόβάτια, diminutive of tenderness). The use of three substantives and two verbs (βόσκει, ποιμαίνει) clearly denotes the universality of the charge.

a stone of stumbling, and a rock of scandal (πέτρα σκανδάλου)” (1 Pet. ii. 4–8; Isa. xxviii. 16; Rom. ix. 33). “Whosoever shall fall upon this stone shall be broken: but upon whomsoever it shall fall, it shall grind him to powder” (Matt. xxi. 44). “Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid, which is Christ Jesus” (1 Cor. iii. 10). If it be objected that these texts exclude St. Peter, we reply with St. Leo (*Serm. iv., In Nat. Ord., c. 2*), “Thou art Peter: that is, whereas I (Christ) am the inviolable Rock; I that chief corner-stone; I Who make both one; I the Foundation besides which no man can lay another; nevertheless, thou also art a rock, because thou art consolidated by My power, that what things belong to Me (or are peculiar to Me) by My power, may be common to thee and Me by participation of them with Me (*tu quoque petra es, quia mea virtute solidaris ut qua mihi potestate sunt propria, sint tibi mecum, participatione communia*).” And Theophylact calls Peter “the Rock and Foundation after Christ (Σολῶς μετ’ ἐμὲ ὄντι τῆς ἐκκλησίας πέτρα καὶ στηρίγματι)” (*In Lucam, c. xxii.*). “The most firm rock, which from that principal Rock received a participation of His virtue and name” (St. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocat. Gent., lib. ii. c. 28*).

2. So, too, Christ, “the First and the Last,” holds “the keys of life and death” (Apoc. i. 18); He is “the holy one and the true one; He that hath the key of David; He that openeth, and no man shutteth; shutteth, and no man openeth” (*ibid.* iii. 7). “And I will give the key of David upon His shoulder (cf. ‘the government is upon His shoulder,’ Isa. ix. 6); and He shall open, and none shall shut; and He shall shut, and none shall open” (Isa. xxii. 22; cf. Job xii. 14).

3. He is “the Good Shepherd” (John x. 11), the Messiah in His best known and most loving office. “I will set up one Shepherd over them, and He shall feed them . . . and He shall be their Shepherd” (Ezech. xxxiv. 23; cf. 11–16; xxxvii. 24). “He shall feed His flock like a Shepherd; He shall gather together the lambs with His arm, and shall take them up in His bosom, and He Himself shall carry them that are with young” (Isa. xl. 11). “For you were as sheep going astray; but you are now converted to the Shepherd and Bishop of your souls” (1 Pet ii. 25).

IV. After our Lord’s Ascension we find, as might be expected, that St. Peter at once steps into the place and office to which he had been appointed. Where formerly we read of “the twelve,” now we read of “Peter with the eleven (ὁ Πέτρος σὺν τοῖς ἑνδεκά);” “Peter and the rest of the Apostles (τὸν Πέτρος καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀποστόλους).” He it is who presides at the election of one to take the place of the traitor Judas (Acts i. 15 sqq.); he is the first, and indeed the only one, to preach and instruct on Pentecost Day; he is the first to exercise the miraculous powers promised to the Church: “Peter, with John, fastening his eyes upon him (the lame man), said, Look upon us (ἀτενίσας δὲ Πέτρος εἰς αὐτὸν σὺν τῷ Ἰωάννῃ εἶπεν, κ.τ.λ.) . . . But he looked earnestly upon them, hoping that he should receive something of them. But Peter said, Silver and gold I have none; but what I have I give thee: In the Name of Jesus,” etc. (*ibid.* iii. 4–6). Again, he alone addresses the people (*ibid.* 12–26). When he and John are the first to be arrested, it is he who defends the action of the Apostles and preaches the Name of Jesus (*ibid.* iv. 1–22). In the story of Ananias and Saphira, although all the Apostles are concerned, it is Peter alone who examines and delivers judgment on the unhappy couple. Ananias, “bringing a certain part of it [the price], laid it at the feet of the Apostles. But Peter said,” etc. (*ibid.* v. 1–10). Though afterwards “by the hands of the Apostles were many signs and wonders wrought,” yet “the multitude brought forth the sick into the streets and laid them on beds and couches, that when Peter came his shadow at the least might overshadow any of them, and they might be delivered from their infirmities” (*ibid.* 12–15). When the

High Priest summoned the Apostles before him and forbade them to preach, “Peter and the Apostles answering, said, We ought to obey God rather than men” (v. 29). When the Gospel was preached in Samaria, Peter was sent<sup>23</sup> with John to confirm the new converts, and again takes the leading part (viii. 14–25). Later on, when “the Church had peace throughout all Judæa and Galilee and Samaria . . . it came to pass that Peter, as he *passed through visiting all* (διερχόμενον διὰ πάντων), came to the saints who dwelt at Lydda” (*ibid.* ix. 31, 32). “Like a general, he went round surveying the ranks, seeing what portion was well massed together, what in order, what needed his presence. Behold him making his rounds in every direction,” etc. (Chrysost., *In Act.*, Hom. xxi. n. 2). Furthermore, he is the first to take the great step of receiving the Gentiles into the Church (Acts x.). When James, the brother of John, one of the three greater Apostles, was put to death by Herod, and when Paul long afterwards was imprisoned, nothing is said of the Church’s anxiety at their arrest, or prayers for their deliverance. But when Peter “was kept in prison, prayer was made without ceasing by the Church unto God for him (προσευχῇ δὲ ἦν ἐκτενωσ γινομένη ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ)” (*ibid.* xii. 1–5). When dissension threatened the unity of the Church, and when “the Apostles and ancients assembled to consider of this matter, and when there had been much disputing, Peter, rising up, said to them, Men, brethren, you know that in former days God made choice among us that by my mouth the Gentiles should hear the word of the Gospel,” etc. As soon as he had spoken, “all the multitude held their peace,” and the subsequent decree of the council was in accordance with his decision. “Peter,” says St. Jerome, “spoke with his wonted freedom, and the Apostle James followed his sentence, and all the ancients at once acceded to it” (*Ep.* 75, *Inter August.*, n. 7).

V. The personal infallibility of each of the Apostles (“When he, the Spirit of truth is come, He will teach you all truth”) and the universality of their jurisdiction (“teach ye all nations”), rendered the exercise of St. Peter’s peculiar prerogatives less manifest, and gave the Apostles a position with regard to him which could not be held by their successors with regard to his successors (see *infra*, § 178). This was especially so in St. Paul’s case. The attacks made upon his authority on the ground that he was not one of the original Twelve, required him to take every occasion of magnifying his own apostolic office. Nevertheless, we find in his Epistles passages which clearly indicate his recognition of Peter’s supremacy. “I went to Jerusalem to see Peter (ἱστορήσαι Κηφᾶν, ‘to make the acquaintance of, to interview Cephas’), and I tarried with him fifteen days; but other of the Apostles I saw none, saving James, the brother of the Lord” (Gal. i. 18, 19). “After so many great deeds,” says St. Chrysostom (in h. l.), “needing nothing of Peter nor of his instruction, but being his equal in rank (ἰσότητος), for I will say no more here, still he goes up to him as to the greater and elder (πρὸς μείζονα καὶ πρεσβύτερον) . . . He went but for this alone, to see him and honour him by his presence. He says, I went up to visit Peter. He did not say, to *see* Peter, but to *visit* Peter (οὐκ εἶπεν, ἰδεῖν Πέτρον, ἀλλ’ ἱστορήσαι Πέτρον): as they say in becoming acquainted with great and illustrious cities. So much pains he thought it worth only to see the man. . . . For he honours the man, and loves him more than all (τιμᾷ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ φιλεῖ μᾶλλον πάντων): for he says that he came up for none (διὰ οὐδένα) of the Apostles save him.” Four times does he mention St. Peter in his First Epistle to the Corinthians: twice where he gives him the place of honour (Paul,

<sup>23</sup>Peter’s defence of his conduct (Acts xi. 1–18) cannot be urged against his primacy. A superior may condescend to explain even where he might simply command. See St. Chrysost., *In Act.*, Hom. xxiv. n. 2; St. Gregory the Great, lib. ix., *Ep.* 39.

Apollo, Cephas, Christ; i. 12; iii. 22, 23); and twice where he singles him out by name, the rest being spoken of in a body (ix. 5; xv. 5). True, in Gal. ii. 9 the order is “James, and Cephas, and John;”<sup>24</sup> but here he is speaking of the three as Apostles, and asserting his equality with them as such. And the division of labour which is there spoken of (“To me was committed the gospel of the uncircumcision, as to Peter was that of the circumcision”) is not opposed to Peter’s primacy. “For, as a mark of his excellence, Christ Himself, Who came to save all men, with Whom there is no distinction of Jew and Greek, was yet called ‘Minister of the circumcision’ by Paul (Rom. xv. 8), a title of dignity according to Paul’s own words, for theirs was ‘the adoption of children, and the glory and the testament, and the giving of the Law, and the service of God, and the promises,’ while ‘the Gentiles praise God for His mercy.’ But just as Christ our Lord was so called Minister of the circumcision, in such sense as yet to be the Pastor and Saviour of all, so Peter, too, was called the minister of the circumcision, in such sense as yet to be by the Lord constituted (Acts ix. 32) pastor and ruler of the whole flock. Whence St. Leo, ‘Out of the whole world Peter alone is chosen to preside over the calling of all the Gentiles, and over all the Apostles, and the collected Fathers of the Church, so that though there be among the people of God many priests and many shepherds, yet Peter rules all by immediate commission, whom Christ also rules by sovereign power’” (Baronius, *Ann.*, A.D. 51, sect. 29; St. Leo, *Serm.* iv.).

There is another famous passage in this same Epistle which is often quoted against St. Peter’s primacy. “When Cephas was come to Antioch, I withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed (κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτῷ ἀντέστην, ὅτι κατεγνωσμένος ἦν). For before that some came from James, he did eat with the Gentiles; but when they were come, he withdrew and separated himself, fearing them who were of the circumcision. And to his dissimulation the rest of the Jews consented (συνυπεκρίθησαν αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Ἰουδαῖοι), so that Barnabas also was led by them into that dissimulation. But when I saw that they walked not uprightly unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas before them all, If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of the Gentiles and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the Gentiles to live as do the Jews?” (Gal. ii. 11–14). Peter’s conduct was in no way an error against the faith. He had been the first to receive the Gentiles (Acts x., xi.), and he distinctly taught that the Law was no longer binding (*ibid.* xv. 7 sqq.) In his anxiety, however, to conciliate the Jews, whom he had lately taken under his special charge (Gal. ii. 9), he lived as a Jew. On the other hand, St. Paul, to whom the Gentiles were entrusted, rightly feared that the example of Cephas (the Man of Rock, on whom Christ had built His Church) might be quoted to prove the necessity of observing the Law, and therefore he strongly protested against such conduct. Nevertheless, we find him shortly afterwards circumcising Timothy “because of the Jews that were in these places” (Acts xvi. 3). The Fathers who comment on the story of the dissension, however they may differ in their interpretation, are anxious to uphold Peter’s dignity, and admire his humility in submitting to be rebuked, rather than Paul’s freedom in rebuking him. “Peter gave to posterity a rarer and a holier example—that they should not disdain, if perchance they left the right track, to be corrected even by their younger—than

<sup>24</sup>This reading is not altogether certain. Peter is placed first in the codices used by some of the Fathers, e.g. Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* l. i, c. 20; Chrysostom, in h. l. (at least when he is commenting on the passage); Ambrosiaster, *ibid.*; Ambrose, *De Interpell. Jobi*, l. i. c. 5; Augustine, in c. 2, *Ep. ad Gal.*; Theodoret, *In Ps.* lxxxvi. 1; *In Cant.* iii. 10; *Ad Rom.* xv. 26; *In 2 Cor.* viii. 18. St. Jerome, both in his text and in his commentary, reads, “Peter and James and John,” and says nothing of any other reading.

Paul: that even *inferiors* might confidently venture to resist *superiors*, maintaining brotherly charity, in the defence of evangelical truth. . . . Much more wonderful and praiseworthy is it willingly to accept correction than boldly to correct deviation. Paul, then, has the praise of just liberty, and Peter of holy humility” (St. August., Ep. lxxxii. n. 22). See also Eſtius’s excellent commentary on Galatians ii.

## § 179 THE FATHERS AND THE PRIMACY OF ST. PETER

In the small space at our disposal it will not be possible for us to give more than a few of the passages in which the Fathers speak of the titles and prerogatives of St. Peter. The English reader will find the Patriſtic evidence given at length in Mr. Allnatt’s excellent work, *Cathedra Petri*; Waterworth’s *The Fathers on St. Peter and his Successors*.

I. St. Peter the Prince and Head of the Apoſtles.

St. Clement of Alexandria: “The blessed Peter, the Chosen (ὁ ἐκλεκτός), the Pre-eminent (ὁ ἐξαιρέτος), the Firſt (ὁ πρῶτος) of the diſciples” (*Quis Dives Salvetur. Op.*, ed. Migne, ii. p. 625).

Origen: “Peter the Prince of the Apoſtles” (*In Lucam*, Hom. xvi. tom. iii. p. 952). “Jesus having adjudged him greater than the other diſciples αὐτὸν μείζονα τῶν λοιπῶν γνωρίμων)” (tom. xiii., *In Matt.*, n. 14; tom. iii. p. 588).

Cyprian: “St. Peter, whom the Lord chose to be firſt, or chief (*quem primum Dominum elegit*)” (*Epiſt.* lxxi., *Ad Quintum*). “The Primacy is given to Peter (*Primatus Petro datur*)” (*De Unit. Eccl.*, n. 4).

St. Peter of Alexandria: “Peter, set above the Apoſtles (Ὁ πρόκριτος τῶν ἀποστόλων Πέτρον)” (*Canon. Penitent.*, n. 9; Galland. iv.; et ap. Hardouin, *Concil.*, tom. i. p. 229).

Eusebius: “That powerful and great one of the Apoſtles, who on account of his excellence was the leader of the reſt (Τὸν καρτερόν καὶ μέγαν τῶν ἀποστόλων τὸν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα τῶν λοιπῶν ἀπάντων προήγορον)” (*Hiſt. Eccl.*, lib. ii. c. 14).

St. Hilary: “The Prince of the Apoſtolate (*Apoſtolatus princeps*)” (*In Matt.* vii. 6).

St. Athanasius: “Peter the Chief or Leader (ὁ κορυφαίος)” (*In Ps.* xv. 8; tom. iii. p. 105, Migne).

St. Cyril of Jerusalem: “Peter the chiefeſt and foremoſt leader of the Apoſtles (ὁ κορυφαιότατος καὶ πρωτοστάτης τῶν ἀποστόλων)” (*Catech.* ii. n. 19, Migne, p. 31).

St. Ephraem Syrus: “The Prince of the Apoſtles” (tom. ii., *Serm. Syr.*, lvi., *Adv. Her.*, p. 559). “The Chief of the Apoſtles” (ib. *Serm. Gr. in Adv. Dom.*, p. 203).

St. Gregory of Nyssa: “The Leader and Coryphaeus of the Apoſtolic Choir. . . . The Head of the Apoſtles” (*Alt. Orat. de S. Steph.*, tom. iii. pp. 730–733).

St. Gregory of Nazianzum: “Peter the Chief of the Apoſtles (μαθητῶν ἄκρος)” (*Carm. Theol.*, lib. ii. ſect. 1, *carm.* xii. 222).

St. Baſil: “Peter, who was preferred before all the diſciples (ὁ πάντων μεν τῶν μαθητῶν προκρινθείς)” (*De Judic. Dei*, tom. ii. p. 221).

St. Epiphanius: “Peter became a Leader to his own brother. And God ſees the diſpositions of the heart, and knowing who is worthy to be appointed unto preſidency (ἄξιος τάττεσθαι). He alſo chose Peter to be the Leader (ἀρχηγὸν) of His diſciples, as in every way has been clearly ſhown” (*Adv. Her.*, 51, n. 17, tom. i. p. 440).

St. Jerome: “Peter the firſt Pontiff of the Chriſtians (*Primus Pontifex Chriſtianorum*)” (*Chron. Euseb. ad Ann.*, 44, tom. viii. p. 578. “The Prince of the Apoſtles (*Princeps*



*Apostolorum*)” (*Dial. adv. Pelag.*, n. 14). “Out of the Twelve, One is chosen in order that by the institution of a Head the occasion of schism might be removed” (*Adv. Jovin.*, lib. i. n. 26, tom. ii. p. 279).

St. Chrysostom: “The Chief of the Apostles, the First in the Church (Ἡ κορυφή τῶν ἀποστόλων, ὁ πρῶτος ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ)” (*Hom. iii. de Pœnit.*, n. 4). “Peter it was to whom had been entrusted the government (τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐγκεχειρισμένοις)” (*Hom. xxxiii., In Act.*, n. 2). “He entrusted into his hands the Primacy over the Universal Church (τὴν ἐπιστασίαν τὴν οἰκουμένης ἐκκλησίας ἐνεχείρισε)” (*Hom. v. de Pœnit.*, n. 2).

St. Augustine: “Who can be ignorant that the most blessed Peter is the first (*primum*) of the Apostles?” (*In Joann. tract.* lvi. n. 1). “Peter, by reason of the Primacy of his Apostolate, personified the Universal Church” (*ib. tract.*, cxxiv. n. 5). (Cf. *Serm. lxxvi.* n. 4; *De Bapt. cont. Donat.*, lib. ii. n. 2.)

General Council of Ephesus, 431: “The blessed Peter, the Head of the whole faith, and even of the Apostles (ἡ κεφαλὴ ὅλης τῆς πίστεως, ἡ καὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων)” (*Act.* ii., Labbe, tom. ii. p. 619). “The Prince (ἔξαρχος) and Head (κεφαλὴ) of the Apostles” (*Act.* iii., Labbe, p. 625).

St. Cyril of Alexandria: “Set over (προεκεκείμενος) the holy disciples;” “the Prince (πρόκριτος) of the holy disciples;” “Prince (πρόκριτος) of the Apostles;” “the Leader (ἡγούμενος)” (*In Joann.* lib. x. tom. ii. p. 924; *ibid.*, lib. xii. p. 1064; *Thesaur.*, tom. viii. p. 340; *Hom. xiii., De fest. Pasch.*, tom. x Pt. ii. p. 105, ed. Migne).

Theodoret: “The Coryphæus of the Apostles” (*In Ps.* ii.); “the first of the Apostles” (*Hisf. Relig.*, c. ii.). “He (Paul) renders due honour to the Head (τὴν πρέπουσαι ἀπονέμει τῷ κορυφαίῳ τιμὴν)” (*Comm. in Gal.*, i. 18).

St. Leo: “Peter . . . not only the Prelate of this see (Rome), but the Primate (*primate*) of all Bishops” (*Serm. iii., De Natal. Ord.*, c. 4). “The Prince of the whole Church (*totius ecclesie principem*)” (*Serm. iv. c. 4*). “The Lord who committed the Primacy (*primatum*) of the Apostolic dignity to the most blessed Apostle Peter” (*Epišt.* v., *Ad Episc. Metrop. per Illyr. Constit.*, c. 2).

## II. St. Peter the Rock of the Church.

Tertullian: “Peter, who is called the Rock whereon the Church was to be built, and who obtained the keys of the kingdom of heaven” (*De Præscr. Hæret.*, c. 22).

Origen: “That great foundation of the Church, and most solid Rock upon which Christ founded the Church (*Magno illi ecclesie fundamento, et petra solidissima, super quam Christus fundavit ecclesiam*)” (*In Exod. Com.*, v. n. 4, *Op.* tom. ii. p. 145, Migne; cf. *In Joann.*, tom. iv. p. 95; *apud Euseb., Hisf. Eccl.*, vi. c. 25). “Peter, against whom the gates of hell shall not prevail” (*De Princ.*, lib. iii. c. 2, n. 5). “Neither against the Rock upon which Christ builds His Church, nor against the Church shall the gates of hell prevail (Οὔτε γὰρ τῆς πέτρας ἐφ’ ἣ ὁ Χριστὸς οἰκοδομεῖ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, οὔτε τῆς ἐκκλησίας πύλαι ἄδου κατασχύσουσιν)” (*In Matt.*, tom. xii. n. 11).<sup>25</sup>

St. Cyprian: “Peter, whom the Lord chose as first, and upon whom He built His Church” (*Epišt.* lxxi., *Ad Quint.*, n. 3). “There is one Church, founded by the Lord Christ upon Peter, for the origin and purpose of unity (*Una ecclesia a Christo Domino super Petrum origine unitatis et ratione fundata*)” (*Epišt.* lxx., *Ad Januar.* Cf. *Epišt.* lxxiii., *Ad Jubaian.*, n. 11; *De*

<sup>25</sup>He also applies the word “Rock” to every faithful disciple.



*Bono Patientia*, n. 9; *Epiſt.* lxvi., *Ad Pupianum*, n. 8; *Epiſt.* lix., *Ad Cornel.*, n. 9; *Epiſt.* xliiii., al xl. *Ad Plebem.*, n. 5; *De Exhort. Martyr.*, n. 11; *De Habitu Virg.*, n. 10).

Eusebius of Cæsarea: "Peter, on whom the Church of Christ is built (ἐφ' ᾧ οἰκοδομεῖται ἡ Χριστοῦ ἐκκλησία), against which the gates of hell shall not prevail" (*Hiſt. Eccl.*, lib. vi. c. 25. Cf. *Demonſtr. Evang.*, lib. iii. c. 4).

St. Hilary of Poitiers: "Peter . . . upon whom He was about to build His Church. . . . Peter the foundation of the Church" (*Tract. in Ps.* cxxxi. n. 4). "The firm Rock upon which the Church was to be built (*firma superædificandæ in ea ecclesiæ petra*)" (*In Ps.* cxli. n. 8. Cf. *De Trin.*, lib. vi. c. 20).

St. Gregory of Nyssa: "Peter the Head of the Apostles . . . is in accordance with the prerogative bestowed upon him by the Lord, the unbroken and most firm Rock (ἡ ἀβράγης καὶ ὄχυρωτάτη πέτρα), upon which the Lord built His Church" (*Alt. Orat. de Stephan. Op.* tom. iii. p. 734, Migne; cf. *Hom. xv. in Cant. Cantic.*, tom. i. p. 1088).

St. Gregory of Nazianzum: "Of the disciples of Christ, all of whom were great and deserving of the choice, one is called a Rock, and is entrusted with the foundation of the Church (τοὺς θεμελίους τῆς ἐκκλησίας πιστεύεται)" (*Orat.* xxxii. n. 18. *Op.*, tom. ii. p. 591, Migne; cf. *Carmin.*, sect. 2, *Poem. Moral.*, n. 1, vers. 489, tom. ii. p. 325; *Carm. Theol.*, loc. cit.; *Orat.* ix., *Apol. ad Patr.*, n. 1, tom. i. p. 235).

St. Epiphanius: "The First of the Apostles, that firm Rock upon which the Church of God is built, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. But the gates of hell are heresies and heresiarchs" (*Anchorat.*, n. 9). "Peter . . . a firm Rock founding the faith of the Lord, upon which the Church was in every way (κατὰ πάντα τρόπον) built. . . . A firm Rock of the building, and Foundation of the House of God" (*Adv. Heres.*, 59, nn. 7, 8).

St. Ambrose: "Whom He (Christ) pointed out as the Foundation of the Church, when He called him the Rock" (*De Fide*, lib. iv. c. 5, n. 56, tom. ii. p. 531, Migne). "It is that same Peter to whom He said, 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church.' Therefore, where Peter is, there is the Church (*ubi ergo Petrus, ibi Ecclesia; ubi Ecclesia ibi nulla mors, sed vita æterna*)" (*In Ps.* xl. n. 30, tom. i. p. 879; cf. *In Lucam*, lib. iv. nn. 70, 77, *De Virginit.*, c. 16, n. 105; *De Incarnat.*, c. iv. n. 33; c. 5, n. 34; *De Sp. Sancto*, c. xiii. n. 158).

St. Chrysostom: "When I name Peter, I name that unbroken Rock, that firm Foundation, the Great Apostle, the First of the disciples (τὴν Πέτρων, λέγω τὴν ἀβράγην, τὴν κρηπίδα τὴν ἀσάλευτον, τὸν ἀπόστολον τὸν μέγαν, τὸν πρῶτον τῶν μαθητῶν)" (*Hom.* iii., *De Pœnit.*, n. 4; cf. *Hom. in illud, Hoc Scitote*, n. 4; *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt*, n. 17; *In illud, Vidi Dom.* *Hom.* iv. n. 3; *Hom. De Dec. Mil. Talent*, n. 3; *Hom.* liv. n. 2; *Hom.* iii., *In Matt.*, n. 5; *Hom.* xix., *In Joann.*, n. 2).

St. Jerome: "Peter, upon whom the Lord founded the Church" (*Epiſt.* xl., *Ad Marcellam*). "Peter the Prince of the Apostles, upon whom the Church was founded in stable massiveness (*super quem ecclesia Domini stabili mole fundata est*)" (*Dial. adv. Pelag.*, lib. i. n. 14). "As Christ Himself gave light to the Apostles, that they might be called the light of the world, and as they obtained other names from the Lord; so to Simon also, who believed on the Rock Christ, He bestowed the name of Peter; and according to the metaphor of a rock, it is rightly said of him, 'I will build My Church upon thee.' The gates of hell are vices and sins, or certainly the doctrines of heretics by which men enticed are led to hell" (*In Matt.* xvi. tom. vii. p. 124). "Upon this Rock (the See of Peter) I know that the Church is founded" (*Epiſt.* xv., *Ad Pap. Damas.*, tom. i. p. 39).

St. Augustine: “Peter, who had confessed Him the Son of God, and in that confession had been called the Rock upon which the Church should be built (*Petrus . . . in illa confessione appellatus est petra super quam fabricaretur ecclesia*)” (*In Ps.*, lxix. n. 4). “Number the bishops from the See itself of Peter, and in that order of Fathers see who succeeded to whom: this is the Rock which the proud gates of hell overcome not (*ipsa est petra quam non vincunt superba inferorum porta*)” (*Ps. in Part. Donat.*, tom. ix. p. 30; cf. *Epiſt.* liiii., *Generoso*, n. 2).

St. Cyril of Alexandria: “Allusively to the name from the rock, He changed his name to Peter; for on him He was about to found His Church (Φερωνύμως δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πέτρας μετωνόμαζε Πέτρον ἐπ’ αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔμελλε τὴν αὐτοῦ θεμελιοῦν ἐκκλησίαν)” (*In Joann.*, i. 42, lib. ii. *Op.*, tom. vi. p. 131, Migne). “Calling, I think, the rock the immoveableness in the faith of the disciple” (*In Isai.*, lib. iv. tom. iii. p. 593; cf. *In Matt.*, c. xvi. tom. v. p. 54).

St. Leo the Great: “The Lord willed that the mystery of His gift should so belong to the office of all the Apostles, as to seat it chiefly in the most blessed Peter, highest of all the Apostles; and from him, as it were from the Head, He wills His gifts to flow as into the whole body; that whosoever dares to recede from the solidity of Peter, may know that he has no part in the Divine mystery. For this man, assumed into the participation of His indivisible unity, He willed to be named what He Himself was, by saying, ‘Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build My Church;’ that the rearing of the eternal temple, by the wonderful grace of the gift of God, might consist now in the solidity of Peter, strengthening with his firmness this Church, that neither the rashness of men might attempt it, nor the gates of hell prevail against it” (*Epiſt. ad Episc. per Prov. Vienn. in causa Hilarii*, c. 1; cf. *Serm. iv. In Natal. Ord.*, c. 2, quoted above, p. 311). “The Rock of the Catholic Faith, which name the blessed Apostle Peter received from the Lord” (*Epiſt.* cxix. n. 2, *Ad Maxim. Ep. Antioch.*). “By the loftiness of his faith he gave so much pleasure as to receive the sacred firmness of an inviolable Rock, upon which the Church being founded, it should prevail over the gates of hell and the laws of death; and that neither in loosing nor in binding should anything be ratified in heaven but what it may have settled by the decision of Peter” (*Serm. li.*, *Hom. Sabbat. ante 2<sup>m</sup> Dom. Quadr.*, c. 1; cf. *Epiſt.* xxviii, *Ad Flav.*).

Council of Ephesus, 431. In this Council the Legate Philip called Peter “the Pillar of the Faith, the Foundation of the Catholic Church (ὁ κίων τῆς πίστεως, ὁ θεμέλιος τῆς καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας)” (*Acf.* iii., Labbe, tom. iii. p. 625; ed. Paris, 1671).

Council of Chalcedon, 451. In the sentence against Dioscorus, approved of by all the bishops (mostly Easterns), Peter is called “the Rock and Foundation of the Catholic Church, and support of the orthodox faith (πέτρα καὶ κρηπίς τῆς καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας, καὶ τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως ὁ θεμέλιος)” (*Acf.* iii., Labbe, tom. iv. p. 425).

St. Gregory the Great: “Who is ignorant that the Holy Church is established on the firmness of the Chief of the Apostles, who in his name expressed the firmness of his mind, being called Peter from the Rock?” (lib. vi., *Epiſt.* 3, *Ad. Eulog. Alexandr.*)

St. John Damascene calls Peter “that Coryphaeus of the Apostles, the Firm Foundation, the unbroken Rock of the Church (τὴν κρηπίδα τὴν ἀσάλευτον, τὴν πέτραν ἀβράχη)” (*In Sac. Parallel.*, tom. ii. p. 591, Migne).

Photius says that “upon Peter rest the foundations of the faith (Πέτρος ἐφ’ ᾧ τὰ τῆς πίστεως κείται θεμέλια)” (*Epiſt.* ccxliii. al. xcix.).

It may be objected that many of the Fathers (notably St. Augustine) take the Rock to be, not Peter himself, but the confession which Peter made; and that others explain that the

Rock was Christ. To this we reply that these interpretations are not opposed to that which we have given, but are rather collateral to it: the three taken together give us an adequate interpretation of the passage. In Christ's words, 'Thou art Peter,' etc., a threefold truth is contained: (1) Peter is the Rock of the Church, *i.e.* the person of Simon, who is made a Rock or is endowed with the Primacy, is the basis on which the Church rests; (2) Faith is the Rock of the Church, *i.e.* Peter's faith is that which constitutes him the foundation of the Church; (3) Christ is the Rock of the Church, *i.e.* He is the principal, original Rock on which Peter rests. See Palmieri, *l.c.*, 248, sqq.; and on St. Augustine's interpretation, Franzelin, *De Eccl.*, p. 136 sqq.

### III. Peter the Key-bearer.

As the Fathers naturally speak of this prerogative of Peter in connection with the foregoing, it will here suffice to quote only two or three passages.

Tertullian: "If thou thinkest heaven is closed, remember that the Lord left here the keys thereof to Peter, and through him to the Church" (*corpice*, cap. 10; cf. *De Præscr. Hæret.*, n. 22).

Origen: "If we carefully examine the writings of the Evangelists, we may discover much difference and preeminence (*ὑπεροχὴν*) in the words spoken to Peter (Matt. xvi. 19), over and above those spoken to the Apostles generally (*ibid.* xviii. 19) in the second place. For it is no small difference that Peter received the keys, not of one heaven, but of many, and that whatsoever things he should bind upon earth should be bound, not in one heaven, but in all (the heavens) . . . for they (the other Apostles) do not transcend in power as Peter, so as to bind and loose in all the heavens" (*Comment. in Matt.*, torn. xiii. n. 31).

St. Ambrose: "What fellowship can these (the Novatians) have with Thee: men who take not up the keys of the kingdom, denying that they ought to forgive sins; which indeed they rightly confess of themselves; for they have not Peter's inheritance who have not Peter's chair, which they rend with impious division" (*De Pœnit.*, lib. i. nn. 32, 33).

St. Chrysostom: "Great was God's consideration towards this city (Antioch), as He manifested by deeds; inasmuch as Peter, who was set over the whole habitable world, into whose hands He put the keys of heaven; to whom He entrusted to do and to support all things (*τὸν γοῦν τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐπιστάτην ἀπάσης Πέτρον, ᾧ τὰς κλεῖς ἐνεχείρισε τῶν οὐρανῶν, ᾧ πάντα ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν ἐπέτρησε*)" (*Hom. in S. Ign. Mart.*, n. 4; cf. *In Matt. Hom.*, liv. n. 2; *In Matt. Hom.*, lxxxii. n. 3).

St. Leo the Great: "The right of this power (of the keys) passed also indeed to the other Apostles, and the constitution of this decree has flowed on to all the princes of the Church; but not in vain is that entrusted to one which is intimated to all. For to Peter is this therefore entrusted individually, because the pattern of Peter is set before all the rulers of the Church. The privilege of Peter therefore remains, whatever judgment is passed in accordance with his equity (*Non frustra uni commendatur quod omnibus intimatur. Petro enim ideo hoc singulariter creditur, quia cunctis ecclesie rectoribus Petri forma preponitur. Manet ergo Petri privilegium, ubicunque ex ipsius fertur æquitate iudicium*)" (*Serm. iv.*, *In Nat. Ordin.*, c. 3; cf. *Epist. x.*, *Ad Episc. per Prov. Vienn. in causa Hilarii*, c. 2, *supra*, p. 322).

St. Gregory: "Behold he (Peter) receives the keys of the heavenly kingdom; the power of binding and of loosing is given to him; to him the care and government of the whole Church is committed (*Ecce claves regni accipit, potestas ei ligandi atque solvendi tribuitur, cura ei totius ecclesie et principatus committitur*)" (lib. v., *Epist. xx.*, *Ad Manric. Augusti*).

Venerable Bede: “Blessed Peter in a special manner received the keys of the kingdom of heaven and the Headship of judiciary power, that all believers throughout the world might understand that all those who in any way separate themselves from the unity of his faith and communion, such can neither be absolved from sins, nor enter the gate of the heavenly kingdom” (*Hom. xvi., In Die SS. Pet. et Paul., Migne, Patr. Lat., tom. xciv. p. 223*).

IV. St. Peter the Confirmer of his Brethren.

St. Ambrose: “Peter, after being tempted by the devil, is set over the Church. The Lord therefore signified beforehand what that is, that He afterwards chose him to be the Paſtor of the Lord’s flock. For to him He ſaid, ‘But thou, when thou art once converted,’ etc. (*Petrus ecclesia præponitur . . . poſtea eum paſtorem elegit dominici gregis*)” (*In Ps. xliiii. n. 40; cf. De Fide, lib. iv. c. 5, n. 56*).

St. Chryſoſtom: “He (Peter) firſt acts with authority in the matter (the election of Matthias), as having all put into his hands; for to him Chriſt ſaid, ‘And thou,’ etc. (πρῶτος τοῦ πράγματος ἀθθεντεί, ἅτε αὐτὸς πάντας ἐγγχειριſθείς)” (*Hom. iii., In Act., nn. 1–3; cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Lucam, tom. v. p. 420; Theodoret, Heret. Fab., lib. v. c. 28*).

In the General Council of Ephesus St. Peter is called “the Pillar of the Faith (ὁ κίλιον τῆς πίſτεως)” (*Act. iii., Labbe, tom. iii. p. 625*). And in the General Council of Chalcedon, “the Foundation (ὁ θεμέλιος) of the orthodox faith” (*Act. iii., Labbe, iv. p. 425*). For St. Leo, ſee above, p. 308.

V. St. Peter the Chief Paſtor.

Origen: “To Peter was the Supreme Power to feed the ſheep delivered, and upon him as on the earth was the Church founded (*Petro cum ſumma rerum de paſcendis ovibus traderetur, et ſuper ipſum velut ſuper terram fundaretur eccleſiæ*)” (lib. v., *In Ep. ad Rom., n. 5*).

St. Cyprian: “Peter, to whom the Lord commends His ſheep to be fed and guarded, on whom He placed and founded the Church (*cui oves ſuas Dominus paſcendas tuendasque commendat*)” (*De Habitu Virg., n. 10*).

St. Ephraem Syrus: “Blessed the flock committed to thy care! How much it has grown! . . . O thou bleſſed one, that obtainedſt the place of the Head and Tongue in the body of thy brethren,” etc. (*Bibl. Orient., ed. Aſſeman., tom. i. p. 95; cf. Serm. lvi., Adv. Har., tom. ii., Syr., p. 559*).

St. Ambrose: “Chosen to feed the flock by the judgment of the Lord Himſelf” (*De Fide, lib. v. prolog. n. 2; cf. the foregoing heading*).

St. Chryſoſtom on John xxi. 15: “And why, then, paſſing over the others, does He conſerve with Peter on theſe things? He was the choſen one of the Apoſtles, and the Mouth of the diſciples and the Leader of the choir. On this account Paul alſo went up on a time to ſee him rather than the others, and withal, to ſhow him that he muſt have confidence, as the denial was done away with. He puts into his hands the preſidency over his brethren (ἐγγχειρίζεται τὴν προſταſίαν τῶν ἀδελφῶν). And He brings not forward that denial, neither does He reproach him with the paſt, but ſays to him, ‘If thou love Me, rule over the brethren (εἰ φιλεῖς με, προιſτασο τῶν ἀδελφῶν)’ (cf. εἰ φιλεῖς με ποιμαίνε τὰ πρόβατα μου). . . . And the third time He gives him the ſame injunction, ſhowing at what a price He ſets the preſidency over His own ſheep. And if any one ſhould ſay, ‘How, then, did James receive the throne of Jeruſalem?’ I would answer, ‘That He appointed this man (Peter) teacher, not of that throne, but of the world’” (*In Joann. Hom. lxxxviii.; cf. Hom. v. de Pænit., n. 2; De Sacerdotio, lib. ii. c. 1*).

St. Auguſtine: “I am held in the communion of the Catholic Church by . . . the ſuc-

cession of priests from the very chair of the Apostle Peter, to whom the Lord, after His resurrection, committed His sheep to be fed (*Tenet me ab ipsa sede Petri Apostoli, cui pascendas oves post resurrectionem Dominus commendavit, successio sacerdotum*)” (*Contra Ep. Fundam Manich.*, n. 5). “Peter was made the Pastor of the Church, as Moses was made the Ruler of the Jewish people” (*Contra Faust.*, lib. xxii. c. 70; cf. *Serm.* xlvi. n. 30; *Serm.* ccxcv. nn. 2, 4).

St. Cyril of Alexandria: “Over the Church He sets Peter as Shepherd (καὶ ταύτης ποιμένα τὸν Πέτρον ἐφίστησιν)” (*In Matt.*, xvi. tom. v. p. 55, ed. Migne).

St. Leo the Great: “Out of the whole world the one Peter is chosen to be set over both the calling of the nations, and over all the Apostles and all the Fathers of the Church; that, although in the people of God there be many priests and many shepherds, Peter may rule all, as made his, whom Christ also rules by supreme headship (*omnes tamen proprie regat Petrus, quos principaliter regit et Christus*)” (*Serm.* iv., *In Nat. Ord.*, c. 1; cf. *Ep.* x., *Ad Episc. per Prov. Vienn. in Causa Hilarii*, c. 2; *Serm.* lxxiii., *De Ascens. Dom.*, n. 2).

St. Gregory the Great: “By the voice of the Lord the care of the whole Church was entrusted to holy Peter, Prince of all the Apostles; for to him it is said, ‘Peter, lovest thou Me? Feed My sheep’” (lib. v., *Epist.* xx., *Ad Maurit. August.*).

Palmieri, *De Rom. Pont.*, p. 225 sqq.; Billet, *De Ecclesia*, p. 528 sqq.; Turmel, *Hist. de la Théol. Posit.*, etc., p. 151 sqq.; Atzberger, *op. cit.*, sect. 342; Allies, *St. Peter: His Name and Office*.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE PRIMACY OF THE ROMAN PONTIFF

“**T**HAT WHICH THE PRINCE OF SHEPHERDS and great Shepherd of the sheep, Christ Jesus our Lord, established in the person of the Blessed Apostle Peter to secure the perpetual welfare and lasting good of the Church, must, by the same institution, necessarily abide unceasingly in the Church; which, being founded upon the Rock, will stand firm to the end of the world. For none can doubt—and it is known to all ages—that the Holy and Blessed Peter, the Prince and Chief of the Apostles, the pillar of the faith and foundation of the Catholic Church, received the keys of the kingdom from our Lord Jesus Christ, the Saviour and Redeemer of mankind, and lives, presides, and judges to this day and always, in his successors the Bishops of the Holy See of Rome, which was founded by him, and consecrated by his blood” (Vatican Council, sess. iv. ch. 2; cf. Acts of the Council of Ephesus, sess. iii., Labbe).

#### § 172 THE PERPETUITY OF THE PRIMACY OF PETER IN THE BISHOPS OF ROME

I. The argument for the perpetuity of Peter’s Primacy is briefly this: Christ’s Church will last for all days, therefore the Primacy must be perpetual. Our Lord built His Church upon a rock, that the gates of hell might never prevail against it; the rock must therefore continue for all days. Satan is ever endeavouring to sift the members of it; hence they always stand in need of confirmation in the faith. The sheep and lambs of His flock must ever be fed, guided, and defended against their foes. Now, these functions of Rock, Key-bearer, Confirmer, and

Shepherd were entrusted to St. Peter, who was, however, a mortal man. They must, therefore, be exercised by other persons acting in his name and invested with his prerogatives. "It is [a] matter of doubt to none, rather, it is a thing known to all ages (πάσι τοῖς αἰώσιν), that the holy and most blessed Peter, the prince and head of the Apostles, the pillar of the faith, the foundation of the Catholic Church, received the keys of the kingdom from Jesus Christ, our Lord and Saviour, and Redeemer of mankind. And to him was given authority to bind and loose sins, who, even till this present, and always, both lives and judges in his successors (ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ διαδόχοις καὶ ζῆ καὶ δικάζει); our holy and most blessed Pope Celestine, the bishop, the canonical successor (κατὰ τάξιν ὁ διάδοχος) and vicegerent of this Peter, has sent us as representatives of his person" (Philip, the papal legate at the Council of Ephesus, Act iii., Labbe, tom. iii. col. 625). "The solidity of that faith, which was commended in the Prince of the Apostles, is perpetual; and as what Peter believed in Christ is perpetual, so is what Christ instituted in Peter permanent. . . . The disposition, therefore, made by the truth remains, and blessed Peter, continuing in his acquired firmness of the rock, has not abandoned the entrusted helms of the Church. . . . If anything, therefore, is rightly done by us, and rightly ordained; if anything be, by our daily prayers, obtained from the mercy of God, it is his doing and merit, whose power survives, and whose authority excels in his own chair (*cujus in sede sua vivit potestas, excellit auctoritas*). . . . That in the person of my lowliness he be acknowledged, be honoured, in whom both the solicitude of all pastors, with the care of the sheep entrusted to them, still continues, and whose dignity fails not, even in his unworthy heir (*et cuius dignitas etiam in indigno herede non deficit*)" (St. Leo, *Serm.*, iii., *De Natal. Ordin.*, cc. 2–4). "The blessed Peter ceases not to preside over his own see, and he enjoys a never-ceasing fellowship with the everlasting Priest (Christ). For that solidity which Peter, himself also made a rock, received from the rock Christ, has passed onwards to his heirs also; and wheresoever any firmness is exhibited, the constancy of that pastor is undeniably apparent" (St. Leo, *Serm.* v., *De Natal. Ordin.*, c. 4).

As the Fathers usually speak of the perpetuity of the Primacy in the person of the Bishop of Rome, we shall reserve further extracts for the next paragraph.

II. The perpetuity of the Primacy is contained in the words of the Gospels no less than is the Primacy itself; but the way in which it was to be perpetuated is not precisely determined. Nevertheless, it is evident that there must be some means of indicating the person or persons invested with the powers originally conferred upon Peter. Now, the voice of tradition tells us that one mode of succession, and one alone, has ever been acknowledged in the Church, viz. that the Bishop of Rome is the successor of St. Peter, forming one moral person with him, holding all his prerogatives of ruling and teaching the Church.

1. The Fathers of the Council of Sardica (A.D. 342) "honour the memory of the holy Apostle St. Peter" in the person of Julius, Bishop of Rome (can. 3): "the priests of the Lord from each of the several provinces" are to "refer to the Head, that is, to the See of the Apostle Peter (*ad caput, id est, ad Petri Apostoli sedem*)" (*Epist. Synod. ad Julium*, Labbe, tom. ii. p. 661). "I bear the burdens," says Pope St. Siricius, "of all who are heavily laden; yea, rather, in me that burden is borne by the blessed Peter, who we trust in all things protects and has regard to us, who are the heirs of his government (*hæc portat in nobis beatus apostolus Petrus, qui nos in omnibus, ut confidimus, administrationis suæ protegit et tuetur hæredes*)" (*Ep. i.*, *Ad Himer. Terrac. Ep.* n. i.; Galland, tom. vii. p. 533). And Pope St. Zosimus says, "Canonical antiquity by universal consent willed that so great a power should belong to that Apostle, a

power also derived from the actual promise of Christ our God, that it should be his to loose what was bound, and to bind what was loosed, an equal state of power being bestowed upon those who, by his will, should be found worthy to inherit his see, for he has both charge of all the Churches, and especially of this wherein he sat . . . You are not ignorant that we rule over his place, and are in possession also of the authority of his name” (*Ep. xi. Ad Afros*, Galland, tom. ix. pp. 15, 16). “Peter . . . even till this present and always, both lives and judges in his successors,” etc. (*Council. Eph. act. iii.*; see above, p. 329). “Anathema to him who believeth not that Peter hath so spoken by Leo (*Petrus per Leonem ita locutus est*)” (Council of Chalcedon, Hardouin, tom. ii. p. 306). “Peter spoke by Agatho” (Third Council of Constantinople, Hardouin, tom. iii. p. 1422; cf. pp. 1159, 1287). The Second Council of Nicæa professed its adherence (“The holy synod so believes, so is convinced, so defines”) to Pope Hadrian I’s letter, in which he says, “Peter’s See shines forth in Primacy (*πρωτεύων διαλάμπει*) over the whole Church, and is Head of all the Churches of God. Wherefore the same blessed Peter the Apostle, governing the Church by the command of the Lord, left nothing uncared for, but held everywhere, and holds, supreme authority (*ἐκράτησε πάντοτε καὶ κρατεῖ τὴν ἀρχήν*)” (Hardouin, tom. iii. p. 103). “We who have taken upon us to rule the Apostolic See in the place of Peter, the Prince of the Apostles” (St. Gregory the Great, Lib. ii., *Ep. Ad. Columb.*).

2. The Bishop of Rome is declared to be, by the very fact of his succeeding to that See, the successor of St. Peter’s Primacy. That is to say, St. Peter, by taking possession of the See of Rome, thereby made that the supreme See, invested with all his primatial prerogatives; so that when he vacated the See by death, his successor in the See became by that very fact his successor in the Primacy. “Peter, therefore, first filled that individual chair which is the first of the marks (of the Church, *cathedram unicam* [unique or pre-eminent] *quæ est prima de dotibus*); to him succeeded Linus; to Linus succeeded Clement; to Clement, Anacletus [he gives the whole succession]; . . . to Liberius, Damasus; to Damasus, Siricius, who is now our colleague, with whom the whole world, by the mutual exchange of circular letters (*commercio formatarum*) is concordant with us in one fellowship of communion. You who wish to claim to yourselves the holy Church, tell us the origin of your chair” (St. Optatus of Milevis, *De Schism. Donat.*, lib. ii. nn. 2–4). “If the order of bishops succeeding to each other is considered, how much more securely and really beneficially do we reckon from Peter himself, to whom bearing a figure of the Church the Lord says, ‘Upon this rock,’ etc. For to Peter succeeded Linus; to Linus, Clement [he gives the whole succession]; to Damasus, Siricius; to Siricius, Anastasius” (St. Augustine, *Ep. liii.* nn. 2, 3). “Cornelius was made bishop . . . when the place of Fabian—that is, when the place of Peter and the rank (*gradus*) of the sacerdotal chair was vacant” (St. Cyprian, *Ep. lii., Ad Anton.*). He speaks of “the chair of Peter the principal Church, whence the unity of the priesthood took its rise (*ecclesiam principalem, unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est*)” (*Ep. iv., Ad Cornel.*). Firmilian is indignant with Pope St. Stephen, “who so prides himself on the place of his episcopate and contends that he holds the succession of Peter, upon whom the foundations of the Church were laid” (*Ep. lxxv., Inter Cyprianas*). St. Ambrose praises his brother Satyrus, who, being in a place of doubtful orthodoxy, “called the bishop unto him, and not accounting any grace true which was not of the true faith, he inquired of him whether he agreed with the Catholic bishops—that is, with the Roman Church (*utrumnam cum episcopis Catholicis, hoc est cum Romana Ecclesia conveniret*)” (*De Excessu Fratris*, n. 46.) “I speak,” says St. Jerome, “with the successor of the

Fisherman, and the disciple of the Cross. I, following none as the first, save Christ, am linked in communion with thy blessedness—that is, with the chair of Peter. Upon that Rock I know that the Church is built. Whoso shall eat the Lamb outside this house is profane. If any be not in the ark of Noah, he will perish when the deluge prevails. . . . I know not Vitalis; Meletius I reject; I am ignorant of Paulinus. Whoso gathereth not with thee (Damasus) scattereth; that is, he who is not of Christ is of Antichrist” (*Epišt.* xv., *Ad Damas.*). “What does he (Rufinus) call his faith? That which is the strength of the Roman Church, or that which is in the volumes of Origen? If he answer, ‘the Roman,’ then are we Catholics (*Si Romanam responderit, ergo Catholici sumus*)” (*Adv. Rufin.*, ed. i. c. 4). “Blessed Peter, who lives and presides in his own See, gives the true faith to those who seek it. For we, in our solicitude for truth and faith, cannot, without the consent of the Roman Church, hear causes of faith” (*Ep. Ad Eutech.*).

3. As the succession to the Primacy of Peter is bound up with the succession to the See of Rome, hence the Church of this See holds the Primacy over the Universal Church. “Your faith,” said St. Paul to the Romans (i. 8), “is spoken of in the whole world.” “For with this Church (of Rome), because of its more powerful principality, every Church must agree—that is, the faithful everywhere—in which (*i.e.* in communion with the Roman Church) the tradition of the Apostles has ever been preserved by those on every side (*Ad hanc ecclesiam propter potentio[re]m [al. potio[re]m] principality[te]m necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam, hoc est, eos qui sunt undique fideles, in qua semper ab his qui sunt undique, conservata est ea qua est ab Apostolis traditio*)” (St. Irenæus, *Adv. Hæres.*, iii. 3).<sup>26</sup> St. Ignatius of Antioch had already before him addressed the Roman Church as the one “which presides (*προκαθιται*) in the place of the region of the Romans,” and again as the Church “which presides over charity (*προκαθημένη τῆς ἀγάπης*)” (*Epišt. ad Rom. Proem.*).<sup>27</sup> St. Cyprian calls the Church of Rome “the chair of Peter, and the chief Church, whence the unity of the priesthood took its rise (*Petri catedram atque ecclesiam principalem unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est*)” (*Epišt. lv., d. Cornel.*, n. 14), “the root and matrix of the Catholic Church (*ecclesia catholica radicem et matricem*)” (*Epišt. xlv., Ad Cornel.*, n. 3). “From this Church (of Rome) the rights of venerable communion flow unto all” (St. Ambrose, *Epišt.* xi. n. 4). But this is abundantly clear from the various passages already cited.

The frequent recourse to the See of Rome, as early as the second century, is a clear proof of the practical acknowledgment of the Primacy of the Popes. St. Justin came there from

<sup>26</sup>“Principalitas” can only mean ‘principality,’ or ‘supremacy.’ It occurs: iv. 38, ‘God holds the principality;’ ii. 30, ‘God is above every principality and domination.’ In eight other places it is used of the supreme God of the Gnostics. So in i. 26, 1: ‘The principality which is above all,’ ‘the principality which is above everything.’ It is used—as we know from the Fragments of the original Greek preserved in the *Philosophum*. x. 21; Theodoret, *Hæret. Fab. i.* 15—to translate *αὐθεντία*, ‘authority’ or ‘supremacy’” (Addis and Arnold, *Cath. Dictionary: POPE*). The passage is thus translated in Clark, *Ante-Nicene Christian Library* (vol. v. p. 261): “For it is a matter of necessity that every Church should agree with this Church on account of its pre-eminent authority—that is, the faithful everywhere.” Waterworth’s version is given *supra*, vol. i. p. 28.

<sup>27</sup>“Si le martyr s’était adressé à l’évêque de Rome, ces présidences pourraient être interprétées comme locales: dans son église c’est toujours l’évêque qui préside. Mais ici il ne s’agit pas de l’évêque, il s’agit de l’Église. A quoi préside l’Église romaine? A d’autres églises dans une circonscription déterminée? Mais Ignace n’a pas l’idée d’une limitation de ce genre. D’ailleurs y avait-il alors en Italie des communautés chrétiennes distinctes, dans leur organisation, de la communauté romaine? Le sens le plus naturel de ce langage c’est que l’Église romaine préside à l’ensemble des églises. Comme l’évêque préside dans son église aux œuvres de charité, ainsi l’Église romaine préside à ces mêmes œuvres dans la chrétienté tout entière” (Duchesne, *Églises Séparées*, p. 128). The learned author refers to a paper read by Ad. Harnack at the Berlin Academy, Feb. 6, 1896.



Grecian Palestine; Hegisippus from Syrian Palestine; Tatian from Assyria; Abercius Marcellus from Phrygia. Asia, especially, sent a large contingent: among whom were St. Polycarp, and St. Irenæus, the future Bishop of Lyons. In the following century Origen undertook the journey, out of his desire to see that very ancient Church. In Africa, Tertullian is continually speaking of the Roman Church: for him, whether as one of the faithful or as a heretic, the centre of Catholic authority is at Rome, and not in Africa (Duchesne, *Églises Séparées*, p. 135).

The doctrine contained in this section was defined in the General Council of Florence (1439), summoned to bring about the union of the Greek and Latin Churches. "We define that the Holy Apostolic See and the Roman Pontiff hold the Primacy over the world, and that the Roman Pontiff is himself the successor of the blessed Apostle Peter, the Prince of the Apostles; and that he is the true Vicar of Christ, and the Head of the whole Church, and the Father and Teacher of all Christians; and that to him, in the blessed Peter, was delivered by our Lord Jesus Christ the full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church, as is also contained in the acts of Ecumenical Councils and in the sacred canons" (Denzinger, *Enchir.*, lxxiii.; see also the confession of faith accepted by Michael Palæologus in 1267, and submitted by him in the Second Council of Lyons, 1274; Denzinger, *ibid.*, lix.). Finally, the Vatican Council condemned those who "deny that it is by the institution of Christ, or by Divine right, that blessed Peter should have a perpetual line of successors in the Primacy over the universal Church, or that the Roman Pontiff is the successor of blessed Peter in the Primacy" (sess. iv. ch 2).

*Scholion.* That Peter laboured in Rome is now admitted by almost all scholars (see Duchesne, *op. cit.*, p. 124); St. Irenæus, Tertullian, and Eusebius are three of the chief, but by no means the only, ancient authorities in favour of his founding his See there. St. Irenæus speaks of "that greatest, most ancient, and most illustrious Church founded and constituted at Rome by the two most glorious Apostles, Peter and Paul,<sup>28</sup> who, having founded and built up that Church, transmitted the office of the episcopate to Linus. To him succeeded Anenctetus, etc." (*Adv. Her.*, lib. iii. c. 3; ap. Euseb., *Hist.*, lib. v. c. 6). See Mr. Allnatt's *Was St. Peter Bishop of Rome?* Lanciani, *Pagan and Christian Rome*, p. 123; Mgr. Barnes, *St. Peter in Rome*; Harnack, PETER, in *Encycl. Brit.*

## § 17ε THE NATURE OF THE PRIMACY OF THE ROMAN PONTIFF

In the present section we shall point out more precisely the nature of the Primacy, the existence of which has already been abundantly proved. To understand this, we must bear in mind the threefold power exercised by our Lord, and transmitted by Him to His Church (*supra*, p. 119).

I. As regards Order, the Roman Pontiff has all the powers, and no more than the powers, of a bishop. If the newly elected Pope is not already a bishop, he must first be consecrated before being crowned. Nevertheless, even before consecration, he is really and truly the Pope, Supreme Head of the Church, able to decree, rule, name or depose bishops, and exercise every duty of pontifical jurisdiction (to be presently referred to); but he cannot ordain or

<sup>28</sup>St. Paul did not actually found the Roman Church (Rom. i. 13; xv. 20-24); but his name is always connected with that Church by reason of the great Epistle which he addressed to it, and by reason of his labours, imprisonment, and death in Rome.

consecrate till he has himself received the imposition of hands from other bishops, inferior to himself, and holding under and from him their sees and jurisdiction.<sup>29</sup>

II. In the matter of jurisdiction the position of the Roman Pontiff is widely different from that of ordinary bishops, archbishops, or patriarchs. Their jurisdiction is dependent and limited: his is supreme and universal. To him alone the whole of Christ's flock is entrusted; he holds the keys of the kingdom of Heaven, and the power of binding and loosing; and these functions come to him not from below, but from above—by succession to St. Peter, whom Christ Himself directly appointed. "The Roman Pontiff," says the Council of Florence, "is the head of the whole Church, Father and Doctor of all Christians: to him [in the person of] blessed Peter was given full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church, as also (*quemadmodum etiam*) is contained in the acts of Ecumenical Councils and in the holy canons." And the Vatican Council: "If any shall say that the Roman Pontiff hath the office merely of inspection or direction, and not full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, not only in things which belong to faith and morals, but also in those which relate to the discipline and government of the Church spread through the world; or assert that he possesses merely the principal part (*potiores partes*), and not all the fulness of this supreme power; or that this power which he enjoys is not ordinary and immediate, both over each and all the Churches, and over each and all the pastors and the faithful: let him be anathema" (sess. iv. ch 3). This latter Council takes care to note that the Primacy of the Pope in no way derogates from "the ordinary and immediate power of episcopal jurisdiction by which bishops, 'who have been set by the Holy Ghost to succeed and hold the place of the Apostles,'<sup>22</sup> feed and govern each his own flock as true pastors." Nay, rather that the authority is asserted and protected by the Primacy, according to the words of St. Gregory the Great, "My honour is the honour of the whole Church: my honour is the firm strength of my brethren. Then am I truly honoured when the honour due to each and all is not withheld" (*Ep. ad Eulog. Alexandrin.*, lib. viii. ep. 30).<sup>26</sup>

III. Just as his jurisdiction is supreme, so is the Pope's teaching authority infallible. It will not be necessary, after what has been said in this chapter and vol. i. §§ 30, 31, to develop at any length the proof of this point. As St. Peter is the Rock of the Church, his faith must be the foundation of the Church's faith: the gates of hell shall not prevail against her faith, because it is founded on his faith; he has the supreme power of binding and loosing, in which is especially contained supreme teaching authority; Christ's prayer that Peter's faith might not fail, and the duty imposed of confirming the brethren, show that the faith of the brethren was to depend upon Peter's faith; the whole of Christ's flock is entrusted to his care, to be fed by him with the genuine word of doctrine. And, as we have seen, the promises made to Peter

<sup>29</sup>The ceremony of consecration sometimes takes place quite apart from the coronation (as in Clement XIV's case), sometimes in connection with it, either before (Gregory XVI's case) or during the Papal Mass.

<sup>22</sup>Council of Trent, sess. xxiii. ch. 4.

<sup>26</sup>St. Gregory, while rejecting the title of "universal bishop," is careful to point out that he does so because the title would imply that there was only one real bishop, and that all the so-called bishops were merely the vicars of this one. But though not the *sole* bishop, he undoubtedly claims to be *supreme* over all the others, who are really and truly bishops of their respective sees. "As to what they say of the Church of Constantinople, who doubts that it is subject to the Holy See? This is constantly owned by the most pious emperor, and by our brother the bishop of that city" (lib. ix. ep. 12). "Every one familiar with the Gospel is aware that by the word of the Lord the care of the whole Church was entrusted to Peter. . . . Behold, the care and the primacy (*principatus*) of the whole Church is entrusted to him, and yet he is not styled the universal Apostle" (lib. v. ep. 20). See Franzelin, *De Eccl.*, p. 175 sqq.; Palmieri, *De Rom. Pont.*, p. 446 sqq.

and the powers conferred upon him apply equally to his successors, the Roman Pontiffs. The Vatican Council, completing the definitions of the Fourth Council of Constantinople (859), the Second Council of Lyons (1274), and the Council of Florence (1438), and the Profession of Faith of Pope Hormisdas (519), thus defines Papal Infallibility: “The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedrâ*—that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding Faith or Morals to be held by the Universal Church—by the Divine assistance promised to him in Blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding Faith or Morals; and therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves (*ex sese*), and not from the consent of the Church” (sess. iv. ch. 4).

Two main objections are brought against this doctrine—one negative and one positive—viz.: (1) that it was not recognized or exercised in the early ages of the Church; and (2) that certain Popes have actually erred.

(a) In answer to the first of these objections, we may refer to the passages of the Fathers already quoted, and to the frequent appeals to Rome as early as the second century.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, we may observe, with Cardinal Newman: “It is a less difficulty that the Papal supremacy was not formally acknowledged in the second century, than that there was no formal acknowledgment on the part of the Church of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity till the fourth. No doctrine is defined till it is violated. And, in like manner, it was natural for Christians to direct their course in matters of doctrine by the guidance of mere floating and, as it were, endemic tradition, while it was fresh and strong; but in proportion as it languished, or was broken in particular places, did it become necessary to fall back upon its special homes, first the Apostolic Sees, and then the See of St. Peter. Moreover, an international bond and common authority could not be consolidated, were it ever so certainly provided, while persecutions lasted. If the Imperial Power checked the development of the Councils, it availed also for keeping back the power of the Papacy. The Creed, the Canon, in like manner, both remained undefined. The Creed, the Canon, the Papacy, Ecumenical Councils, all began to form as soon as the Empire relaxed its tyrannous oppression of the Church. And as it was natural that her monarchical power should display itself when the Empire became Christian, so was it natural also that further developments of that power should take place when the Empire fell” (Newman, *Development*, p. 151, 6th ed.).

(b) As regards the Popes who are said to have erred, it may be answered generally that any such erroneous teaching is not *ex cathedrâ*; that is to say, it does not fulfil the conditions required by the Vatican definition (see § 27). Thus, the conduct of Liberius in purchasing his return from exile by condemning Athanasius and subscribing a semi-Arian creed, cannot be urged against infallibility. He did not “define any doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church:” what he did he did under compulsion, and as soon as he was free to speak he confirmed the orthodox Council of Alexandria. As St. Athanasius himself says, “Liberius, being exiled, later on, after a period of two years gave way (ὄκλασεν),

<sup>30</sup>“Le centre d’une future orthodoxie catholique était évidemment là (à Rome). Sous Antonin (138–161) le germe de la papauté existe bien caractérisé” (Reman, *Rome et la Christianisme*, p. 153). “L’esprit qui, en 1870, fera proclamer l’infaillibilité du pape, se reconnaît dès la fin du II<sup>e</sup> siècle, à des signes déjà reconnaissables. L’écrit dont fit partie le fragment latin connu sous le nom de *Canon de Muratori*, écrit à Rome vers 180, nous montre déjà Rome réglant le canon des Églises, donnant pour base à la catholicité la passion de Pierre, repoussant également le montanisme et le gallicanisme” (*ibid.*, p. 172).

and in fear of the death with which he was threatened, subscribed. But even this shows their violence, and the hatred of Liberius against the heresy, and his decision for Athanasius when his will was free. For things done through torments contrary to the original judgment—these are not acts of will on the part of those who have been put to fear, but of those who inflict the torture” (*Epist. ad Monach. et Hist. Arian.*, 41). See Card. Newman, *Arians*, pp. 314, 334; *Catholic Dictionary*, LIBERIUS; Palmieri, *De Rom. Pont.*, p. 637.<sup>31</sup>

The condemnation of Pope Honorius (625–638) by the Sixth General Council (Third Constantinople, 680), and the confirmatory letter of Leo II anathematizing “Honorius, who did not endeavour to sanctify this Apostolic Church by teaching of Apostolic tradition, but permitted the spotless one to be defiled by unholy betrayal,” certainly present some difficulty. We cannot here discuss the question at any length; we must content ourselves with stating what would seem to be the best answer. First, then, the teaching of Honorius was not erroneous. What he held was that there were not two *contrary* wills in Christ: Our Lord’s action was morally one. St. Maximus, the most determined opponent of Monothelitism, regards him and his expressions as perfectly orthodox. Why, then, was he condemned? Because this doctrine served as a cloak to the Monothelite heresy, especially as he declared that it was foolish to speak of one operation or two operations, and that it was better to leave such subtleties to the grammarians. Leo II, at any rate, condemned him only in this sense. “The crafty Byzantine, Sergius, put the unsuspecting Pope (Honorius) on a false scent, and elicited from him a letter which he was enabled to misuse for his own purpose, and indeed in favour of a heresy advocated by himself, but then totally unknown to the pontiff. These expectations were crowned with success. The expressions of Honorius, as could not fail to happen, were set up by the Greeks in connection with the question then so warmly agitated; and so, as the Byzantines (at the Council of Constantinople) required, to whom the condemnation of so many of their patriarchs was excessively irksome and displeasing, Honorius likewise was condemned” (Hergenröther, *Anti-Janus*, Eng. trans., p. 80. See *supra*, p. 40; Franzelin, *De Verbo Incarn.*, p. 396 sqq.; Palmieri, *De Rom. Pont.*, p. 655 sqq.).

On the Primacy of the Pope see Palmieri, *op. cit.*, 319 sqq.; Billot, *De Eccl.*, 586 sqq.; Atzberger, *op. cit.*, sect. 343; Turmel, *op. cit.*, p. 228 sqq.; *Histoire du Dogme de la Papauté*.

## CHAPTER V

### THE PROPERTIES AND MARKS OF THE CHURCH

FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID CONCERNING THE PRIMACY of the Roman Pontiff, it is clear that that Church alone which acknowledges this Primacy is the true Church of Christ. Nevertheless, as Catholics in their discussions with Protestants are accustomed to waive this proof, and to appeal to such marks of the true Church as are admitted by both sides, we shall now proceed to speak of these.

It should be noted that, though the Church possesses many properties, not all of these are marks, in the technical sense of the word. Marks are those properties or signs by which she may be distinguished from other bodies. She alone possesses the marks; other bodies

<sup>31</sup>As Peter Ballerini briefly puts it: “*Liberii lapsus non certus, nec si certus, voluntarius, nec in definitione Fidei*” (*De Vi et Ratione Primatus*, cap. xv. sec. 13, n. 39). [“The fall of Liberius is not certain; nor if it is certain, was it voluntary, nor in definition of the Faith.” —Ed.]

may possess certain of her properties. Thus, visibility is one of her properties; yet this may belong to heretical sects. Unity, Holiness, Catholicity, and Apostolicity are marks, and are found in her alone. On the subjects dealt with in this chapter, see Franzelin, *De Ecclesia*, sect. iv.; Palmieri, *De Ecclesia*, p. 27 sqq.; *De Rqm. Pont.*, Append., p. 677 sqq.; Murray, *De Ecclesia*, cap. iv. sqq.; Newman, *Angl. Diff.*, I. p. 229 sqq.; Billot, *De Eccl.*, p. 128 sqq.; Turmel, *op. cit.*, p. 117 sqq.; Atzberger, *op. cit.*, sect. 331 sqq.

## § 180 THE VISIBILITY AND PERPETUITY OF THE CHURCH

I. When we speak of the Visibility of the Church, we do not mean simply that her members, her rites, and her ministry can be seen. What we mean is that these can be recognized to constitute the true Church of Christ; so that, in other words, we can point out a certain society, and say of it, "This is Christ's Church." As a rule, Protestants do not deny to the Church some sort of visibility; but they hold that in its essence it cannot be seen, because the qualities which make a man a member of it are themselves invisible.

1. In the passages of the Old Testament in which the Church is foretold, she is spoken of as especially conspicuous to all mankind. "In the last days the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be prepared on the top of mountains, and it shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it. And many people shall go and say, Come, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and the house of the God of Jacob; and He will teach us His ways, and we will walk in His paths" (Isa. ii. 2, 3); "It shall come to pass in the last days that the mountain of the Lord shall be prepared in the top of mountains, and high above the hills," etc. (Mich. iv. 1, 2; cf. Matt. v. 14). So, too, the expressions used by our Lord manifestly refer to a body which can be seen and distinguished. His Church is a Kingdom (Matt. xvi. 19), a Fold or Flock (John xxi. 15), a tribunal before which the wicked are to be denounced (Matt. xviii. 17). It is also styled a City by St. John (Apoc. xxi. 2), and a House by St. Peter (1 Pet. ii. 5) and St. Paul (1 Tim. iii. 15). And in the Acts of the Apostles its history is narrated as that of a body plainly distinguishable from all false religious bodies.

2. If we turn to the Fathers, we find this doctrine even more explicitly stated. "It is an easier thing for the sun to be quenched than for the Church to be made invisible (τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀφανισθῆναι)" (St. John Chrysost., *Hom.* iv., *in illud Uidi Dom.*, n. 2; cf. *In Is.* ii. n. 2). "There is no safeguard of unity," says St. Augustine, "save from the Church made known by the promises of Christ—a Church which, being seated on a hill, as has been said, cannot be hid; and for this cause it must needs be known to all parts of the earth. Let us, then, hold it as a thing immovable and firm, that no good men can separate themselves from her; that is, that no good men—wherever those men may dwell, even though they may have to bear with evil men well known to them—will, on account of those evil men, separate themselves by the foolhardy sacrilege of schism, from the good that are at a distance from and unknown to them" (*Contra Ep. Parmen.*, n. 28; see also lib. ii., *Contra Lit. Petil.*, n. 74). "The Church," says St. Cyprian, "flooded with the light of the Lord, puts forth her rays throughout the whole world; yet the light is one which is spread over every place, while its unity of body is preserved" (*De Unitate*, n. 5). In fact, the Fathers taught that they who cut themselves off from the visible Church by refusing to believe what she taught and to submit to her rule—that such were none of Christ's, and were shut out from salvation. See *Faith of Catholics*, vol. i. p. 189 sqq. And, indeed, it is clear from reason itself that, if our Lord founded a Church at all—if He gave it authority to teach and rule and sanctify—it must be

distinguishable from false bodies not founded by Him and not possessed of His authority.

When Christ said to the Pharisees, “The kingdom of God cometh not with observation (μετὰ παρατηρήσεως)” (Luke xvii. 20), He meant that it did not require prolonged and difficult investigation, for it was in the very midst of them (ἐντος ὑμῶν). Again, when He told the Samaritan woman that “the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth” (John iv. 23), He contrasted them, on the one hand, with the Jews, whose worship was by means of carnal sacrifices; and, on the other, with the Samaritans, whose worship was false, inasmuch as they adored that which they knew not. Nor can the words of St. Paul, “For you are not come to a mountain that can be touched,” etc. (Heb. xii. 18), be urged against the visibility of the Church; for the object of the Apostle is to show the excellence of the New Law by pointing out that, while the Old was given on an earthly mountain amidst terrible signs, the New comes down from heaven and is a covenant of mercy and love.

In order to understand this property of visibility, we must carefully note the distinction between the body and the soul of the Church. The former consists of those external elements which go to make a society, viz. the ministry of the pastors and subordination of the sheep, the profession of the faith and participation in the sacraments; the latter means the internal gifts of sanctifying grace, of faith and charity, and other virtues. The external elements are necessary for the Church’s social existence; the internal elements must be possessed by her members if they would attain the end for which they were called to the Church, *i.e.* eternal salvation. Hence, not every member of the Church is necessarily saved; and, on the other hand, some who belong only to the soul of the Church are saved. When we maintain, with St. Ignatius, St. Irenæus, St. Cyprian, St. Augustine and his contemporaries, that “out of the Church, out of the Faith, there is no salvation” (Athanasian Creed), we mean that those are not saved who are outside the soul as well as the body of the Church. “We and you know,” said Pius IX to the bishops of Italy (August 10, 1863), “that those who lie under invincible ignorance as regards our Holy Religion, and who, diligently observing the natural law and its precepts, which are engraven by God on the hearts of all, and prepared to obey God, lead a good and upright life, are able, by the operation of the power of Divine light and grace, to obtain eternal life.”<sup>32</sup>

II. That the Church will last “for all days, even to the consummation of the world (ἕως τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος),” is clear from our Lord’s promises, and also from the very nature and purposes of the Church. It was foretold of Him that “of His kingdom there should be no end” (Luke i. 32). He has promised her His abiding assistance: “Behold, I am with you always” (Matt. xxviii. 20); “The gates of hell shall not prevail against her” (*ibid.* xvi. 18); “I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you for ever” (John xiv. 16); the end of the world is to come when the Gospel has been preached everywhere (Matt. xxiv. 14); the good seed and the cockle are both to grow until the harvest, which is the end of the world (*ibid.* xiii. 24 sqq.) Moreover, as God wills that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. ii. 4), and as the Church is the means instituted for this purpose, it follows that as long as men shall be, the Church shall be too.

It is not necessary to quote at any length the Fathers, where their testimony is so plain and so abundant. “Not for a brief period,” says St. Augustine, “was the Church to exist

<sup>32</sup>See also similar words in an earlier allocution, December 9, 1854.

on this earth, but the Church will be here till the end of the world. . . . The Church shall not be conquered; shall not be rooted up; nor give way before any trials whatever till the end of this world shall come, and out of this temporal dwelling-place we be received into that eternal one" (*Enarr. in Ps. lx. n. 6*). "Unbelievers think," he says elsewhere, "that the Christian religion will last for a certain period in the world, and will then disappear. But it will remain as long as the sun—as long as the sun rises and sets: that is, as long as the ages of time shall roll, the Church of God, the true body of Christ on earth—will not disappear" (*In Ps. lxxi. n. 8*). And again: "The Church will totter if its foundation shakes; but how can Christ be moved? . . . Christ remaining immovable, it (the Church) shall never be shaken. Where are they that say that the Church has disappeared from the world, when it cannot even be shaken?" (*Enarr. in Ps. ciii. serm. ii. n. 5*). "Secede not from the Church," says St. Chrysostom; "for nothing is stronger than the Church. Thy hope is the Church; thy salvation is the Church; thy refuge is the Church. It is higher than the heavens and wider than the earth. It never grows old, but is ever full of vigour. Wherefore Holy Writ, pointing to its strength and stability, calls it a mountain" (*Hom. De Capto Eutropio, n. 6*).

Our Lord's words, "But yet the Son of Man, when He cometh, shall He find, think you, faith on earth?" do not make any direct statement, but allude to the great "revolt" or falling off (*ἀποστασία*) which is to precede the last days (2 Thess. ii. 3). Still even then the false Christs and false prophets shall not be able to deceive the elect (Matt. xxiv. 24).

## § 181 THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH

It is so clear from the Holy Scriptures that the Church of Christ must be one, that no Christian can venture to deny it. The great question is—What sort of unity did our Lord will for His Church? As the Church is a visible society, the union must also be visible and external. Moreover, it must be a union of belief not simply in certain so-called fundamental doctrines, but in all revealed truths. And again, it must be not a loosely confederated union of different Churches, but one single Church, one body and one spirit, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one fold, and one Shepherd—one, that is, in communion, one in faith, and one in worship. "The Church in respect of its unity," says St. Clement of Alexandria, "belongs to the category of things indivisible by nature, though heretics try to divide it into many parts. We say, therefore, that the Catholic Church is unique in its essence, in its doctrine, in its origin, and in its excellence. . . . Furthermore, the eminence of the Church arises from its unity, as the principle of its constitution—a unity surpassing all else, and having nothing like unto it or equal to it" (*Strom., lib. vii. c. 17*).

I. Our Lord's prayer at the Last Supper (John xvii. 11–23) is not merely an ineffectual wish, but an efficacious cause of that for which He asked. "All My things are Thine, and Thine are Mine," He said to His Father; and He expressly stated that the unity of His followers was to be a sign of the Divinity of His mission. "Holy Father, keep them in Thy Name . . . that they may be one, as we also are . . . that they may be one, as thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee; that they also may be one in us; *that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me.*" Again, Christ spoke of His Church as a Kingdom (Matt. xvi. 17; cf. John xviii. 36 sqq.), and He said, "If a kingdom be divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand" (Mark iii. 24). He called it also the one Fold under the one Shepherd (John x. 16). By St. Peter it is styled a House (1 Pet. ii. 5); "If a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand" (Mark

iii. 25). St. Paul says God “hath made Him (Christ) Head over all the Church, which is His mystical body” (Eph. i. 22, 23). Of this body he says, “All the members of the body, whereas they are many, yet are one body, so also is Christ; for in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body” (1 Cor. xii. 12, 13); and of this mystical body, “The Head, Christ; from Whom the whole body being compacted and fitly joined together by what every joint supplieth, according to the operation in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in charity” (Eph. iv. 15, 16). “As in one body we have many members, but all the members have not the same office, so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another” (Rom. xii. 4, 5) No stronger language could be used to bring out the compactness, the close union, of the members of Christ’s Church. Anything like a vague agglomeration of different bodies is absolutely excluded. “There is one God and one Christ,” says St. Cyprian, “and His Church is one, and the faith is one, and one the people joined together in the solid unity of the body in the bond of concord. This unity cannot be broken, nor the one body divided by the separation of its constituent parts” (*De Unit. Eccl.*, n. 23). And St. Augustine: “See what you must beware of—see what you must avoid—see what you must dread. It happens that, as in the human body, some member may be cut off—a hand, a finger, a foot. Does the soul follow the amputated member? As long as it was in the body it lived; separated, it forfeits its life. So the Christian is a Catholic so long as he lives in the body; cut off from it, he becomes a heretic—the life of the spirit follows not the amputated member” (*Serm. cclxvii. n. 4*).

II. 1. “Agreement and union of minds is the necessary foundation of this perfect concord among men, from which concurrence of wills and similarity of action are the natural results. Wherefore in His Divine wisdom He ordained in His Church unity of faith: a virtue which is the first of those bonds which unite man to God, and whence we receive the name of the Faithful” (Leo XIII, *Encycl., Satis cognitum*). As the Church is one, and as she is the union of those that believe, it follows that her faith must be one. “One faith,” says St. Paul (Eph. iv. 5). And again: “I beseech you, brethren, by the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you, and that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment” (1 Cor. i. 10). He says that Christ “gave . . . pastors and doctors . . . for the edifying of the body of Christ, until we all meet together in the unity of the faith . . . that henceforth we be no more children tossed to and fro by every wind of doctrine” (Eph. iv. 11–14). We have already shown that this unity of faith is secured by the teaching authority of the bishops, presided over by their infallible visible head, the Bishop of Rome (Book I Part I, and *supra*, p. 125 sqq.). It is a unity of faith in the *whole* of Revelation, and not in certain parts of it; for to reject even a single revealed doctrine is to reject the authority of God (*supra*, § 32). “In many things they are with me, in a few things not with me; but in those few things in which they are not with me, the many things in which they are will not profit them” (St. Augustine, *In Ps. liv. n. 19*).

2. A religious society having one faith must necessarily also have unity of worship, which is the outward expression of the faith and social union of the members. Hence the Catholic Church throughout the world has the one same sacrifice of the Mass, and all her members participate in the same sacraments. “For we, being many, are one bread, one body, all that partake of one bread” (1 Cor. x. 17): “One Lord, one faith, one baptism” (Eph. iv. 5). “Except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you” (John vi. 54; cf. Matt. xxvi. 26; 1 Cor. xi. 23). “All these were persevering in one



mind in prayer . . . And they were persevering in the doctrine of the Apostles, and in the communication of the breaking of bread and in prayers" (Acts i. 14; ii. 42). "Neither attempt ye," says St. Ignatius, "anything that seems good to your own judgment; but let there be, in the same place, one prayer, one supplication, one mind, one hope, in love and joy undefiled. There is one Jesus Christ, than whom nothing is better. Wherefore haste ye all together, as unto the temple of God, as unto one altar, as unto one Jesus Christ, Who proceeded from one Father, and is in one, and to one returned" (*Ad Magnes.*, 7). "God is one, and Christ one, and the Church one, and the chair one, founded by the Lord's word upon a rock. Another altar or a new priesthood, besides the one altar and the one priesthood, cannot be set up. Whosoever gathereth elsewhere, scattereth" (St. Cyprian, *Ep.* xl., *Ad Plebem, De Quinque Presb.*, n. 5, and *De Unitate, passim*). "Adoration is necessary, but adoration which is not out of the Church, but is ordered in the very court of God. Invent not, He saith, your own courts and synagogues for Me. One is the holy court of God" (St. Basil, *Hom. in Ps.*, xxviii. n. 3).

3. On the unity of government, necessary to preserve the unity of faith and of worship, we have already spoken when treating of the Primacy of St. Peter. See Leo XIII's Encycl., *Satis Cognitum*.

## § 182 THE HOLINESS OF THE CHURCH

A thing is said to be holy, either because it is itself dedicated to God, *e.g.* a temple, an altar; or because it has the power of producing personal holiness (*i.e.* moral righteousness in the sight of God), *e.g.* sacraments (see § 75). We shall here show that the Church is herself a holy object, and that she contains the means of making her members holy: she is the Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of *Saints*.

I. The Church is Christ's Mystical Body: "The Church, which is His body, and the fulness of Him Who is filled all in all" (Eph. i. 22; cf. 1 Cor. xii. 27). She is His Bride: "The husband is the head of the wife; as Christ is the Head of the Church. . . . Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it, that He might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life: that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing, but that it should be holy and without blemish," etc. (Eph. v. 23–32); "the House, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth" (1 Tim. iii. 15); "the Temple of God is holy, which you are" (1 Cor. iii. 17; cf. vi. 19); the kingdom of God, the kingdom of Heaven (Matt. xxi. 43; xxv. 1, etc.). It is hardly necessary to quote the Fathers on a doctrine so clearly taught in Scripture. The difficulty about evil members of the Church will be dealt with presently.

II. The object for which Christ founded His Church is the salvation of mankind. Hence He endowed her with all the means necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose. Her ministry, her doctrine, her laws ("He that heareth you, heareth Me, etc."), her sacraments ("He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved")—all are means for sanctifying her members. "He gave . . . other some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of the *saints* (τῶν ἁγίων) . . . for the edifying of the body of Christ . . . unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ" (Eph. iv. 11 sqq.).

"It is of her (the Church) that we are born; with her milk are we nourished; her breath is our life. The spouse of Christ cannot become adulterate; she is undefiled and chaste. She owns but one home; with spotless purity she guards the sanctity of one chamber. She keeps

us for God; she appoints unto a kingdom the sons that she has borne. Whosoever, having separated from the Church, is joined to an adulteress, he is cut from the premises of the Church. Neither shall he come into the rewards of Christ who leaves the Church of Christ. He is an alien, he is profane, he is an enemy. He can no longer have God for a Father who has not the Church for a mother” (St. Cyprian, *De Unitate*, nn. 5, 6).

III. Because the Church is holy, and possesses the means of sanctifying her members, we must not thence conclude that as a fact all her members are holy, and that mortal sin shuts them out of her pale. Holy Scripture speaks of the Church as a field in which the cockle grows along with the wheat (Matt. xiii. 24 sqq.); as a barn containing chaff as well as wheat (*ibid.* iii. 12); as a draw-net cast into the sea and gathering together all kinds of fishes, both bad and good (*ibid.* xiii. 47); it tells us that in the Church the goats are mingled with the sheep (*ibid.* xxv. 32), foolish virgins with the wise (*ibid.* xxv. 1–13), the wicked servants with the good, and that vessels to dishonour are found in the same great house as vessels to honour (2 Tim. ii. 20). Hence the Apostles, although they did their utmost for the sanctification of the faithful, nevertheless looked upon sinners as still members of the Church. “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us” (1 John i. 8). This was the doctrine which St. Augustine and St. Optatus of Milevis urged against the Donatists.<sup>33</sup>

### § 183 THE CATHOLICITY OF THE CHURCH

The word “Catholic” (*καθολικός, κάθολος*) means “general” or “universal.” When we say that the Church of Christ is Catholic, we maintain that she is universal as regards time, space, and doctrine. That is to say: (1) she has always existed since she was originally founded, and she will continue to exist for all time; (2) she is not confined to any special place or nation, but is spread over the whole earth; and (3) she teaches the whole of the doctrine revealed by Jesus Christ. It is, however, with the second of these meanings that we have here to deal. We should, moreover, carefully note that it is of moral universality, not of physical, that we speak; and that in the beginning the Church was not, of course, actually spread throughout the whole world, but only tended to be so spread, inasmuch as the Apostles received the commission to teach all nations.

I. In the Old Testament universality is expressly foretold as a mark of the Church which the Messiah is to found. “I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for Thy possession” (Ps. ii. 8); “He shall rule from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth” (*ibid.* lxxi. 8); “All the kings of the earth shall adore Him, all nations shall serve Him” (*ibid.* lxxi. 11); “All the ends of the earth shall remember, and shall be converted to the Lord, and all the kindreds of the Gentiles shall adore in His sight” (*ibid.* xxi. 28); “Behold, I have given Thee to be the Light of the Gentiles, that Thou mayest be My salvation, even to the furthest part of the earth” (Isa. xlix. 6); “All nations shall flow into the house of the Lord” (*ibid.* ii. 2). Daniel speaks of the Church as “the stone” which “became a great mountain, and filled the whole earth” (ii. 35). “I have no pleasure in you [the Jews], saith the Lord of Hosts, and I will not receive a gift of your hands. For from the rising of the sun even to the going down My Name is great among the Gentiles, and in every place there is

<sup>33</sup>St. Augustine’s letters and other writings on the Donatist schism may be seen in the ninth volume of his works in the Benedictine edition. The great work of St. Optatus on the same subject, entitled *De Schismate Donatarum*, teaches that not any sort of sin, but only heresy and schism, can make a man cease to be a member of the Church.

sacrifice, and there is offered to My Name a clean oblation: for My Name is great among the Gentiles” (Mal. i. 10, 11). Our Lord, when reminding His Apostles that all the prophecies concerning Him must be accomplished, said to them, “Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer and to rise again from the dead the third day, and that penance and remission of sins should be preached in His Name unto all nations.” His commission to them was, “Go ye into the whole world, and preach the gospel to every creature” (Mark xvi. 15); “Go ye and teach all nations (πάντα τὰ ἔθνη)” (Matt. xxviii. 19); “You shall be witnesses to Me in Jerusalem, and in all Judæa, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost parts of the earth (ἕως ἐσχάτου τῆς γῆς)” (Acts i. 8). Hence, the Apostles “going forth, preached everywhere” (Mark xvi. 20)—at first, indeed, to those of the Jewish faith, “devout men of every nation under heaven” (Acts ii. 5), but afterwards to the Gentiles (Acts x., xv. 7 sqq.). And St. Paul says, “We have received grace and apostleship for obedience to the faith in all nations for His Name” (Rom. i. 5); and that “God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of truth; for there is one God and one Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, Who gave Himself a redemption for all” (1 Tim. ii. 4, 5).

II. Already as early as the end of the first and the beginning of the second century, the Church of Christ was called “Catholic.” “Where the bishop is,” says St. Ignatius, “there let the multitude of believers be; even as where Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church (ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία)” (*Ad Smyrn.*, n. 8). And St. Justin, “There is no race of men—whether of barbarians or of Greeks, or in fine, hearing any other name, whether because they live in waggons or without a fixed habitation, or dwell in tents, leading a pastoral life—among whom prayers and eucharists are not offered to the Father and Maker of the universe through the Name of the crucified Jesus” (*Dial. cum Tryph.*, n. 117). “Having received this faith, the Church, though spread over the whole world (ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ διεσπαρμένη, and elsewhere Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησία καίπερ καθ’ ὅλης τῆς οἰκουμένης ἕως περάτων τῆς γῆς διεσπαρμένη), guards it sedulously, as though dwelling in one house; and these truths she uniformly holds as having but one soul, and one and the same heart; and these she proclaims and teaches, and hands down uniformly, as though she had but one mouth. For though throughout the world the languages are various, still the force of the tradition is one and the same. And neither do the Churches founded in Germany, nor those in Spain, in Gaul, in the East, in Egypt, in Africa, nor in the regions in the middle of the earth, believe or deliver a different faith; but as God’s handiwork, the sun, is one and the same throughout the universe, so the preaching of the truth shines everywhere, and enlightens all men that wish to come to the knowledge of the truth” (St. Irenæus, *Adv. Hæres.*, l. i. c. 10, n. 2). “You, Parmenianus, have said that the Church is with your party only . . . consequently, for it to be with you in a small portion in Africa, will it not be with us in another part of Africa? Will it not be in Spain, in Gaul, in Italy, where your party is not? . . . Where will be the propriety of the name ‘Catholic,’ since the Church is called Catholic from this, that it is according to reason and everywhere diffused?<sup>34</sup> For if you thus at your pleasure narrow the Church into so straitened limits, if you withdraw from it all nations, where will that be which the Son of God merited? Where that which the Father freely of His bounty bestowed on Him, saying, in the second Psalm, ‘I will give thee,’ etc.?” (St. Optatus of Milevis, *De Schism. Donat.*, l. ii n. 1.) Many passages might be quoted from St. Augustine: “The question between us undoubtedly is, Where is

<sup>34</sup>“Cum inde dicta sit Catholica quod sit rationabilis et ubique diffusa.” Optatus here takes “catholic” in the sense of κατὰ λόγον as well as καθ’ ὅλον.

the Church? whether with us or with them (the Donatists)? That Church assuredly is one, which our ancestors called the Catholic, that they might show by the name itself that it is throughout the whole. For throughout (or according to) the whole is expressed in Greek by καθ' ὅλον. But this Church is the body of Christ. . . . Whence assuredly it is manifest that he who is not in the members of Christ cannot have Christian salvation" (*De Unit. Eccles.*, n. 2). "The agreement of peoples and of nations keeps me; an authority begun with miracles, nourished with hope, increased with charity, strengthened by antiquity, keeps me; the succession of priests from the chair itself of the Apostle Peter—unto whom the Lord, after His resurrection, committed His sheep to be fed—down even to the present bishop, keeps me; finally, the name itself of the Catholic Church keeps me (*tenet postremo ipsum Catholica nomen*)—a name which, in the midst of so many heresies, this Church alone has, not without cause, so held possession of (*obtinnit*) as that, though all heretics would fain have themselves called Catholics, yet to the inquiry of any stranger, 'Where is the assembly of the Catholic Church held?' no heretic would dare to point out his own basilica or house" (*Contra Ep. Manichæi Fundam.*, n. 5). "If ever thou art sojourning in any city, inquire not simply where the Lord's house is (for the sects of the profane also attempt to call their own dens houses of the Lord), nor merely where is the Church, but where is the Catholic Church? for this is the peculiar name of this holy (Church) and mother of us all, which is, indeed, the spouse of our Lord Jesus Christ" (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.*, xviii. 25).

#### § 184 THE APOSTOLICITY OF THE CHURCH

The fourth mark of the Church is Apostolicity, by which we mean that the true Church must be the same as the Church of the Apostles, holding the same doctrine as the Apostles, and deriving her orders and mission from them. If a Church teaches any doctrine other than that taught by the Apostles, or if she has not a succession of ministers coming down uninterruptedly from them, she cannot be the Church of Christ. We have already dealt with this subject in Book I (vol. i).

#### § 185 THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH THE TRUE CHURCH OF CHRIST

As we have observed above (p. 142), we have abundantly proved that that Church alone which acknowledges the Primacy of St. Peter is the true Church of Christ. This is, of course, sufficient to convince us that the Roman Catholic Church is the only true Church. Apart, however, from this proof, we can show her Divine origin from the fact of her possessing the our above-mentioned marks—Unity, Holiness, Catholicity, and Apostolicity.

I. Before applying these tests of the true Church, it may be well to make a few observations which will anticipate certain objections.

1. It is obvious that unity is the most practical of all the marks. Whether a Church is at one with itself is a matter more easy to discover than whether it is holy or apostolic. On the other hand, there may be a sort of unity due to stagnation; and there may be variety and dissensions in matters not essential. Where there is life and vigour, and where differences are adjusted by appeal to an authority recognized by all, there we may safely apply the test of unity.

2. Holiness is a far more difficult test to apply, for it is internal (though manifesting itself outwardly), and it is not essential for membership of the Church. Nevertheless, God's

providence requires that the means of sanctity should not altogether fail of effect, and that extraordinary degrees of holiness should be found only within His visible Church.

3. Catholicity ranks almost with unity as a practical test. At the same time, we must not expect anything like physical universality. We are confronted with the profound difficulty of the existence of hundreds of millions of human beings who are outside Christianity (see vol. i). Hence the test must be applied among the various bodies claiming the name of Christian, and applied to some one as against some other, not as against all the rest which are not joined together in anything like a union. The existence of such bodies is only to be expected after our Lord's warnings about antichrists and false prophets, and the testimony of St. Paul (2 Tim. iii. 12 sqq.; iv. 3, etc.), St. John (ii. 18), and St. Jude (11 sqq.).

4. Apostolicity is sometimes hard to apply, both on account of the scarcity of early documents, and the difficulty of grasping their meaning; and also on account of the development of the Church's doctrine and practice (vol. i).

On the various objections connected with the application of these marks of the Church, see Newman's *Anglican Difficulties*, vol. i. part ii.<sup>35</sup>

II. 1. The unity of the Roman Catholic Church is a fact of such notoriety that any proof would be superfluous. All her members throughout the whole world have the same faith; they all participate in the same sacrifice of the Mass and the same seven sacraments; and they all acknowledge one supreme ruler and teacher on earth, the Bishop of Rome, the Vicar of Christ.

2. The doctrines which she teaches, and the practices which she enjoins, are eminently holy: she holds out to her members numberless aids to sanctification—from the Mass and the sacraments downwards; and, in spite of many scandals, she has ever been renowned for the sublime degree of holiness of some, and the general worthiness of countless, members of her communion.

3. She is truly Catholic, because she is not restricted to any race, or tongue, or nation. Her numbers greatly surpass those of any heretical or schismatical body—nay, they probably surpass the numbers of all the non-Catholic sects put together.

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<sup>35</sup>As Anglicans are fond of appealing to antiquity against us, we draw attention to Cardinal Newman's summary reply: "Though the Creed of the Church has been one and the same from the beginning, yet it has been so deeply lodged in her bosom as to be held by individuals more or less implicitly, instead of being delivered from the first in those special statements, or what are called definitions, under which it is now presented to us, and which preclude mistake or ignorance. These definitions, which are but the expression of portions of the one dogma which has ever been received by the Church, are the work of time; they have grown to their present shape and number in the course of eighteen centuries, under exigency of successive events, such as heresies and the like, and they may, of course, receive still further additions as time goes on. Now this process of doctrinal development, as you might suppose, is not of an accidental or random character; it is conducted upon lines. as everything else which comes from God; and the study of its laws and of its exhibition, or, in other words, the science and history of the formation of theology, was a subject which had interested me more than anything else from the time I first began to read the Fathers. . . . It was gradually brought home to me . . . that the decrees of later Councils, or what Anglicans call the Roman corruptions, were but instances of that very same doctrinal law which was to be found in the history of the early Church; and that in the sense in which the dogmatic truth of the prerogatives of the Blessed Virgin may be said, in the lapse of centuries, to have grown upon the consciousness of the faithful, in that same sense did, in the first age, the mystery of the Blessed Trinity also gradually shine out and manifest itself more and more completely before their minds. Here was at once an answer to the objections urged by Anglicans against the present teaching of Rome; and not only an answer to objections, but a positive argument in its favour; or the immutability and uninterrupted action of the laws in question throughout the course of Church history is a plain note of identity between the Catholic Church of the first ages and that which now goes by that name" (*Anglican Difficulties*, ii. p. 394 sqq.).

4. The Roman Catholic Church is Apostolic both in her doctrine and in her ministry. What she believes she has always believed; she has never taught any other truths than those which have been handed down to her by the Apostles by word of mouth or by writing; for every one of her doctrines she is able to produce most ancient authority. The succession of her pastors begins with the Apostles, and comes down uninterruptedly to our own day. "Pointing out that tradition which the greatest and most ancient and universally known Church of Rome—founded and constituted by the two most glorious Apostles, Peter and Paul—derives from the Apostles, and that faith announced to all men, which through the succession of (her) bishops has come down to us, etc. For to this Church, because of its more powerful principality, every Church must agree—that is, the faithful everywhere—in which the tradition of the Apostles has ever been preserved by those on every side" (St. Irenæus, *Adv. Hæres.*, iii. 3). "If the order of bishops succeeding each other is to be considered, how much more securely and really beneficially do we reckon from Peter himself. . . . For to Peter succeeded Linus; to Linus, Clement [he gives the whole succession]; to Damasus, Siricius; to Siricius, Anastasius. In this order of succession no Donatist appears" (St. Augustine, Ep. liii. n. 2, *Generoso*).

## PART II

### THE SACRAMENTS

WE HAVE NOW TO CONSIDER THE SACRAMENTS, "through which all true righteousness (*justitia*) begins, or being begun is increased, or being lost is repaired" (Council of Trent, sess. vii). We shall treat, first, of the sacraments generally, and then of each in turn. In connection with the Blessed Eucharist we shall take occasion to speak of the sacrifice of the Mass.

Authorities: Peter Lombard, *Sent.* iv., *dist.* 1 sqq.; St. Thom., *Summ. Theol.* 3<sup>a</sup> qq. 60–90, with Comm. and *Supplem.*, qq. 1–68; Bellarmine, *De Controversiis*, etc., tom. iii.; Chardon, *Histoire des Sacraments*; Drouin, *De Rē Sacramentaria*; Franzelin, *De Sacramentis in Genere, De Eucharistia*; De Augustinis, *De Rē Sacramentaria*; Gousset, *Théologie Dogmatique*, vol. ii.; Schanz, *Die Lehre von den heiligen Sacramenten der kath. Kirche*; Pourrat, *La Théologie Sacramentaire*; Billot, *De Ecclesiæ Sacramentis*; Auberger, *op. cit.*, book vii. chap. ii.

## CHAPTER I

### THE SACRAMENTS GENERALLY

THE WORD "SACRAMENT" IS USED in many senses, both in profane and in sacred literature. Originally it was a legal technical term, meaning the money staked as a wager by the parties to a suit, so called because the money when forfeited was used for the bronze of the vessels employed in sacred rites, or, according to others, was deposited in a sacred place. Then it came to be applied to the military oath of allegiance, and so to any solemn oath or engagement. The early Latin Fathers frequently use it in these latter meanings, e.g. Tertullian (*Lib. ad Martyr.*, c. iii.). But, like so many other words, it gradually came to have a technical ecclesiastical meaning, viz. any sign or external rite by which man was

initiated into the sacred mysteries; and thus it became the equivalent of *μυστήριον*.<sup>36</sup> In the course of time it became restricted to mean the sacred signs by which man was sanctified, whether in the Old Law or in the New. Lastly, it was still further narrowed in its meaning to denote those efficacious signs of grace by which man is sanctified under the New Law.

## § 186 NATURE OF THE SACRAMENTS

I. Just as God has been pleased to command that men should worship Him by certain external acts which are called sacrifices, so His Divine Son has been pleased to ordain that grace should be applied to our souls by other external acts which are called sacraments. The same principle is the foundation of both. Man is composed of body and soul; both belong to God; both co-operate in virtue and in sin; hence both should take part in Divine worship, and both should be joined in sanctification.<sup>37</sup> The notion of a sacrament as an act, and as an external act should be borne in mind throughout. It is something done, not something made. Sacraments, indeed, are usually styled things (*res*); but as acts come under the designation of things, and as the word “act” conveys a specific meaning, it is better to use it here.<sup>38</sup> Again, man has a supernatural as well as a natural life, and his supernatural acts have an analogy with those which are natural. He is born, he is nourished, and he dies, both naturally and supernaturally. Our Lord, in instituting the sacraments, took certain natural acts of our everyday life, capable in themselves of producing only a natural effect, and raised them, when performed with certain distinguishing marks, to a supernatural sphere, making them capable of producing a supernatural effect.

II. The terms “matter” and “form” were not applied to the sacraments until the beginning of the thirteenth century. The Fathers, indeed, often speak of the form of a sacrament;<sup>39</sup> but they mean thereby the whole external rite in contradistinction to the inward grace, of which the rite is the sign and cause. Even writers as late as Hugh of St. Victor (†1141), St. Bernard (†1153), and the Lombard (†1164),<sup>3c</sup> do not make use of the terms; nor are they found in the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215). As soon, however, as the Aristotelian metaphysic found its way into the Christian schools, it was but natural that its grand distinction of matter and form should be applied to the things which are eminently the province of theology, viz. the sacraments. Here it seemed easy to distinguish the two elements. The familiar quotation from St. Augustine (*Tract. lxxx. In Joan.*, n. 3) seemed to have been an anticipation of the new terminology: “*Quid est aqua nisi aqua? Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum.*”<sup>3c</sup> No wonder, then, that the terms were readily accepted by both the rival schools of Scotists and Thomists, and were used at Constance (*Contra Wicl. et Hus.*), Florence (*Decr. pro Armenis*), and Trent (sess. xiv. capp. 2, 3; *De Extr. Unct.*, cap. 1).<sup>40</sup>

<sup>36</sup>“Sacramentum (*μυστήριον*, ‘the secret’) regis abscondere bonum est” (Tob. xii. 7; cf. Col. i. 27; Apoc. xvii. 7. On “mystery,” see vol. i.

<sup>37</sup>St. Thomas, 3, q. 61, a. 1.

<sup>38</sup>“Sub rebus autem comprehenduntur etiam ipsi *actus sensibiles*, puta ablutio, inunctio et alia hujusmodi, quia in his est eadem ratio significandi et in rebus” (3, q. 60. a. 6. ad. 2; cf. Billot. p. 27).

<sup>39</sup>For example, St. Augustine, lib. i., *De Peccat. Merit. et Remiss.*, c. 34.

<sup>3c</sup>But he says: “*Sacramentum est invisibilis gratia visibilis forma.*”

<sup>3c</sup>“What is water other than water? The word approaches to the element, and the sacrament is made.” —Ed.

<sup>40</sup>At the Council of Florence, Eugenius IV drew up for the Armenian delegates a statement of the doctrine and discipline of the Roman Church. It contained the Nicene Creed, the definitions of the Council of Chalcedon, and the Third Council of Constantinople, the decree enacting the acceptance of Chalcedon and of St. Leo’s letter; then came an instruction on the sacraments, followed by the Athanasian Creed, the decree of union with the Greeks,

Much diversity of opinion arose, however, when the distinction came to be applied to each sacrament in turn. These different opinions will be noted in due course. Here it will be enough to observe that when the Schoolmen speak of the matter and form of the sacraments, they cannot mean that the sacraments are material, corporeal things. What they mean is that just as bodies are composed of two constituents, the one indeterminate and the other determining, so too in the sacraments two elements, the one indeterminate and the other determining, can be distinguished; and that these may rightly be called matter and form. The latter term is not likely to mislead us, because there is nothing corresponding with shape or figure in the sacraments; but the English word "matter" unfortunately suggests something tangible; and, as there is something of this kind in several of the sacraments, it has given rise to a false notion of its meaning. The natural acts (*e.g.* washing, anointing, etc.) are the matter of the sacraments, the distinguishing marks are the form; that is to say, the natural act is the indeterminate element, while the distinguishing mark is that which determines it to be a sacrament (St. Thom. 3, q. 64, a. 8). The sacraments are not, indeed, natural signs; on the other hand, they are not merely arbitrary signs. The natural act has some analogy with some particular kind of grace, and hence is suitable for being selected by Christ to convey that grace; and, as a fact, has been so selected by Him. As St. Augustine says, "If the sacraments had no likeness to the things of which they are the sacraments, they would not be sacraments at all" (*Ep.* 98, n. 9). And Hugh of St. Victor speaks of them as "representing by likeness, and signifying by institution" (*De Sacram.*, lib. i. part 9, c. 2).

III. The Council of Trent has defined that the sacraments of the New Law are not merely external signs of grace, but actually confer the grace which they signify, and confer it of themselves (*ex opere operato*) (sess. vii. cann. 5, 8).<sup>41</sup> The minister and the recipient, indeed, play an important part, as will be explained later on (*infra*, p. 154); but the sacraments themselves are the true causes of the grace.

1. Holy Scripture testifies to this doctrine in many passages. "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved" (Mark xvi. 16); "Unless a man be born again of (ἐξ) water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (John iii. 5); "Do penance and be baptized every one of you in the Name of Jesus Christ for the remission of your sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost" (Acts ii. 38); "Be baptized and wash away thy sins" (*ibid.* xxii. 16); "They laid their hands upon them and they received the Holy Ghost; and when Simon saw that by (διὰ) the imposition of the hands of the Apostles the Holy Ghost was given," etc. (*ibid.* viii. 17, 18); "Stir up the grace which is in thee by (διὰ) the imposition of my hands" (2 Tim i. 6); "Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to

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and the decree concerning feasts. The mere perusal of the instruction on the sacraments will convince any one that the Pope had no intention of issuing a dogmatic definition on the subject, but rather of giving an account of the common teaching and practice or the Western Church. (See Denzinger's *Enchiridion*, lxxiii. B; Franzelin, *De Traditione*, p. 120). The Council of Trent says nothing about matter and form in its decrees concerning the sacraments generally. The only times that the words are used by the Council are in the fourteenth session, where absolution is said to be the form of penance, and the acts or the penitent to be "quasi materia;" also baptism and penance are declared to differ "in matter and form which constitute the essence of a sacrament" (chap. 2), and oil blessed by the bishop is said to be the matter, and the words the form, of Extreme Unction. In the canons themselves the word "form" is never used at all; "matter" occurs only once, and then in the qualified phrase "quasi materia."

<sup>41</sup>*Opus operatum* is the sacramental act itself, as opposed to the *opus operantis*, the good dispositions or merits, whether of the minister or recipient. To those who object to the passive use of *operor*, we may answer with St. Augustine: "*Melius est ut nos reprehendant grammatici quam ut non intelligent populi.*"



His mercy He saved us by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost” (Titus iii. 5); “Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it, that He might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life (τῷ λουτρῷ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν ῥήματι)” (Eph. v. 25, 26).

2. Many passages to the same effect may be quoted from the Fathers. Thus Tertullian says, “Happy the sacrament of our water, whereby (*qua*), being cleansed from the sins of our former blindness, we are made free unto eternal life. . . . We poor little fishes, following after our ἰχθύς, Jesus Christ, are born in water; nor are we safe except by abiding in the water. . . . What then? Is it not wonderful that death should be washed away by a bath?” (*De Bapt.*, cc. 1, 2.) And St. Gregory of Nyssa: “Baptism is the cleansing away of sins; the remission of transgressions; the cause of renovation and regeneration. . . . Should any one ask me how water regenerates, and as to the mystic initiation effected by it, I shall say to him with just reason, ‘Show me the way in which we are born according to the flesh, and I will explain to thee the power of that second birth which is according to the spirit’” (*In Bapt. Christi*). See also St. John Chrysostom, *Hom. 25 in Joann.*; St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Lib. 2 in Joann.*; St. Leo, *Serm. 4 De Nativ. Domini*; St. Augustine, *Tract. 80 in Joann.*, n. 3. In the Nicene Creed, too, we confess “one baptism unto (εἰς) the remission of sins.” Cf. the Council of Milevis, ch. 2; the Second Council of Orange, can. 5.

3 This doctrine is likewise proved by the constant practice of the Church. Unless the sacrament could of itself give grace, it would be useless to confer Baptism on infants, or on those who have lost their reason, or on the unconscious. Formerly it was the custom throughout the whole Church, and is so still in the Eastern Church, to confer not only Baptism but the Holy Eucharist and Confirmation on infants.

On the celebrated scholastic discussion as to whether the sacraments are the physical or moral causes of grace, see Franzelin, *De Sacram.*, thes. x.; Drouin, *De Re Sacram.*, q. iv. cap. 2.

*Scholion.* Before the coming of Christ there must have been both in the law at nature and in the Mosaic Law some remedy at least for original sin. St. Augustine found this remedy, as far as the Mosaic Law was concerned, in circumcision (*De Nupt. et Concup.*, lib. ii. c. 11; *De Bapt.* lib. iv. c. 24). The Latin Fathers and Schoolmen, following his views, speak of “sacraments of the Old Law”—an expression adopted by the Councils of Florence and Trent. The latter Council condemns the opinion of Calvin that the sacraments of the Old Law and the sacraments of the New Law differ only in the outward rite (sess. vii., *De Sacr.*, can. 2). The common teaching is that the former could not give grace *ex opere operato*, whereas the latter can. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 62, a. 6; Drouin, *De Re Sacr.*, q. ii.

## § 187 THE INSTITUTION OF THE SACRAMENTS

I. It follows, from the doctrine laid down in the foregoing section, that the sacraments must have a Divine origin. God alone, the Source of all grace, can give to natural acts the power of producing a supernatural effect; and it is God, the Apostle says, Who justifieth. He is the Author of the sacraments not simply as First Cause, in the same way as He is the Author of all things, but as *principal cause*, having under Him not secondary, but merely instrumental agents.

II. It is of Faith that all the sacraments were instituted by Christ, our Lord (Council of Trent, sess. viii., *De Sacr.*, can. 1). This institution by Christ was a theandric action (*supra*,

p. 42). As Man He instituted the sacraments, and gave His Apostles instructions for the due ministrations of them; but the power of conferring grace was derived from His Divine authority. We may, however, go further and say that Christ as Man had a special power in instituting the sacraments. He merited all grace; He is the Mediator and Founder of the New Testament, and the Head of the Church; on Him depends the application of His merits. "All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth; go ye therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them," etc. (Matt. xxviii. 18). "As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you. . . . Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins ye shall forgive, they are forgiven them" (John xx. 21). Hence the Fathers commonly say that the sacraments flowed from the side of Christ hanging on the cross (*e.g.* St. Ambrose, St. Chrysostom, St. Augustine, St. Leo, St. Cyril of Alexandria: see Suarez, in 3 disp. 39, sect. 3; St. Thom. 3, q. 64, a. 3).

As no mention is made in Scripture of the institution of the sacraments of Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, the question has arisen whether Christ instituted these sacraments mediately or immediately; that is to say whether He instituted them Himself, or whether His Apostles instituted them in virtue of powers conferred upon them by Him. We cannot here enter into the discussion; we would, however, point out that the definition of the Council of Trent has by no means decided the question. See Franzelin, *De Sacr.*, thes. xiv. p. 183; Drouin, *De Rē Sacr.*, q. vi.

III. The controversy concerning the mediate or immediate institution by Christ must not be confounded with the further question as to how far He determined the matter and form of each sacrament; or, in other words, how far He prescribed the acts and the words to be used in each. The diversity of practice at different times, and indeed at the present time, in the Eastern and Western portions of the Church, is sufficient proof that He left much undetermined. "This power has ever been in the Church, that, in the dispensation of the sacraments, their substance being untouched, it may ordain or change what things soever it may judge most expedient for the profit of those who receive, or for the veneration of the said Sacraments" (Council of Trent, sess. xxi. ch. 2). There are, of course, over and above the matter and form, numerous rites and ceremonies used in the administration of the sacraments, *e.g.* in Baptism, the anointings, the giving of blessed salt, etc. These are not necessarily of Divine origin, but are not lightly to be omitted or changed (Council of Trent, viii. can. 13; see also St. Thom. 3, q. 64, a. 2).

On the subjects contained in this section, read Franzelin, thes. xiv. and v.; Drouin, q. vi.; Pourrat, ch. vi.

## § 188 THE MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENTS

I. We have seen in a preceding section (§ 174) that the Church, the Mystical Body of Christ, exercises in His name imperial, magisterial, and ministerial functions. To these last belongs the administration of the sacraments. Christ, our Lord, being no longer present on earth in His bodily form, makes use of the agency of men for the performance of those acts which He has raised to the dignity of sacraments. These acts are morally His, and they derive their supernatural value entirely from His merits; the persons who perform the acts being simply His agents acting in His behalf. "So let a man think of us as the ministers of Christ and the dispensers (οἰκονόμους) of the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. iv. 1). Though these functions are intended for the good of all, they are not capable of being exercised by all. Christ did not say

to all, "Do this in commemoration of Me," but only to the Apostles and their successors. So, too, He did not say to all, "Whose sins ye shall forgive," etc. In like manner, St. Paul's words (1 Tim. iv. 14), "Neglect not the grace that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with imposition of the hands of the priesthood," were meant for Timothy and those who have received similar ordination; and it was to the ancients of the Church that he said, "Take heed to yourselves, and to the whole Church, in which the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to rule the Church of God" (Acts xx. 28). Again, the same Apostle says, "God hath set *some* in the Church, first Apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly doctors. . . . Are all Apostles? are all prophets? are all doctors?" (1 Cor. xii. 28, 29; cf. Eph. iv. 2); "Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins. . . . Neither doth any man take the honour to himself, but he that is called by God, as Aaron was" (Heb v. 1, 4).

In accordance with this doctrine, the Church has never suffered the sacraments to be administered, whether publicly or privately, by any one who has not received ordination. Baptism alone has been excepted from this rule, because it is necessary for salvation, and an ordained minister cannot always be had. When St. Peter exhorts the faithful to be "living stones built up, a spiritual house, a holy priesthood (*ἱεράτευμα*) to offer up spiritual (*πνευματικὰς*) sacrifices" (1 Pet. ii. 5), he refers to an internal and spiritual priesthood, which consists in the offering of the sacrifice of a contrite heart (Ps. l. 19), good works, etc. And St. John, in the Apocalypse (i. 6), means a heavenly priesthood when he says that "Christ hath loved us . . . and hath made us a kingdom and priests to God" (cf. xx. 6). "All the children of the Church," says St. Ambrose, "are priests; for we are anointed to a holy priesthood, offering ourselves as spiritual sacrifices to God" (*In Cap. vi. Lucae*; cf. *De Sac.*, iv. 1).<sup>42</sup>

II. Granting that the efficacy of the sacraments depends entirely upon the merits of Christ, we may go on to inquire whether heresy or mortal sin incapacitates an otherwise competent person from being the minister of a sacrament; and, further, what is required in order that the person should actually exercise this ministry. In other words, we have now to discuss the difficult questions concerning the faith, the worthiness, and the intention of the minister. To enable us to understand these, we must carefully distinguish between valid and invalid, lawful and unlawful, administration. A sacrament may be really and truly conferred, yet the minister may be acting against the law by conferring it. Thus, a lay person performing without necessity the ceremony of baptism over a child not previously baptized, would really and truly confer the sacrament, but would commit a sin by so doing. In the present discussion we are concerned only with the question of validity.

1. Whether heresy is a bar to valid administration was the root of the famous controversy between St. Cyprian and Pope St. Stephen. The former maintained that outside the Church there were no true sacraments; and that, consequently, those who had been baptized by heretics should be rebaptized, or, more strictly speaking, baptized, since the previous ceremony had been null and void. The Roman Pontiff, when appealed to, condemned this practice. "In days gone by," says Vincent of Lerins, "Agrippinus, of blessed memory, Bishop of Carthage, the first of all mortal men against the Divine canon [Holy Scripture], against the rule of the universal Church, against the sense of all his fellow-priests, against the custom and institutes of our forefathers, held that baptism ought to be repeated. . . . When, therefore, on every

<sup>42</sup>The ministers of Matrimony are the parties themselves. Whether the angels or the blessed can administer the sacraments is discussed by St. Thomas, 3, q. 64, a. 7.

side men protested against the novelty of the practice, and all the priests in every direction, each according to his zeal, did oppose, then Pope St. Stephen, of blessed memory, prelate of the Apostolic See, assisted with the rest of his colleagues indeed, but still beyond the rest (*præ ceteris*); thinking it, I suppose, becoming that he should excel all the rest as much in devotion for the faith as he surpassed them in authority of place (*quantum loci auctoritate superabat*). In fine, in an epistle which was then sent to Africa, he issued a decree in these words: ‘Nothing is to be innovated [nothing] but what has been handed down (*nihil innovandum nisi quod traditum est*).’<sup>43</sup> What, therefore, was the result of the whole matter? What, indeed, but the usual and accustomed one? Antiquity, to wit, was retained; novelty exploded” (*Adv. Hæres.*, n. 6). “Do not object against us the authority of Cyprian in favour of repeating baptism,” says St. Augustine, “but adhere with us to the example of Cyprian in favour of preserving unity. For that question about baptism had not then been as yet thoroughly examined with care; but the Church, notwithstanding, adhered to a most wholesome practice—to amend what was evil in the heretics and schismatics themselves, but not to repeat what had been given; to make whole what was wounded, not to heal what was whole (*corrigen quod prævum est, non iterare quod datum est; sanare quod vulneratum est, non curare quod sanum est*)” (*De Bapt.*, lib. ii. c 7). Although St. Stephen’s decree was primarily a disciplinary rule, yet it practically decided the doctrinal question which lay at the root of the controversy. The Council of Arles (314) repeated the rule, and in spite of the sanctity, the learning, and the influence of St. Cyprian’s adherents, the practice of rebaptism of heretics fell into disuse. We shall presently see, however, that the question of rebaptism assumed a new form later on. Any doubts concerning the doctrinal question were set at rest by the decision of the Council of Trent, that baptism given by heretics, with the intention of doing what the Church does, is true baptism (sess. vii., *De Bapt.*, can. 4).<sup>44</sup>

2. While St. Cyprian was contending for the rebaptism of heretics, the Novatians went further, and maintained that baptism conferred by sinners was invalid. Early in the next century this error was taken up by the Donatists, at least as far as notorious sinners were concerned. Long afterwards the Waldenses, Wyclif, and Huss held similar opinions, and were condemned by the Councils of Constance, Florence, and Trent (sess. vii., *De Sacr. in Gen.*, can. 12). The Donatists found a strenuous opponent in St. Augustine, whose writings contain numberless passages against them; “That water over which the Name of God is invoked is not profane and adulterous, even though the invoker is adulterous and profane; for neither the created thing nor the name is adulterous. . . . The light of the sun, or even of a lamp, when shed abroad through foul places, contracts nothing vile thereby. And can Christ’s baptism be contaminated by any one’s crimes?” (*De Bapt.*, lib. iii. c. 10.) “Baptism takes its quality

<sup>43</sup>The exact words of St. Stephen’s reply have not come down to us. According to St. Cyprian (*Ep.* 74), they are as follows: “*Si quis ergo a quacumque hæresi venerit ad vos, nihil innovetur nisi quod traditum est, ut manus illi imponatur in penitentiam.*” The meaning would seem to be, “Let nothing fresh be done to the convert except what has been handed down, namely,” etc. (Labriolle, *Vinc. de Lérins*, p. 22). See, however, Franzelin, *De Trad.*, p. 77, note; and Benson, who translates thus: “No innovation is to be made, only tradition must be kept to” (*Cyprian*, p. 424).

<sup>44</sup>The Council speaks of baptism only. Although we may infer that the same principle holds good of the other sacraments, we cannot say that it is strictly of faith. The conditional baptism which is sometimes given to converts in England is not properly a re-baptism. If the original baptism, though conferred by an heretical minister, was duly performed, the subsequent ceremony has no effect. The practice of conditional baptism was introduced on account of the doubt about this this performance in a Church in which it can be held that baptismal regeneration is no part of its teaching.

from the quality of Him in whose power it is given, not from that of him by whose ministry it is conferred (*Baptisma tale est qualis est ille in cujus potestate datur; non qualis est ille per cujus ministerium datur*). . . . What was given by Paul and what was given by Peter are both Christ's; and if it was given by Judas it was Christ's" (*In Joan. tract. v. 6; cf. Contra Cresconium, passim*). That is to say, the minister acts like an instrument or channel; and, consequently, the action derives its force and value from the prime mover or principal cause. Just as a medical man, though ill himself, can cure others; just as a pipe, no matter whether it is of silver or of lead, can conduct water; so can the ministers of the Church confer the sacraments, even though they themselves may be sinners (St. Thom., 3, q. 64, a. 5).

3. Without going into details concerning the various kinds of attention and intention, we may state generally that the minister of a sacrament must be aware of what he is doing, and must really and truly intend to do it. Though he is an instrument in Christ's hands, he is not simply a tool; he is a living instrument, and therefore the action of his will must come in. Moreover, he must at least have "the intention of doing what the Church does" (*faciendi quod facit Ecclesia*; Council of Trent, sess. vii., *De Sacr. in Gen.*, can. 11). What, however, is the precise import of this formula is a matter of discussion among theologians. All agree that the minister need not have the specific intention of doing what the Roman Catholic Church does; that he need not intend to produce the effect of the sacrament; and that he need not even believe that the rite is a sacrament at all, or know what a sacrament is. They agree, too, that he must intend to perform a ceremony which is held as sacred and religious by the Church of Christ. The reason is plain. What is indeterminate needs to be determined, otherwise its character is not fixed. Now, washing can be performed for various purposes, e.g. cleanliness, health, amusement, or devotion. In order to make it really and truly a sacrament, it needs to be determined by the intention of the minister, which intention is expressed by the words, "I baptize thee in the Name of the Father," etc. (St. Thom., 3, q. 65, a. 8). But whether it is enough to mean to perform seriously the external rite, while internally having no further intention, or even an opposite intention (e.g. "The Church of Rome holds matrimony to be a sacrament, but I do not; I will go through the ceremony, but I do not intend to confer any sacrament"), is a disputed point. See Drouin, *l.c.*, vii. sect. 2; Franzelin, *l.c.*, thes. xvii.; Pourrat, p. 315.<sup>45</sup>

## § 189 THE RECIPIENT OF THE SACRAMENTS

I. We have seen above that the efficacy of the sacraments is in no way dependent on the merit of the receiver. Nevertheless, as they are not charms, and as they are conferred upon human beings, these latter must receive them in a human way. To understand what is required on the part of the receiver, we must bear in mind the distinctions between valid and invalid, worthy

<sup>45</sup>Some light has been thrown on this vexed question by the Bull *Apostolicæ Curæ* against Anglican Orders. "The Church," says Pope Leo XIII, "does not judge about the mind or intention in so far as it is something by its nature internal; but, in so far as it is manifested externally, she is bound to judge concerning it. When any one has rightly and seriously made use of the due form and the matter requisite for effecting or conferring the sacrament, he is considered by the very fact to do what the Church does. On this principle rests the doctrine that a sacrament is truly conferred by the ministry of one who is a heretic or unbaptized, provided the Catholic rite be employed. On the other hand, if the rite be changed with the manifest intention of introducing another rite not approved by the Church and of rejecting what the Church does, and what by the institution of Christ belongs to the nature of the sacrament, then it is clear that not only is the necessary intention wanting to the sacrament, but that the intention is adverse to and destructive of the sacrament."

and unworthy, reception; and we must also observe that the sacraments differ so much from each other, that it is difficult to lay down any general principles that will apply to all of them. Some persons are incapable of receiving certain of the sacraments, *e.g.* a woman cannot be ordained, a healthy person cannot be anointed. Supposing that there is no such incapacity, some sort of intention is required, at least on the part of adults, for valid reception. "From defects of age," says St. Augustine, "(infants) can neither with the heart believe unto justice, nor with the mouth make confession unto salvation. Hence, when others answer for them, in order that the celebration of the sacrament may be accomplished, it is surely valid for their consecration, seeing that they cannot answer for themselves. But if another answer for one who can do so for himself, it is not valid. Hence the Gospel dictum . . . he is of age, let him speak for himself" (*De Bapt.*, lib. iv. c. 24).

II. The Council of Trent has defined that the sacraments confer grace on those who place no "obstacle" (*obex*) in the way (sess. vii. can. 7). That is to say, the receiver does not co-operate positively in the action of the sacrament. He can, indeed, defeat its action; but if he wishes it to produce its effect, his own activity is confined to merely removing obstacles. These vary in the different sacraments. Thus, in some sacraments (called the "Sacraments of the living," *e.g.* the Holy Eucharist), the consciousness of being in a state of mortal sin is an obstacle to their action. If this is removed by repentance, these sacraments can then produce their effect. In other Sacraments (called the "Sacraments of the dead," viz. Baptism and Penance), which were instituted expressly for the forgiveness of sin, it is not the conscious state of sin that is the obstacle, but only impenitence or a wilful abiding in that state. The texts of Scripture quoted above (p. 152) in support of the doctrine that the Sacraments give grace of themselves (*ex opere operato*), generally make mention of something required on the part of the receiver. For example, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved" (Mark xvi. 16). Here justification is produced by the merits of Christ conveyed through baptism; the faith of the receiver merely removing the obstacle to the action of the sacrament. See Franzelin, thes. vi.; De Augustinis, part iii. art. 3.

## § 187 NUMBER AND DIVISION OF THE SACRAMENTS

I. It is of faith that there are in the New Law neither more nor less than seven sacraments properly so called, and that these are Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Order, and Matrimony (Council of Trent, sess. viii. can. 1). The obvious way of proving this doctrine is to show that each of these sacred rites is really and truly a sacrament (which will be done in the succeeding chapters); and also that no other sacred rite combines all the elements required for a true sacrament. Here, in this section, we shall point out that besides this method we can prove that the sevenfold number was explicitly held by the Church long before the Tridentine definition.

1. Before Luther and his followers began their attempts to divide the Church, it had been admitted on all hands, both in the East and West, that the sacraments were seven in number. Even from an historical point of view, this unanimity is a sufficient proof of antiquity. "Is it likely that so many and such great Churches should have gone astray into one faith? Never is there one result among many chances. The error of the Churches would have taken different directions. Whatever is found to be one and the same among many persons is not an error, but a tradition" (Tertullian, *De Præscr.*, c. 28; cf. vol. i. p. 68).

(a) At the very opening of the Scholastic epoch of theology we find the sevenfold number taught, and taught not as some new discovery, but as handed down from our Lord. Thus, St. Otho of Bamberg: "As I am about to leave you, I deliver to you the things which were delivered to us by the Lord . . . viz. the seven sacraments of the Church" (*Apud. Bolland*, tom. i. *Julii*, pp. 396, 397). Peter Lombard, in the fourth book of the Sentences, distinctly enumerates our seven sacraments; and the Scholastic commentators, though they freely criticize him in other matters, and widely differ among themselves, all unanimously accept this doctrine. The same was decreed by many provincial councils from the twelfth century onwards. The teaching of the old Church of England is abundantly clear from the Constitutions of Richard, Bishop of Salisbury, renewed in the Council of Durham (1217 or 1223); the statutes issued by Cardinal Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, to be read in the Council of Oxford (1222); the "Chapters of the Council of London," held under the presidency of the Papal legate (1237); and the English "Synodal Constitutions" of the same year. The sevenfold number was acknowledged at the Council of Constance even by the followers of John Huss, and was mentioned in the *Decretum pro Armenis* at Florence.

(b) As far as the Greek (schismatic) Church is concerned, it should be noted that in the various disputes with the Western Church there was no dissension as to the number of the sacraments, though there was considerable discussion concerning the rites and ceremonies connected with them. When overtures for union were made by the Protestants at the end of the sixteenth century to the Eastern schismatics, the Patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremias, distinctly pointed out that, contrary to the Augsburg Confession, "the sacred ceremonies and sacraments recognized in the Catholic Church by orthodox Christians are seven in number: viz. Baptism, the Unction of the Divine chrism, the Divine Communion, Ordination, Matrimony, Penance, and Holy Oil (Extreme Unction); just as there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to Isaias (iv. 2), so are there seven sacraments which the Holy Ghost works, neither more nor less." See *Perpétuité de la Foi*, tom. v. lib. i. ch. 3; Pourrat, p. 262.

2. Though the Fathers treat of the various sacraments in detail, we are not surprised to find that they nowhere expressly state that these are seven in number. It was no part of their method to compose systematic theological treatises unless, indeed, on such subjects as the Incarnation and Blessed Trinity, which were keenly controverted. As soon as theology began to be reduced to a system, we find the number seven immediately accepted by all. Besides, "the discipline of the secret," to which frequent reference must be made when dealing with the sacraments, would easily account for the silence of the Fathers on many points connected with them. Moreover, the word "sacrament" was not restricted to its technical sense until later.

The answer to the arguments of those who maintain other sacraments besides these seven, notably, the Washing of Feet (John xiii. 1-15), may be found in Drouin, q. iii. cap. 2, sect. 2; Franzelin, p. 285 sqq.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>46</sup>The reason of the sevenfold number is thus explained by St. Thomas (3, q. 65, a. 1): "Man in his temporal capacity comes into being, grows and is strengthened, is nourished, and is cured from diseases: moreover, the race is propagated, and order and government are handed down from generation to generation. So in his spiritual capacity he is born by Baptism, strengthened by Confirmation, fed by the Holy Eucharist, healed by Penance and Extreme Unction; while the priestly powers are transmitted by Order, and the propagation of the race is sanctified by Matrimony." Other explanations are also given by St. Thomas (*l.c.*, St. Bonaventure (*In 4 Dist.* 2, q. 3), and other commentators on this passage of the Sentences. See also *Catechism of the Council of Trent*, p. ii. c. 1, n. 31; and *Decretum pro Armenis*.



II. These seven Sacraments may be divided into various classes.

1. We have already spoken of the distinction between “Sacraments of the Living” and “Sacraments of the Dead.”

2. Another important distinction is that the sacrament of Baptism is necessary for salvation, whereas others, however useful, are not necessary (*supra*, § 39).

3. Again, three of the sacraments (Baptism, Confirmation, and Order) impress a “Character,” and therefore cannot be repeated. This “Character” or mark is defined by the Council of Trent to be “a certain spiritual and indelible sign (*signum quoddam spirituale et indelibile*)” (sess. viii, *De Sacr.*, can. 9).

(a) That these three sacraments impress a Character was distinctly taught by all the mediæval theologians (St. Thom. *In 4 Disſ.* q. 1, a. 1). There was, indeed, considerable disagreement as to the precise nature of the Character; and some (Scotus, Biel, Cajetan) went so far as to deny that its existence could be proved from Scripture or the Fathers; but even these accepted it on the authority of the Church. This universal consent is sufficient proof that the doctrine is a tradition and not an error (*supra*, p. 158).

(b) But the Fathers, notably St. Cyprian and St. Augustine, had already maintained the existence of the Character, though not in the exact technical language of the Schoolmen. In the early controversies concerning heretical Baptism and Order,<sup>47</sup> both parties agreed that it had been handed down from the Apostles that these sacraments could not be repeated. The Catholics maintained that the reason of this prohibition was that these sacraments produced an effect quite independent of grace—an effect which could be produced outside the Church, and remained even in those who quitted her fold. This was called a seal (*sigillum*), or mark (*signum, character*), impressed upon the soul, and designating the subjects of it as the sheep of Christ’s flock, or as the soldiers and ministers of His kingdom. “The sacrament of Christian Baptism is valid and sufficient for consecration, even though it is not sufficient for the participation of eternal life; and this consecration makes the heretic a culprit (*reum facit*) who bears the character outside the Lord’s flock; nevertheless, sound doctrine bids that he should be corrected, not consecrated anew” (St. Aug, *Ep.* xcvi. n. 5). And, again, addressing a Donatist: “Thou art a sheep of my Lord’s flock. Thou hast gone astray with His mark (*signum*) on thee, and because of that I seek thee the more. . . . Dost thou not know that the deserter is condemned for having the service mark (*character*), whereas the fighting soldier is rewarded for it?” (*Ad Pleb. Casar.*, n. 4). The Greek Fathers frequently use similar expressions. Thus Clement of Alexandria (*De Divite Servando*, c. 42) speaks of Baptism as “the seal of the Lord (*σφραγίδα τοῦ Κυρίου*);” St. Basil (*Bapt.*, n. 5), “the unassailable seal (*σφραγίς ἀνεπιχειρήτος*);” St. Cyril of Jerusalem (*Procatech.*, n. 16), “a holy and indelible seal (*σφραγίς ἅγια καὶ ἄλυτος*)? Cf. St. Greg. Naz., *Or.* 40, *In Bapt.*, n. 4; St. John Chrysoſt., *In 2 Cor.*, hom. iii. n. 7.

(c) It is clear, then, that the doctrine of the Character must have come down from the Apostles, and hence, even though it could not be proved from the text of Sacred Scripture taken alone, nevertheless such expressions as “sealing” and “signing” must, according to the Catholic rule of interpretation, be taken to refer to the sacramental Character. “He that hath anointed us is God, Who also hath sealed (*ὁ σφραγισάμενος*) us and given the pledge (*ἀραβῶνα*) of the Spirit in our hearts” (2 Cor. i. 21, 22); “You were signed (*ἐσφραγίσθητε*) with

<sup>47</sup>Confirmation used to be given immediately after Baptism, hence it often happens that no special mention was made of it.



the Holy Spirit of promise” (kph. i. 13); “Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby (ἐν ᾧ) you are sealed (ἐσφραγίσθητε) unto the day of redemption” (*ibid.* iv. 30). See St. Thom, 3, q. 63; Drouin, q. v. c. 2; Franzelin, theses xii., xiii.; Billot, p. 138; Pourrat, p. 185.

On the number of the Sacraments see Billot, p. 191; Pourrat, p. 232; Franzelin, *De Sacr. in Gen.*, cap. vi.; Drouin, *De Rē Sacramentaria*, Qu. iii. cap. ii.

## CHAPTER II

### BAPTISM

**T**HE VERB βαπτίζειν is used by profane authors in a number of different senses: (1) The dipping of an object into water or any other fluid for any purpose whatever; (2) the immersion or sinking of an object; (3) the covering over of any object by the flowing or pouring of a fluid on it, and so, metaphorically (in the passive) being overwhelmed or oppressed; (4) the washing or wetting of an object, whether by aspersion or immersion.<sup>48</sup> Turning to the sacred writings, we find the word used in the Septuagint four times (4 Kings v. 14; Isa. xxi. 4; Judith xii. 7; Eccclus. xxxiv. 30). In three of these it means to bathe or wash. The passage of Isaias is metaphorical, as in the third usage above-mentioned. Both the noun (βάπτισμα, βάπτισμός) and the verb occur frequently in the New Testament, and are used sometimes in the sense of washing (Mark vii. 3, 4, 8; Luke xi. 38), sometimes metaphorically (Mark x. 38, 39; Luke xii. 50), but especially to designate a rite by which men are spiritually cleansed. The baptism of St. John was not able of itself (*ex opere operato*) to wash away sin. Like the sacraments of the Old Law, it signified the grace which was conferred by the dispositions of the minister or recipient. Hence St. Paul (Acts xix. 5) rebaptized those who had received John’s baptism. The sacred rite which we are here concerned with is the sacrament properly so called, instituted by Christ for the remission of sin.

#### § 18ξ THE NATURE AND INSTITUTION OF BAPTISM

I. That entry into the Church of Christ was to be effected by means of a distinct rite, consisting of washing, accompanied with certain words, is plain from the New Testament and the teaching of the Fathers.

1. Our Lord’s final charge to the Apostles was to teach all nations, “baptizing them in the Name (εἰς τὸ ὄνομα) of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost” (Matt. xxviii. 19); “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved” (Mark xvi. 16). And to Nicodemus He said, “Unless a man be born again of water and of the Holy Ghost (ἐὰν μή τις γεννηθῆ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος), he cannot enter into the kingdom of God” (John iii. 5). Accordingly, we find that when the first converts on Pentecost day asked of St. Peter what they were to do, the answer was, “Do penance (μετανοήσατε), and be baptized every one of you in the Name of Jesus Christ for the remission of your sins (βαπτισθήτω ἕκαστος ὑμῶν ἐπὶ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς ἄφεσιν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ὑμῶν), and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. . . . They, therefore, that received his word were baptized” (Acts ii. 37–41). So, too, St. Philip’s Samaritan converts were baptized (Acts viii. 12, 16) εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ; and the Eunuch (*ibid.* 38); St. Paul himself (*ibid.* ix. 18), and Cornelius with his household (*ibid.* x. 48). Though St. Paul

<sup>48</sup>Kitto, *Bibl. Encycl.*: “Baptism,” where instances are quoted.

said that he was sent “not to baptize, but to preach the gospel” (1 Cor. i. 17), nevertheless he frequently baptized (Acts xvi. 33; xviii. 8; xix. 5; 1 Cor. i. 14, 16); and he speaks of baptism in many parts of his Epistles: “All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus (εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν) are baptized in His death (εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ); for we are buried together with Him by baptism unto death, that as Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in the newness of life” (Rom. vi. 3, 4; cf. Col. ii. 12); “In one spirit we are all baptized into one body (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι . . . εἰς ἓν σῶμα)” (1 Cor. xii. 13); “One Lord, one faith, one baptism” (Eph. iv. 5); “But when the goodness and kindness of God our Saviour appeared, not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy, He saved us by the *laver of regeneration* (διὰ λουτροῦ παλινγενεσίας) and renovation (ἀνακαινώσεως) of the Holy Ghost, whom He hath poured forth upon us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour; that being justified by His grace we may be heirs according to hope of life everlasting” (Tit. iii. 4–7; cf. Eph. v. 27).

2. It would be superfluous to quote the Fathers at any length. One or two early instances need alone be given. “We will also state in what manner we have dedicated ourselves to God, having been created anew by Christ . . . . As many as are persuaded that the things which we teach and declare are true, and give assurance that they are able to live accordingly, are instructed to pray and to fast and to entreat from God the remission of their past sins, we praying and fasting with them. They are then conducted by us where there is water, and are regenerated according to the mode of regeneration, by which we were regenerated. For they are then washed in that water in the Name of God, the Father and Lord of the universe, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit. For Christ also said, ‘Except ye be born again, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven’” (St. Justin, *Apol.*, i. 61). “Happy the sacrament of our water, whereby, being cleansed from the sins of our former blindness, we are made free unto eternal life. . . . We poor little fishes, following after our ἸΧΘΥΣ, Jesus Christ, are born in water; nor are we safe except by abiding in the water. . . . What then? Is it not wonderful that death should be washed away by a bath? Yea, but if because it is wonderful it be therefore not believed, it ought on that account the rather to be believed. For what else should the works of God be, but above all wonder?” (Tertull., *De Bapt.*, 1, 2.)

II. We have now to inquire more particularly into the nature of this initiatory rite. Man comes into this world devoid of the grace of God and spiritually dead; or, to put it in another way, he has the stain of Adam’s sin upon his soul (*supra*, p. 13). Both these metaphors, “death” and “stain,” are used in Scripture to describe the fallen state of man. Hence, when our Lord was instituting the sacrament which was to remove this stain and to give new life to the soul, He naturally chose the act of washing. This act does not at first sight seem to have any connection with regeneration; but in the East it was the custom to wash the child as soon as it was born (Ezech. xvi. 4); and St. Paul speaks of the “laver of regeneration (λουτροῦ παλινγενεσίας)” (Tit. iii. 5; cf. Eph. v. 25). Hence Christ said, “Unless a man be born again of water (as the cleansing element) and the Holy Ghost (as the life-giving principle), he cannot enter into the kingdom of God” (John iii. 5). Washing, then, is the “matter” of the sacrament; that is to say, washing is the natural act chosen by our Lord as the sign and cause of the removal of the stain of original sin from the soul. But it is not every washing that is capable of producing this effect. The act must be accompanied by some distinguishing mark, determining it to be a baptism in the technical sense. This mark is found in certain words which indicate this, viz. “I baptize thee (or similar words) in the Name of the Father, and

of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" (St. Thom., 3. q. 66, a. 5, ad. 1; see also a. 1). It may be objected that water is the matter of the sacrament: "*Quid est aqua nisi aqua? Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum*" (St. Aug.).<sup>49</sup> We answer, in the words of the Council of Trent, that water is necessary for baptism: "*Aquam veram et naturalem esse de necessitate baptismi*" (sess. vii, *De Bapt.*, can. 2).<sup>47</sup> To say that water is the matter, is likely to make people think that the matter of a sacrament is something material and tangible. Water, indeed, may be said to be the "material" or thing used in baptism; but, as we have already observed, many of the sacraments require no material thing, and yet have "matter."

1. The act of washing with water, which is essential to the validity of the sacrament, may be performed in various ways. The early practice of the Church was to immerse the recipient, after the example of our Lord's baptism (Matt. iii. 16; Mark i. 10) and the baptism of the eunuch by Philip the deacon (cf. Acts viii. 38, 39). This continued to be the common use, even in the West, as late as the end of the thirteenth century (St. Thom., 3, q. 66, a. 7). Nevertheless, circumstances frequently arose when it was not convenient to confer baptism in this way. Dying persons, for example, had to be baptized in their beds. We frequently read, too, of martyrs who baptized their fellow-prisoners or their jailors in the prison itself. Some writers also are of opinion that the first converts on Pentecost day could not have been immersed on account of their great numbers (Acts ii. 41). Difficulties, too, would arise in cold countries, and in regard to the immersion of women. Hence baptism by effusion, that is, by pouring water over the body, and especially the head, gradually supplanted the older custom. Immersion, indeed, more fully brings out the meaning of the sacrament. "All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized in His death; for we are *buried together with Him* by baptism unto death" (Rom. vi. 3, 4; cf. Col. ii. 12). It is more like the "*bath of regeneration* (*λουτρόν παλιγγενεσίας*)" (Tit. iii. 5; cf. Eph. v. 27). Nevertheless, inasmuch as effusion and aspersion (sprinkling: "Thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed," Ps. l. 9) are true forms of washing, they are sufficient for validity. As is well known, the Roman Ritual enjoins effusion; and the Council of Trent has defined that there is in the Roman Church true doctrine concerning baptism (sess. vii., *De Bapt.*, can. 3). Threefold washing (whether by immersion, effusion, or aspersion), suggested by the words expressing the doctrine of the Trinity, has at all times been the more common practice, but is not essential. St. Gregory the Great tells Leander that "it cannot be blameworthy to immerse an infant either thrice or once; for the threefold immersion signifies the Trinity of the Persons, and the single immersion the unity of the Divinity" (lib. i., *Ep.* 43). Hence, at certain times and in certain countries the single immersion has been enjoined, e.g. in order to bring out the unity of baptism against the errors of the various sects of rebaptizers (Fourth Council of Toledo, can. 6). The present discipline of the Church requires threefold washing, though single washing is of course valid.

2. Turning now to the words, "I baptize thee" (or something similar) "in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost," which are the determining element or form, we have to examine the precise meaning of this formula.

(a) To perform the act, uttering at the same time merely the words, "In the Name of the Father," etc., is not enough. It must be determined by the words, "I baptize thee," or "The servant of Christ is baptized," the latter of which is the Greek formula. "If any one has immersed a child three times in water, 'In the Name of the Father,' etc., without saying, 'I

<sup>49</sup>"What is the water but water? The word approaches to the element and becomes the sacrament." —Ed.

<sup>47</sup>"That true and natural water is *necessary* for baptism." —Ed.

baptize thee,' the child has not been baptized" (Cap. *Si quis* 1 *Extrav. de Baptismo*).

(b) The words, "In the Name of the Father (εις τὸ ὄνομα)," etc., do not simply mean that the act is performed by the authority of the Divine Trinity. They signify, rather, that the recipient is consecrated and dedicated to the Trinity as the object of faith, hope, charity, and generally of supernatural worship. "That He might sanctify it (the Church), cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life, that He might *present it to Himself* (αὐτὴν ἑαυτῷ) a glorious Church" (Eph. v. 26, 27); "We are buried together with Him by baptism unto death . . . so do you also reckon that you are dead indeed to sin, but *alive unto God* (ζῶντας δὲ τῷ Θεῷ), in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom. vi. 3, 11); "For you are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus; for as many of you as have been baptized in Christ (εις Χριστόν) have *put on Christ* . . . You are all one in Christ Jesus; and *if you be Christ's*, then are you the seed of Abraham, the *heirs* according to the promise" (Gal. iii. 26, 29); "Every one of you saith, I indeed am of Paul, and I am of Apollo. . . . Was Paul, then, crucified for you, or were you baptized in the name of Paul (εις τὸ ὄνομα Παύλου)? . . . I baptized none of you . . . lest any should say that you were baptized in my name (εις τὸ ἐμὸν ὄνομα) . . . What, then, is Apollo, and what is Paul? The ministers of Him Whom you have believed. . . . Let no man, therefore, glory in men; or all things are yours, whether it be Paul or Apollo . . . all are yours, and *you are Christ's, and Christ is God's*" (1 Cor. i. 12 sqq.; iii. 4, 5, 21-23). See Franzelin, *De Trin.*, p. 20.

(c) In the Acts of the Apostles we read that many were baptized "in the Name of Christ (ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ)" (ii. 38; viii. 12, 16, etc.). This does not mean that they were baptized under the invocation of Christ, but in the faith and by the authority of Christ, by the baptism instituted by Him. Thus (Acts xix. 2-5) baptism "in the Name of Christ" is plainly the baptism of Christ, in opposition to the baptism of John. For, as St. Thomas argues, if anything instituted by Christ be omitted from the administration of the sacraments, such administration is null and void. Now, the invocation of the Three Divine Persons was ordained by Christ, and therefore baptism without this invocation is of no effect. Nevertheless, the Angelic Doctor, moved by the authority of Pope Nicholas I, admits that, when performed according to a special revelation from Christ, the Author and Lord of the sacraments, baptism under the sole invocation of Christ may be valid (q. 66, a. 6). This exception is not now generally recognized. For the answer to the difficulties connected with Nicolas's decision, see De Augustinis, *De Re Sacram.*, i. p. 352; and Palmieri, *De Rom. Pont.*, p. 638.

## § 190 NECESSITY AND EFFECTS OF BAPTISM

I. The Council of Trent has defined that baptism is necessary for salvation (sess. vii., *De Bapt.*, can. 5). The proof of this doctrine and the various qualifications, or rather explanations, with which it must be understood, have now to be considered.

1. The words of our Lord to Nicodemus are the plainest proof of the necessity of baptism: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (John iii. 5). He commanded His Apostles to baptize all nations, and promised that those who should believe and be baptized should be saved (Matt. xxviii. 19; Mark xvi. 16). So St. Peter told the first converts that they must be baptized (Acts ii. 37), and all the other converts mentioned in the Acts and Epistles submitted to the same rite (*supra*, p. 15c). Hence the early Fathers insist on its necessity. "It is prescribed that no one can obtain salvation

without baptism, according to that great saying of the Lord, ‘Unless a man,’” etc. (Tertull., *De Bapt.*, c. 12; see also St. Irenæus, *Adv. Hæres.*, lib. iii, cap. 17). We have already (*supra*, p. 160) quoted a passage from St. Justin, describing how the converts were received into the Church. But it was in the controversies with the Pelagians that the necessity of baptism and the reason thereof were especially insisted on: the necessity of baptism being appealed to as one of the proofs of Original Sin, or Original Sin being assigned as the reason why it was necessary. To these proofs may be added the argument adduced by St. Thomas: No one can be saved but through Christ; now, it is by baptism that we become members of Christ and put on Christ; therefore baptism is necessary for salvation (q. 68 a. 1).

2. We have, in the first volume (§ 39), distinguished two kinds of necessity: necessity of means (*necessitas medii*), and necessity of precept (*necessitas præcepti*).

(a) Baptism is a necessary means of salvation; that is to say, without baptism a person cannot be saved, even though the omission is due to no fault on any one’s part. Those who are capable of receiving God’s commands (that is, all grown-up persons) are bound to seek baptism, and if they neglect to do so, they commit a grievous sin.

(b) The apparent harshness of this doctrine is mitigated when we bear in mind a further distinction recognized by the Council of Trent (sess. vi., *De Justif.*, cap. iv.; sess. vii., *De Sacr.*, can. 4), and thus explained by St. Thomas: “The sacrament of baptism may be wanting to a person in two ways: first, in fact and in desire (*re et voto*), as in the case of those who are not baptized and refuse to be baptized, which is manifestly a contempt of the sacrament, and therefore those who in this way are without baptism cannot be saved, seeing that they are neither sacramentally nor mentally (in spirit) incorporated in Christ, through Whom alone is salvation. Secondly, the sacrament may be wanting in fact but not in desire, as when a person wishes to be baptized, but is stricken by death before he can receive baptism, and such a one can without actual baptism be saved on account of the desire of baptism proceeding from faith working by love, by means of which God, Whose power is not restricted to visible sacraments, internally (*interius*) sanctifies him. Hence, Ambrose saith of Valentinian, who died while only a catechumen: ‘I have lost him whom I was about to regenerate; but he has not lost the grace which he asked for’” (q. 68, a. 2). This “baptism of desire” (*fluminis*), as opposed to actual baptism (*baptismus fluminis*), is treated of at great length by St. Augustine. “I find,” he says (*De Bapt.*, iv. 22), “that not only suffering for the name of Christ can supply the defect of baptism (*id quod ex baptismo deerat*), but even faith and conversion of heart, if there be no time for celebrating the sacrament (*mysterium*) of baptism.”

(c) Martyrdom (*baptismus sanguinis*), also, in the case of those who have not been baptized, can supply the defect of the sacrament. “Whosoever, without having received the laver of regeneration, die for confessing Christ, obtain remission of their sins just as much as if they had been washed in the font of baptism. For He Who said, ‘Except a man be born again,’ etc., made an exception with regard to these when He said, not less universally, ‘Every one therefore that shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father Who is in heaven,’ and ‘He that shall lose his life for Me shall find it’ (Matt x. 32, 39)” (St. Aug., *De Civ. Dei*, xiii. 7; cf. St. Thomas, 3, q. 66, a. 12).

II. In the course of this section and the preceding one we have had occasion to refer frequently to the effects of baptism. A summary treatment will here be sufficient.

1. The first effect is the removal of all sin, whether original or actual, from the soul. This is indicated by the two metaphors of a new “birth” and “washing;” and is more expressly

stated in the texts: “Do penance (μετανοήσατε), and be baptized every one of you . . . for the remission of your sins (εις ἄφεσιν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ὑμῶν)” (Acts ii. 38); “Rise up and be baptized, and wash away thy sins” (*ibid.* xxii. 16); “From the child just born,” says St. Augustine, “even to the decrepit old man, as none is to be prohibited from baptism, so none is there who does not die to sin in baptism; but infants to original sin only, but older persons die also to all sins whatsoever, which by living ill they have added to that which they derived from their birth” (*Enchirid. De Fide*, n. 13, al. 43; cf. *Serm. De Symbolo ad Catechum.*, c. 10). And the Council of Trent (sess. v. can. 5): “If any one denieth that by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted; or even asserteth that the whole of that which has the true and proper nature of sin is not taken away, but saith that it is only rased (*radi*), or not imputed, let him be anathema. For in those who are born again there is nothing that God hateth, because there is no condemnation to those who are truly buried together with Christ by baptism unto death (Rom. viii. 1; vi. 4), who walk not according to the flesh, but putting off the old man and putting on the new, who is created according to God (Eph. iv. 22, 24), are made innocent, immaculate, pure, harmless, and beloved of God; heirs, indeed, of God, and joint-heirs with Christ (Rom. viii. 17).”

2. Besides taking away sin, baptism confers supernatural gifts, graces, and virtues upon the soul. “He saved us by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost, Whom He hath poured forth upon us abundantly” (Tit. iii. 5, 6). It does not, however, entirely undo the effect of original sin and restore to man the integrity (*supra*, § 108) which our first parents possessed before their fall. “In the baptized there remains concupiscence or an incentive to sin (*fomite*); which, whereas it is left for our trial, cannot injure those who consent not, but resist manfully by the grace of Jesus Christ; yea, he who shall have striven lawfully shall be crowned (2 Tim. ii. 5). This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin (Rom. vi.–viii.), the Catholic Church hath never understood it to be so called as being properly and truly sin in those born again, but because it is of sin and inclines to sin (*ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat*)” (Council of Trent, sess. v. can. 5).

3. It also impresses a character on the soul (*supra*, p. 157).

4. Finally, it makes the baptized person a member of Christ’s Church, with all the rights and duties of a Christian. “As many of you as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ” (Gal. iii. 27): “Know ye not that your bodies are members of Christ?” (1 Cor. vi. 15); “They, therefore, that received his word were baptized, and there were added [to the Church] that day about three thousand souls” (Acts ii. 41).

These various effects of the sacrament are beautifully summed up by St. Gregory of Nazianzum: “Baptism is the soul’s brightness; life’s amendment; the questioning of the soul towards God. Baptism is our weakness’s aid; the laying aside of the flesh; the attainment of the spirit; the participation of the word; the rectification of the creature; sin’s deluge; the communication of light; the dispersion of darkness. Baptism is a chariot (to bear us) to God; a pilgrimage with Christ; faith’s support; the mind’s perfection; the key to heaven’s kingdom; life’s change; freedom from bondage; the unloosing of chains; the transformation of our substance into a better. Baptism—what need of further enumeration?—is of God’s gifts the fairest and most excellent” (*Or.*, xl.). See St. Thomas, 3 q. 69; De Augustinis, *op. cit.*, art. viii.



## § 191 THE MINISTER AND THE RECIPIENT

I. To understand the teaching of the Church regarding the minister of baptism, we must carefully bear in mind the distinction between the lawful and unlawful, valid and invalid, reception of a sacrament. Moreover, we should note that, besides the immersion or pouring of the water, there are in solemn baptism a number of ceremonies and prayers which are not essential.

1. Since God wills all men to be saved, and has ordained baptism as a necessary means of salvation, it follows that this means should be at the ready disposal of all. Hence our Lord chose the common element water, and gave every human being, whether priest or layman, man or woman, Christian or pagan, the power of conferring valid baptism (Fourth Lateran Council, cap. *Firmiter*; Council of Florence, *Decr. pro Armenis*; Council of Trent sess. vii., *De Bapt.*, c. 4).

2. Nevertheless, this power can only be lawfully used by the laity in case of necessity.

(a) It was to the Apostles and their successors, the bishops, that Christ entrusted this office when He said to them, "Go ye, therefore: teach all nations, baptizing them," etc. (Matt. xxviii. 19). So we find that the early Fathers, e.g. St. Ignatius (*Ep. ad Smyrn.*), teach that without a bishop it is not lawful to baptize; and Tertullian says, "The power of baptizing belongs to the chief priest (*summus sacerdos*); then to the priests and deacons, but not without the authority of the bishop" (*Lib. De Bapt.*, c. 17). And even as late as the sixth century, says Chardon (*Bapt.*, p. ii. ch. 9), it was still the custom for the bishops alone to baptize, or at any rate the priests did not do so without special permission of the bishop.

(b) In the course of time, as the Christian religion extended itself into the country districts,<sup>46</sup> it became impossible for the bishops to be the sole ministers of the sacrament. Simple priests, therefore, were permitted to confer it by virtue of their office and without special authority. The reason why priests possess this power is thus explained by St. Thomas: "By baptism a man is made a participator in the union of the Church, and acquires the right to approach the Lord's Table, and therefore, as it belongs to the priest to consecrate the Eucharist, so it is his office to baptize; for it belongs to one and the same person to perform the whole, and to arrange the part in the whole (*ejusdem enim videtur esse operari totum et partem in toto disponere*). Though the office of baptizing," continues the saint, "was committed to the Apostles and their successors, the bishops, yet it was so entrusted as to be exercised by others; for St. Paul says, 'Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach' (1 Cor. i. 17). And the reason of this is that whereas teaching (likewise entrusted to the Apostles) depends upon the merit and knowledge of the minister, baptism is independent of these" (q. 67, a. 2). Hence, according to the Council of Florence (*Decr. pro Arm.*), it is said, "The minister of this sacrament is a priest, who by virtue of his office possesses the power of baptizing (*cui ex officio competit baptizare*)."

(c) The functions of a deacon are, as we shall see (*infra*, Chap. VIII), and as his name implies, to assist those who administer the sacraments. Nevertheless, at his ordination he is told that it is his duty to baptize: "*Diaconum oportet ministrare ad altare, baptizare, et prædicare.*"<sup>50</sup> This is a further extension of the permission granted to priests. According to

<sup>46</sup>"Pagans," *pagani*, dwellers in hamlets and villages. The word came to be applied to infidels because the rustic population remained longest unconverted. So, too, "heathen" originally meant one who lived in the wild heaths.

<sup>50</sup>"The deacon must minister to the altar, baptize, and preach." —Ed.

present discipline, however, a deacon may not baptize solemnly without special permission from the bishop (St. Liguori, *Theol. Mor.*, lib. vi. n. 116).

The persons who, according to the practice of the Church, assist at the solemn administration of baptism to make profession of Christian faith in the name of the baptized, are called “sponsors,” or “godparents,” and are in no way ministers of the sacrament. They are mentioned by the Fathers under the various names of *Sponsores*, *Fideijussores*, *Susceptores*, or *Offerentes* (Tertull., *Lib. de Bapt.*; St. Basil, *Epist.*, cxxviii.; St. Augustine, *Serm.* cxliii. *De Temp.*). Concerning these, St. Thomas observes that, just as in carnal birth the nurse receives the child and takes care of it, and later on a teacher has charge of it, so in baptism, which is a spiritual birth, the services of similar persons are required for the newly made Christian.

II. In treating of the necessity of baptism (*supra*, § 190), we have seen that every human being is bound to be baptized. We have now to consider the conditions required on the part of the recipient of the sacrament; and in connection with this we shall speak of infant baptism.

1. Seeing that by baptism a person dies to the old life of sin, and begins a new life (Rom. vi. 4), he must have the will to give up the old life and begin the new; and hence he must have the intention of receiving the sacrament which is the means of entering on this life. So in solemn baptism the catechumen is asked, “Wilt thou be baptized?” and he answers, “I will.” For the valid reception of baptism, however, neither faith nor detestation of sin is required. Hence those who have been baptized without proper dispositions cannot afterwards be rebaptized. See St. Thom, 3, q. 68, aa. 7, 8.

2. In the case of those who are incapable of actually intending to receive the sacrament, their intention to receive it may be presumed. Hence the practice of baptizing children before they come to the use of reason. They have contracted original sin, and, should they die before being cleansed from it, they would be shut out from the bliss of heaven. “He came to save all men through Himself: all, I repeat, who through Him are born again unto God; infants and children, and boys and youths, and elders. Therefore did He pass through every age; to infants made an infant, sanctifying infants; to children a child, sanctifying those of that age” (St. Irenæus, *Adv. Her.*, lib. ii. c. 22). “Whence is it that, since the baptism of the Church is given for the remission of sins, baptism is, according to the observance of the Church, given even to little children? Since assuredly if there were nothing in little children which must relate to remission and pardon, the grace would seem to be superfluous” (Origen, *In Lev.*, hom. viii. n. 3). The same Father also says, “The Church received from the Apostles the tradition of baptizing even little ones (*parvulis*)” (*In Ep. ad Rom.*, lib. v. n. 9). St. Cyprian, writing in his own name and in that of the bishops present at the Council of Carthage (253), says to Fidus, “Now, as to the case of infants, who you say ought not to be baptized within the second or third day after birth, and that the law of ancient circumcision ought to be observed, so that in your opinion the child born ought not to be baptized and hallowed within the eighth day, it has seemed far otherwise to all of us in our council. For in what you thought ought not to be done, not one agreed; but we all, on the contrary, gave our judgment that to none born of man was the mercy and grace of God to be denied” (*Ep.*, lix.). Concerning this passage St. Augustine says, “Not forming any new decree, but maintaining the most assured faith of the Church” (*Ep.*, cxlvi., *ad Hieronym.*, n. 23; cf. also *Serm.*, ccxciv. n. 19, and *Contra Duas Ep., Pelag.*, l. iv. n. 23, and elsewhere in his writings). “Let the child be sanctified from its infancy; let it be consecrated to the Spirit from its earliest days. Thou fearest the



seal on account of the weakness of nature, O mother of mean spirit and of little faith! Ann, before Samuel was born, promised him to God, and when born instantly consecrated him to Him” (St. Greg. of Naz., *Orat.* xl.). The Second Council of Milevis (416) anathematized those who denied that infants should be baptized (can. 2). This condemnation was repeated by the Councils of Lateran (Fourth), Vienne, Florence, and Trent (sess. vii. cann. 12, 13). The objection drawn from the baptism of Christ at the age of thirty is of no weight. He needed no sanctification; the baptism was merely John’s baptism; and, moreover, He had already been circumcised at the usual time. See St. Thom., q. 68. a. 9.

On the whole of this chapter, see St. Thomas, 3. qq. 66–71; Chardon, liv. i. sect. 1; De Augustinis, i. 325; Billet, p. 205; *Diçt. de Th  ol. Catholique*, BAPT  ME; *Diçt. d’Arch  ologie*, BAPT  ME; *Catholic Encyclop  dia*, BAPTISM; Turmel, *His  . de la Th  ol. Positive*, pp. 123, 245, 296, 419.

## CHAPTER III

### CONFIRMATION

**S**O MANY DIFFICULTIES AND VARIOUS OPINIONS have arisen concerning the sacrament of Confirmation, that the Council of Trent (sess. vii.) contented itself with three short canons on the subject: defining (1) that it is truly and properly a sacrament; (2) that a bishop only is the ordinary minister thereof; and (3) anathematizing any one who says “that they who ascribe any virtue to the sacred chrism of Confirmation offer an outrage to the Holy Ghost.”<sup>51</sup> Elsewhere (sess. vii, *De Sacr. in Gen.*, can. 9) the Council also defined that a character was imprinted by the sacrament.

For the first four centuries the word “Confirmation” was not used to designate this sacrament. Various other terms and phrases, however, quite clearly refer to it; e.g. “imposition of hands,” “unction,” “chrism,” “sealing,” etc.

#### § 192 NATURE AND INSTITUTION OF CONFIRMATION

I. After a person has been born again, and cleansed from his original stain, he needs to be spiritually strengthened by the Holy Ghost to enable him to overcome the enemies of his soul; he must be enrolled in Christ’s army, and a mark must be set upon him whereby he may be known to be a Christian soldier. The sacrament instituted for this purpose should therefore, by its outward signs, indicate these effects.

1. To lay the hand on any one is the means of pointing him out; and is often an emblem of setting him apart for any particular office or dignity. Imposition of hands, accordingly, formed a part of the ceremonial observed on the appointment and consecration of persons to high and holy undertakings. “Take Josue, the son of Nun, a man in whom is the spirit, and put thy hand upon him,” etc. (Num. xxviii. 18). Again, anointing with oil was used by the ancients for the purpose of strengthening the limbs, and so enabling the athletes to take part in the contests of the arena.<sup>52</sup> Hence imposition of hands and anointing are made use of in this sacrament. There has been much difference of opinion as to whether the latter is part of the

<sup>51</sup>The guarded wording of this canon should be carefully noted.

<sup>52</sup>“*Exercent patrias oleo labente palastras / Nudati socii.*” (*  n.*, iii. 281; cf. v. 135.) [“The unprotected companions train the fatherlands for the gymnasias with falling oil.” —Ed.]

matter of Confirmation. According to the Council of Florence (*Decr. pro Armenis*), chrism is the matter. We find that the Fathers speak of “the sacrament of anointing,” and attribute to the chrism the power of conferring grace. Thus, Tertullian (*De Bapt.* c. 7): “After this, having come out of the laver, we are anointed thoroughly with a blessed unction according to the ancient rule. . . . The unction runs bodily over us, but profits spiritually.” And St. Cyril of Jerusalem: “To you also, after you had come up from the pool of the sacred streams, was given the chrism (unction), the emblem (antitype) of that wherewith Christ was anointed; and this is the Holy Ghost. . . . After the invocation, this holy ointment is no longer plain ointment, nor, so to say, common, but Christ’s gift, and by the presence of His Godhead it causes in us the Holy Ghost” (*Cat. Myst.*, iii. 3). (Cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Comm. in Joel*, ii. 23; and St. Augustine, *In 1 Ep. Joann.*, tract. iii. n. 5). So, too, St. Thomas: “Chrism is the appropriate (*conveniens*) matter of this sacrament; for in this sacrament the fulness of the Holy Ghost is given for the spiritual strength which belongs to perfect age. . . . Now, the grace of the Holy Ghost is symbolized by oil; wherefore Christ is said to be ‘anointed with the oil of gladness’ (Ps. xlv; Heb. i. 9), on account of the fulness of the Holy Ghost which He had” (3, q. 72, a. 2). Moreover, the Eastern Churches have always looked upon the anointing with chrism as the principal part of the sacrament, and to it they attribute the power of impressing upon the soul the seal of the Holy Ghost; so that for many centuries past the sacrament has gone by the name of “the Sacrament of Chrism,” or “Chrism” simply. (Chardon, *Confirm.*, ch. i), Nevertheless, when the sacrament was conferred by the Apostles, no mention is ever made of anointing. On the other hand, no mention of imposition of hands is made by the Council of Florence; nor is it found in the Greek rituals (see, however, Chardon, *l.c.*) But the anointing spoken of by St. John (“Let the unction (τὸ χρίσμα) which you have received abide in you,” 1 Ep. ii. 27; cf. 20) and St. Paul (“He that confirmeth us with you in Christ, and that hath anointed us, is God, Who also hath sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts, ὁ δὲ βεβαιῶν ἡμᾶς σὺν ὑμῖν εἰς Χριστὸν καὶ χρίσας ἡμᾶς Θεός, ὁ καὶ σφραγισόμενος ἡμᾶς καὶ δούς τὸν ἀραβῶνα τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν,” 2 Cor. i. 20, 21) may be referred to this sacrament; and as the very act of anointing involves a laying-on of hands, the omission of any express mention of it need not present much difficulty. In practice, however, the general imposition of hands prescribed in the Roman ritual must not be omitted when the sacrament is conferred on those who are subject to the Western rite.

2. The form of Confirmation—that is to say, the distinguishing element which marks off the imposition of hands and anointing from the ordinary profane use of these acts—consists in words suited for this purpose. When the Apostles conferred the sacrament, “they prayed for [the baptized] that they might receive the Holy Ghost. . . . Then they laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost” (Acts viii. 15–17). What words were used is not mentioned, and hence considerable variation has prevailed (see Chardon, *l.c.*). Besides the prayers accompanying the imposition of hands, the Roman rite prescribes the following to accompany the anointing: “I sign thee with the sign of the cross, and I confirm thee with the chrism of salvation, in the name of the Father,” etc. This formula did not come into general use, according to Chardon, until the twelfth century. The formula in the Greek Church is simply, “The seal of the gift of the Holy Ghost (σφραγίς δωρεᾶς Πνεύματος Ἁγίου),” and was prescribed by the First Council of Constantinople (381).

II. The institution of Confirmation by our Lord is nowhere expressly stated in Scripture; nevertheless, there are several texts from which this institution may be inferred.

1. Christ promised that those who believed in Him should receive the Holy Ghost (John vii. 37–39); and in the discourse at the Last Supper He made frequent reference to the sending of the same Spirit (*ibid.* xv., xvi.). We find the Apostles from the very first making use of a rite to confer this Divine gift (Acts viii. 14–17; xix. 1–6), and frequently alluding to it in their writings (2 Cor. i. 21, 22; Eph. i. 13; Tit. iii. 5; 1 John i. 20, 27). We may be sure that they would not take upon themselves to confer a rite in addition to Baptism (which Christ had expressly enjoined) unless they had received it from Him. The institution probably took place some time during our Lord's risen life, "when He showed Himself alive after His passion by many proofs, for forty days appearing to them, and speaking of the kingdom of God" (Acts i. 3).

2. The Fathers frequently speak of this sacrament, mentioning it along with Baptism and the Eucharist; *e.g.* Tertullian (*supra*, p. 168); St. Cyprian, "Anointed also must he of necessity be who is baptized, in order that, having received the chrism, that is, the unction, he may be anointed of God, and have within him the grace of Christ" (*Ep. lxx. ad Januarium*). (For St. Cyril of Jerusalem, see *supra*, p. 168). St. Cyril of Alexandria, explaining Isaiah xxv. 6, says, "By the wine he signifies the mystic eulogy and the manner of the unbloody sacrifice which we are wont to celebrate in the holy churches; whilst the ointment admirably points out to us the unction of the Holy Spirit. For the wise John writes, 'And you have an unction from the Holy One, and you have no need that any man teach you, but as His unction teacheth you of all things;' for we are anointed with ointment at the time, especially of the holy Baptism, making a symbol of our partaking of the Holy Spirit" (*In Esai.*, l. iii.). If more frequent mention of Confirmation as a special sacrament is not found among the early Fathers, this arose from the fact that as baptism was usually conferred upon grown-up people, Confirmation immediately followed. Later Fathers speak clearly enough; *e.g.* St. Pacian: "By the laver sins are cleansed away; by the chrism the Holy Spirit is poured upon us; but both of these we obtain at the hand and mouth of the bishop, and thus the whole man is born again and is renewed in Christ" (*Serm. de Bapt.*, nn. 5, 6). Cf. St. Ambrose, *De Mysterioris*, c. vii. n. 42; St. John Chrysostom, *Hom. xviii. in Act. Apost.*, n. 3; see also *Hom. ix. in Ep. ad Heb.*, n. 2; St. Augustine, *Serm. ccxxvii. ad Infantes*; *Tract. vi. in Ep. Joan.*; St. Innocent I, *Ep. xxv. ad Decentium*, n. 6, etc. They do not speak clearly of its institution by our Lord.

3. Some of the greatest of the Schoolmen were of the opinion that the sacrament was instituted by the Holy Ghost through the instrumentality of the Apostles (Peter Lomb. *Sent.*, iv. dist. 7; Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacram.*, ii; St. Bonav., in 4 dist. 7, a. 1, q. 1). St. Thomas, however, with the greater number, held the institution by our Lord. "Concerning the institution of this sacrament," says the Angelic Doctor, "there are two opinions: some say that this sacrament was instituted neither by Christ nor by His Apostles, but later on in the course of time at a certain council.<sup>53</sup> This was the opinion of Alexander of Hales (*Summ.* iv. q. 9, m. 1), whereas others said that it was instituted by the Apostles. But this cannot be the case, because the institution of a sacrament belongs to the power of excellence which is proper to Christ alone. And therefore we must hold that Christ instituted this sacrament not by showing it (*exhibendo*), but by promising it, according to the text (John xvi. 7), 'If I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send Him to you.' And this because in this sacrament the fulness of the Holy Ghost is given which was not to be given before Christ's resurrection and ascension, according to the text (John vii. 39), 'As yet the

<sup>53</sup>The Council of Meaux (845).

Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified” (3, q. 72, a. 1, ad. 1). Though the Council of Trent refrained from any express canon on the subject, it nevertheless defined of the sacraments generally, that “all were instituted by Christ Jesus our Lord” (sess. vii., *De Sacr. in Gen.*, can. 1); and hence all the later theologians have held that Confirmation was instituted by Him. This opinion is not, however, strictly of faith. See Franzelin, *De Sacr. in Gen.*, p. 183.

## § 193 THE MINISTER, RECIPIENT, AND EFFECTS OF CONFIRMATION

I. We read in the Acts of the Apostles that, after the Samaritan converts had been baptized by Philip the deacon, the Apostles “sent unto them Peter and John, who, when they were come, prayed for them, that they might receive the Holy Ghost; for He was not yet come upon any of them, but they were only baptized in the Name of the Lord Jesus; then they laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost” (viii. 14–17, *cf.* also xix. 2–6). It is plain from this that the Apostles, and not the deacons, were the ministers of the sacrament. But a celebrated difficulty has arisen as to whether this office can be exercised by simple priests, whose position lies midway between that of the bishops and that of the deacons.

According to present practice, the bishops alone in the Western Church can administer Confirmation; in extraordinary cases, however, with special powers granted by the Pope, simple priests can also administer it. On the other hand, in the Eastern Churches, simple priests are commonly the ministers; and their ministrations are accepted by the Western Church as valid. There is no doubt that, though the Eastern use is tolerated, the Western is more in accordance with the Tridentine decree, the teaching of the Fathers, and theological reason. The Council condemns those who say “that the *ordinary* minister of holy Confirmation is not the bishop alone, but any simple priest soever” (sess. vii., *De Conf.*, can. 3). St. Cyprian says that “they who are baptized in the Church are presented to the *bishops* (*prepositis*) of the Church, and by our prayer and imposition of hands they receive the Holy Ghost and are perfected with the seal of the Lord” (*Ep.* lxxiii. *ad Jubajanum*). St. Cornelius requires the faithful “to be sealed by the *bishop* (σφραγισθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου)” Apud Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, vi. 43). “As regards the sealing of infants,” says Pope St. Innocent, “it is clear that it is not lawful for it to be done by any one but a bishop (*non ab aliis quam ab episcopo fieri licere*). For presbyters, though they be priests of the second rank (second priests), have not attained to the summit of the pontificate. That this pontificate is the right of bishops only—to wit, that they may seal or deliver the Spirit, the Paraclete—is demonstrated not merely by ecclesiastical usage, but also by that portion of the Acts of the Apostles wherein it is declared that Peter and John were sent to give the Holy Ghost to those who had already been baptized. For when presbyters baptize, whether with or without the presence of a bishop, they may anoint the baptized with chrism, provided it be previously consecrated by a bishop, but not sign the forehead with that oil, which is a right reserved to bishops (*episcopis*) only, when they give the Spirit, the Paraclete. The words, however, I cannot name, for fear of seeming to betray rather than to reply to the point on which you have consulted me” (*Ep.* xxv. *ad Decentium*, n. 6).

II. Confirmation can be conferred only on those who have already been baptized, and in order to receive it worthily they must already be in a state of grace. “Confirmation is to Baptism what growth is to generation. Now, it is clear that a man cannot advance to a perfect age unless he has first been born; in like manner, unless he has first been baptized he cannot

receive the sacrament of Confirmation” (St. Thomas, 3, q. 72, a. 6). Moreover, Baptism is, as we have seen, the gate of the other sacraments (*Decr. pro Armenis*). If it be objected that the early Christians received the Holy Ghost before they were baptized (Acts x. 44), we reply that by a miracle they received the effect of Confirmation, but not the sacrament itself (St. Thomas, *l.c.*). Confirmation is not necessary for salvation; nevertheless, so important a means of grace ought not to be lightly neglected. It was formerly administered immediately after baptism, as indeed is still the custom in the Greek Church. The Catechism of the Council of Trent, however, recommends its postponement at least until the candidate is seven years old: “for Confirmation has not been instituted as necessary to salvation, but that by virtue thereof we might be found very well armed and prepared when called upon to fight for the faith of Christ; and for this kind of conflict no one will consider children, who still are without the use of reason, to be qualified” (Part II. chap. 3, q. 17).

III. The effects of Confirmation are: (1) grace, and (2) a character.

1. As Confirmation is “a true and proper sacrament” (Council of Trent, sess. vii., can. 1), it must have the power of conferring grace. This grace is not that by which the sinner is reconciled to God, but that by which we are made more and more pleasing to Him. “Do penance, and be baptized every one of you in the Name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost” (Acts ii. 38). In particular we receive the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and of these especially fortitude to profess our faith and to fight against the enemies of our souls. “Stay you in the city till you be endued with *power* from on high. . . . You shall receive the *power* of the Holy Ghost coming upon you, and you shall be witnesses unto Me” (Luke xxiv. 49; Acts i. 8).

2. On the character conferred by Confirmation, see *supra*, p. 157.

See St. Thomas, 3, q. 72; Chardon, liv. i. sect. ii; De Augustinis, i. 409; Billot, p. 265; *Diſt. de Th  ol. Cath.*, CONFIRMATION; *Cath. Encyclop  dia*, CONFIRMATION; Turmel, pp. 130, 250, 301, 427.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE SACRAMENT OF THE HOLY EUCHARIST

“THE MOST HOLY EUCHARIST has, indeed, this in common with the rest of the sacraments, that it is a symbol of a sacred thing, and a visible form of an invisible grace; but it has also this peculiar excellence, that whereas the others have the power of sanctifying when they are administered, in the Eucharist there is present before administration the very Author of sanctity Himself” (Council of Trent, sess. xiii. chap. 3). Moreover, the Holy Eucharist is not only a sacrament, but also a sacrifice: it is an offering made to God, as well as a source of grace given to men. In the present chapter we shall speak of it as a sacrament, reserving the doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass for the next chapter.

The peculiarity of this sacrament in being a permanent sign, and in being the Real Presence of our Lord, calls for special treatment differing from that given to the other sacraments. We shall first give the proofs of the Real Presence from Scripture and Tradition; next we shall treat of Transubstantiation, or the mode of our Lord’s presence; and, finally, we shall speak of the matter and form, the minister, the recipient, and the effects of the sacrament.

See St. Thomas, 3, qq. 73–83; Franzelin, *De SS. Eucharistia Sacramento et Sacrificio*; De Augustinis, *De Rē Sacramentaria*, lib. ii.; Wiseman, *Lectures on the Holy Eucharist*; Dalgairns, *Holy Communion*.

### § 194 THE REAL PRESENCE PROVED FROM HOLY SCRIPTURE

“The holy Synod teacheth . . . that in the august (*almo*) sacrament of the Holy Eucharist, after the consecration of the bread and wine, our Lord Jesus Christ, true God and man, is truly, really, and substantially contained under the appearances (*species*) of those sensible things. . . . If any one denieth that in the sacrament of the most Holy Eucharist are contained truly, really, and substantially the body and blood, together with the soul and divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ, and consequently the whole Christ (*totum Christum*); but saith that He is therein only as a sign, or in figure or virtually, let him be anathema” (Council of Trent, sess. xiii. ch. 1, can. 1).

We find the Blessed Sacrament plainly spoken of in three different parts of the New Testament. Our Lord promised to give His flesh as food and His blood as drink (John vi. 48 sqq.). At the Last Supper He fulfilled this promise (Matt. xxvi. 26–28; Mark xiv. 22–24; Luke xxii. 19, 20; 1 Cor. xi. 23–25). And in St. Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians (x. 16 and xi. 27–29) we have an account of the belief and practice of the Apostolic Church concerning the sacrament. Any one of these passages, taken by itself, would be sufficient to prove the doctrine of the Real Presence; taken together, they form an overwhelming argument in its favour.

I. On the day after the feeding of the five thousand in the desert, our Lord delivered a discourse to the multitudes who had followed Him to Capharnaum. As was His wont, His words bore referenceto the miracle lately wrought. He bade the Jews not to labour for the meat that perisheth, but for that which endureth unto everlasting life. “I am the Bread of life,” He said; “He that cometh to Me shall not hunger, and he that believeth in Me shall never thirst.” In the first part of the discourse (vv. 26–47) our Lord spoke of belief in Him when He made use of the metaphor of bread from heaven. At verse 48 (or, at least, at verse 51) there is a transition to something suggested, indeed, by what went before, but entirely different from it. A well-known instance of a similar transition is found in St. Matt. xxiv., where our Lord passes from the prophecy of the destruction of the Temple to the prophecy of the end of the world (v. 43). The passage of St. John is as follows:

1. (1) “I am the Bread of Life,
- (2) “Your fathers did eat manna in the desert,
- (3) “And are dead.
2. (1) “This is the Bread
- (2) “Which cometh down from heaven.
- (3) “That if any man eat of it he may not die.
3. (1) “I am the Living Bread
- (2) “Which came down from heaven.
- (3) “If any man eat of this bread he shall live for ever:

“And the bread that I will give is My flesh [Gr., ‘which I will give’] for the life of the world.

“The Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying, How can this man give us His flesh to eat! Jesus therefore said to them, Amen, amen, I say to you, except you eat the flesh of the

Son of Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you. He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath everlasting life, and I will raise him up at the last day. For My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed. He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood abideth in Me and I in him. As the living Father hath sent Me, and I live by the Father, so he that eateth Me, the same also shall live by Me” (vv. 48–58).

These words of our Lord, taken in the literal sense, are a plain proof of the Real Presence. Our Lord has spoken, and we believe Him. Difficulties, indeed, there are in believing such a marvel, but “with God all things are possible.” Protestants, on the other hand, are so overwhelmed by these difficulties, that they think that our Lord must have meant something else. Hence they try to show that the passage is figurative. If so, our Lord either made use of a figure already known, or He introduced a new one. Eating a man’s flesh was a familiar figure among the Jews, but it meant to do a person a grievous wrong, especially by calumniating him (see Ps. xxvi. 2; Job xix. 22; Mich. iii. 3; Eccl. iv. 5). This meaning is therefore clearly excluded. And our Lord did not introduce any new figure, because He would not choose a known repulsive figure to convey an entirely new and endearing meaning. This view is strengthened by the act that drinking blood was peculiarly abominable to the Jews (see Gen. ix. 4; Levi vii. 10; 1 Kings xiv. 33; Judith xi. 10, 11). Besides, there is nothing to show that our Lord was inventing a new figure. But the best answer to the Protestant interpretation, is the objection raised by the Jewish hearers, and our Lord’s reply to it. We should bear in mind that our Lord was wont to make two sorts of answers to objections against His teaching. When the objection arose from a difficulty in understanding His meaning, He used to explain. When the difficulty was not in understanding His doctrine, but in accepting it, He did not explain, but insisted all the more. Thus, when our Lord said, “Unless a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God,” Nicodemus, not understanding the meaning of our Lord’s words, asked, “How can a man be born when he is old?” Our Lord explained: “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God” (John iii.). But on another occasion, when our Lord said to the Jews, “Abraham, your father, rejoiced to see My day; he saw it and was glad,” they objected, “Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast Thou seen Abraham?” He did not explain, but insisted, “Amen, amen, I say unto you, before Abraham was made, I am” (John viii.). In like manner, when the Jews objected, “How can this man give us His flesh to eat?” our Lord did not explain His words, and point out that they were figurative, but He insisted the more, “Except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, ye shall not have life in you.” The Jews therefore rightly understood our Lord as speaking literally; their only difficulty was in accepting what He said. Furthermore, our Lord embodies the doctrine in the form of a precept, which, as all will own, ought to be given in clear language. He makes use of the “Amen, amen,” which adds particular weight to what he says, and shows that His words are to be taken in their obvious meaning. Again, “My flesh is meat *indeed* (ἀληθῶς), and My blood is drink *indeed*”—expressions which certainly do not look figurative. He does not even shrink from saying, “He that eateth Me,” which evidently shows that He meant literally what He said.

No wonder that our Lord’s words should have been the occasion of difficulty to his hearers. Many even of His disciples said, “This saying is hard (σκληρός), and who can hear it?” A word from Him explaining that He spoke figuratively, would have removed their objections. But no such word came, and many of them “went back and walked with Him no more.” The Apostles, however, remained firm. “To whom shall we go?” Peter exclaims;

“Thou hast the words of eternal life.” They humbly accepted the doctrine, in spite of its difficulty, just as Catholics do now.

It is sometimes objected that our Lord pointed out the figurative meaning when He said, “It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing. The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life” (v. 64). We reply that the words “flesh” and “spirit” in the New Testament never mean “literal” and “figurative,” but the natural and the spiritual man, or human nature as left to its own impulses and human nature as ennobled by grace (Rom. viii.). Hence our Lord’s meaning here is, “My words are spirit and life,” or “the spirit of life” (*hendiadys*); they are such as mere man cannot receive, but which man endowed with grace can receive (cf. Gal. v. 13–26; 1 Pet. iv. 6, etc.).

## II. The words of institution.

### MATT. xxvi. 26–28

And whilst they were at supper, Jesus took bread, and blessed and broke, and gave to His disciples and said: Take ye and eat; THIS IS MY BODY. And taking the chalice, He gave thanks, and gave to them, saying, Drink ye all of this; for THIS IS MY BLOOD of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many unto remission of sins.

### LUKE xxii. 19, 20

And taking bread, He gave thanks, and broke, and gave to them, saying: THIS IS MY BODY which is given for you. Do this for a commemoration of Me. In like manner the chalice also, after He had supped, saying: THIS IS THE CHALICE, THE NEW TESTAMENT IN MY BLOOD, which shall be shed for you.

It is evident that the important words in these passages are, “This is My body.” We take these words in their plain literal sense. They are the very simplest words in the language. No explanation can make them plainer. Our Lord says that what He holds in His hands is His body, and we humbly believe Him. Those who do not accept the literal sense must show that our Lord did not mean His words to be so taken, and that, in fact, the Apostles did not take them so. The literal sense holds the field until it is driven out. If we can beat off the attacks upon it, it must be held to be the right interpretation. Our adversaries say (1) the word “is” may mean “represents;” and (2) it *must* have that meaning here.

1. The texts usually quoted to prove that the verb “to be” sometimes means “to represent,” may be grouped in four classes:

(a) “The seven good kine *are* seven years” (Gen. xli. 26, 27); “The ten horns *are* ten kingdoms” (Dan. vii. 24); “The field *is* the world” (Matt. xiii. 38, 39); “The rock *was* Christ” (1 Cor. x. 4); “These *are* the two covenants” (Gal. iv. 24); “The seven stars *are* the angels of the seven churches” (Apoc. i. 20).

(b) “I am the door” (John x. 7); “I am the true vine” (John xv. 1).

### MARK xiv. 22–24

And whilst they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessing, broke and gave to them, and said: Take ye, THIS IS MY BODY. And having taken the chalice, giving thanks, He gave it to them, and they all drank of it. And He said to them: THIS IS MY BLOOD of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many.

### 1 COR xi. 23–25

(Jesus) took bread, and giving thanks, broke and said: Take ye and eat; THIS IS MY BODY, which shall be delivered [Greek, broken] for you; this do for the commemoration of Me. In like manner, also, the chalice, after He had supped, saying: THIS CHALICE IS THE NEW TESTAMENT IN MY BLOOD: this do ye as often as ye shall drink for the commemoration of Me.



(c) "This *is* My covenant between thee and Me" (Gen. xvii. 10).

(d) "This *is* the Lord's Passover" (Exod. xii. 11, Angl. version).

If these texts are carefully examined, will be seen that the only real difficulty is in group (a). In the others the verb "to be" does not signify "to represent." *E.g.* "I am the door" does not mean "I represent, or am the figure of the door." Again, circumcision, referred to in (c), was not only a sign, but the instrument or record of the covenant. In the last passage the verb "is" must be taken in its literal meaning; the real translation is, "This is the feast, or day of Passover, sacred to the Lord."

As regards (a), we observe that the passages are parallel to each other, but not to the words of institution. In these passages there is the explanation of some symbol, such as the interpretation of a vision, a parable, or a prophecy; and consequently the verb "to be" is rightly taken in the sense of "to represent." But in the words of institution there is nothing to show that our Lord was speaking an allegory, and therefore we take the verb "to be" in its natural and literal sense. The force of this argument will be better felt if we examine one of the texts, *e.g.* "the rock was Christ." Protestants rightly take this to mean, "the rock was a figure of Christ." If a Socinian were to argue that the text "the Word was God" must therefore mean "the Word represented, or was a figure of God," they would point to the difference in the context of the two passages. They would show that St. Paul was speaking allegorically: "All these things were done to them *in figure*, and they drank of the *spiritual* rock, and the rock was Christ;" whereas St. John's context does not contain any allusion to an allegory. This is exactly what Catholics do in defending the literal sense of "this is My body." This case is really far stronger when we compare the three passages—

"The Word was God."

"The rock was Christ,"

"This is My body."

The first two are clearly more like each other than they are like the third, especially when we remember that St. Paul tells us that Christ is "the Image of God" (2 Cor. iv. 4; cf. Heb. i. 3). We suppose that no one will now make use of the once popular argument that the language which our Lord spoke contained no word for "to represent" except the verb "to be." Cardinal Wiseman has shown that the Syriac language is peculiarly rich in such words (*Hore Syriaca*, pp. 18–53).

2. The opponents of the literal sense insist that the words must be taken figuratively on account of the philosophical difficulties involved in the doctrine of the Real Presence. This argument is based upon a principle that would be subversive of all belief in mystery or miracle. Are we to reject all interpretations that present philosophical difficulties? What would become of belief in the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Resurrection? We own that the Real Presence involves a suspension of the laws of nature; but we and our Protestant opponents hold that God, who is the Author of these laws, is also Supreme Ruler of them (see Franzelin, *De Euch.*, th. ii.). We must remember that our Lord's words were spoken not to philosophers, but to Galilæan fishermen. He had shown them that the laws of nature were subject to Him: He had changed water into wine; He had fed five thousand with five loaves and two fishes, and four thousand with seven loaves and a few fishes; disease, and even death, were under His control; the devils obeyed Him; and He disposed of the keys of the kingdom of heaven. All power was given to Him in heaven, on earth, and in hell. Moreover, He had always encouraged unreasoning faith in His words, and had always condemned those who

were captious or critical or doubted His power. The Last Supper was surely an occasion when He should have spoken plainly to the twelve chosen ones. Now, the Protestant argument is that the Apostles must have felt the force of the philosophical difficulties so strongly that they said within themselves, "He cannot mean His body, He means the figure of His body!" Our argument is that the Apostles, believing that our Lord could do all things, and that He taught them unreasoning submission to His words, humbly took our Lord's words in their plain and simple meaning. The Catholic interpretation is based upon an exalted notion of God's power, and a lowly estimate of man's knowledge. The Protestant sets limits to God's power, making it extend only as far as man's mind will allow. The pious Christian will not hesitate in his choice between the two.

III. "The chalice of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion (*κοινωνία*) or the blood of Christ? And the bread which we break, is it not the partaking (*κοινωνία*) of the body of the Lord?" (1 Cor. x. 16.)

"Therefore, whosoever shall eat this bread or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and of the blood of the Lord. But let a man prove (*δοκιμαζέτω*) himself, and so let him eat of that bread and drink of the chalice. For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment (*κρίμα*) to himself, not discerning (*μὴ διακρίνων*) the body of the Lord" (1 Cor. xi. 27-29).

These two passages are evidence of what was taught and practised by the Apostles. In the former, St. Paul contrasts the Jewish and heathenish sacrifices and rites with those of the Christians. Our cup is a partaking of the blood of Christ, our bread is a partaking of the body of Christ. Now, if this was only figurative, wherein would the Christian have the advantage over the Jew?

But the second text is far more important. The Evangelists (Matthew, Mark, and Luke) have recorded the history of the institution. St. Paul, after narrating the story, goes on to the practical consequences of the Real Presence. If our Lord is truly present under the appearances of bread and wine, then it is clear that "whosoever shall eat this bread or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and of the blood of the Lord." If our Lord is truly present, a man should "prove himself" before eating "of that bread" and drinking "of the chalice." If our Lord is truly present, "he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself." If our Lord is not there, all this has no meaning. Those who deny His presence are expressly condemned by the Apostle: "He that eateth and drinketh, eateth and drinketh judgment unto himself, *if he discern not the body*" (Revised Version).

We have said that, taken by themselves, the words of promise, or the words of institution, or the teaching of St. Paul, would be quite enough to prove the Real Presence. We can now see how strong our position is when all the passages are taken together. Let us allow, for the sake of argument, that our Lord might have spoken figuratively at the time of the promise; would He not have let fall some hint about the figurative meaning at the Last Supper? Would not St. Paul, in one or other of the texts quoted, have made some reference to it? On these four different occasions, our Lord and His Apostles, explaining different doctrines, speaking to different assemblies, under quite different circumstances, all agree in using certain words, without ever giving the smallest hint as to any figurative meaning. This is surely an unanswerable argument in our favour.

## § 195 THE REAL PRESENCE PROVED FROM TRADITION

A complete account of the doctrine of the Fathers concerning the Blessed Eucharist cannot be given here. The reader is referred to Card. Franzelin, *De Euch.*, pp. 83–154; *Faith of Catholics*, ii. pp. 190–374; Batiffol, *Études d’Hist. et de Théol. Posit.*, 2e série, p. 107 sqq.

I. The express teaching of the Fathers may be grouped under four heads:

1. They hold that in the Blessed Eucharist the *very Body* of Christ is present.

“They (the Docetæ) abstain from Eucharist and prayer, because they confess not that the Eucharist is flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, the flesh which suffered for our sins which the Father in His mercy raised again. They, therefore, who deny the gift of God, perish in their disputing” (St. Ignatius Mart., *Ad Smyrn.*, nn. 7, 8).

“We have been taught that the food over which thanksgiving has been made (or which has been eucharistized) by the prayer of the word which came from Him—by which (food) our blood and flesh are nourished by transmutation—is both flesh and blood of that same incarnate Jesus” (St. Justin, *Apol.*, i. 65, 66).

“How shall they feel assured that that bread over which thanksgiving has been made (*e.g.* the eucharistized bread) is the body of their Lord, and the chalice of His blood, if they do not declare Him the Son of the world’s Creator? . . . How, again, do they say that that flesh which is nourished by the body of the Lord and by His blood passes into corruption, and partakes not of the life?” (St. Irenæus, *Adv. Heres.*, iv. 18).

“If the Word was truly made flesh, and we truly receive the Word (made) flesh in the dominical food (*vere verbum carnem cibo Dominico sumimus*), how can He be thought not to abide naturally in us—He Who, being born man, hath assumed the nature, now inseparable, of our flesh, and also united the nature of His flesh to the nature of His divinity, under the sacrament of the flesh that was to be communicated to us? (*et naturam carnis suæ ad naturam æternitatis [divinitatis] sub sacramento nobis communicandæ carnis admisceat*). . . . He Himself says, ‘My flesh is truly meat, and My blood is truly drink. He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood abideth in Me, and I in him.’ Of the verity of the flesh and blood there is no room left for doubting. For now both by the declaration of the Lord Himself and by our faith it is truly flesh and it is truly blood” (St. Hilary, *De Trin.*, viii. 13 sqq.).

“This food which thou receivest, this living bread that cometh down from heaven, supplies us with the substance of eternal life; and whosoever shall have eaten of this (living bread) shall never die; and it is the body of Christ. Consider now whether the bread of angels (manna) be more excellent, or Christ’s flesh, which is in truth the body of life. . . . In that sacrament Christ is, because it is Christ’s body, therefore it is not bodily food, but spiritual” (St. Ambrose, *De Myster.*, cc. viii, ix.).

“Being fully persuaded that what seems bread is not bread, even though it seems so to the taste, but Christ’s body; and what seems wine is not wine, even though the taste will have it so, but Christ’s blood” (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.*, iv. 9). And again: “We become Christ-bearers (Χριστοφόροι), His body and blood being diffused through our members; thus are we made, according to the blessed Peter, partakers of the Divine nature” (*ibid.*, n. 3).

“We believe the Divine Word that not something like or equal, but that it is properly and truly the Divine body which is sacrificed on the Divine table and is partaken of by the people, altogether, without any division or failing” (St. Cæsarius, brother of St. Greg. Naz. (?) *Bibl.*

Gallandi, tom. vi. p. 127). See also St. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Joann.*, l. x. et l. iv.; and St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthod.*, iv. 13.

2. The Fathers deny that the Eucharist is a mere figure of Christ's body.

"Christ said, 'This is My body;' for it is not the figure (τύπος) of body or the figure of blood, as some have stupidly repeated, but it is truly the body and blood of Christ" (Macarius Magnes, who flourished at the beginning of the fourth century, *Bibl. Gallandi*, tom. iii. p. 541).

St. Anastasius of Sinai describes a dispute between a Christian and a Gaianite heretic. Both agree that the Eucharist is not the figure of the body of Christ. The heretic says, "God forbid that we should say that the Holy Communion is only the figure of the body of Christ or simple bread; but we truly receive the very body and blood of Christ, the Son of God." The Christian answers, "So do we believe and confess, according to the saying of Christ Himself, which He pronounced to the disciples in the mystical supper, giving them the life-giving bread: 'Take, eat, this is My body;' in like manner, delivering the chalice to them, He said, 'This is My blood.' He did not say, 'This is the figure of My body and blood'" (*Bibl. Max. Patrum*, tom. ix. pp. 840, 855). "Saying, 'This is My body,' He showed that the bread sanctified upon the altar is the very body and not a figure; for He did not say, 'This is a figure,' but 'This is My body'" (Theophylact, *In Matt.*, xxvi. 26).

"The bread and wine are not the figure of the body and blood of Christ, God forbid! but the very deified body of the Lord; since the Lord Himself said, not 'This is the figure of My body,' but 'This is My body,' and not 'The figure of My blood,' but 'My blood'" (St. John Damascene, *De Fid. Orthod.*, iv. 13).

3. The Fathers hold that an objective change takes place in the thing itself, and hence that our Lord is not received only by faith, or by virtue of any merely subjective conditions on the part of the receiver: He is received physically and corporally.

"Christ does not say that He will be in us by a kind of habit only—a habit which the mind conceives of as in the affections, but also according to physical participation. For as, if a person joins one piece of wax to another and apply both to the fire, he makes the compound of both one (body), so by means of the participation of the body of Christ and of His precious blood, He is indeed in us, and we also are united together in Him" (St. Cyril of Alex., *In Joann.*, l. x. tom. iv. 862, 863; see also St. Hilary, quoted above).

"Rightly, therefore, do I believe that now also the bread that is sanctified by the Word of God is changed (μεταποιεῖσθαι) into the body of the God-Word. . . . The bread, as the Apostle says, is sanctified by the Word of God and prayer, passing into the body of the Word, not by being eaten and drunk, but instantly changed into the body of the Word according as was said by the Word, 'This is My body'" (St. Greg. of Nyssa, *Catech. Magn.*, c. 37; cf. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Cat.*, v.).

"It is truly the body united to the divinity, the body born of the Holy Virgin, not that the body taken up into heaven comes down on earth (*i.e.* moves locally, leaves heaven), but that the bread itself and wine are changed into the body and blood of God" (St. John Damasc., *De Fide Orthod.*, l. iv. c. 13; see also St. Ambrose, *De Myster.*, c. 9).

We wish that we could quote at length the magnificent passages in which St. John Chrysostom speaks of the Real Presence (Hom. 82, *In Matt.*; Homm. 45, 46, 47, *In Joann.*, explaining the discourse in St. John's sixth chapter; Hom. 24, *In 1 Ep. ad Cor.*). The following must suffice: "How many nowadays say, 'Would that we could gaze upon His form, His figure, His

raiment, His shoes! Lo! thou seeſt Him, toucheſt Him, eateſt Him. And thou deſireſt to ſee even His veſture, but He gives Himſelf to thee, not to look upon only, but even to touch, and eat and receive within thee. . . . Think how indignant thou art againſt him that betrayed, againſt them that crucified Him. See to it, then, leſt thou alſo become guilty of the body and blood of Chriſt. They ſlew that moſt holy body, but thou, after ſo great benefits, receiveſt in an unclean ſoul. For neither was it enough for Him to become man, nor to be ſcourged and ſlain, but He alſo commingles Himſelf with us, and not by faith only, but alſo in very deed does He make us His body” (*In Matt., l.c.*, n. 4). “It is not man that makes the things that lie open to view become Chriſt’s body and blood, but that ſame Chriſt who was crucified for us. The prieſt, fulfilling his office, ſtands pronouncing thoſe words; but the power and the grace is of God. ‘This is My body,’ He ſays. This word changes the things that lie open to view (μεταρρυθμίζει τὰ προκειμένα). And as that word that ſaid, ‘Increase and multiply, and fill the earth,’ was pronounced indeed but once, but through all time is actually operative on our nature for the procreation of children; ſo alſo that word uttered but once operates from that time to this, and till His own advent, the ſacrifice perfect at every table in the Churches” (Hom. 1 *De Prodit. Judæ*, n. 6).

4. How the Fathers made uſe of the doctrine of the Real Presence to confute the various heresies concerning the Incarnation, may be ſeen in Franzelin, theſe ix.

II. Although the proof from the Fathers is moſt convincing, certain paſſages occur which at firſt ſight preſent ſome difficulty. The following remarks will help us to underſtand theſe rightly.

1. We have already ſpoken of the Discipline of the Secret (p. 159). The Blessed Sacrament was eſpecially liable to profanation. The Fathers, therefore, were obliged either to be ſilent about it, or to ſpeak of it in guarded language intelligible only to the initiated.

2. Our Lord’s preſence in the Blessed Sacrament is ſo wonderful, and may be looked at from ſo many points of view, that many expreſſions may be uſed concerning it which are quite orthodox in one ſenſe and falſe in another.

(a) There is no ſenſible change. Hence it might be ſaid that, in a certain ſenſe, no change takes place.

(b) Bread is the *terminus a quo*,<sup>54</sup> and the phenomena of bread remain after the change. Hence the Blessed Sacrament may be called bread.

(c) Although our Lord’s body underlies the appearances of bread, theſe appearances themſelves are not our Lord’s body. Hence the Blessed Sacrament may be called the ſign of His body.

(d) Our Lord’s body is not preſent in the form which it had on earth, or in the glorified form which it now has in heaven. Hence our Lord is ſaid to be ſpiritually preſent in the Blessed Sacrament, whereas He was corporally preſent when on earth.

(e) The expreſſion “to eat our Lord’s body” may be underſtood in many ſenſes. There is the Capharnaïtic ſenſe, *i.e.* to eat His body under the form which it had on earth. This is rightly excluded by St. Auſtine. Again, there is the ſenſe of eating our Lord’s body in the Blessed Sacrament in ſuch a way that His body is ground down by our teeth and affected by diſteſtion. This alſo muſt be excluded. We may alſo deny that the wicked eat the body of the Lord, *i.e.* ſo as to derive any benefit from it.

<sup>54</sup>“The end from which.” —Ed.

(f) The Blessed Sacrament is in a certain sense the figure of our Lord's body (see above, c). His presence under the appearances of bread is a sacrament or figure of His presence when on earth. The Blessed Sacrament is also the antitype or fulfilment (*figura adimpleta*) of the Old Testament types and figures. See Franzelin, *thes.* x.

## § 196 TRANSUBSTANTIATION

The Church teaches not only the fact that our Lord is really and truly present in the Blessed Sacrament, but also the way in which He is present. By the words of consecration the whole substance of bread is changed into our Lord's body, and the whole substance of wine is changed into His blood, the appearances (*species*) of bread and wine alone remaining. Although the name "Transubstantiation," which is given to this change, is not older than the eleventh century, the notion itself was clearly taught by the Fathers. Protestants, who objected to the introduction of the word, walk in the footsteps of the Arians, who objected to the term *ὁμοιοσις*, and of the Nestorians, who objected to the term *Θεοτόκος*. Transubstantiation is no more philosophical than these, and is just as much contained in Scripture. It is founded on the familiar distinction between a substance and its accidents or phenomena. When our Lord changed water into wine, the substance of the water was changed into the substance of wine, and the taste, smell, appearance, etc., of water, gave place to the taste, smell, etc., of wine. In the Blessed Sacrament the substantial change takes place without any accidental change. For such a distinct kind of change there should be a distinct name, and none fitter could be invented than transubstantiation. That the notion conveyed by this word is contained in Holy Scripture, all the Schoolmen agree. Some, however (*e.g.* Scotus), have held that it could not be proved from Scripture alone. We need hardly say that Scotus was a firm believer in the doctrine itself. But the Council of Trent favours the opposite view: "Forasmuch as Christ our Redeemer declared that which He offered under the species of bread to be truly His own body, *therefore* hath it ever been a firm belief in the Church of God, and this holy Synod doth now declare it anew, that by the consecration of the bread and of the wine, a conversion is made of the whole substance of the bread," etc. (*sess.* xiii. c. 4).

I. The words of institution, "This is My body," are equivalent to two propositions: (1) "This which I hold in My hand, which is now here before you, is My body;" and (2) "This which I hold in My hand, which is now before you, is no longer bread." If bread were still present, our Lord could not say, "This is My body;" but only, "Here, or in this, is My body." To make the words of institution true, it is necessary that they should effect what they signify. That is to say, when our Lord pronounced the words, what He held in His hands must have ceased to be bread, and must have become His body. And as no change took place in the accidents or appearances, the change must have been that which is called transubstantiation.

We have seen that the proper rule for the interpretation of the Scriptures is the teaching of the Church (Book I. part i. ch. 3). If we examine the writings of the Fathers, we see that not only do they teach the doctrine of transubstantiation, but they base their belief in it on the words of institution. Hence we rightly hold that the doctrine can be proved from Scripture, at least with the help of the legitimate means of interpretation.

II. We have already shown that the Fathers teach that the bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of our Lord. We noticed that no difficulty could be urged against the Real Presence, from the fact that the Blessed Sacrament was sometimes called bread, even

after the consecration. But the Fathers insist that it is not bread, but only seems to be such; that we are not to believe it to be what our senses tell us; that instead of the bread which was present our Lord's body is laid upon the altar.

"What seems bread is not bread, though it seems so to the taste, but Christ's body; what seems wine is not wine, even though the taste will have it so, but Christ's blood" (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* iv. 9).

"The Lord Jesus Himself cries out: 'This is My body.' Before the benediction of heavenly words another species (nature) is named; after the consecration (His) body is signified (*i.e.* is said to be no longer bread, but His body). He Himself declares it His own blood. Before the consecration it is called another thing; after consecration it is called blood. And thou sayest, 'Amen;' that is, it is true" (St. Ambrose, *De Myst.* ix).

"From that moment when He took bread and called it His body, it was not bread, but His body" (St. James of Sarug, *Serm.* 66, *De Passione Domini*).

"It (the bread) is changed by a wonderful operation, though to us it appears bread. . . . Bread, indeed, it appears to us, but flesh in reality it is (ἄρτος μὲν ἡμῖν φαίνεται, σὰρξ δὲ τῷ ὄντι ἔσται)" (Theophylact, *In Matt.* xxvi. 26).

The Fathers say that the Blessed Sacrament is not common bread. This would not by itself prove their belief in transubstantiation. They take care, however, to say that what was common bread becomes "the bread of life;" "the living bread which came down from heaven," "the bread that we break;" "the bread which Christ said was His flesh;" that it is not common bread, but "the body of Christ." *E.g.* "We do not receive these things as common bread and common drink, but . . . the food . . . is both flesh and blood of that same incarnate Jesus" (St. Justin; see above, p. 175). "Wherefore do not contemplate the bread and wine as bare (elements), for they are, according to the Lord's declaration, Christ's body and blood" (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech. Myst.*, iv. 6).

They say that the bread itself is changed into our Lord's body. "The bread itself and wine are changed into the body and blood of God" (St. John Damascene; see above, p. 176).

"He Himself therefore having declared and said concerning the bread, 'This is My body,' who shall dare to doubt henceforward? And He Himself having settled and said, 'This is My blood,' who shall ever doubt, saying, 'This is not His blood?' He once, at Cana of Galilee, changed (μεταβέβληκεν) water into wine, which is akin to blood, and is He undeserving of belief when He changed wine into blood?" (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Cat.*, iv. 2.) This comparison shows that Cyril held that the substance of bread and wine were changed. (Cf. St. Ambrose and St. Chrysostom, quoted in the foregoing section.)

When the Fathers speak of our Lord's body and blood as being *in* bread and wine, they do not mean that the substance of bread and wine remains, but they refer either to that out of which the sacrament is made (*e.g.* "He consecrated His blood in wine," Tertullian), or to the appearances under which our Lord is present.

III. When the heresy of Berengarius arose in the eleventh century, the whole Church explicitly professed the doctrine of transubstantiation. The Fourth Lateran Council, held in 1215, defined that "the body and blood (of Christ) are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the appearances (*sub speciebus*) of bread and wine, the bread being transubstantiated into the body, and the wine into the blood, by the power of God." The Second Council of Lyons (1274), in the profession of Faith proposed to Michael Palæologus, and accepted by him on behalf of the Eastern Church, says, "The said Roman Church believeth

and teacheth that in the sacrament the bread is truly transubstantiated (ἀληθῶς μετουσιῶται) into the body, and the wine into the blood of the Lord Jesus Christ." The Council of Trent, therefore, only renewed more solemnly and clearly what had long before been defined, and had been explicitly believed by the faithful.

*Cor.* The Council of Trent has defined that in the Eucharist "the whole Christ is contained under each species (*i.e.* under the appearances of bread or wine), and under every part of each species when separated" (sess. xiii. can. 3). These two points do not present any difficulty when transubstantiation has once been admitted.

1. Our Lord Himself uses the expression, "He that eateth *Me*," thereby showing that he who eats receives the whole Christ. So, too, St. Paul, "whosoever shall eat of this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord, shall be guilty of the body *and* blood of the Lord." It is also clear that the words, "This is My body," make our Lord's body to be present, as it actually is, *i.e.* as a living body containing the blood.

2. As to the other point, Our Lord's conduct at the Last Supper proves that He is present at least under every portion of the consecrated wine, for every Apostle that drank received Him. The constant and universal practice of breaking the consecrated bread is a proof of belief in this doctrine. It is also theologically certain, though not of Faith, that our Lord is whole and entire in each part even before separation.

*Scholion.* We need not here enter into the philosophical or scientific bearings of transubstantiation. We may observe that the doctrine is inconsistent only with idealism, and that it is not bound up with any ultrarealist theories. The Council of Trent, when defining the change of substance, studiously avoids the use of the term "accident," the usual scholastic correlative of substance, and speaks of "species" (εἶδος), appearances, or phenomena. It is commonly held, however, that these are not merely subjective impressions, but have some sort of corresponding reality. See Franzelin, thes. xi. and xvi.; Dalgairns, part i. chap. 2, and note F.

## § 197 THE MATTER AND FORM OF THE EUCHARIST: MINISTER, RECIPIENT, EFFECTS

I. The Holy Eucharist being a sacrament, it must have matter and form in the sense already explained (§ 186).

1. Just as in the case of Baptism washing is the natural act, so here in the Eucharist eating and drinking are the natural acts chosen by our Lord to be the means of conveying spiritual nourishment to our souls. "Eat," "drink" (Matt. xxvi. 26, 27). But an important difference should be noted. No change takes place in the water used for Baptism; whereas in the Eucharist the bread and wine are, as we have seen, changed into the body and blood of our Lord. The Blessed Eucharist is therefore a permanent sacrament, our Lord's body and blood being present not only while the sacrament is being received, but also before and after use (Council of Trent, sess. xiii. can. 4). Bread and wine may be said to be the matter of this permanent sacrament (*Decr. pro Armenis*), as they are the natural things raised by transubstantiation into the body and blood of our Lord. Wheaten bread (ἄρτος) and wine of the grape must be used, as they are the typical food and drink used by our Lord. Whether the bread should be leavened or unleavened has long been a point of dispute between the Eastern and Western Churches. The Council of Florence (1439) decided that either kind of



bread was sufficient for the validity of the sacrament; but that leavened bread should be used in the East, and unleavened bread in the West.<sup>55</sup> “It hath been enjoined by the Church on priests to mix water with the wine that is to be offered in the chalice;<sup>56</sup> as well because it is believed that Christ the Lord did this, as also because from His side there came out blood and water: the memory of which mystery is renewed by this commixture, and whereas in the Apocalypse of blessed John the peoples are called ‘waters,’ the union of that faithful people with Christ their Head is hereby represented” (Council of Trent, sess. xxii. ch. 7).

2. The form of the sacrament, by which the bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of our Lord, consists of the words, “This is My body,” “This is My blood,” or “This is the chalice of My blood.” After what has been said in the preceding sections, no further proof of this is required. We may observe, however, that the Epiclesis after the consecration in the Greek liturgy—praying “God to send His Holy Spirit upon the gifts set forth, and to change the bread into the body of Christ, and the wine into His blood”—does not produce the change (which has indeed already been made), but serves to declare what has taken place, and to implore that it may have a salutary effect upon Christ’s mystical body, the Church (see Franzelin, *De Eucharistia*, thes. vii.).

II. As the Eucharist is a permanent sacrament, we must distinguish between the act of consecration and the act of administration.

1. No one but a bishop or a priest has the power of consecrating. Our Lord Jesus Christ “offered up to God the Father His own body and blood under the appearances of bread and wine, and under the symbols of those same things He delivered (His own body and blood) to be received by His Apostles, whom He then constituted priests of the New Testament; and by those words, ‘Do this in commemoration of Me,’ He commanded them and their successors in the priesthood to offer (them), even as the Catholic Church hath always understood and taught. . . . If any one saith that by those words, ‘Do this,’ etc., Christ did not institute the Apostles priests, or did not ordain that they and other priests should offer His own body and blood, let him be anathema” (Council of Trent, sess. xxii. ch. 1, can. 2). And the Fourth Lateran Council (ch. 1) had already defined that “no one but a priest (*sacerdos*) rightly ordained can perform (*conficere*) this sacrament.” St. Justin, describing the ceremonies of the Mass, says, “To him who presides over the brethren [*τῷ προεστῶτι*, *i.e.* the bishop or priest] bread is brought, and a cup of wine mixed with water, and he, having taken them, sends up praise and glory to the Father of all things, through the Name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and at much length he makes a Eucharist (*Εὐχαριστίαν . . . ποιῆται*) for that God hath vouchsafed to them these things . . . . He who presides having given thanks (eucharistized), and all the people having expressed their assent, they who are called among us deacons give to each of those present a portion of the consecrated (eucharistized) bread, and wine and water, and carry away a portion to those who are absent” (*Apol.*, i. n. 65; see also Tertullian,

<sup>55</sup>The Western practice would seem to be more in accordance with the example of our Lord at the Last Supper. “On the first day of the Azymes (unleavened bread) the disciples came to Jesus, saying, Where wilt Thou that we prepare for Thee to eat the Pasch?” (Matt. xxvi. 17). Now, in the Book of Exodus (xii. 15) we read: “Seven days shall you eat unleavened bread; in the first day there shall be no leaven in your houses; whosoever shall eat anything leavened from the first day until the seventh day, that soul shall perish out of Israel!” (see also *ibid.* 17–20). Even if our Lord anticipated the time of the Passover (“Before the festival day of the Pasch,” John xlii. 1; cf. 27–29; xviii. 28; xix. 14). He would have used paschal food (see De Augustinus, *De Re Sacramentaria*, lib. ii, p. 181.

<sup>56</sup>Council in Trullo (*Quinisextum*), ch. xxxii.; Third Council of Carthage, ch. xxiv.; Council of Florence, *Decr. pro Armenis*.

*De Præscr.*, cap. xli.; *De Corona Militis*, cap. iii.; St. Cyprian, *Epiſt.*, iv.; Origen, *Hom. iv. in Num.*, n. 3). “Not even deacons,” says St. Epiphanius (*Her.*, lxxix. n. 4), “are allowed to perform any sacrament in the ecclesiastical order, but merely to be the ministers of those already completed.” St. Jerome says that the heretic Hilarius, when he left the Church as a deacon, “could not perform (*perficere*) the Eucharist, as he had no bishops or priests” (*Adv. Lucif.*, n. 21; see also St. John Chrysoſtom, *De Sacerdotio*, lib. iii. n. 4, etc.). “It hath come to the knowledge of the holy and great synod,” says the Council of Nicæa (can. 18), “that in certain places or cities the deacons give the Eucharist to the presbyters; a thing which neither canon nor custom hath handed down, that they who have not authority to offer, should give the body of Christ to those who do offer (τοὺς ἐξουσίαν μὴ ἔχοντας προσφέρειν, τούτους τοῖς προσφέρουσι δίδονται τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ).”

2. The administration of the Eucharist to the faithful properly belongs to priests, though under extraordinary circumstances a deacon may administer. “It was always the custom in the Church of God,” says the Council of Trent (sess. xiii. chap. 8), “that laymen should receive the Communion from priests, but that priests when celebrating should communicate themselves.” The passages just cited from the Fathers clearly show who are the ordinary and extraordinary dispensers of the sacrament. We may add the authority of the Fourth Council of Carthage (398), which, in its 38th canon, permits the deacon to administer if necessity requires (*si necessitas cogat*). So far we have been speaking of solemn administration. In former ages of the Church, clerics in minor orders, and even the laity, were permitted in cases of necessity to carry the Blessed Sacrament and administer it. St. Tarcisius, a young acolyte, was beaten to death by the pagans while he was bearing the Holy Eucharist; and St. Dionysius of Alexandria tells how he gave the Holy Eucharist to a boy to carry to the dying Serapion (see Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, book vi. chap. 44).

III. The dispositions required for the worthy reception of the Eucharist are treated of in moral and ascetical theology. Here it will be sufficient to quote the words of the Council of Trent: “The more the holiness and divinity of this heavenly sacrament are understood by a Christian, the more diligently ought he to give heed that he approach not to receive it but with great reverence and holiness, especially as we read in the Apostle those words full of terror, ‘He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself.’ Wherefore he who would communicate, ought to recall to mind the precept of the Apostle, ‘Let a man prove himself.’ Now, ecclesiastical usage declareth that necessary proof to be, that no one conscious to himself of mortal sin, how contrite so ever he may seem to himself, ought to approach to the sacred Eucharist without previous sacramental confession” (sess. xiii. chap. 7). We shall now discuss two important questions: (1) the necessity of receiving this sacrament, and (2) communion under one kind.

1. The Holy Eucharist is not absolutely necessary for salvation (*necessitate mediæ*); that is to say, it is possible for a person to be saved without ever having received the sacrament. “Little children who have not reached the use of reason,” says the Council of Trent, “are not by any necessity obliged to the sacramental Communion of the Eucharist, forasmuch as having been regenerated by the laver of baptism, and being incorporated with Christ, they cannot at that age lose the grace which they have already acquired of being the sons of God. Not therefore, however, is antiquity to be condemned if in some places at one time it observed that custom; or as those most holy Fathers had a reasonable (*probabilem*) cause for what they did in respect of their times, so assuredly is it to be believed without controversy that they did this without

any necessity thereof unto salvation” (*eos nulla salutis necessitate id fecisse*; sess. xxi. chap. 4). And Scripture teaches that baptism alone is necessary: “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved” (Mark xvi. 16); “He saved us by the laver of regeneration” (Tit. iii. 5); “Baptism being of the like form now saveth you also” (1 Pet. iii. 21). Moreover, theological reasoning tells us that if the Eucharist were necessary, it would be so either for acquiring the state of grace or for preserving it; whereas, on the contrary, it requires us to be already in a state of grace, and that state can be lost only by sin. We have said not *absolutely necessary*, because the Eucharist is necessary in the sense that we are obliged by our Lord’s express command to receive it: “Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you” (John vi. 54): “Do this in commemoration of Me” (Luke xxii. 19; 1 Cor. xi. 23 sqq.) “Our Saviour, when about to depart out of this world to the Father, instituted this sacrament, in which He poured forth, as it were, the riches of His Divine love towards man, making a remembrance of His wonderful works; and He commanded us, in the participation thereof, to venerate His memory, and to show forth His death until He come to judge the world. And He would also that this sacrament should be received as the spiritual food of souls, whereby may be fed and strengthened those who live with His life, Who said, ‘He that eateth Me, the same also shall live by Me’” (Council of Trent, sess. xiii. chap. 1). The Council, renewing the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), commands the faithful to communicate every year, at least at Easter (can. 9).

2. “Layman and clerics, when not celebrating,” says the same Council (sess. xxi. chap. 1), “are not obliged by any Divine precept to receive the sacrament of the Eucharist under both kinds (*species*); neither can it by any means be doubted, without injury to faith, that communion under either kind is sufficient for them unto salvation. For although Christ the Lord in the Last Supper instituted and delivered to the Apostles this venerable sacrament in the species of bread and wine, not therefore do that institution and delivery tend thereunto that all the faithful of the Church are bound by Divine ordinance (*statuto*) to receive both kinds. But neither is it rightly gathered from that discourse which is in the sixth of St. John . . . that communion under both kinds (*utriusque speciei communionem*) was enjoined by the Lord; for He who said, ‘Except you eat,’ etc., also said, ‘He that eateth this bread shall live for ever. . . . The bread that I will give is My flesh for the life of the world.’” We read in the Acts that the faithful “were persevering in the doctrine of the Apostles, and in the communication of the breaking of bread (τῆ κοινωνίᾳ τῆ κλάσει τοῦ ἄρτου), and in prayer” (ii. 42).<sup>57</sup> St. Luke is here describing what the faithful did. The Apostles, of course, consecrated under both kinds. St. Paul, writing to the Corinthians, alludes to the same practice of receiving under one kind: “Whosoever shall eat this bread, *or* drink the chalice of the Lord, unworthily, shall be guilty of the body *and* of the blood of the Lord” (1 Cor. xi. 27).

It is commonly objected that the present practice is (a) completely modern, and (b) contrary to the essence of the sacrament.

(a) We grant that for the first twelve centuries it was customary for the faithful to receive under both kinds.<sup>58</sup> Nevertheless we have numerous instances of communion under one kind

<sup>57</sup> Compare Luke xxiv. 30, 35: “Whilst He was at table with them, He took bread, and blessed, and brake, and gave to them. . . . They knew Him in the breaking of bread (ἐν τῆ κλάσει τοῦ ἄρτου).”

<sup>58</sup> St. Thomas, writing just before his death (1274), speaks of communion under the species of bread alone as “the practice of many Churches (*multarum ecclesiarum usus*),” and says that “it is observed in certain Churches (*in quibusdam ecclesiis*)” (3, q. 80, a. 12).

alone. Thus, to infants the Eucharist was often given under the form of wine, as is still the practice among the Greeks. In times of persecution or under difficulties, the consecrated bread was carried away from the church for private Communion. The sick also often communicated under one kind alone.<sup>59</sup> It may be inferred from St. Leo (*Serm.* 42, *De Quadragesima*) and Sozomen (*Hist.*, viii. 5) that both at Rome and at Constantinople, even in public, the Communion was sometimes received by the faithful under the appearances of bread only. So, too, in England in the old Saxon days (see Bede, *Hist. Eccl.* ii. 5). In the so-called "Masses of the Presanctified" of the Greek Church during Lent, and of the Western Church on Good Friday, both the priests and the people received the consecrated Host alone.<sup>60</sup> Our Good Friday "Mass" is described in the ancient *Ordo Romanus* (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, tom. lxxviii. p. 954). Moreover, theological reasoning tells us that if Christ is whole and entire under either kind alone, those who receive under either kind receive the whole of Christ.

(b) But does not communion under one kind destroy the very essence of the sacrament, which consists in *eating and drinking*? We reply that we *do* receive both the body and blood of Christ under either kind, and so the essence of the sacrament (partaking of the heavenly banquet) is retained. Those who do not believe in the real objective presence of our Lord in the Host, and who maintain that the essence of the sacrament consists in eating mere bread and drinking mere wine, are of course logically bound to insist on receiving under both kinds. But our doctrine of the Real Presence lays us under no such necessity.

The reasons why the Church has enjoined the use of one species (kind) are thus stated by the Catechism of the Council of Trent: "The greatest caution was necessary to avoid spilling the blood of the Lord on the ground, a thing that seemed not easy to be avoided if the chalice ought to be administered in a large assemblage of the people. Besides, as the Holy Eucharist ought to be in readiness for the sick, it was very much to be apprehended that if the species of wine were long unconsumed it might turn acid. Moreover, there are very many who cannot at all bear the taste or even the smell of wine; lest therefore what is intended for the health of the soul should prove noxious to that of the body, most prudently has it been enacted by the Church that the faithful should receive the species of bread only. It is further to be observed that in several countries they labour under extreme scarcity of wine, nor can it be brought from elsewhere without very heavy expenses, and very tedious and difficult journeys. In the next place, a circumstance most of all to the point, the heresy of those was to be uprooted who denied that Christ, whole and entire, is contained under either species, and asserted that the body only without the blood is contained under the appearances (species) of bread, and the blood only under the appearances of wine" (Part ii. ch. iv. n. 64).<sup>61</sup>

IV. The effects of the Holy Eucharist are described at length by our Lord Himself (John vi. 48 sq.): "I am the bread of life. . . . If any man eat of this bread he shall live for ever. . . . He

<sup>59</sup>Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, vi. 44; Paulinus, *Vita S. Ambrosii*, n. 47; Eleventh Council of Toledo (675), ch. ii.

<sup>60</sup>The modern practice of pouring some drops of the consecrated wine over the consecrated bread has no warrant in antiquity.

<sup>61</sup>The appendix to the decrees on communion under one kind is worthy of note: "Whether the reasons by which the Holy Catholic Church was led to communicate, under the one species of bread alone, laymen and also priests when not celebrating, are in such wise to be adhered to, as that on no account is the use of the chalice to be allowed to any one soever; and whether in case that for proper (*honestis*) reasons, consonant with Christian charity, it appears that the use of the chalice is to be granted to any nation or kingdom, it is to be conceded under certain conditions; and what are those conditions; this same holy Synod reserves the same to be examined and defined at some other times." Pius IV in 1563 granted the use of the chalice to the German Churches, but the grant was withdrawn by his successor, Pius V.

that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath everlasting life, and I will raise him up at the last day . . . [he] abideth in Me and I in him. . . . He that eateth Me, the same also shall live by Me. . . . He that eateth this bread shall live for ever.” The Author and Fount of life becomes the true meat and drink of our souls; He abides in them, gives them life and preserves it in them. The physical union of Christ with us by entering within us, is not strictly the effect, but rather the application, of the sacrament; it is the spiritual union by charity which is the proper effect. See the passages quoted from the Fathers, *supra*, § 195.

1. The Eucharist, however, is a sacrament of the living (p. 158). It was not instituted to confer the first grace; it cannot properly produce its effects unless the soul is already spiritually alive. “Whosoever shall eat this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord, unworthily (*ἀναξίως*), shall be guilty of the body and of the blood of the Lord.” “Let a man prove himself (*δοκιμαζέτω* . . . *ἑαυτόν*, ‘put himself to the test, examine himself’), and so let him eat of that bread and drink of the chalice; or he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment (*κρίμα*) to himself” (1 Cor. xi. 27–29). So, too, the Fathers and the Liturgies insist that the Eucharist shall not be given to any who are in a state of sin. The very nature of the sacrament—the *food* and *drink* of our souls—requires that the recipient should be already alive in order to receive it. “If it is unbecoming,” says the Council of Trent, “for any one to approach to any of the sacred functions unless he approach holily; assuredly the more the holiness and dignity of this heavenly sacrament are understood by a Christian, the more diligently ought he to give heed that he approach not to receive it but with great reverence and holiness, especially as we read in the Epistle those words full of terror, ‘He that eateth,’ etc. Wherefore he who would communicate ought to recall to mind the precept of the Apostle: ‘Let a man prove himself.’ Now, ecclesiastical usage declares that necessary proof to be, that no one conscious to himself of mortal sin, how contrite soever he may seem to himself, ought to approach to the sacred Eucharist without previous sacramental confession” (sess. xiii. ch. 7, and can. 11). “If any one saith that the principal fruit of the most Holy Eucharist is the remission of sins . . . let him be anathema” (can. 5).

2. But do not the Fathers and the Liturgies often speak of remission of sins among the effects of the Eucharist? True; but this remission is attributed to the Eucharist as a *sacrifice*, or else it refers only to daily defects and venial sins. Many theologians also maintain that even mortal sins may be remitted by the Eucharist, though only *per accidens*; that is to say, if a person, unaware that he is in mortal sin, and having attrition for sin,<sup>60</sup> approaches the sacrament, his sin will be remitted by the action of the sacrament.<sup>61</sup> The remission of venial sins is a consequence of the principal effect of the Eucharist; for the union of charity with God, who is charity itself, removes all obstacles to the perfection of this union. Hence our Saviour “would that this sacrament should be received . . . as an antidote whereby we may be freed from daily faults, and be preserved from mortal sins” (Council of Trent, sess. xiii. ch. 2).

3. The Fathers frequently speak of the effects of the Eucharist upon our bodies. The intimate union of our bodies with Christ’s body makes us of one body and one blood (*σύσσωμοι καὶ σύναιμοι*) with Him. And from this union with Him, who cannot see corruption (Ps. xv. 10), there results an antidote to that bodily corruption which is the effect of sin. “The body attains . . . to a participation of, and commixture with, Him Who is life. For as they who

<sup>60</sup>For the meaning of “attrition,” see *infra*, p. 471.

<sup>61</sup>This is denied by such grave authorities as Vasquez and De Lugo.

from some device have taken poison, quench its deadly potency by some opposite (other) remedy . . . so we, again, after having tasted of that which dissolves our nature, as a matter of necessity must also stand in need of that which reunites what has been dissolved, . . . What, then, is this? Nothing else but that very body which was manifested to be more powerful than death, and which was the principle of our life. For as a little leaven, according to the Apostle, leaveneth the whole lump, so when that body which was by God smitten with death is within our body it changes and transfers the whole unto itself” (St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Or. Cat.*, c. 37). This action on our bodies consists partly in allaying concupiscence (St. John Chrysoſtom, *In Joann. Hom.*, xlvi. n. 4), partly in adapting them for resurrection. “He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath everlasting life, and I will *raise him up on the last day*” (John vi. 55). See St. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Joann.*, tom. iv. p. 363; St. Irenæus, lib. iv. cap. 18, n. 5. Our Saviour would have the Eucharist “to be a pledge of our glory to come and everlasting happiness, and thus be a symbol of that one body whereof He is the Head, and to which He would fain have us, as members, be united by the closest bond of faith, hope, and charity, that we might all speak the same things, and there might be no schisms among us” (Council of Trent, sess. xiii. ch. 2) See St. Thomas, 3, q. 79; Franzelin, theses xvii.–xix.; De Augustinis, part ii. art. 7; and Bossuet, *Traité de la Communion sous les deux espèces*.

On the Sacrament of the Eucharist see, in addition to the authors mentioned in the beginning of this chapter: Chardon, *Hiſt. des Sacrements*, livre i. ſect. iii.; Billot, *De Ecclesia Sacramentis*, p. 287 sqq.; Turmel, *Hiſt. de la Théologie Positive*, pp. 132, 306, 432; Batiffol, *Études d’Hiſtoire et de Théologie Positive*, 2e série; Bp. Hedley, *The Holy Eucharist*; Bridgett, *The Holy Eucharist in Great Britain*.

## CHAPTER V

### THE MASS

**O**UR LORD JESUS CHRIST, “though He was about to offer Himself once on the altar of the Cross unto God the Father, by means of His death (Heb. ix. 5), there to operate an eternal redemption (*ib.* 12); nevertheless, because His priesthood was not to be extinguished by His death, in the Last Supper on the night in which He was betrayed—that He might leave to His own beloved spouse the Church a visible sacrifice, such as the nature of man requires, whereby that bloody sacrifice, once to be accomplished on the Cross, might be represented, and the memory thereof remain even unto the end of the world, and its salutary virtue be applied to the remission of those sins which we daily commit—declaring Himself constituted a priest for ever, according to the order of Melchisedech, He offered up to God the Father His own body and blood, under the appearances of bread and wine; and under the symbols of those same things He delivered (His own body and blood) to be received by His Apostles. whom He then constituted priests of the New Testament; and by those words, ‘Do this in commemoration of Me,’ He commanded them and their successors in the priesthood to offer. . . . If any one saith that in the Mass a true and proper sacrifice is not offered to God . . . let him be anathema” (Council of Trent, sess. xxii. ch. 1, can. i). See St. Thomas, 3, q. 85, with the commentaries thereon by Vasquez, Suarez, and the Salmanticenses; Bellarmine, *De Eucharistia*, lib. v.; De Lugo, *De Eucharistia*; Thomassin, *De Incarnatione*, lib. x.; Franzelin, *De Eucharistia Sacrificio*; De Augustinis, *De Re Sacramentaria*, lib. ii. p. 3;

Hedley, p. 147 sqq.

## § 198 SACRIFICES AND DIVINE WORSHIP

I. History knows of no religion without some form of sacrifice. Jews and Gentiles, civilized and uncivilized nations, have found in human reason, and in the religious instinct common to all, a natural impulse to communicate with the Supreme Being by means of gifts, called sacrifices on account of the sacred character they receive from being destined for Divine acceptance. As between man and man, so between man and God, gifts of things visible serve to express the invisible feelings of esteem and gratitude, to conciliate benevolence, and to atone for misdeeds. There is, then, in gifts to God, or sacrifices, an innate aptitude to be the external manifestation of all the acts of Divine worship—adoration, thanksgiving, petition, propitiation or expiation.

II. The natural aptitude of a gift to be the subject-matter of acts of worship, receives its final form when, by private intention or authorized institution, certain sacrifices are set apart to express certain acts of worship. Public worship necessarily postulates public institution by lawful authority. This alone can determine the signification of the single acts for the whole community, and impart to the whole system the uniformity required by society considered as a unit. In the supernatural order the lawful authority is God. He alone determines which sacrifices He accepts, for what purposes He accepts them, and by whom they are to be offered. Scripture—at least since the Mosaic legislation—is most explicit in this matter. Nothing essential is left to the arbitrary decision of man: God has revealed the matter and form, and the minister of the sacrifices by which He commands us to worship Him.

III. The whole character of the sacrificial institutions of the Old Testament was temporary, and typical of the great sacrifice of the New Law. The Epistle to the Hebrews is devoted to the demonstration of this proposition. The Levitical priesthood, “who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things” (Heb. viii. 5), foreshadowed and pointed to the “High Priest who is set on the right hand of the throne of majesty in the heavens, a minister of the holies, and of the true tabernacle, which the Lord hath pitched, and not man” (*ibid.* 1, 2). The sacrifices and ceremonies and the whole external worship were imperfect and powerless as to the expiation of sins. They produced only legal expiations, “the cleansing of the flesh,” thus expressing the necessity of an internal expiation and of the sacrifice of Christ, by which this true expiation is accomplished. “The Holy Ghost signifying this, that the way into the holies was not yet made manifest, whilst the former tabernacle was yet standing. Which is a parable of the time present; according to which gifts and sacrifices are offered, which cannot, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth, only in meats and drinks, and divers washings, and justices of the flesh laid on them until the time of correction (*διωρώσεως*). But Christ, being come an High Priest of the good things to come, . . . by His own blood, entered once into the holies, having obtained eternal redemption” (Heb. ix. 8–12 sqq.).

IV. “Entering once (*ἐφ’ ἅπασι*, ‘once for all’) into the holies, Christ obtained eternal redemption;” that is, He acquired merit sufficient to redeem all mankind. His sacrifice has consummated the work of redemption: it need not and cannot be repeated (cf. Book V, § 144). It deprives of their object the ancient sacrifices, which were but “an oblation for sin,” a confession of impotence to give due satisfaction. It also excludes a repetition of itself for the purpose of further merit. But it implies, or at least does not exclude, a representation of itself for the application to individual members of mankind of the infinite treasure of grace

gained by Christ. In view of the way in which saving grace is applied to man, viz. by the free use of the means of grace, and in view of the nature of public worship, of which sacrifice is the central and most solemn act, a perennial representation of Christ's sacrifice appears as a most fitting element in the organism of the supernatural order. The Council of Trent adopts this view (sess. xxii. ch. 1).

## § 199 THE SACRIFICE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT FORETOLD BY THE PROPHET MALACHIAS

I. The last of the Prophets of the Old Covenant announces the abolition of the Mosaic sacrifices, and the introduction of a new order of public worship: "I have no pleasure in you (the priests), saith the Lord of hosts, and I will not receive a gift of your hand. For from the rising of the sun even to the going down, My Name is great among the Gentiles; and in every place there is a sacrifice, and there is offered to My Name a clean oblation: for My Name is great among the Gentiles, saith the Lord of hosts" (Mal. i. 10, 11).

1. "I will not receive a gift of your hand." These words clearly imply the abolition of the Mosaic priesthood, and of the public worship whose ministers they were. They have to give place, as appears from ver. 11, to an order of things in which the Name of God is great, not only among His chosen people and in the chosen land, but among all nations and in all places. The Prophets always characterize the coming of the Messias by this universal acknowledgment and glorification of God (*supra*, p. 52). Hence the idea underlying ver. 11 is that in the New Testament the particular priesthood and the particular sacrifices of the Jews will be abolished and their place taken by something better.

2. "In every place there is a sacrifice, and there is offered to My Name a clean oblation." From the text itself and from the context (vers. 5-10) we see that the Prophet deals exclusively with external worship. As the sacrifices to be abolished are real and true sacrifices, so the pure oblation to be substituted for them is a real and true sacrifice. The technical terms used in the Hebrew leave no shadow of doubt on this point. The term מִטְּרָרָה (*muctar*), a form of *catar* ("to burn incense") is used one hundred and forty-six times in the sacrificial sense; מִגִּגָּס (*muggas*), from *nagas* ("to offer"), at least twelve times, and מִנְחָה (*mincha*), an unbloody sacrifice, about one hundred and fifty-four times. Nowhere are they used in connection with internal worship; nowhere are they applied to oblations other than proper sacrifices. Taking, then, the three expressions together, we have a threefold argument in favour of the true sacrificial nature of the promised new worship.

3. Ch. v. 3: the sons of Levi, cleansed and purified, are said to be the priests of the new order. But Isaias (lxvi. 21) has told us that God will take men of all nations and tongues to be priests and Levites. Hence the minister of the new sacrifice is a sacrificing priest as of old, only purer and nobler, as he offers a purer and nobler sacrifice.

II. The consent of the Fathers and theologians in this matter is all but unanimous. Belarmino (l. v. c. 10) and Petavius (*De Incarn.*, l. xii. n. 12 sqq.) have collected the interpretations of the Fathers. Cornelius à Lapidè is so impressed with their unanimity, that he confidently says, "It is of faith that this clean oblation is the sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Eucharist" (*Comm. in Mal.*, i. 11). Such also is the explicit doctrine of the Council of Trent, sessr xxii. chap. 1.



## § 197 INSTITUTION OF THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE

I. The prophecy of Malachias received its fulfilment at the Last Supper, when Christ instituted the unbloody sacrifice of the New Testament. The four accounts given of the institution by the Evangelists Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and by St. Paul, slightly differ in their terms, but convey the same meaning, viz. what Christ meant when He used those or similar expressions. We subjoin the various texts in the original Greek, and in the Vulgate and Rheims-Douay translations. From an analysis of them we shall prove that they clearly and convincingly express the institution of a true sacrifice.

**Luke xxii. 20:** “Τοῦτό το ποτήριον, ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη ἐν τῷ αἵματί μου, τὸ ὑπὼν ἐκχυνόμενον.”  
*“Hic est calix novum testamentum in sanguine meo, qui pro vobis fundetur.”*  
 “This is the chalice, the new testament in My blood, which shall be shed for you.”

**Mark xiv. 24:** “Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ αἷμά μου τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης, τὸ περὶ πολλῶν ἐκχυνόμενον.”  
*“Hic est sanguis mei novi testamenti, qui pro multis effundetur.”*  
 “This is My blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many.”

**Matt. xxvi. 28:** “Τοῦτό γάρ ἐστι τὸ αἷμά μου τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης, τὸ περὶ πολλῶν ἐκχυνόμενον εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν.”  
*“Hic est enim sanguis meus novi testamenti, qui pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum.”*  
 “For this is My blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many unto remission of sins.”

1. St. Luke evidently speaks of the effusion of the blood “as it is in the chalice.” “This chalice is shed,” as the Greek has it, can convey but one meaning: that the blood contained in the chalice is shed, at the present time, for you. The same blood was shed on the Cross, but not as contained in the chalice, in its sacramental state. Matthew and Mark do not use the same figure of speech as Luke. Instead of naming the cup to signify what it contains, they directly name the contents, “My blood.” The meaning, however, must be the same, as the three narratives report one and the same event. Hence they all refer to the blood as it is actually in the chalice, and all state that it is there shed for us, and unto remission of sins. Now, the shedding of blood unto remission of sins is a sacrifice, really and truly (cf. Book V part III chap. I). Christ commands the Apostles to do this for a commemoration of Him. The celebration of the Holy Eucharist, therefore, was instituted by our Lord as the perennial sacrifice of the New Law.

2. The words “for you, for many, for many unto remission of sins,” make it clear that the consecration of the chalice is a sacrificial action. But they are not the words of consecration. The words used to put the body and blood of Christ into the state of victim are these: “This is My body, this is My blood.” The sacrifice takes place when these words are uttered by the minister; what follows is but a declaration or explanation not essential to the sacrificial form.

3. By a natural association of ideas, “effusion of blood” and “sacrifice” have become, with the sacred writers, interchangeable terms. Instances abound: Acts xx. 28; Rom. iii. 25; v. 9; Eph. i. 7; ii. 13; Col. i. 14; Heb. and Apoc., *passim*. This usage suggests the question: How is the blood shed in the Eucharistic Sacrifice? Only in a mystical way. The real effusion took

place once, upon the Cross, and cannot be repeated. But the bleeding victim of the Cross is made really present on the altar, under the appearances of bread and wine, and with the whole merit of the former sacrifice. The representation is made in a manner most fittingly representing the death of the victim, viz. the body and the blood, although inseparably united, are produced by a separate consecration and under separate species. The sacrificial words, like a spiritual sword, divide the Divine body and blood, and thus recall the memory of Christ's death on Calvary.

II. The words used in the consecration of the bread afford the same proof of the real sacrificial nature of the Mass as those used in the consecration of the chalice.

**1 Cor. xi. 24:** “Τοῦτό μου ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα, τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κλύμενον.”  
 “*Hoc est corpus meum, quod pro vobis tradetur.*”  
 “This is My body, which shall be delivered for you.”

**Luke xxii. 19:** “Τοῦτό ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα μου, τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν διδόμενον.”  
 “*Hoc est corpus meum, quod pro vobis datur.*”  
 “This is My body, which is given for you.”

**John vi. 52:** “Ὁ ὀρτος δὲ ὃν ἐγὼ δώσω, ἡ σὰρξ μου ἐστίν, [ἣν ἐγὼ δώσω] ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ζωῆς.”  
 “*Et panis, quem ego dabo, caro meo est pro mundi vita.*”  
 “And the bread that I will give is My flesh, for the life of the world.”

In the received Greek text of St. Paul, the body of Christ, made present under the appearance of bread, is said to be “broken for us.” In the language of the Bible, “to break bread” is to give it as food. According to St. Paul, then, in the Eucharistic celebrations Christ is given us as food. The same meaning, therefore, attaches to the words of St. Luke, who reports the same sentence of Christ. Now, the words of Luke, “My body, which is given for you,” are identical in signification with those of Mark and Matthew, “which is given for you, for many unto remission of sins,” and, like these, they directly convey the idea of a sacrifice offered *hic et nunc*.<sup>62</sup> This idea of an actual and present sacrifice is, however, not so much conveyed by the present tense of the verb (*frangitur*, “is broken, given”) as by the circumstance of being given “as food,” which only is true of the Eucharistic Sacrifice (cf. Franzelin, th. xi).

## § 19c NEW TESTAMENT REFERENCES TO THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE

The scantiness of references to the Eucharistic Sacrifice in the New Testament and in the early writings was formerly accounted for by the “Discipline of the Secret”—that is, the custom of concealing from the heathens and the catechumens the more sacred and mysterious rites and doctrines of the Christian religion, either by not mentioning them at all, or by merely alluding to them in enigmatical language. That this custom prevailed to some extent during the period of the catechumenate (from the end of the second to the end of the fifth century) is undoubted. But it does not account for the silence of the earlier writings; and indeed, even in the later period, the restriction had to do with preaching rather than writing (Batiffol, *Études d’Histoire*, etc., *La Discipline de l’Arcane*). A better explanation is that the doctrine of the

<sup>62</sup>“Here and now.” —Ed.

Mass is an instance of the development of doctrine as explained *supra*, vol. i. According to this, we cannot expect to find clear, explicit teaching in the apostolic and sub-apostolic ages. Nevertheless we can produce distinct traces and germs of the doctrine as held in the later ages.

“They were persevering in the doctrine of the Apostles, and in the communication or the breaking of bread (τοῦ ἄρτου), and in prayers” (Acts ii. 42, 46). The breaking of “the” Bread, coming between the preaching and the praying, cannot refer to a common meal. It is the religious rite instituted at the Last Supper, alluded to in terms perfectly intelligible to the initiated, but telling nothing to the profane.

“As they were ministering to the Lord (λειτουργούντων δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ Κυρίῳ)” (xiii. 2). Here, for the first time, we meet with the term λειτουργέω, which henceforth becomes for all time the Greek technical expression for the sacred functions of the Mass. Erasmus translates it by *sacrificantibus*. The suggestion that the ministering consisted in preaching, as it does in some sects without sacrifice, mistakes the signification of λειτουργέω, and leaves unexplained how they preached “to God.”

II. In I Cor. x. we read: Ver. 16. “The chalice of benediction which we bless, is it not the Communion of the blood of Christ? And the bread which we break, is it not the partaking of the Body of the Lord? 17. For we, being many, are one bread, one body, all that partake of one bread. 18. Behold Israel according to the flesh: are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar? . . . 20. But the things which the heathen sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God: and I would not that you should be made partakers with devils. 21. You cannot drink the chalice of the Lord, and the chalice of devils: you cannot be partakers of the table of the Lord and of the table of devils.”

Verse 16 sets before us the Eucharistic blessing of the bread and wine, and their subsequent transmutation into the Body and Blood of the Lord, as taking place in the Churches of Corinth. The command, “Do this in memory of Me,” is carried into practice. The Christian sacrifice gives to the converts from Judaism and heathenism a more intimate communion with God than the one sought for in their previous sacrifices. Having an altar of their own, they ought not to return to the “tables” of false gods. The sacred tables of the idols are the altars upon which is offered the meat afterwards to be partaken of by the worshippers. St. Paul, therefore, is witness that the Church at Corinth offered a real sacrifice, and that this sacrifice was the one instituted by the Lord on the eve of His Passion (cf. Cornelius à Lapide, *in hunc loc.*; Council of Trent, sess. xxii. ch. 1).

III. “We have an altar (θυσιαστήριον), whereof they have no power to eat who serve the tabernacle.” Is this altar the Cross, or the altar of the daily sacrifice? Many Fathers, and the majority of commentators, especially since the Reformation, hold the latter opinion. On the other hand, St. Thomas, Nicholas of Lyra, Titelmann, Estius, Oswald, and nearly all the Protestants (except Bähr, Böhme, and others) understand the altar to be the Cross, and the eating thereof to be through faith. The Council and the Catechism of Trent abstained from quoting the text, probably in deference to St. Thomas. Cornelius à Lapide, whose opinion is of great weight, argues in favour of the Christian altar as follows: “‘An altar,’ on which we offer the sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ . . . of which the Jewish Levites do not partake, but the Christian priests and faithful, when they take the Holy Eucharist in order ‘that the heart be established with grace,’ as the Apostle says (ver. 9). Thus Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Anselm, Sedulius, Haymo. That the Apostle does not speak of the altar of the Cross, as the heretics contend, is plain from the words ‘we have.’ For we *have* not

the altar of the Cross, but *had* it 1600 years ago. Again, from the word ‘to eat;’ for we do not eat or the altar of the cross, but of the altar of the Eucharist. Lastly, from the contrast established by the Apostle between the altar of the tabernacle of old, from which the Jewish priests and worshippers ate the victims as holy meat, and this new altar of the Church, from which the faithful eat not the carnal viands of oxen and sheep, but a Divine and heavenly food, the body of Christ. The Apostle recommends this Eucharistic altar to the Hebrews in order to strengthen their souls during persecution. For nothing gives more strength and comfort to the soul than Holy Communion,” etc. Further, Cornelius remarks that “altar” stands for the food and sacrifice on it, and then continues. “Hence it is plain that the Eucharist and the Mass are a sacrifice. The Eucharist has its altar; where there is an altar there must be a priest, and likewise a sacrifice, for these three are correlative. Hence also the Greek text has for altar θυσιαστήριον, *i.e. sacrificatorium*, the sacrificial altar” (*Comm. in Heb.*, xiii. 10).

### § 170 THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE AND THE TEACHING OF THE FATHERS AND THE COUNCILS

I. The references to the Sacrifice of the Mass during the first three centuries are, as might be expected, few, they are unmistakable.

1. In the *Didache*, or *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* (c. 100?) we read (ch. xiv.): “Having assembled together on the Lord’s day, break bread and give thanks (εὐχαριστήσατε) having confessed your sins beforehand in order that your sacrifice (θυσία) may be pure.” The text goes on to refer to Malachy (i. 11): “for that (sacrifice) is the same as that spoken of by the Lord. In every place and time to offer to me a pure oblation (θυσίαν καθάραν).” It is clear that the author of the *Didache* held that the Eucharistic rite was the “pure oblation” foretold by Malachy (*supra*, p. 186).

2. St. Ignatius († 115) speaks of the Eucharist as “the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ,” Who suffered for our sins, and Whom the Father in His mercy raised again (*Ad Smyrn.*, c. 7). The repeated mention of the altar, through which the people are in communion with the bishops, priests, and deacons, and show their adherence to the Church, and the remark that through the Liturgy the power of Satan is broken, connect altar and Liturgy with the Cross, upon which Satan was conquered (*Ad Phil.*, 4; *Eph.* v. 13; *Magn.*, 7; *Trall.*, 7). Ἄρτος τοῦ Θεοῦ (the bread of God), and ἐντός τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου (within the altar) (*Eph.*, v.), in view of parallel texts, must be understood of the Eucharistic bread and altar. “Hope of salvation and union between the members of the community” are but consequences of the eating of the Divine bread from the same altar. They cannot be read into the text as its literal and primary meaning.

3. Clement of Rome († 102), in his first Epistle to the Corinthians, c. 40–44, compares the bishops and deacons with the priests and Levites, and exhorts them to perform προσφορὰς καὶ λειτουργίας (oblations and liturgical services) according to the prescribed order. Δῶρα προσφέρειν and προσφοραὶ (“offering gifts and oblations”) are, in Clement’s writings, interchangeable terms; and the new Liturgy is analogous to the old. Hence, in his mind, the new sacrifice is also analogous to the old: his name for it is εὐχαριστεῖν, to celebrate the Eucharist.

4. St. Justin († 160) deals with the Eucharist as a true sacrifice, in a way which leaves no room for controversy. He distinguishes between προσφορὰ (“oblation”), (*Apologia*, i. 67; *Dial.*, 41) and θυσία (“sacrifice”), (*Dial.*, 117). The oblation is not only the act of offering,

but, at the same time, the bread and wine offered; the sacrifice consists in the λόγος εὐχῆς καὶ εὐχαριστίας (“the word of prayer and thanksgiving”), which is pronounced by the officiating priest. Προσφέρειν, θυσίας, εὐχαριστίαν ποιεῖν, τὸν ἄρτον ποιεῖν, τὸ ποτήριον ποιεῖν (“to offer sacrifice,” “to make the Eucharist,” “to make the bread,” “the chalice”), are expressions constantly used in reference to the public worship of the Christians. They show that the sacrificial character of the Eucharist was uppermost in Justin’s mind (cf. *Dial.*, 116–118).

5. St. Irenæus († 202) also represents the Eucharist as a true sacrifice. He connects προσφορά and θυσία—the oblation and the sacrifice; and he is the first of the Fathers, antecedent to Cyprian, who designates Christ Himself as the victim offered. “And this oblation the Church alone offers pure to its Maker, offering to Him, with thanksgiving, things of His creation (*ex creatura ejus*). But the Jews do not offer; their hands are full of blood, for they have not received the Word which is offered to God” (*Adv. Her.*, iv. 18, 4). Irenæus already mentions, as different parts, the offering or oblation; the transmutation through prayer (*epiklesis*), and the Communion.

6. Tertullian (160–220) describes the Eucharistic sacrifice as a perpetual representation of the Sacrifice of the Cross. St. Cyprian († 258) is still more explicit. He says, “If Christ Jesus our Lord and our God is Himself the High Priest of God the Father, and offered Himself as a sacrifice to the Father, and commanded this to be done unto a commemoration of Him, then truly does that priest perform the functions of Christ who imitates what Christ did, and offers a true and full sacrifice to God in the Church” (*Ep.*, lxiii. 14).

II. From the fourth century onwards, the teaching of the Fathers is so explicit and so complete that no doubt is possible as to their holding the Eucharist to be a real and true sacrifice. The question of fact (*an sit*) is settled; the inquiry now is as to the explanation (*quomodo sit*); the dogma enters the domain of theological science. St. Augustine says, “Through this sacrifice He is also priest, Himself offering and Himself being the oblation; the mystery (*sacramentum*) of which He willed to be the daily sacrifice of the Church” (*De Civ. Dei*, x. 20). He calls the Eucharist *sacramentum memoria*<sup>63</sup> (*C. Faust.*, xx. 21), and finds in this relation to the sacrifice of the Cross an analogy with the relation of the Jewish sacrifices to the same. Fulgentius, Cæsarius, and others have examined into the identity of both sacrifices, and the difference of the manner in which they are offered. Leo I, commenting on 1 Cor. v. 7, celebrates Christ as the new Paschal Lamb, Who allowed Himself to be crucified outside the camp as the new and true propitiatory sacrifice, in order that, after the old sacrifices had ceased, a new oblation might be laid upon the new altar, and that the Cross of Christ might be made the altar not of the temple, but of the whole world. The place of the manifold sacrifices of the old Law is taken by the one sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ. For Jesus is the true Lamb, which taketh away the sins of the world (*Serm. de Pass.*, viii. 5, 7). Gregory I has the expressions, “Eucharist,” “sacrifice,” “Mass” (*missa*), “oblation,” “host” (*hostia*, “victim”), “sacrament of the Passion,” “Communion.”

III. The theology of the Middle Ages elaborated the teaching of the Fathers, and the Church formulated the dogma on the same lines. The Fourth Council of Lateran teaches: “In the Church the self-same is priest and sacrifice, Jesus Christ, Whose body and blood is truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the appearances of bread and wine” (Denzinger, *Ench.*, n. 357). In the profession of faith proposed to the Waldenses, belief in the sacrifice of

<sup>63</sup>“The Sacrament of memory.” —Ed.

Holy Eucharist is commanded. Martin V rejected the thesis of Hus, that the institution of the Mass by Christ was not warranted by the gospels (Denzinger, *Ench.*, nn. 370, 481). The Council of Trent, in its twenty-second session, fully sets forth the Catholic doctrine against the innovations of the Reformers. Cf. Schanz, *Die Lehre von den h. Sacramenten der Kirche*, Freiburg, 1893; Franzelin, th. xi.; *Kirchenlexicon*, s.v. "Opfer," "Messe."

## § 171 THE EUCHARIST A SACRIFICE OF PROPITIATION

I. The root of the word "propitiation" is *prope*, "near." Hence its meaning, when applied to the relations between God and man, of "bringing together, making favourable." A propitiatory sacrifice brings man nearer to God by satisfying for man's sin, and obtaining for him God's favour or grace. The law was "a bringing in of a better hope by which we draw nigh (ἡγγιζομεν) to God" (Heb. vii. 19). The English word "atonement," if the etymology "at-one-ment" is correct, beautifully renders the idea of propitiation. Man offers satisfaction for his misdeeds; God forgives, and restores the sinner to the communion of grace.

II. The sacrifice of the Mass has taken the place of all the sacrifices of the Old Testament. Hence it contains in itself alone all the efficacy and attains all the objects of the former institutions. Foremost among these was the sacrifice for sin. Primasius, a sixth century Father, commenting on Heb. x., says, "Our priests offer daily to commemorate His death. And because we sin daily and require to be cleansed daily, He Who cannot die again gave us this sacrament of His body and blood, in order that, as His Passion was the redemption and absolution of the world, so also this oblation might be the redemption and cleansing of all who offer it in the true faith." This *a priori* argument is fully confirmed by the words of the institution: This is My body "which is given for you;" My blood "which is shed for you, for many, unto the remission of sins." The sense of the Church that the unbloody representation of the sacrifice on the Cross has the same propitiatory character as its prototype, is abundantly declared in all our Christian liturgies. Not one of them is without prayers for the remission of sins on behalf of the living and the dead, or without formulas declaring in set terms the atoning nature of the sacrifice. "In the book of the Machabees," says St. Augustine, "we read that sacrifice was offered for the dead. But, even if nowhere we read this in the ancient Scriptures, we have for it the great authority of the universal Church which clearly adheres to this custom when, in the prayers, offered by the priest at the altar of God, commemoration is made for the dead" (*De Cura pro Mortuis Gerenda* c. 1, n. 3). St. Chrysostom refers this custom to the Apostles: "By Apostolic laws it is determined that in the venerable mysteries commemoration of the dead be made" (*In Phil. Hom.* 3, n. 4). The Council of Trent embodies the universal doctrine in the following canon: "If any one saith that the sacrifice of the Mass is only one of praise and thanksgiving, or the bare commemoration of the sacrifice offered on the Cross, and not also propitiatory; or that it only profiteth him who takes it, and that it ought not to be offered for the living and the dead, for punishments and satisfactions and other needs, let him be anathema" (sess. xxii. can. 3).

## § 172 EFFICACY OF THE HOLY MASS

I. The principal source of the value of the Eucharistic Sacrifice is the *opus operatum*; that is, the work done by Christ offering Himself to the Father for us. Accidental value accrues to it from the personal worth of those who offer it with Christ; that is, *ex opere operantis*. These

are: the priest, who acts as the minister of Christ; the faithful, who, in one way or another, take part in the celebration; the Church, as the spouse of Christ.

II. 1. Provided the necessary conditions be present, there can be no doubt that the offering priest, and the faithful who assist or serve at Mass, or who have Mass said for them, acquire, *ex opere operantis*, certain benefits proportionate to their personal dispositions. These fruits of the sacrifice are, of course, finite. In as far as they consist in satisfaction and impetration, they may be applied to others, in virtue of the communion of saints; but the merit proper, being entirely personal, is not transferable.

2. The Church, as the mystical body of Christ, daily offers herself through Him to God. Each priest offers in the name of the whole Church (Heb. v.). From this point of view, God always accepts the sacrifice independently of the personal worth of the priest. The *operans* here is the immaculate spouse of Christ, whose adoration and praise, thanksgiving, satisfaction, and prayers, ascend to Him as an odour of sweetness. Hence the prayers of the Mass receive a (finite) value from the dignity of the Church (*ex opere operantis*), and no Mass is "private" in the sense that only one or a few persons share in its fruits.

III. Christ is the Minister of the Eucharistic Sacrifice: (1) as the author of the rite, and as delegating the priest to act in His Name; (2) as actually performing the sacrificial action in each Mass, when, by a present act of His will, He constitutes Himself the victim, and offers Himself to the Father. From this point of view the value of the sacrifice is entirely independent of the human priest, the Church, and the faithful. As far as these are concerned, the value is wholly *ex opere operato*. But with regard to Christ, the merit and satisfaction are derived from His death on the Cross *ex opere operantis*; the value accruing to the sacrifice from the dignity and work of the sacrificer and the victim, is derived from Christ Himself offering and offered on the altar. In both respects the value of the Mass is simply infinite; for it is the Sacrifice of the Cross daily renewed until the sanctification of mankind is consummated. This infinite merit, however, is not a newly acquired merit, but only the new presentation of the merit acquired once for all by Christ's death. The impetration and intercession (Rom. viii. 34; Heb. vii. 25; ix. 24), as distinguished from the merit on which they rely, are new acts of Christ as Priest of the daily sacrifice.

IV. Although the merits presented to God in the Mass are infinite in themselves (*in actu primo*), their application to individuals can only be finite (*in actu secundo*), because it cannot exceed the finite capacity of the receiver, and is, moreover, measured by the intention of Christ as man, and by the acceptance of God. The exact measure of the application is determined by the Divine laws ruling the supernatural order. It is, therefore, an idle task to pursue the question further. The curious will find the conflicting opinions of theologians in Suarez, disp. 79, § ii. 12; De Lugo, disp. 19, § 9; Ysambert, in 3, q. 83, disp. 7 a. 1, 8, 10.

V. The Mass is offered "for our needs" (Council of Trent, sess. xxii. can. 3), as distinguished from sins and punishments. This points out its character of "impetration," otherwise the power to obtain for us Divine assistance in our spiritual wants, and also in natural wants not incompatible with our supernatural end. The intrinsic value of the sacrifice is sufficient to "impetrate" the satisfaction of all possible needs; but in its actual working it is limited as stated above (IV).

VI. The same canon lays down that the Mass is offered "for punishments and satisfactions," whereby the character of *propitiation* is pointed out. These pains and punishments are (1) those which the living members of the Church either have to undergo for their sins, or take upon

themselves as spontaneous satisfactions, and (2) the pains suffered by the souls in purgatory. All liturgies are unanimous on this latter point. But if the Mass obtains the remission of the pains of the departed, much more may it be expected to remit the pains and penalties or the living.

VII. Again, in the same canon, we are taught that the Mass is offered “for sins.” The propitiatory bearing of the Eucharistic sacrifice on sin requires a special explanation. The Council’s doctrine on Justification shows that, in the present order of things, there is no other ordinary means of immediate sanctification than the personal acts or the sinner (*ex opere operantis*) or the efficacy of the sacraments (*ex opere operato*). Hence the Eucharist, as a sacrifice, is not appointed to be a vehicle of habitual grace; if it were, it would be a sacrament of the new Law. On the other hand, the universal Church proclaims aloud that the Eucharist is a “propitiation for sins.” To reconcile the two statements, the latter must be taken to imply, not that the Mass imparts “immediate” sanctification, but that it propitiates God, Who, favourably looking down upon the sinner, brings him to repentance and justification by the ordinary means. Such is the doctrine of the Council: “The sacred Synod teacheth that this sacrifice is truly propitiatory. . . . For God, appeased by its oblation, grants grace and the gift of repentance, and remits crimes and even the greatest sins” (sess. xxii. chap 2). Although mortal sin is here chiefly aimed at, we may apply the same principle to venial sins. These also are remitted, *ex opere operato*, inasmuch as the Divine Justice, appeased by the sacrifice, does not punish venial sins by a withdrawal of grace, but continues to supply sufficient help to avoid mortal sin and to repent of venial sin.

VIII. The nature of the Eucharistic sacrifice entitles us to distinguish three degrees in the distribution of its fruits.

1. The priest, as minister and delegate of Christ, offers the sacrifice for the Church as a whole, and consequently for all its members, and indirectly also or such as are only members *in potentia*. The good resulting from this application is aptly termed *fructus generalis*.

2. According to the universal practice, based upon the general rule that works of satisfaction and prayers may be applied to others, the priest applies the fruit of this sacrifice to certain specified persons, either living or dead. This special intention carries with it the *fructus specialis*. It confers upon these persons all the fruits of the sacrifice which do not belong either to the Church as a whole or to the person of the sacrificing priest.

3. The personal benefit to the priest is called *fructus specialissimus*, because it is the most specialized of the three. It arises from the sacred function itself in which the priest acts as another Christ, and partakes of the Sacred Victim. The faithful who take part in the celebration by their presence and intention, likewise gather a special fruit analogous to the *fructus specialissimus* of the priest (Cf. Suarez, disp. 79).

### § 173 HOW THE MASS IS A TRUE SACRIFICE

So far we have dealt chiefly with the dogmatic question, “Is the Mass a true sacrifice?” (*an sit*); we now face the theological question, “How is the Mass a true sacrifice?” (*quomodo sit*). The former point is of faith, and admits of no controversy on the part of Catholics; the latter is left open to discussion, and every Catholic is at liberty to follow his own opinion. When a dogma is defined, the definition necessarily supposes a certain knowledge of its terms. Otherwise it would be unintelligible and to no purpose. The knowledge, however, of the terms, or, to



be more accurate, of the things connoted by the terms, must be deemed sufficiently perfect when it contains one or more essential notes, and enables us to give a reasonable assent to the dogmatic statement. To believe that “in God there are three persons,” it is enough to conceive God as the Supreme Being and a person as a reasonable being. That “grace is necessary for salvation,” that “Scripture is inspired,” that “original sin is a true sin,” are propositions to which the assent of faith can be given on the vague knowledge that grace is a gift of God, inspiration a Divine influence, and sin something wrong. In like manner the simple believer, who knows sacrifice only as “a sacred offering to God,” satisfies the claims of faith when he admits that the Mass is truly such an offering. The Councils speak the general language of the Church. In their decrees and canons they are most careful to avoid terms or expressions favouring particular schools of theology. No scientific definition is usually expected from any Council. That is left to theology. On the other hand, dogmatic definitions are a help to the theologian in search of scientific definitions. *E.g.* if he strives to define a sacrament by genus and species, he must analyze the several rites defined as sacraments by the Church, and first find an essential note common to all, and then another proper to each. In like manner, the dogma that the Mass is a true sacrifice, compels him to find in it the essential notes of all sacrifices, and another essential note which distinguishes it from all other sacrifices.

I. In the treatise on Redemption (§ 155), we have given the essential elements of sacrifice on the lines laid down by Scheeben, the deepest and most fascinating of modern theologians. As, at the present time, the papal Bull on Anglican Orders, the “Reply” by the Anglican Archbishops, and the “Vindication” by the Catholic Bishops of England, have given a new interest to the question in hand, we shall now put before the reader a summary of what Dr. Paul Schanz wrote on the subject in 1895. See the Freiburg *Kirchenlexikon*, OFFER.

The inquiry into the idea which underlies the various sacrificial rites is one of the most difficult problems of the philosophy of religion. On the one hand, sacrifices are the symbols of certain feelings, desires, and ideas; on the other, they are types of the future. The first we gather from the rites themselves; the second, from the fulfilment in the Christian dispensation. The notion of offering (*oblatio*, *προσφορά*) may be taken as the fundamental notion of all sacrifices. Man gives to the Divinity part of his property in order either to express his veneration and gratitude, or to secure the Divine favour, taking it for granted that God is pleased with such gift and with the dispositions of the giver. The Divine pleasure is supposed to be increased by the fact that the gift implies submission, acknowledgment (= adoration), and veneration on the part of the giver. In this St. Augustine sees the reason why demons desired sacrifices to be offered to them, and why no man has such a desire (*Contra Advers. Legis et Proph.*, 1, 18, 37; cf. Thomassin, *De Incarn.*, 10, 2) The burning or outpouring of the gifts hands them over to God, and through their acceptance God admits the giver to communion with Him. For the essential character of the sacrificial gift is not its destruction, but its handing over and consecration to God. The privation suffered by the giver parting with his property, and the dispositions with which that privation is endured, may have a great moralizing influence on the giver, but they are not essential.<sup>64</sup> The outpouring of the libations and the killing of the animals are but the means for handing over the gift to God, and for bringing the giver into communion with Him. The killing necessarily precedes the burning, but the killing is not the sacrifice. “The victim is killed in order to be offered” (Greg. I, *In Ezech.* i. 2, Hom. 10, 19);

<sup>64</sup> Many sacrifices involve no appreciable privation; the Mass probably none at all.

in other words, the killing is preparatory to the sacrifice. More importance attaches to the blood of the victim which is gathered and poured out at the altar. For, according to ancient ideas, the life, or the soul, is in the blood. When, therefore, the blood is offered, the highest that man can give, viz. a soul or a life, is handed over to God. On the received principle of "soul for soul (= life), blood for blood," the sacrifice of blood was a substitute for the sacrifice of self. Human sacrifices were prompted by the same idea of giving to the Divinity what is best in man, the soul which is in the blood. As milder views came to prevail, the life of domestic animals was offered instead of the life of man. They who see in the killing of the victim the final act of the sacrifice, have no satisfactory explanation for the pouring out of the blood, the offering of the life in it and the burning. These rites cannot mean "that the two essential points of the sacrifice (adoration and propitiation), already expressed in the act of killing by the shedding of blood, are once more clearly and prominently represented." Against this stands the fact that the pouring out of the blood is the special function of the priest, whereas the killing—which nowhere is set down as a pain or punishment inflicted on the victim—may be performed by a layman. Moreover, the sacrificial eating of the victim is, in this hypothesis, insufficiently accounted for. Hence in the sprinkling with the blood there is more than an act of propitiation, and in the cremation there is more than an act of supreme worship (*latría*). Both express in the first place, the oblation of self to God and the union of self with God. The sanctifying power of fire is as well known as the rôle it plays in heathen mythologies. God Himself was a fire, "Our God is a consuming fire" (Heb. xii. 29), or the fire was a power sent from heaven, and frequently the heavenly fire is said to have consumed the victim. The Persians only offered the soul in the blood, and Philo explains the shedding of blood as an oblation of the soul (839 B, in the Paris edition of 1640). Our Lord Himself says that He will give His soul (*ψυχὴν*) for our redemption (Matt. xx. 28). The independent unbloody sacrifices can only be explained from the same point of view, viz. that they express oblation of self to, and union with, God. In the most ancient sacrifices of incense (and of oil) the sweet odour generated in the burning is the chief object in view.<sup>65</sup> The Fathers (e.g. Theodoret, q. 62, *In Exod.*; cf. q. 62, *In Genes.*) remark that burnt bones and flesh produce no sweet odour, and that, consequently, the pleasure God finds in the sacrifice must lie in the pious dispositions of those who offer. The sacrificial meal is an element to be considered in the interpretation of sacrifices; but, taken by itself, it affords no explanation for the outpouring of blood (which is no food) and of the incense offering. It is altogether too gross a notion to see in the ancient sacrifices nothing but a banquet in which the gods were supposed to take part. The eating of the victim accepted by God is simply the symbol of the union with God intended by those who offer the sacrifice. This *τελείωσις*—making perfect (Heb. ix. 9; x. 1, 14)—is the end and final object of all sacrifices. St. Irenæus says, "Sacrifices do not sanctify man, for God is not in want of sacrifices; but it is the conscience of him who offers which sanctifies the sacrifice, for when it is pure it causes God to accept the sacrifice as from a friend" (*Adv. Hæreses*, 4, 18, 3). Sacrifice in general may therefore be defined as "the offering to God, by an authorized minister, of an external gift of something our own [transformed] by the consecration of the minister, and thus passing into the dominion of God, Who accepts the gift for the sanctification of the offerer." The self-sacrifice which lies in the parting with the gift works for the same ends as the sacrifice

<sup>65</sup>The fire which consumes the victim or the oblation represents God accepting the gift, and thus establishing a bond between Himself and the offerer.

itself: acknowledgment of the Deity, thanksgiving, atonement, impetration—in short, for the sanctification of man. The Fathers and Schoolmen laid peculiar stress on the juridical aspect of sacrifices, yet without overlooking the end of sanctification and union with God. St. Augustine sets down as a true sacrifice any work performed in order to unite us with God in holy society.<sup>66</sup> Alexander of Hales follows Augustine: “*Sacrificium est oblatio quæ sacra fit offerendo et sanctificat offerentem*”<sup>67</sup> (*Sum. Theol.* 3, q. 55, n. 4, a. 1). St. Thomas has several definitions or quasi-definitions: “In the oblations and sacrifices man offered to God things of his own to acknowledge that he held them from God” (1<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>e</sup>, q. 102, a. 3); “properly speaking, a sacrifice is something done to give God the honour due to Him, and to appease Him” (3 q. 48, a. 3); “in order perfectly to unite the spirit of man with God” (3, q. 22, a. 2); “the term sacrifice expresses that man makes something sacred” (2<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>e</sup>, q. 85, a. 3, ad. 3). Later, the scholastic *aliquid facere circa rem oblatam* (“doing something to the gift”) was supplanted by *conficere rem* (“to make the gift”), (Suarez), and this was further explained as *conficere per immutationem* (“to make by means of a change”). Vasquez again narrowed the notion by describing the *confectio* as *destructio*, the *immutatio* as *demutatio* (i.e. change for the worse), and the *dominium Dei* as the Divine dominion over life and death. Franzelin and many modern theologians take the notion of sacrifice to include the following elements: “Sacrifice is an offering made to God by the destruction or quasi-destruction of some sensible object, such offering having been instituted by public authority to acknowledge God’s supreme dominion over all things and man’s absolute dependence on God for life and everything; after the Fall it also expresses a sense of sin for which Divine justice must be satisfied” (Franzelin, *De Eucharistia Sacrificio*, thes. ii.). But, as Schanz justly observes, so far as this definition makes it essential to a sacrifice that it should recognize God’s supreme dominion by the destruction or quasi-destruction of something, it evidently does not correspond to the notion of sacrifice in the old heathen world, for it implies that sacrifice cannot be offered to inferior deities, nor to heroes; nor does it express the meaning of the Jewish sacrifices, for the victim in these sacrifices was not unfrequently killed by the person offering it, and not by the priest. As to the burning on the altar, it was regarded as the means of conveying the victim to God. or, when the fire was kindled from heaven (3 Kings xviii. 38; 2 Paral. vii. 1), it was God’s acceptance of the sacrifice. Many of the Hebrew sacrifices may be described as things given to God to secure His favour, or to appease His wrath, or as thank and tribute offerings; but frequently also they meant an act of communion with God, either by means of a feast, which God was supposed to share with His worshippers, or by the renewal of a life-bond in the blood of a sacred victim.

These reasons justify the elimination of the element of destruction, real or equivalent, from the essential constitution of sacrifice in general. With Scheeben and Schanz we revert to the definitions commonly adopted before the time of Vasquez († 1604).

II. Two more questions lie before us: Does the Mass contain the above generic element of sacrifice? and, What is its specific element? We deal first with the second of these questions, because on its solution depends the solution of the first. It is admitted on all hands that the Mass is a sacrifice “relative to the sacrifice of the Cross.” The relation is founded extrinsically upon the expressed will of Christ: “This do ye as often as you shall drink for the commemoration of Me; for as often as you shall eat this bread and drink the chalice, you

<sup>66</sup>*Verum sacrificium est omne opus, quod agitur, ut sancta societate inhareamus Deo*” (*De Civ. Dei*, x. 6).

<sup>67</sup>“Sacrifice is an offering which makes things sacred by being offered, and sanctifies the one who offers.” —Ed.

shall show the death of the Lord until He come" (1 Cor. xi. 25, 26); intrinsically upon the identity of priest and victim in both sacrifices, and upon the similarity between the mystical effusion of blood in the Mass and the real effusion on the Cross. The relation, external by institution, and internal by nature, belongs uniquely to the Eucharistic sacrifice. It is this specific difference which, added to the generic notion of sacrifice, gives us the definition of the Mass: "The sacrifice in which, by the institution of Christ, the sacrifice on the Cross is re-offered in an unbloody manner." For the better understanding of the relative nature of the Christian sacrifice we add some details.

1. The Last Supper was the celebration of another commemorative sacrifice, the Jewish paschal lamb. "This day shall be for a memorial to you; and you shall keep it a feast of the Lord in your generations with an everlasting observance. . . . And when your children shall say to you, What is the meaning of this service? you shall say to them, It is the victim of the passage of the Lord, when He passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, striking the Egyptians, and saving our houses" (Exod. xii. 14, 26). Jesus, as head of a house, acted as minister of this most typical of all sacrifices; and when it was over, when He had explained its meaning to the Apostles, He offered Himself as the antitype, "Christ, our Pasch, is sacrificed" (1 Cor. v. 7), and His words, "Do this for the commemoration of Me," sound like the echo, or the literal repetition of the words by which God instituted this typical sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb (cf. Cornelius à Lapide, *In Exod.* xii, 14, 26, 47; *In Matt.*, xxvi. 17, etc.).

2. The internal fitness of the yearly sacrifice of a lamb to represent and commemorate the first Pasch celebrated in Egypt is founded upon the identity of the minister, the victim, and the ritual. The minister was not the ordinary priest, but the head of the house, a layman; the victim was a lamb—one year old, male, without blemish; the ritual was the same, with one important exception: the relative sacrifice omitted the sprinkling of the door-posts with blood, because the redemption from the Egyptian slavery had been accomplished, and needed no repetition. The object of the commemoration was to gather the fruit of the model sacrifice: the closer union of the people with God through the grateful acknowledgment of His sovereign power. The Eucharistic sacrifice adapts itself better to the commemoration of its type on the Cross than the Paschal Lamb to the commemoration of the Egyptian sacrifice. In the Mass the real minister and the victim are identically (*numero*) the same as on the Cross, whereas in the paschal sacrifice they were so only specifically. Both rites differ in a similar way from their types. They both are unbloody, whereas both the types are bloody sacrifices. In the Jewish rite the eating of the victim, symbolizing union with God, is the consummation to which the whole rite leads up; and the same is true of the Mass.

3. We use the term "mystical" in reference to the "mystery" in which the effusion takes place; it is opposed to "real," and equivalent to "representative, commemorative, or relative." The mystical effusion consists in placing the Divine body and blood on the altar under distinct and separate species. Of course Christ is wholly present under either species, yet so that the words of consecration which strike our ears, and the species which strike our eyes, convey a first impression (only to be rectified by reason and faith) of a divided presence. Considering the glorified state of the victim on the one hand, and on the other the manner in which the human memory is awakened by sense perceptions, it seems impossible to devise a better commemoration of the death on the Cross. The distinctness and expressiveness of the words of the institution, "This is My blood which *is shed*; My body which *is given* (= sacrificed)," leave no doubt that in the mind of Christ the very essence of the commemorative sacrifice lies

in the separate presence of body and blood on the altar.

III. This reflection leads us on to the crucial theological question how the Mass is a real sacrifice, and not a mere (*nuda*) commemoration.

As long as theology was taught from the bishop's pulpit, rather than from the professor's chair, the subtle question under consideration received but scant attention. It was only when the Schoolmen began to scrutinize the Scriptures and the Fathers that such pointed questions were mooted and solved according to the principle *quot capita tot sensus*.<sup>68</sup> The Fathers, who spoke and wrote for the instruction of the faithful at large, when touching on the Eucharistic sacrifice, naturally laid greater emphasis on its objects, chief among which is the sanctification of the people by close communion with God. In the Middle Ages stress was laid upon the notion of commemoration and representation. The Mass is an immolation of Christ, because it is "a certain image representative of the Passion or Christ, which is His true immolation" (St. Thomas, 3, q. 83, a. 1). The further explanation of the sacrificial act differs according to the theories held on the essence of sacrifice. Nobody placed it in the offertory, because there bread and wine, and not the body and blood of Christ, are offered; and the offerer is the priest (with the congregation), not Christ, who is only introduced with the words of consecration. Bread and wine are indeed called oblations, but merely as the matter prepared at the offertory for the sacrificial transformation in the canon. St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and others, see the sacrificial act in the consecration; some in the consecration and the Communion taken together (Bellarmine, the Salmanticenses, Tournely, etc.); others, again, in the breaking of the bread, the dipping of the particle in the consecrated wine and the Communion (*e.g.* Canus). This latter opinion found but few followers, because the breaking and dipping affect the species only, and not the body of Christ; and even at the Communion, the transformation is but the destruction of the species. At the consecration itself, the commemoration and representation of the scene on the Cross are not effected by the transformation of the substance (Suarez), or by the mystical killing of the celestial body in the separation of body and blood on the altar (Lessius), but by the presence of separate species. In this separation may be traced an immutation of the victim, inasmuch as Christ is wholly present under each separate species only *per concomitantiam* (Vasquez, Tournely). De Lugo and Franzelin take the consecration to be the sacrificial act. The latter has this thesis, "We think, with Card. De Lugo, and a great many later theologians, that the intrinsic form (essence) of the sacrificial act is in this: Christ, the High Priest, by the ministry of the priests offering in His name, puts His body and blood, under the species of bread and wine, in a state of food and drink, by way of despoiling Himself (*exinanitionem* = *κενωσις* = 'emptying') of the functions connatural to His sacred Humanity."<sup>69</sup> In proof of his theory, he describes the state of victim as follows: Christ's body and blood are present as meat and drink, *i.e.* as inanimate things; the Eucharistic body, not occupying space, cannot naturally receive actions from, nor react on, external material objects; His sense-life is suspended; He lies under the species as if He were dead, and subjects Himself, through the species, to be dealt with at the will of His creatures. Exception may be taken to this on two counts. The suspension of the lower life in Christ on the altar is a theological deduction not easily understood; at any rate, it

<sup>68</sup>"As many heads, so many meanings." —Ed.

<sup>69</sup>"*Christus . . . corpus et sanguinem suum sub speciebus panis et vini constituit secundum quandam sanctissimæ suæ humanitatis a functionibus et rationibus existendi cannaturalibus exinanitionem ad statum cibi et potus*" (*De Sacrif. Euch.*, th. xvi.).

is too dark to throw light upon other dark questions. Again, the state of meat and drink, and all the rest, do not produce in the real victim, *i.e.* Christ glorified, any change for the worse which may be called, or likened to, destruction. Christ dieth no more. The painful efforts of some theologians to inflict at least a semblance of death on the Giver of life, are entirely due to their narrow notion of sacrifice. If we eliminate the “change for the worse” from the notion of “victim,” and replace it by “a change for the better,” we obtain a notion of the sacrificial act which throws new light upon all sacrifices. That we are justified in so doing, has been shown above. The student may turn to Scheeben’s *Dogmatik*, vol. iii. p. 400, for further proofs and explanations.

In the definition of man as a rational animal, the specific element (reason) fixes the generic element (animal) as the form fixes and determines matter. The genus is the secondary, the specific difference the primary, element in the compound. The same is true of all definitions by genus and species. Hence, in the definition of the Mass as “a sacrifice relative to the sacrifice on the Cross,” the element “relative” is the form, and gives us the *proper* essence, the true nature, the essential character, of the Mass. The relativity is founded upon the will of Christ and the identity of Sacrificer and Victim on the Cross and on the Altar; and also upon the similarity between the mystical and the real effusion of blood. The re-presentation of the sacrifice of Christ is, therefore, the proper essence of the sacrifice of the Mass.

IV. It only remains to show how all the elements of a real sacrifice are found in the representation of Christ’s death. For our starting point we take the definition of Tanner, adopted by Scheeben (cf. Book V § 155).

1. “Sacrifice is an oblation.” The prayers of the canon, before and after the consecration, abundantly show that the offering of a gift to God is the primary motive of the whole action. The oblation is expressed eight or ten times.

2. “Of a corporeal thing,” *i.e.* of some sensible object. The body and blood of Christ are corporeal, but it may be objected that we see only the appearances. The ready answer is that Christ cannot be perceived by us exactly as He is in heaven, and that He expressly willed to be sacrificed under these appearances. The representative nature of the sacrifice accounts for this slight divergence from other sacrifices.

3. “In which oblation this thing, by means of a transformation (*per immutationem transformativam*), is made and consecrated (*conficitur et conficiendo consecratur*).” Where does the transformation come in? There is no real effusion of blood, no material fire to consume the victim, no victim even capable of immutation as commonly understood. These difficulties disappear if we remember that the sacrifice is essentially representative, and, as much as possible, identical with Christ’s own. We have the same victim in the real presence; we have the mystical separation of body and blood in the separate presence under separate species; we have also the same sacrificial act (*sacrificatio*). Only this latter point requires elucidation. The making of the victim by the sacrificial act (*conficere conficiendo*) has always been understood to mean the *productio corporis Christi per conversionem panis in ipsum* (the production, or making present, of the body of Christ through the conversion of the bread into the body). In this sense *conficere sacrum* (to make the sacrifice) is a technical term with the Fathers, and in all liturgies. When Christ, through the priest, pronounces the words of consecration, he puts Himself, as much as possible, in the same state of victim as on Calvary. There He gave to His violent death the character of the most perfect sacrifice by an act of His will: the complete gift of Himself to God as the price of our redemption. That intention transformed His whole

life, and especially His death, into the state of victim. For the crucifixion performed by the soldiers was but a preparation, a condition, of the sacrifice. This takes its being, its dignity, and all its effects from the holy will of Christ. Like the fire which consumed the victims and the incense of old, and made them a sweet odour to God, the love of Christ, burning with all the energy of the Divine Spirit Who fills Him, transformed Him into “a pure Host, a holy Host, an immaculate Host.” On the Christian altar, our Saviour does the same when He makes Himself “the holy bread of eternal life, and the chalice of everlasting salvation” (Prayer, *Unde et Memores*, immediately after the consecration).

4. “As an earnest (*testimonium*) of the Divine Majesty and of the subordination (*ordinis*) of the creature to God, its first principle and last end.” These words express the objects for which sacrifices are offered. They are but an expansion of the simple and more appropriate idea of our communion with God, *i.e.* our sanctification. The Eucharistic sacrifice brings us into communion with God in more ways than one. For the real Sacrificer is Christ, the Spiritual Head of Whom we are the body. The Church, His bride, and we, its members, unite our intention with His, and make ourselves a joint sacrifice with Him. “Through Him, and with Him, and in Him (we give) to Thee God the Father Almighty, in the unity of the Holy Ghost, all honour and glory (*per ipsum et cum ipso*, etc.)” (Canon of the Mass). The same idea is beautifully rendered in the blessing of the water before mixing it with the wine at the Offertory: “O God, Who in creating human nature didst wonderfully dignify it, and hast still more wonderfully renewed it; grant that by the mystery of this water and wine, *we may be made partakers of His Divinity, Who vouchsafed to become partaker of our humanity*, Jesus Christ, Thy Son, our Lord.” Freedom from sin is the first condition of our participation in the Divine life; hence we pray, “In the spirit of humility, and with a contrite heart, may we be received by Thee, O Lord . . . (*in Spiritu humilitatis* . . .);” and “May the Lord enkindle in us the fire of His love and the flame of everlasting charity” (*Ascendat* . . . prayer after incensing the altar). At the *Orate, Fratres*, the priest turns to the people and says, “Brethren, pray that my sacrifice and yours may be acceptable to God the Father Almighty.” The people answer, “May the Lord receive the sacrifice from thy hands, to the praise and glory of His Name, to our benefit, and to that of all the Church.” At the Preface, in union with the Angels in heaven, we offer thanks and praise to the thrice-holy Lord God, and then the *Actio*, the sacrifice, commences. First the Church on earth, with “our Pope, our Bishop, and all believers of the Catholic and Apostolic faith,” are introduced to the altar; then the Church triumphant in heaven with “the glorious Mother of our Lord, the Apostles and all the Saints,” is communicated with, and the Lord is besought to “accept this oblation of His whole family.” The objects of the *Actio* are again laid before Him: “Dispose our days in Thy peace, command us to be delivered from eternal damnation, and to be numbered in the flock of Thy elect.” The Divine High Priest now takes up the *Actio*, and performs anew the sacrifice He instituted at the Last Supper. The pure, holy, and immaculate Host is immediately presented to God, with a prayer “that as many of us as, by participation at this altar, shall receive the most sacred body and blood of Thy Son, may be filled with all heavenly benediction and grace; through the same Christ our Lord.” The “servants and handmaids who are gone before us with the sign of faith, and slumber in the sleep of peace,” are remembered; “we sinners” beg for “fellowship with the holy Apostles and all the Saints, not considering our merits, but expecting the free pardon of our offences.” The supreme and all-embracing object of the sacrifice receives its fullest expression in the communion of

the priest and the people. "The body—the blood—of our Lord Jesus Christ preserve my (thy) soul to life everlasting." The sacrificial action terminates with the sacrificial feast, in which the Victim is taken as food "with a pure mind, and of a temporal gift becomes to us an eternal remedy." The eternal participation in the Divine life by the union of charity is not only foreshadowed, but actually commenced in the sacramental Communion. At this sacred banquet, the adopted sons of God sit down with the Natural Son, Who made them heirs of His kingdom; they appropriate the benefits of His Passion, and receive a tangible pledge, and a foretaste of the glory that awaits them "when that which is perfect is come" (1 Cor. xiii. 10). As now "they see through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face," so also now they adhere to God in a true and real, but imperfect, manner; but then they will be "made participators of the Divine life."

It may be useful and acceptable to the reader to have in brief the essential points of the Catholic doctrine on the Mass. We give them in the words of the "Vindication" of the Bull on Anglican Orders by the Bishops of England, n. 12: "The Mass, according to Catholic doctrine, is a commemoration of the sacrifice of the Cross, for as often as we celebrate it 'we show the Lord's death till He come.' At the same time, it is not a bare commemoration of that other sacrifice, since it is also itself a true sacrifice in the strict sense of the term. It is a true sacrifice because it has all the essentials of a true sacrifice: its Priest, Jesus Christ, using the ministry of an earthly representative; its victim, Jesus Christ, truly present under the appearances of bread and wine; its sacrificial offering, the mystic rite of consecration. And it commemorates the sacrifice of the Cross, because, whilst its Priest is the Priest of Calvary, its Victim the Victim of Calvary, and its mode of offering a mystic representation of the blood-shedding of Calvary, the end also for which it is offered, is to carry on the work of Calvary, by pleading for the applications of the merits consummated on the Cross to the souls of men. It is in this sense that the Mass is propitiatory. To propitiate is to appease the Divine wrath by satisfaction offered, and to beg mercy and forgiveness for sinners. The sacrifice of the Cross is propitiatory in the absolute sense of the word. But the infinite treasure of merit acquired on the Cross cannot be diminished or increased by any other sacrifice. It was then offered once and for all, and there is no necessity of repeating it. That plenitude, however, of merit and satisfaction by no means excludes the continual application of such merit and satisfaction by the perpetual sacrifice of the Mass. Thus the sacrifice of the Mass is also propitiatory. And so, according to Catholic doctrine, even the dead in Christ are not excluded from the benefits of this sacrifice; we call the Mass 'a propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead.'

"Such being our doctrine on the Eucharistic Sacrifice, its essential dependence on the doctrine of the Real Objective Presence is manifest. For, if there were no power in the words of consecration to make the true body and blood of Christ really and objectively present on the altar, we should not have on our altars the Victim of Calvary, and without its Victim the sacrifice could not subsist."

*Scholion.* In 1905 the late Bishop Bellord suggested and defended the "banquet" theory of sacrifice. A long and interesting discussion ensued, in which his view was almost universally rejected, and various other theories were discussed. See *American Ecclesiastical Review*, 1905-6.



## CHAPTER VI

### PENANCE

**A**FTER BEING CLEANSED IN THE LAVER of regeneration, strengthened by the Holy Ghost, and fed with the body and blood of Christ, man would seem to need no further aids to secure his salvation. But his will is free; his flesh, since the Fall, is weak. He is therefore able and inclined to transgress. God, too, on His side, for His own wise purposes, permits sin to take place (*supra*, § 113). But He does not leave man helpless. “As a father hath compassion on his children, so hath the Lord compassion on them that fear Him; for He knoweth our frame, He remembereth that we are dust. He forgiveth all” our “iniquities, He healeth all our diseases” (Ps. cii. 13, 3); “As I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live” (Ezech. xxxiii. 11). Sins committed after baptism do not altogether undo the work of that sacrament. The original sin cannot return; the baptized sinner does not cease to be a Christian and a member of the Church. It is not fitting, therefore, that these sins should be remitted by a repetition of baptism, even if that were possible. Hence our Divine Lord instituted a special sacrament—Penance—for the forgiveness of sins committed after baptism. See St. Thomas, 3, qq. 84–90: Suppl., qq. 1–28, with the commentaries; Bellarmine, *Controv.* iv.; Chardon, *Hist. des Sacrements*; De Augustinis, *De Rē Sacramentaria*, lib. iii., *Faith of Catholics*, vol. iii.

#### § 174 NATURE AND INSTITUTION OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE

I. We have already examined the stages by which the sinner is enabled to pass from death to life, and to blot out the stains of sin on his soul. In instituting a sacrament for this purpose, our Lord, as usual, took certain acts and endowed them with a special power. Here it is the acts of the virtue of penance which are the basis or matter of the sacrament. Penance is not a mere emotional sorrow, but a habit residing in the will. The penitent is sorry for his sin, inasmuch as it is an offence against God; and together with, or rather included in, this sorrow, there is a determination not to offend any more. Moreover, repentance involves not merely cessation from sin, but a readiness to make good the injury done to God and man (St. Thom., 3, q. 85, a. 3). We may go further, and add that confession also is an element of full and true repentance. The guilty man is persuaded that there is no forgiveness for him as long as his sin lies buried in his bosom. Sometimes the acknowledgment of his guilt is made to the world at large; sometimes, and perhaps oftener, to some trustworthy person, thereby satisfying the impulse to unburden himself, and at the same time securing immunity from punishment. The chronicles of crime, the plots of the novelist and dramatist, bear testimony to this instinctive impulse to confess.<sup>67</sup> Contrition, Confession, and Satisfaction—the acts of the virtue of Penance—are therefore the matter of the sacrament. What elevates these acts of the penitent to the dignity of a sacrament—in other words, the form of the sacrament of Penance—is the priest’s absolution.<sup>68</sup> “The form of the sacrament of Penance,” says the Council of Trent (sess. xiv. chap 3), “wherein its force principally consists, is placed in those words of the minister, *I absolve thee*, etc.; to which words indeed, certain prayers are, according to the custom of Holy Church, laudably joined, which, nevertheless, by no means regard the essence of that form,

<sup>67</sup> De Maiſtre, *Du Pape*, liv. iii. ch. 3.

<sup>68</sup> It is, of course, by Christ’s institution that the form possesses this elevating power.

neither are they necessary for the administration of the sacrament itself. But the acts of the penitent himself, to wit, Contrition, Confession, and Satisfaction, are, as it were, the matter of this sacrament (*sunt quasi materia hujus sacramenti*).<sup>70</sup> There had been much discussion among theologians concerning the matter and form of penance. Scotus, preceded by Robert Pullen and followed by Ockham, held that the absolution alone was of the essence of the sacrament, the acts of the penitent being merely necessary conditions; and, consequently, that absolution, considered as a sensible rite, was the matter; and, considered as signifying the effect, was the form. Durandus believed the absolution to be the form, and the confession alone to be the matter. In his view contrition was only a condition, and satisfaction the spirit, of the sacrament. Some theologians even held that the imposition of the priest's hands was part of the matter. The decrees of the Council were so worded as not to exclude the Scotist opinion. (Cf. St. Thom, 3, q. 84, a. 1.)

II. That our Lord instituted a rite whereby His Apostles and their successors should forgive sin, is plain from Holy Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers.

1. After His resurrection He said to His Apostles, "As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you. . . . Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins ye shall forgive (ἀφήτε), they are forgiven them (ἀφιένται, al. ἀφέωνται); and whose sins ye shall retain (κρατήτε), they are retained (κεκράτηνται)" (John xx. 21, 23). These words clearly prove that the power on earth of forgiving sins (Mark ii. 10) which the Son of Man possessed from His Father, He conferred upon His Apostles; and not on them alone, but also on their successors, for Christ's mission was to be exercised by His ministers for all days, even to the consummation of the world (*supra*, § 180). Moreover, this power of forgiving sins was to be exercised by means of an external rite, because on the one hand the penitent must show signs of penance, and on the other the minister must make known to the penitent that his sins are forgiven. The Council of Trent says that it was when our Lord pronounced these words that He "principally" instituted the sacrament of Penance. Other words of our Lord also refer to its institution: "Whatsoever ye shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. xviii. 18). Here, too, the discretion as to binding or loosing can be exercised only by external manifestation on the part of the penitent and the minister.<sup>70</sup>

2. These passages of Holy Scripture have served the Fathers as texts for discourses on the sacrament of Penance.

"He that, like the Apostles, has been breathed upon by Jesus—and who can be known by his fruits as having received the Holy Ghost, and become spiritual by being led by the Spirit, after the manner of the Son of God, to each of the things that are to be done according to reason—he forgives whatsoever God would forgive, and retains the sins that are incurable; ministering as the prophets ministered to God when they spoke not their own, but the things of the Divine will—so he also to God, Who alone has the power of forgiving. The words respecting the forgiveness which accrued to the Apostles are, in the Gospel according to John, 'Receive ye the Holy Ghost,' etc." (Origen, *De Orat.*, n. 28).

"God would never threaten the penitent if He forgave not the penitent. God alone, you rejoin, can do this. True; but that which He does through His priests is His own power. For what is that which He says to His Apostles, 'Whatsoever ye shall bind,' etc.? Why this,

<sup>70</sup>See, however, *supra*, p. 128.

if it was not lawful for men to bind and loose? Is this allowed to Apostles only? Then to them alone is it allowed to baptize, to them alone to give the Holy Ghost, and to them alone to cleanse the sins of the nations; inasmuch as all this was given in command to none but the Apostles. But if in the same place both the loosing of the bonds and the power of the sacrament are conferred, either the whole has been derived to us from the model (form and power) of the Apostles, or neither has the former been abrogated from the decrees [of God] (*Aut totum ad nos ex apostolorum forma et potestate deductum est, aut nec illud ex decretis relaxatum est*)” (Pacian, *Ep.* i. n. 6).

The second book of St. John Chrysostom’s work on the Priesthood is almost entirely filled with rules as to the guidance of souls in the sacrament of Penance. We must here content ourselves with the following brief extracts:

“Men that dwell on earth and have their abode therein, have had committed to them the dispensation of the things that are in heaven, and have received a power which God hath not given to angels or to archangels; for not to these was it said, ‘Whatsoever ye shall bind,’ etc. They that rule on earth, have indeed also power to bind but the body only; whereas this bond touches the very soul itself, and reaches even unto heaven; and what the priests shall do below, the same does God ratify above, and the Lord confirms the sentence of His servants. And what else is this but that He has given them all heavenly power? For He saith, ‘Whose sins ye shall,’ etc. What power could be greater than this? . . . The Jewish priests had power to cleanse the leprosy of the body; or, rather, not to cleanse it at all, but to decide on those who were clean, and you know what struggles there were for the sacerdotal dignity then; but these [Christian priests] have received power not to cleanse the leprosy of the body, but the uncleanness of the soul; not to decide that it is cleansed, but to cleanse it indeed (οὐκ ἀπαλλαγείσαν δοκιμάζειν ἀλλ’ ἀπαλλάττειν παντελῶς ἔλαβον ἐξουσίαν)” (*De Sacerdotio*, lib. iii. nn. 5, 6).

“‘Whose sins ye shall forgive,’ etc. He gave the power of forgiving sins—He Who by His own breath infused Himself into their hearts, and bestowed on them Him Who forgives sins. ‘When He said this He breathed on them,’ etc. Where are the men who teach that sins cannot be forgiven men by men? Who with a cruel spirit take from the sick and the wounded their cure, and deny them their remedy? Who impiously insult sinners with despair of a return? Peter forgives sins, and receives the penitent with all joy, and avails himself of this power which God has granted to all priests” (St. Peter Chrysol., *Serm.* lxxxiv.).

Further passages will be cited below, when we come to speak of Confession.

“Our Lord then principally instituted the sacrament of Penance when, raised from the dead, He breathed on His disciples, saying, ‘Receive ye,’ etc. By which action so signal, and by words so plain, the unanimous consent of the Fathers hath always understood that the power of forgiving and of retaining sins, for the reconciling of the faithful, was communicated to the Apostles and to their legitimate successors. And with great reason did the Catholic Church reject and condemn as heretics the Novatians who obstinately in olden times denied that power. . . . If any one shall say that in the Catholic Church Penance is not truly and properly a sacrament instituted by Christ our Lord for reconciling the faithful unto God as often as they fall into sins after baptism, let him be anathema. . . . If any one shall say that those words of the Lord the Saviour, ‘Receive ye the Holy Ghost,’ etc., are not to be understood of the power of forgiving and of retaining sins in the sacrament of Penance, as the Catholic Church hath always from the beginning understood them, but shall wrest them, contrary to

the institution of this sacrament, to the power of preaching the Gospel, let him be anathema” (Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 1, and canons 1 and 3). Cf. St. Thom., 3. q. 84, a. 1.

## § 175 THE RECIPIENT

Penance differs from the other Sacraments chiefly in this, that the recipient must not merely have the intuition of receiving it, and place no obstacle in the way of its efficacy; he must also positively contribute by his own acts to the working of the Sacrament. Some theologians, indeed, have held that these acts are only necessary conditions, and do not enter into the essence of the Sacrament; but even in this opinion the recipient must necessarily perform these acts in order that the effect may be produced. We need hardly point out that the efficacy of the Sacrament is not due to the merits of the penitent. His acts are part of the sacrament which, like the other sacraments, owes all its efficacy to the merits of Christ.

I. Contrition, which holds the first place among these acts, is defined by the Council of Trent (sess. xiv. chap. 4): “A sorrow of mind and a detestation for sin committed with the purpose of not sinning for the future” (*Animi dolor ac detestatio de peccato commiso, cum proposito non peccandi de cetero*).”

1. It is plain that God will not forgive a sinner without sorrow for sin. The penitent must not only cease from offending, and resolve to begin a new life; he must also have a hatred of the evil that he has done. “Cast away from you all your transgressions by which you have transgressed, and make to yourselves a new heart and a new spirit” (Ezech. xviii. 31). “Be converted to me with all your heart, in fasting, and in weeping, and in mourning; and rend your hearts, and not your garments, and turn to the Lord your God” (Joel ii. 12, 13). “Against Thee only have I sinned, and done evil in Thy sight . . . I have laboured in my groaning; every night will I wash my bed; I have watered my couch with my tears . . . I will recount to Thee all my years in the bitterness of my soul” (Ps. l. 6; vi. 7; Isa. xxxviii. 15). “And Peter . . . going forth, he wept bitterly” (Matt. xxvi. 25), “And standing behind at His feet, she began to wash His feet with tears, and wiped them with the hairs of her head” (Luke vii. 38). “I will arise and go to my father, and say to him, Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee; I am not now worthy to be called thy son” (*ibid.* xv. 18, 19). “And the publican, standing afar off, would not so much as lift up his eyes towards heaven, but struck his breast, saying, O God, be merciful to me a sinner” (*ibid.* xviii. 13; see also Acts ii. 37).

2. Detestation for sin may arise from various motives: the vileness of sin itself; the fear of hell, or other punishments; the love of God, Who has been offended. Hence there has been a discussion among theologians as to which motive is necessary for forgiveness.

(a) There can be no doubt that hatred of sin, because by it we have offended the infinitely good God, reconciles us to Him at once, even before the actual reception of the sacrament; but this sorrow, which is perfect Contrition, or Contrition properly so called, includes the readiness to do all that God commands, and consequently includes the desire to receive the sacrament instituted for the remission of sin (see Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 4).

(b) The difficulty is therefore about the efficacy of imperfect Contrition (attrition); that is, sorrow arising from the lower motives already mentioned. That such sorrow, if accompanied with the resolve to lead a better life, is a true and profitable sorrow, and paves the way for grace, is defined by the Council of Trent (*ibid.*). Is it, however, sufficient for the efficacious reception of the sacrament? Unless it is so, it is hard to see in what the faithful are benefited

by the institution of the Sacrament of Penance, except it be by a certainty of forgiveness, and an additional outpouring of grace upon the soul. The question was discussed with so much acrimony in the seventeenth century, that Alexander VII was obliged to intervene, and forbid both parties to pronounce theological censures on each other. Later on, St. Alphonsus was able to say, "It is certain, and commonly held by theologians, that perfect Contrition is not required, but that Attrition is sufficient" (*Theol. Moral.*, lib. vi. n. 440). See also Ballerini, *Opus Theol. Mor.*, vol. vi. p. 24; De Augustinis, *De Rē Sacram., De Pœnit.*, part ii. art. 7.

II. By Confession is meant the acknowledgment, by word of mouth or in some equivalent way, of our sins to a priest. The sacrament is by its very nature similar to a criminal trial: the penitent is at once accuser, defendant, and witness; while the priest is the judge. When the penitent has declared himself to be guilty, and appeals for mercy on the ground of repentance, it is for the priest to decide whether the case is one for forgiveness or retention of the crime, and also to determine the satisfaction to be made in case of absolution.

1. The necessity of Confession is contained in the words of Christ: "Whose sins ye shall forgive," etc. As the Council of Trent observes (sess. xiv. chap. 5), it is manifest that the Apostles and their successors could not exercise the power conferred upon them except after due knowledge of the case, nor could they observe equity in enjoining punishment unless the faithful declare their sins specifically and individually. The same may be inferred from the words relating to the power of binding and loosing (Matt. xviii. 18). Two other texts, though not directly enjoining confession to a priest, yet prove the necessity of confession, and have been interpreted to refer to Confession in the technical sense: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us; if we confess our sins, [God] is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all iniquity" (1 John i. 9); "Confess, therefore, your sins one to another (ἐξομολογεῖσθε οὗν ἀλλήλοις τὰς ἀμαρτίας), and pray for one another, that you may be saved" (James i. 16; cf. v. 14). The meaning of this latter passage, as Estius observes (*in loc.*), is: confess yourselves not only to God, but also men to men; that is to say, to those whom you know to be endowed by God with the power of forgiving sins.

2. We have already seen in the preceding section that the Fathers taught that Christ conferred upon the Apostles and their successors the power of forgiving sins. They also go on to show that confession is required in order that this power may be exercised.

"If we have revealed our sins not only to God, but also to those who are able to heal our wounds and sins, our sins will be blotted out by Him Who saith, 'Behold, I will blot out thine iniquities as a cloud, and thy sins as a mist'" (Origen, *Hom. xvii., in Lucam*). "If a man become his own accuser, while he accuses himself and confesses, he at the same time ejects the sins and digests the whole cause of the disease. Only look diligently round to whom thou oughtest to confess thy sin. Prove first the physician to whom thou shouldst set forth the cause of thy sickness, who knows how to be weak with the weak, to weep with the weeping, who knows the art of condoling and sympathizing; that so, in fine, thou mayest do and follow whatever he shall have said. . . . If he shall have understood, and foresee that thy sickness is such as ought to be set forth and cured in the assembly of the whole Church, and thereby perhaps others be edified and thou thyself easily cured, this must be prescribed with much deliberation, and on the very experienced advice of that physician" (*Id., Hom. 2, in Ps., xxxvii.*; see also *Hom. 2, in Levit.*). This comparison of the priest with the physician, and the penitent with the patient, is insisted on by Origen and many other Fathers, to bring out the necessity of confession, since the patient must declare his symptoms or show his wounds to

his physician in order to be cured.

“The confession of sins follows the same rule as the manifestation of bodily infirmities. As, therefore, men do not disclose their bodily infirmities to every one, nor to a few at random, but to such as are skilful in the cure of them, so also ought the confession of sins to be made to those who are able to apply a remedy” (St. Basil, *Reg. Brév.*, 228).

“Put off the old man . . . by means of confession (δὲ τῆς ἐξομολογήσεως) that you may put on the new man. . . . Now is the season of confession: confess the things that thou hast done, whether in word or in deed; the things done in the night and those in the day” (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* 2–5).

“Sin is to be confessed in order that pardon may be obtained” (St. Hilary, *Tract. in Ps.*, cxviii.).

“Lo! we have at length reached the close of holy Lent; now especially must we press forward in the career of fasting, and make more fervent prayers, and exhibit a full and accurate confession of our sins (πολλὴν καὶ ἀκριβῆ τὴν ἐξομολόγησιν τῶν ἡμαρτημένων ἐπιδειξέσθαι) . . . that with these good works, having come to the day of Easter, we may enjoy the bounty of the Lord. . . . For as the enemy knows that we can during this time, after having treated of what holds us fettered, and having confessed our sins and shown our wounds to the physician, attain to an abundant cure, he then in an especial manner opposes us” (St. John Chrysostom, *Hom.* xxx. in *Gen.*, 1, 5).

Many other similar passages may be found collected together in *Faith of Catholics*, iii. pp. 36–113. It should be noted that, though some of these passages may seem to refer only to confession generally, or to public confession, they really prove the necessity of private, or auricular confession, as it is called. This is clear from the duty of confessing to a priest, and also from the duty of acknowledging even the most secret sins. To be obliged to make public declaration of hidden crimes, especially of those against certain of the commandments, would be too great a burden to impose upon the faithful, and would involve most injurious consequences. “Although,” says the Council of Trent (sess. xiv. chap. 5), “Christ hath not forbidden that a person may—in punishment of his sins and for his own humiliation, as well for an example to others as for the edification of the Church that has been scandalized—confess his sins publicly, nevertheless this is not commanded by a Divine precept; neither would it be very prudent to enjoin by any human law that sins, especially such as are secret, should be made known by a public confession.”

An account of the “Suppression of the Penitentiary,” narrated by Socrates (*Hist. Eccl.*, v. 19) and Sozomen (*Hist. Eccl.*, vii. 16), will be found in Chardon, sect. ii. chap. 2.

3. Though the necessity of confession is plainly contained in and inferred from Christ’s words, yet, inasmuch as He did not expressly and explicitly command it, the mediæval theologians used to discuss whether it was or was not of “Divine institution (*juris divini*).” As the Council of Trent has decided this question in the affirmative (sess. xiv. can. 6 and 7), the utmost that may now be said is that the Church has promulgated or declared the necessity of confession. This, indeed, was the meaning of some of the Schoolmen who denied the Divine institution. Others, again, admitted the Divine institution, but denied that it could be proved from John xx. 21, taken by itself, without the help of tradition. Before the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), a small number of theologians held, with Peter Lombard (*Sent.* iv. dist. 17), as an “opinion,” that it was enough to confess to God, without doing so to man. They were led to this view through not understanding that perfect charity—which undoubtedly remits sin

before actual confession—includes the desire (*votum*) and the obligation of confession.

Further information concerning confession should be sought in the writings of moral and ascetical theologians.

III. The third act required on the part of the recipient is satisfaction. When the guilt (*culpa*) of sin has been pardoned by God, there often remains the liability to some temporal punishment to atone for the injury done to Him, and also to serve for the reformation of the sinner. If such punishments were not inflicted, “taking occasion therefrom, thinking sins less grievous, we offering as it were an insult and outrage to the Holy Ghost, should fall into more grievous sins, treasuring up wrath against the day of wrath” (Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 8). There are numbers of instances of such punishments recorded in Holy Scripture. Adam received pardon for his sin (Wisd. x. 2), yet severe temporal punishment was inflicted upon him. The Israelites were punished for their murmuring, even after the sin itself was forgiven. “And the Lord said, I have forgiven, according to thy word . . . but yet all the men that have seen My majesty, and the signs that I have done in Egypt and in the wilderness, and have tempted Me now ten times, and have not obeyed My voice, shall not see the land for which I swore to their fathers, neither shall any one of them that hath detracted Me, behold it” (Num. xiv. 20–23). Even Moses was shut out of the promised land as a punishment for his want of confidence at the waters of strife (Deut. xxxii. 49–52). When David repented of his adultery and murder, Nathan said to him, “The Lord also hath taken away thy sin: thou shalt not die. Nevertheless, because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme for this thing, the child that is born to thee shall surely die” (2 Kings xii. 13, 14; cf. 18, 19) So, too, he was punished temporarily for the sin of numbering his people (2 Kings xxiv.).

1. That the temporal punishments due to sin already forgiven may be atoned for by penitential acts, is also clearly taught in Scripture. The Israelites over and over again, by their fastings and tears and prayers, averted the chastisements due for their falling away from God (Judges, *passim*); the people of Ninive, by the same means, warded off the destruction of their city (Jonas iv.); Manasses, “after that he was in distress, he prayed to the Lord his God; and did penance exceedingly before the God of his fathers; and he entreated Him and besought Him earnestly; and He heard his prayer, and brought him again to Jerusalem into his kingdom” (2 Paral. xxxiii. 12, 13); “Water quengeth fire, and alms resisteth sins” (Ecclus. iii. 33); “Alms delivereth from all sin and from death, and will not suffer the soul to go into darkness” (Job iv, 11). “As we have sinned greatly,” says St. Cyprian, “let us weep greatly. . . . Men must pray and entreat most earnestly, pass the day in grief, spend nights in vigils and tears, spend their whole time in sorrowing lamentations, lie stretched on the ground, prostrate themselves among ashes, sackcloth, and dust; after Christ’s raiment lost, wish for no other clothing; after the devil’s food, of choice must fast; apply themselves to just works (*justis operibus incumbere*), whereby sins are purged away; give abundant alms, whereby souls are freed from death. . . . He who has thus made satisfaction to God (*Deo satisfecerit*), who by penitence for what he has done, by shame for his sin has gained for himself an increase both of virtue and faith from the very suffering which his fall occasions, heard and helped by the Lord, will give gladness to the Church which he had lately grieved, and merit not only God’s pardon now, but a crown also” (*De Lapsis*, cap. 35). See also Tertullian, *De Pœnitentia*, cap. 3; St. Ambrose, *In Luc.*, lib. vii. n. 156; St. Jerome, *Ep.*, cviii.; “Whilst we thus, by making satisfaction, suffer for our sins, we are made conformable to Jesus Christ, Who satisfied for

our sins, from Whom all our sufficiency is; having also a most sure pledge that if we suffer with Him we shall also be glorified with Him” (Council of Trent, *l.c.*).

2. In accordance with this doctrine, it has always been the practice of the Church that the minister of the sacrament of penance should “enjoin salutary and suitable satisfactions according to the quality of the crimes and the ability of the penitent.” If it be objected that such acts are opposed to the efficacy of Christ’s satisfaction, the Council of Trent replies, “Neither is this satisfaction which we discharge for our sins so our own as not to be through Jesus Christ. For we who can do nothing of ourselves as of ourselves, can do all things with the co-operation of Him Who strengthened us. Thus man hath not wherein to glory, but all our glorying is in Christ; in Whom we live; in Whom we merit; in Whom we satisfy; bringing forth fruits worthy of penance, which from Him have their efficacy; by Him are offered to the Father; and through Him are accepted by the Father” (*l.c.*; see also canons 12–15).

On the whole of this section concerning the acts of the penitent, see St. Thomas, 3, q. 90, and Suppl., q. 1 sqq.; De Augustinis, *op. cit.*, part ii. art. 7, 8, 9.

*Scholion.* It has been shown that the temporal punishment due to sin is not always remitted when the guilt of the sin has been forgiven, and that the penances imposed by the priest in confession are given for the purpose of securing this remission. But our Lord has given to His Church the power of remitting temporal punishment, even apart from the sacrament of Penance. Such a remission has been known by various names, e.g. *relaxatio*, *donatio*, or *condonatio*, but is now generally called an Indulgence. It is not, therefore, as some imagine, a remission of sin; much less is it a permission to commit sin.

1. “Whereas the power of conferring Indulgences was granted by Christ to the Church, and she has even in the most ancient days used the said power delivered unto her of God, the sacred holy Synod [of Trent] teaches and enjoins that the use of Indulgences, for the Christian people most salutary and approved of by the authority of sacred Councils, is to be retained in the Church; and it condemns with anathema those who either assert that they are useless, or who deny that there is in the Church the power to grant them” (sess. xxv.). We are therefore bound to believe (a) that the Church has the power of granting Indulgences; and (b) that Indulgences are of benefit to the faithful.

(a) The power of binding and loosing on earth and in heaven, granted to St. Peter (Matt. xvi. 19) and to the Apostles (*ibid.* xviii. 18), in the widest terms and without any sort of restriction, must include the power of remitting all that is due to sin. In the case of the repentant, incestuous Corinthian, St. Paul exercised this power (2 Cor. ii. 6, 7, 10) by remitting the sentence of excommunication and the remainder of the penance imposed (see Estius’s *Commentary*, in *h.l.*). In the ages of persecution, the canonical penances were frequently relaxed by the intercession of the martyrs (Tertullian, *Ad Martyr.*, cap. i.). St. Cyprian, in particular, treats of this practice. “Since I am informed,” he says, “that some (of the lapsed) are urgent with you (the martyrs and confessors). . . . I beseech you with all possible earnestness, that, mindful of the Gospel, and considering what and what kind of concessions the martyrs your predecessors in times past made, how anxious they were in all cases,—you would also anxiously and cautiously weigh the requests of your petitioners; that as the Lord’s friends, and hereafter to judge with Him, you would look into the conduct and the merits of each, and examine also the kind and quality of their offences, lest, if anything should have been rashly and unworthily either promised by you or *executed by us*, our Church should begin to be ashamed even before the very Gentiles,” etc. (*Ep. x., Ad Mart. et Conf.*, n. 4).



These relaxations were actually granted by the bishops, and not by the martyrs themselves. “The blessed martyrs have written to me concerning some individuals, requesting that their desires may be considered. When the Lord shall have first given peace to all . . . then each of these cases shall be examined into, in your presence, and aided by your judgment” (*Ep. xi., Ad Plebem.* n. 1; see also *Epp. Ad Clerum, Ad Clerum Romæ*). In the fifth canon relating to penitents, the Council of Ancyra (314) decreed that “the bishops have the power, having considered the manner of their conversion, to deal indulgently (φιλανθρωπεύεσθαι) with them, or to add a longer period. But, above all things, let their previous as well as their subsequent life be inquired into, and so let the indulgence be measured out” (οὕτως ἢ φιλανθρωπία ἐπιμετρεῖσθω). And the Council of Nicæa: “For as many as, in tears and patience and good works, manifest their conversion in deed, and not in appearance (only), these having completed the appointed time as hearers, may deservedly communicate in the prayers; together with authority to the bishop to determine something yet more indulgent respecting them” (can. 12). We have not space to trace the subsequent history of Indulgences. We may, however, mention the great Indulgence granted by Urban II (1098) to Crusaders, releasing them from all canonical penances which they might have incurred.

(b) The benefit derived from an Indulgence does not mean that the person who receives it is simply let off his canonical penance here on earth. Unless his liability to temporal punishment was remitted by Almighty God, an Indulgence would really be of no benefit at all. But our Lord’s words, “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed *also in heaven,*” and the words of St. Paul, “I have done it *in the person of Christ*” (2 Cor. ii. 10), abundantly prove that the relaxation is ratified by God. Although open to abuse, Indulgences are an encouragement to repentance: “You should rather pardon and comfort (the sinner) lest perhaps such a one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow” (2 Cor. ii. 7).

2. The Church grants these relaxations out of the superabundant merits of Christ and His saints, which constitute, as it were, a treasure at her disposal for distribution. “The reason why they are valid is the unity of the Mystical Body (the Church), in which many in their works of penance have paid more than their debt, and many have patiently borne unjust tribulations by which their punishments (*pœna*) could be expiated, if any were due to them; whose merits are so great as to exceed the punishments due to all who are now alive; and, above all, on account of Christ’s merit which, although it works in the sacraments, is not restricted thereto, but by its infinity exceeds (*excedit*, ‘goes beyond’) the efficacy of the sacraments . . . One can make satisfaction for another. Now the saints, in whom the superabundance of satisfactory works is found, have not performed these works for the benefit of any particular individual . . . but for the whole Church at large; as the Apostle says (Col. i. 24) that he ‘fills up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ, in my flesh for His body which is the Church,’ to which he writes. And so the forementioned are common to the whole Church” (St. Thomas, *Suppl.* q, 25, a. 1).

3. Indulgences may be applied, by way of suffrage, to the souls in purgatory. As “the souls of the devout dead are not cut off from the Church” (St. August., *De Civ. Dei*, lib xx. cap. 9, n. 2), they can still benefit (if they need it) by the prayers and good works of their brethren on earth; and in their behalf the Church can unlock the treasure of merit which she possesses. But she cannot directly apply this merit to them; she can only offer it to God, and beg Him to apply it to them as He may think fit.

4. Among the good works to which Indulgences are attached, are almsgiving and con-

tributions for various ecclesiastical purposes. In the Middle Ages it was common to grant Indulgences to those who, unable to take the Cross themselves, gave sums of money towards the equipment of Crusaders. Such practices no doubt sometimes gave rise to abuses, and to the erroneous belief in the “sale” of Indulgences. The Council of Trent, “being desirous that the abuses which have crept therein, and by occasion of which the excellent (*insigne*) name of Indulgences is blasphemed by heretics, be amended and corrected, ordains . . . that all evil gains for the obtaining thereof—whence a most prolific cause of abuses among the Christian people has been derived—be wholly abolished,” etc. (sess. xxv.). See also St. Thomas, *Suppl.*, q. 25, a. 3.

5. Indulgences are either *plenary*—remitting the whole of the temporal punishment; or *partial*—remitting only a portion. The expression, “an Indulgence of seven years,” does not mean a remission of seven years’ purgatory, but merely a remission of so much punishment as could be obtained by seven years’ canonical penance on earth. See St. Thomas, *Suppl.*, qq. 25–27; De Augustinis, *De Rē Sacr.*, p. ii., Appendix.

## § 176 THE MINISTER

I. The power of the keys—of opening and shutting, binding, loosing, forgiving, and retaining—was conferred by Christ upon the Apostles and their successors, the bishops and priests, as will be shown further on when we come to speak of the sacrament of Order. Hence bishops and priests alone are the ministers of the sacrament of Penance (Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 6.). The passages already quoted from the Fathers leave this beyond doubt. The practice of confessing to lay persons, when a priest could not be had, was common in the Middle Ages, and continued until recent times. It was recommended by some of the greatest of the Schoolmen—Peter Lombard, Albertus Magnus, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas himself (*In iv. Sent. dist.*, 17, q. 3, a. 3).<sup>71</sup> This, however, did not imply that laymen could absolve. The act of confessing was looked upon as a humiliation, and as an endeavour on the part of the sinner to conform as far as in him lay to Christ’s ordinance. Hence the confession would tend to appease the offended God, and would be a means of moving the hearer to pray for him who had acknowledged his sins. In accordance with the general principle that the validity of the sacraments does not depend upon the moral worth of the minister, the Council defined that “even priests who are in mortal sin exercise—through the power of the Holy Ghost which was bestowed in ordination—the office of forgiving sins as the ministers of Christ” (*ib.*).

II. Every priest receives at ordination the power of the keys. “Receive the Holy Ghost,” says the ordaining bishop, imposing his hands on the candidate; “whose sins thou shalt forgive, they are forgiven them; whose sins thou shalt retain, they are retained.”

1. As, however, the exercise of this power is an act of judicial authority, it can be performed only upon such subjects as are assigned to the priest. In other words, he must have jurisdiction over the penitent before he can absolve him (Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 7). This jurisdiction may be either “ordinary” (in virtue of office) or “delegated.” The Pope has ordinary jurisdiction over all the world; the bishops over their dioceses; the parish priests over their parishes. Hence the Pope can absolve any of the faithful; the bishops those of their

<sup>71</sup>See Chardon, sect. ii. chap. 7.

dioceses; the parish priests the members of their flock.<sup>72</sup>

2. Priests belonging to religious Orders obtain delegated jurisdiction from the Pope. This privilege gave rise to so much opposition during the Middle Ages,<sup>73</sup> that the Council of Trent decided that no priest, even though he be a religious, should hear the confession of a secular person without the approbation of the bishop of the diocese (sess. xxiii., *De Ref.*, cap. 15.)

3. It was the custom from the earliest times for those who had been guilty of certain grave crimes to be absolved only by the bishops, or even by the Sovereign Pontiff. For wise reasons the person conferring jurisdiction can rightly limit it as to time, place, person, or case. This power of "reservation," as it is called, can be exercised by the Pope over the world, and by the bishops in their dioceses, "unto edification, but not unto destruction." "Lest, however," adds the Council of Trent (sess. xiv. chap. 7), "anyone should perish on this account, it hath always been very piously observed in the Church of God that there be no reservation at the point of death (*in articulo mortis*), and that, therefore, all priests can absolve any penitents whatsoever from any kind of sins and censures whatsoever (*omnes sacerdotes quoslibet pœnitentes a quibusvis peccatis et censuris*)."

III. The form of the sacrament of Penance, in which the efficacy of the sacrament chiefly resides, is the priest's absolution. This word is used to denote the act of "loosing" (*solvere, solutio*), in accordance with the power conferred by Christ (Matt. xvi. 19; xviii. 18). In Roman Law *absolutio* meant acquittal.<sup>74</sup> Like so many other legal expressions, it was adopted by Tertullian (*De Pœnit.*, 10) to signify release or acquittal from the guilt and punishment of sin.

1. The priest's absolution has been defined to be a judicial act, and not a mere pronouncing or declaring that the penitent's sins are forgiven (Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 6, can. 9). This is clear from the words of Christ: "Whose sins *ye shall forgive*," etc.; "whatsoever *ye shall loose*," etc.

2. The exact formula to be used was not expressly stated by Christ or His Apostles. It is certain that for upwards of a thousand years a precatory form ("May Christ absolve thee," or similar words) was in general use, as indeed is still the case in the East. The indicative form ("I absolve thee") came into use in the Western Church during the early Middle Ages, and gradually supplanted the other. The two are found side by side in Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure; St. Thomas, however, was strongly in favour of the indicative form (3, q. 84, a. 3), and this was afterwards adopted by the Council of Trent (sess. xiv. chap. 3). At the present day a priest of the Western Church using the precatory form alone would grievously sin, and would expose the sacrament to the danger of nullity. Various explanations have been given of the difficulties connected with the variation of the formula of absolution. The best would seem to be to hold that where Christ Himself and His Apostles have not specifically determined the form of a sacrament, He left it to be determined by their successors; and that the Church in such cases may vary this form at different times and places, so as to bring out more clearly the exact force and significance of the sacrament. Thus, in the present case there can be no doubt that the indicative formula of absolution brings out the judicial character

<sup>72</sup>Bishops and parish priests may also absolve those who come into their dioceses or parishes, but only by implied concession of the bishops to whose dioceses these penitents belong.

<sup>73</sup>See Chardon, *señt.* ii. chap. 8.

<sup>74</sup>"*Sententis decem et octo absolutio confici poterat*" (Cicero, *Pro Cluentio*, 27).

better than the precatory formula would do.<sup>75</sup> The latter, however, does not altogether exclude the judicial character of the act of the minister, for it leaves him to decide whether the penitent is disposed for absolution, and also leaves him to determine the penance to be imposed.

3. The old Sacramentaries and Penitential books enjoin the imposition of the priest's hands while he is giving absolution. So, too, the Roman Ritual at the present day contains the rubric, "*Deinde dextra versus pœnitentem elevata dicit, 'Misereatur,'*"<sup>76</sup> etc.; this lifting up of the hand being a sort of survival of the more ancient custom. Hence some of the Fathers speak of imposition of hands as a synonym for the sacrament of Penance, and attribute to it the forgiveness of sins. We have already (§ 192) spoken of the meaning of this rite. Its connection with the sacrament of Penance arose from our Lord's words (Mark xvi. 18), "They shall lay their hands upon the sick, and they shall recover;" and from His practice of healing the sick by touching them (*ibid.* vi. 5; Matt, viii. 3). But, as St. Thomas points out, the laying on of hands there spoken of is not sacramental, but is ordained for the working of miracles; that by the touch of the hand of Christ, or of a sanctified man, even corporal infirmities may be taken away (3, q. 84, a. 4). No mention is made of it by the Council of Trent. It is therefore only an accidental adjunct, and not a part of the sacrament.

In addition to the works mentioned on p. 196, see also Batiffol, *Études d'Histoire et de Théologie Positive*, tom, i., *Les Origines de la Pénitence*; Vacandard, *La Confession Sacramentale dans l'Eglise Primitive*; Turmel, *Histoire de la Théologie Positive*, pp. 141 sqq., 317 sqq., 453 sqq.

## CHAPTER VII

### EXTREME UNCTION

“OUR MOST MERCIFUL REDEEMER, Who would have His servants at all times provided with salutary remedies against all the weapons of all their enemies: as in the other sacraments He prepared the greatest aids whereby during life Christians may preserve themselves whole from every grievous spiritual evil, so did He guard the close of life with a most firm defence, viz., the Sacrament of Extreme Unction” (Council of Trent, sess. xiv., *Extr. Unct.*). This sacrament has been known under various other names: e.g. “Oil of blessing” (*oleum benedictionis*); “Holy Oil” (*oleum sanctum*, ἅγιον ἔλαιον); “the Sacrament of Sacred Unction” (*sacramentum sanctæ unctionis*); and also among the Greeks, εὐχέλαιον (oil with prayer).

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<sup>75</sup>It should be carefully noted that the Council of Trent does not condemn the precatory formula; and that it abstains from defining the form of confession in the *canons* of the often-quoted fourteenth session. It is only in the third *chapter* that the Council says with some vagueness, which or course was not accidental, “the form of the sacrament of Penance, in which its force principally consists, is placed in those words of the minister, ‘I absolve thee,’ etc. (*pœnitentiæ formam in qua præcipue ipsius vis sita est, in illis ministri verbis positam esse, Ego te absolvo,*” etc.).

<sup>76</sup>“Then, right hand raised against the penitent, he says, ‘Misereatur.’” —Ed.

## § 127 NATURE AND INSTITUTION OF EXTREME UNCTION—ITS MATTER AND FORM

I. In speaking of the number of the sacraments (*supra*, p. 159, n. 46), we said that Penance and Extreme Unction were the two medicinal or healing sacraments: Penance for the healing of the soul, and Extreme Unction for the healing of the body, and also for strengthening and cleansing the soul when about to leave the body. Bodily disease and death are, as we have seen (*supra*, p. 13), the penalty of sin. Extreme Unction does not altogether remove these, for we must all die; nevertheless, even when it does not restore health, it rubs death of its sting and its victory by making death the means of cleansing and purifying the body, and thereby fitting it for eternal life. More will be said on this subject when we come to speak of the effects of the sacrament. The natural act raised to a supernatural sphere is, in this case, anointing. As we saw in speaking of Confirmation, rubbing the limbs with oil was practised for the purpose of strengthening them; and we may add, what more concerns us here, anointing is a potent means of healing (Isa. i. 6; Mark vi. 13; Luke x. 38). Hence it was chosen as the rite for supernaturally conferring the health of the body and strength of the soul. "Is any man sick among you?" says St. James, "let him bring in the priests (πρεβυτέρους) of the Church; and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil (ἀλείφαντες ἐλαίῳ) in the Name of the Lord. And the prayer of faith (ἡ εὐχὴ τῆς πίστεως) shall save (σώσει) the sick man, and the Lord shall raise him up (ἐγερεῖ); and if he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him" (v. 14, 15). The rite here described is undoubtedly identical with the sacrament of Extreme Unction as administered by the Church. It is clear that the Apostle is giving a precept which is to hold good for all time, because it comes in the midst of other general commands: "Is any of you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him sing. Is any man sick? etc. . . . Confess your sins one to another. Pray for one another that you may be saved." Again, all the ancient authorities on Extreme Unction refer to this passage; and they declare that the Church in administering this sacrament is acting in obedience to the Apostle's injunction. That the rite is a sacramental one is clearly indicated: there is the external action (prayer and anointing), and the inward supernatural effect ("shall save him," "shall raise him up," "the sins shall be forgiven"). The institution by Christ we shall now proceed to show.

II. "Now this sacred unction," says the Council of Trent (*l.c.*, ch. i.), "was instituted by Christ our Lord as truly and properly a sacrament of the New Law, insinuated indeed in Mark (vi. 13), but recommended and promulgated to the faithful by James the Apostle, and brother of the Lord. 'Is any man,' etc. In which words, as the Church hath learned from Apostolic tradition, received from hand to hand, he teacheth the matter, the form, the proper minister, and the effect of this salutary sacrament." And the Council condemns those who say "that Extreme Unction is not truly and properly a sacrament instituted by Christ our Lord, and promulgated by the blessed Apostle James; but is only a rite received from the Fathers, or a human figment" (can. 1). Hence the Council teaches on the one hand that the passage in St. James is a "promulgation" and "commendation;" and on the other that the passage in St. Mark (the Apostles "anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them") is an "insinuation." According to the Catechism of the Council (*De Extr. Unct.*, cap. xvi.), this latter term means that our Lord gave a sort of specimen of example (*specimen quoddam*) of this unction. Some of the greatest mediaeval theologians, *e.g.* Hugh of St. Victor (*De Sacr.*, lib. ii. p. xv. cap. 2), Peter Lombard (*Sent.*, iv, dist. 23). and St. Bonaventure (in *Sent.*, *l.c.*, a. 1,

q. 2), taught that Christ did not Himself institute the Sacrament, but left the Apostles to do so. St. Thomas (*Suppl.*, q. 29, a. 3; and 3, q. 64, a. 2) and his school maintained the immediate institution by our Lord, declaring it to be one of the many acts unrecorded in the Gospels (John xx. 30; Acts i. 3). The Thomist view, though not expressly defined, appears to be more in harmony with the teaching of the Council, and has therefore been the prevailing opinion in modern times. See, however, Franzelin, *De Sacr.*, thes. xiv. p. 183 *seq.*

In the writings of the early Fathers there are fewer references to Extreme Unction than to the other sacraments. This comparative silence doubtless arose from the fact that it did not belong to the public life of the Church; and also that it was looked upon as an appendage of Penance (Council of Trent, sess. xiv., *De Extr. Unct.*), and so did not require separate mention. Thus we find the two spoken of together by Origen (*In Levit.*, Hom. 2, n. 4); St. John Chrysostom (*De Sacerd.*, iii. n. 6); St. Cæsarius (*Serm.*, cclxv. n. 3). The most striking patristic authority on the subject is Pope St. Innocent I. "The words of St. James," he says, "ought without doubt to be taken or understood of the faithful who are sick, who can be anointed with the holy oil of chrism, which, being prepared by a bishop, may be used not only for priests, but for all Christians, for anointing in their own need, or in that of their connections (*non solum sacerdotibus sed omnibus uti Christianis licet in sua aut suorum necessitate inungendum [al. inungendo]*). . . . For this chrism cannot be poured upon penitents, inasmuch as it is a kind (*genus*) of sacrament. For to persons to whom the other sacraments are denied, how can it be thought that one kind [of sacrament] can be granted?" (*Ep. ad Decentium*, cap. 8).<sup>77</sup> The Liturgical books, from St. Gregory's Sacramentary onwards, contain numberless proofs of the use of Extreme Unction; and frequent mention of it is made in Provincial Councils, e.g. Châlon sur Saone (813), Aix la Chapelle (836), Mayence (847), Pavia (850), and also in the General Councils of Constance (1414) and Florence (1439). All the Eastern Churches, too—Greek, Armenian, Coptic, and Nestorian—are at one with the Roman Church concerning the doctrine of Extreme Unction. See *Perpét. de la Foi*, l. v. c. 2; Martène, *De Eccl. Rit.*, tom. ii. cap. 7; Denzinger, *Ritus Orient.*, ii. 483 *seq.*

III. As there is no express record of the immediate institution of Extreme Unction by our Lord, so there is no express record how far He Himself determined its matter and form. Nevertheless, "the Church," says the Council of Trent (sess. xiv. ch. 1), "hath understood the matter thereof to be oil blessed by a bishop: for the unction very aptly represents the grace of the Holy Ghost, with which the soul of the sick person is invisibly anointed; and, furthermore, that these words, 'By this unction,' etc., are the form."

1. In treating of the sacraments generally, we said that the matter of a sacrament is the natural action which has been raised by our Lord to a supernatural sphere. Certain of the sacraments, however, make use of material tangible objects (e.g. water, oil, etc.), and these are sometimes styled "the matter" of the sacrament. Theologians call these material things "the remote matter," and the application of them "the proximate matter."

(a) Oil is the remote matter of the sacrament. St. James expressly says, "Anointing him with oil." "The spiritual healing," says St. Thomas, "which is granted to a man at his last end should be perfect, for none comes after it; and it should be soothing, so that hope, which is especially needed by the dying, may not be broken, but encouraged. Now, oil is soothing, and penetrating, and flowing; and, therefore, as regards both the foregoing requirements, it

<sup>77</sup>The apparent difficulty about the laity being ministers as well as the priests, is easily explained if we bear in mind that *inungendum*, or *inungendo*, is taken passively.

is the fitting matter of this sacrament” (*Suppl.*, q. 29, a. 4). There is some difficulty, however, regarding the necessity of the bishop’s blessing, as in the Eastern Church it is the priest who blesses the oil during the administration of the sacrament. Though the Council of Trent says that oil “blessed by a bishop” is the matter, yet the Council does not expressly say that this blessing is essential. Of course, in practice no oil may be used for the sacrament in the Western Church unless it has been blessed by a bishop. See two decrees on the subject in Denzinger’s *Enchiridion*, nn. 1494, 1495.

(b) There has been considerable diversity of practice in different times and places regarding the parts anointed. As a rule the oil was applied to the organs of sense: the nose, ears, mouth, and eyes. Sometimes only one portion was anointed. Thus St. Eusebius, as we learn from his *Acts*, was anointed only on the shoulders. Moreover, inasmuch as one of the purposes of the sacrament is the restoration of bodily health, it was often administered by anointing the diseased part (see Martène, *De Eccl. Rit.*, tom. ii. c. vii. art. 4). According to the present usage of the Roman Church, the anointing of the four above-mentioned organs of sense, together with the hands, feet, and loins, is prescribed. The anointing of the loins is now, however, commonly omitted. Although the *Decretum pro Armenis* (Council of Florence) orders these, it does not declare them to be essential; and the Council of Trent speaks of *unctio*<sup>78</sup> in the singular. One single anointing complies with St. James’s instruction, and is therefore sufficient; but in practice the ritual must be followed (see St. Alphonsus, lib. vi. n. 710).

2. While the minister of Extreme Unction anoints, he pronounces certain words which are the form of the sacrament. These words, in some rituals, are absolute; in others they are a prayer; in others, again, they are both absolute and also a prayer. As far as the essence of the sacrament is concerned any one of these is sufficient, though a prayer is more in accordance with St. James’s words, “Let them pray over him,” “The prayer of faith shall save,” etc. And the Council of Trent says that the words, “By this holy unction,” etc., which are a prayer, are the form. Here, again, the Council must not be understood in an exclusive sense, as though these words were the only valid form. In practice they must be used in the Western Church (see St. Alphonsus, *l.c.*, n. 711). The various Eastern rites may be found in Renaudot, *Perpétuité de la Foi*, l. v. cc. 1, 2, 3; see also Chardon, *l.c.*, ch. i.

## § 128 THE MINISTER, RECIPIENT, AND EFFECTS OF EXTREME UNCTION

I. “The proper ministers of this sacrament,” says the Council of Trent, “are the Presbyters of the Church; by which name are to be understood in that place (James v.), not the elders by age, or the foremost in dignity amongst the people, but either bishops or priests, rightly ordained by the imposition of the hands of the priesthood” (sess. xiv. ch. 4, and can. 4). As St. James speaks of “priests” (in the plural), we find it prescribed in many ancient rituals that the sacrament should be administered by more than one priest (see also St. Thom., *Contr. Gent.*, iv. 73). Sometimes one was to anoint, while another recited the prayers; sometimes one part was anointed by one priest and another part by another; sometimes each priest anointed each part and recited the prayers. At the present day Extreme Unction is administered in the Greek Church by seven, or at least three, priests. Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of the present Western usage in which only one priest administers (Chardon, *l.c.*, ch. i.); and the

<sup>78</sup>“Anointing.” —Ed.



Council of Trent condemns those that say “that the rite and usage of Extreme Unction, which the holy Roman Church observeth, is repugnant to the sentiment of the blessed Apostle James” (*L.c.*, can. 3). See St. Thomas, *Suppl.*, q. 31, a. 1, 3.

II. “It is also declared,” continues the Council of Trent, “that this unction is to be applied to the sick, but especially to those who lie in such danger as to seem to be about to depart this life; whence, also, it is called the sacrament of the departing. And if the sick should recover, after having received the unction, they may again be aided by the succour of this sacrament when they fall into another like danger of death” (sess. xiv. ch. 4). According to the usage prescribed by the Roman ritual, it is given after the Holy Viaticum. But nearly every ancient ritual reverses this order (Martène, *De Ant. Eccl. Rit.*, tom. ii. p. 108). As sickness is a necessary condition for receiving this sacrament (“Is any man sick [ἀσθενεῖ] among you?” “The prayer of faith shall save the sick man [τὸν κάμνοντα],”) it cannot be given to soldiers going to battle, or to the condemned before execution. It should not, however, be delayed until the sick person has lost consciousness, and so cannot receive the sacrament with attention and devotion (*Catech. of the Council of Trent*, ii. 6, 9). It cannot be repeated in the same illness; but if the sick person recovers and falls ill again, it may again be administered. See St. Thomas, *Suppl.*, q. 33; St. Alphonsus, *L.c.*, n. 715.

III. The effects of the sacrament are thus described by the Council of Trent: “The thing (*res*) here signified is the grace of the Holy Ghost, whose anointing cleanses away sins, if there be any still to be expiated, as also the remains of sins; and raises up and strengthens the soul of the sick person, by exciting in him a great confidence in the mercy of God, whereby the sick person, being supported, bears more easily the inconveniences and pains of his illness, and more readily resists the temptations of the devil, who lieth in wait for his heel (Gen. iii. 15); and at times obtains bodily health when expedient for the welfare of the soul” (sess. xiv. ch. 2). Here, then, are three effects enumerated: (1) remission of sin; (2) strengthening of the soul; (3) restoration of health.

1. Although remission of sin is the first effect mentioned by the Council, the sacrament was not primarily instituted for this purpose. St. James says, “If he be in sins (καὶν ἁμαρτίας ἢ πεποιηκώς), they shall be forgiven him.” The sacraments of the dead are only two in number: Baptism and Penance; the former for the remission of Original Sin, the latter for the remission of Actual Sin. Nevertheless, if the sick person has been unable to confess, and has only attrition (*supra*, p. 122), the sacrament of Extreme Unction can remit his mortal sins. If, however, these have already been forgiven, the sacrament removes “the remains of sin” (*peccati reliquias*); that is to say, the evil effects of sin, the weakening of the will, spiritual sloth, disgust for heavenly things, etc. And it also remits, more or less, the temporal punishment due to sin.

2. The strengthening of the soul in the final combat with the Evil One is the primary object of Extreme Unction. “As in the other sacraments,” says the Council of Trent, in addition to the words quoted above, “our Redeemer prepared the greatest aids whereby during life Christians may preserve themselves whole from every grievous spiritual evil, so did He guard the close of life, by the sacrament of Extreme Unction, as with a most firm defence. For though our adversary seeks and seizes opportunities all our life long to be able in any way to devour our souls, yet is there no time wherein he strains more vehemently all the powers of his craft to ruin us utterly, and if he can possibly, to make us fall even from trust in the mercy of God, than when he perceives the end of our life to be at hand” (sess. xiv., of *Extr. Unct.*).

3. Seeing that we must all die, and, moreover, that the restoration of health may only give



occasion for fresh sin, it is clear that the third effect of this sacrament is conditional; viz. if God sees that the prolongation of life will be beneficial to the sick person.

These various effects are admirably described by St. Thomas: "Every sacrament is instituted primarily for some one effect, though it may likewise produce other effects as consequences of this one. And inasmuch as a sacrament produces what it signifies, its primary effect is to be gathered from its signification. Now, this sacrament is administered by way of a cure, just as baptism is administered by way of washing. And a remedy is meant to remove disease. Hence this sacrament is primarily intended to heal the disease of sin. Hence, just as baptism is a spiritual regeneration, and penance a spiritual raising to life, so extreme unction is a spiritual healing or curing. But just as the healing of the body presupposes the body to be alive, so does the healing of the soul (*medicatio spiritualis*) presuppose the life of the soul. And therefore this sacrament is not given as a remedy against defects by which the life of the soul is taken away, e.g. original sin or mortal sin; but against those defects by which a man is spiritually weakened and is deprived of perfect strength for acts of life, grace, and glory; and this defect is nothing but a certain debility and unfitness (*ineptitudo*) left in us by original or actual sin; and it is against this weakness that man is strengthened by this sacrament. But inasmuch as this strength is given by grace which suffers not the presence of sin, therefore if [the sacrament] finds any mortal or venial sin in the soul, it removes the guilt (*culpa*) of the sin, provided that the recipient places no obstacle in the way, as already observed in the case of the Eucharist and Confirmation. And therefore James also speaks of the remission of sin conditionally, saying, 'If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him;' that is to say, as regards guilt; (or [the sacrament] does not always blot out sin, because it does not always find it present; but it always remits sin so far as regards the weakness aforesaid, which is called the remains of sin" (*Suppl.*, q. 30, a. 1). See also Bellarmine, *De Extr. Unct.*, c. 8; Suarez, *Disp.* xli.

On the whole of this chapter, see St. Thomas, *Supp.* xxix.–xxxiii.; Chardon, *Hist. des Sacrements*; De Augustinis, *De Re Sacramentaria*, lib. iii.; Turmel, *Hist. de la Théologie Positive*, pp. 154, 340, 463; Billot, *De Ecclesia Sacramentis*, tom. ii.; Ballerini, *Opus Theologicum Morale*, vol. v.

## CHAPTER VIII

### HOLY ORDER

THE POWERS WITH WHICH JESUS CHRIST HAS endowed His Church are not exercised by the body of the faithful nor are they merely delegated by the faithful to certain members chosen for that purpose. Our Lord Himself instituted the Christian priesthood, and gave to the Apostles and their successors the power of consecrating, offering, and administering His Body and Blood, as also of forgiving and retaining sins (Matt xxvi.; Mark xiv.; Luke xxii.; John xx.). By Divine ordinance there is in the Church a hierarchy, consisting of bishops, priests, and other ministers of various ranks, who possess in different degrees the sacred powers belonging to or connected with the priesthood. Holy Scripture speaks not only of priests, but also of deacons (Phil. i. 2; 1 Tim. iii. 8, 12; Acts vi. 5; xxi. 8); and from the earliest times we find mention of other inferior orders, sub-deacons, acolytes, exorcists, lectors, and doorkeepers (Council of Trent, sess. xxiii. chap. 2). The means instituted by Christ for the transmission of the priestly powers is the sacrament of Order. We shall

treat first of this sacrament generally, and afterwards devote a section to the consideration of each of the different orders.

### § 179 ORDER A SACRAMENT—ITS MATTER AND FORM

I. Order (*ordo*), as St. Thomas explains (*Suppl.*, q. xxxiv. a. 2, ad. 4), means “rank,” whether high or low; but in ecclesiastical use it is taken in the sense of eminent rank—the clerical state as distinguished above that of the laity. It is also used to denote the particular rank occupied in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. And further, it designates the rite by which the rank is conferred; though this would be more clearly indicated by the word “ordination.” As a sacrament, it is defined by Peter Lombard: “A certain sign or seal of the Church whereby a spiritual power is given to the ordained” (*Sent.* iv. dist. 24).

1. St. Paul writing to his disciple St. Timothy, says, “Neglect not the grace (*χαρίσματος*), which was given thee by prophecy, with imposition of the hands of the priesthood (*διὰ προφητείας μετὰ ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ πρεσβυτερίου*)” (1 Tim. iv. 14); and again, “I admonish thee that thou stir up the grace of God, which is in thee by the imposition of my hands (*διὰ τῆς ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν μου*)” (2 Tim. i. 6; cf. 1 Tim. v. 22; Tit. i. 5; Heb. v. 14). We also read that the Apostles ordained the deacons by prayer and laying on of hands (*προσευξάμενοι καὶ ἐπέθηκαν αὐτοῖς τὰς χεῖρας*) (Acts vi. 6). And in the same book we read that the prophets and doctors at Antioch prayed and imposed hands (*προσευξάμενοι καὶ ἐπιθέντες τὰς χεῖρας*) upon Saul and Barnabas (xiii. 3); and that these latter in turn ordained (*χειροτονήσαντες προσευξάμενοι*) priests for every Church (xiv. 22). It is St. Paul, also, who tells that Christ Himself “gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry (*διακονίας*), for the edifying of the body of Christ” (Eph. iv. 11, 12). Now, in these various passages we find all the elements of a sacrament: the external symbolical rite, consisting of the imposition of hands and prayer; the grace conveyed by this rite; and likewise Divine institution.

2. The Fathers, in commenting on these and similar texts, sufficiently indicate the sacramental nature of ordination. “Observe,” says St. John Chrysostom, “how the writer (of the Acts) avoids redundancy; for he says not how, but simply that they were ordained by prayer, for this is the *χειροτονία*, or laying on of hands (*ἐχειροτονήθησαν διὰ προσευχῆς, τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ χειροτονία ἐστίν*). The hand of man is laid on, but God works all; and it is His hand that touches the heart of him that is ordained, if he be ordained as he ought to be” (Hom. xiv. n. 3). “What some of these men, forced by truth, have begun to say, ‘He that recedes from the Church does not forfeit baptism, but yet loses the right of conferring it,’ is evidently in many ways a useless and foolish opinion. . . . For each is a sacrament, and each is given to man by a certain consecration (*utrumque enim sacramentum est, et quadam consecratione utrumque homini datur*): baptism when a man is baptized, the other when he is ordained; and for this cause, in the Catholic Church, neither is allowed to be repeated” (St. Augustine, lib. ii., *Contra Epistol. Parm.*, cap. 13, n. 28). “Let the Donatists explain to us how the sacrament of the baptized cannot be lost, and the sacrament of the ordained can be lost. . . . For if both are sacraments, which no one doubts, how is the one not lost and the other lost? No injury should be done to either sacrament” (*ibid.*, n. 30). “The Sacred Scripture,” says St. Leo, “also shows how, when the Apostles were, by the command of the Holy Ghost, sending Paul and Barnabas to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles, they, fasting and praying, imposed hands upon

them; that we may understand with what religious attention both of those who give, and of those who receive, care is to be taken lest the sacrament of so great a benediction seem to be negligently accomplished" (*Ep. ix., ad Diosc., c. i.*). And the Council of Trent says, "Whereas by the testimony of Scripture, by Apostolic tradition, and the unanimous consent of the Fathers, it is clear that grace is conferred by sacred ordination which is performed (*perficitur*) by words and outward signs, no one ought to doubt that Order is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of Holy Church" (sess. xiii. chap. 3; cf. can. 3).

II. There has long been a celebrated controversy among theologians as to the matter and form of this sacrament. A short sketch of the rites and ceremonies of the ordination service will be of help to enable us to come to a decision on the question.

Episcopal consecration has always in all ages been given by imposition of hands and the invocation of the Holy Ghost, in accordance with what we read in the Acts, and Epistles of St. Paul. This has been proved to demonstration by numbers of passages from the Fathers, and from ancient Rituals and Pontificals published by Morin (*De Sacr. Ecclesie Ord.*, part. 1 et 2), and Martène (lib. i., *De Antiq. Eccl. Rit.*, cap. 8, art. 1). An additional ceremony of ancient origin, in use both in East and West as early as the fourth century, is the placing of the book of the Gospels on the head or shoulders of the bishop-elect. In the ordination of a priest there are, according to the Roman Pontifical, three impositions of hands: first, by the bishop and assistant clergy in silence; secondly, by the same, but the bishop reciting two prayers; and thirdly, after the communion, by the bishop only, who pronounces the words, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost, whose sins ye shall," etc. The bishop also causes each to touch the chalice containing wine, and the paten with bread upon it, at the same time saying, "Receive the power to offer sacrifice to God, and to celebrate masses as well for the living as for the dead." In the Greek rite, the third imposition of hands, with the accompanying words, and the handing of the chalice and paten, are omitted. A deacon is ordained in the Latin rite by imposition of the hands of the bishop, who pronounces the words, "Receive the Holy Ghost or strength, and to withstand the devil and his temptations;" and then, with hands extended over him, the bishop goes on to pray that the Holy Ghost may come down upon him. The stole and dalmatic are placed upon him; and lastly, the book of the Gospels is handed to him to be touched while the bishop pronounces the words, "Receive the power of reading the Gospel in God's Church, as well for the living as for the dead." In the Greek rite this last ceremony is omitted. It should be noted that the prayers recited by the bishop are not the same in the two rites. As the Church has always recognized both rites of ordination, it is clear that the matter and form of the sacrament must be sought in what is common to both. The neglect of this consideration has led to many erroneous opinions on the question.

1. When treating of the matter of the sacraments generally (*supra*, § 186), we said that our Lord took certain natural acts and made them, when performed with certain distinguishing marks, capable of producing a supernatural effect. In the sacrament of Order, as described in Holy Scripture, we find that the laying on of hands is the natural act so chosen. This act, as already pointed out (§ 192), is a way of singling out a person, setting him apart and conferring upon him some office or dignity.<sup>79</sup> The imposition of hands, common alike in East and in

<sup>79</sup>Τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιτιθέναι, τῶν χειρῶν ἐπίθεσις, mean to lay hands upon a person. Χειροτονία is a stretching out at hands, and so an election by show of hands. These expressions and their derivatives, like so many others, came to have technical ecclesiastical meanings, not always restricted to ordination, and sometimes they are carefully distinguished from each other. Thus, St. Hippolytus says, "The bishop ordains (χειροτονεῖ). . . . The presbyter imposes

West, and made use of in the ordination of bishops, priests, and deacons, is therefore the matter of Order. Holy Scripture, as we have seen, says that it was by imposition of hands that the Apostles ordained bishops, priests, and deacons. So, too, the Fathers and Councils use the word χειροτονία (imposition of hands) as equivalent to ordination. The Council of Trent (sess. xiv. ch. 3) says expressly that Extreme Unction can be administered only by bishops or priests “ordained by the imposition of hands.”

The tradition of instruments, which was commonly held by the Schoolmen to be the matter of Order, has never been in use among the Greeks, and is not mentioned by the ancient Latin rituals. It was introduced about the tenth century, and gradually spread during the Middle Ages, so as to be general in the West by the time of the Council of Trent. At that Council (sess. xxiii.) an attempt was made to define the matter and form of the Sacrament; but, at the suggestion of the Cardinal of Lorraine, the Fathers contented themselves with declaring that ordination “is performed (*perficitur*) by words and external signs;” and quoting St. Paul: “I admonish thee that thou stir up the grace that is in thee *by the imposition of my hands*” (2 Tim. i. 6). Nevertheless, as may be seen in the Preface to Morin’s *De Sacr. Eccl. Ordinationibus*, the Scholastic opinion was still prevalent as late as 1639. Mainly owing to his researches and those of Martène, it is now almost universally abandoned. We should mention that St. Bonaventure held that imposition of hands was the sole matter of Order (iv. *Dist.* 24, P. 2, a. 1, q. 4). As, however, the *tutior pars* must always be followed in the administration of the sacraments, the tradition of instruments must be strictly carried out in all Latin ordinations (St. Alph. *Theol. Mor.*, lib. vi. tract. v. n. 742).<sup>7c</sup>

2. As the form of a sacrament must be used at the same time as the matter, it follows that the difference of opinion as to the matter of Order implies difference of opinion as to the form. Thus, those who hold that the tradition of instruments is the matter, will also hold that the form is the words accompanying this action; and, on the other hand, those who contend for the imposition of hands, will maintain that the accompanying words are the form. As regards episcopal consecration, it should be noted that the words, “Receive the Holy Ghost,” do not occur at all in the Eastern rites, and were almost unknown in the West for more than twelve hundred years.<sup>7c</sup> The Council of Trent (sess. xxiii. can. 4) merely condemned those who held “that vainly do the bishops say, *Receive ye the Holy Ghost*,” without declaring in any way that these words were the form. Hence, by comparing the various rites of all ages and places, we find that an appropriate prayer is the form of the sacrament (Chardon, *l.c.*, P. 2, ch. 1). The Apostles “*praying, imposed hands* upon them;” “then they fasting: and *praying and imposing their hands* upon them,” etc.; “and when they had *ordained* (χειροτονήσαντες) to them priests in every Church, and had *prayed* with fasting,” etc. (Acts vi. 6; xiii. 2; xiv. 22).

This prayer should specify the particular Order which is being conferred, or should mention the powers conveyed by the Order. “The imposition of hands . . . by itself signifies nothing definite, and is equally used for several Orders and for Confirmation.” In the case of priestly ordination, the words should “definitely express the sacred Order of Priesthood, or its grace and power, which is chiefly the power of consecrating and offering the true body and

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hands, but does not ordain (χειροθετεί οὐ χειροτονεί” (*De Charism.*, n. 17).

<sup>7c</sup> On the *Decretum pro Armenis*, which declares the tradition of instruments to be the matter, see *supra*, p. 151, note 40.

<sup>7c</sup> They do not occur in any of the English pontificals (consecration of bishops), except in that of Exeter (Maskell, *Monum. Ritualia Eccl. Angl.*, iii. p. 258). The Reformers inserted them in the Edwardine Ordinal.

blood of the Lord in that sacrifice which is no nude commemoration of the sacrifice offered on the Cross. . . . The same holds good of Episcopal consecration” (Bull *Apostolica Cura*; condemning Anglican Orders).<sup>80</sup>

On the controversy concerning the matter and form of Order, see especially Benedict XIV, *De Synodo Diœces.*, lib. viii. cap. 10, and the various authorities there quoted.

## § 177 THE MINISTER AND RECIPIENT OF ORDER—ITS EFFECTS

I. The sole ministers of the sacrament of Order are bishops. In the Holy Scriptures we read that ordination was conferred only by the Apostles, or by those whom the Apostles had consecrated as bishops. It was the Apostles who imposed hands on the first deacons (Acts vi. 6); Paul and Barnabas ordained priests for the Churches of Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch (*ibid.* xiv. 22); Timothy was consecrated bishop by St. Paul (2 Tim. i. 6); and the same Apostle instructs both Timothy and Titus as to ordaining others (1 Tim. iii. iv.; Tit. i.). “What is there,” says St. Jerome, “which a bishop can do and a priest cannot do, except ordaining?” (*Ep.*, 146, al. 85, *ad Evang.*, n. 1.) “The order of bishops,” says St. Epiphanius, “is generative of fathers, for it begets fathers to the Church; whereas the priestly order, unable to beget fathers, begets, through the laver of regeneration, children to the Church, but not fathers or teachers” (*Adv. Hæres.*, 75). And St. Chrysostom teaches that it is only in ordaining that bishops are superior to priests (*Hom.* 11, *in Ep.*, 1 *ad Tim.*). So, too, the Canons of the Apostles (can. 1 et 2), the Apostolic Constitutions, and the ancient Councils (especially the Fourth Council of Carthage, A.D. 398) bear witness to the same doctrine and practice. The Council of Trent condemned those who maintain that bishops “have not the power of confirming and ordaining, or that the power which they possess is common to them and to priests” (sess. xxiii. can. 7). Finally, it is fitting that only the higher officers of the Church should possess the power of ordaining those who should be her ministers (St. Thom., *Suppl.*, q. 38, a. 1).

So far we have spoken of the sacrament of Order generally. Various questions concerning the minister of each order will be dealt with in the next section.

II. In order to receive the sacrament of Order validly, a person must be (1) of the male sex; (2) baptized; (3) he must not have the intention not to be ordained.

1. “Let women keep silence in the Churches, for it is not permitted them to speak; but to be subject, as also the law saith. But if they would learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home. For it is a shame for a woman to speak in the Church” (1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35). “Let the women learn in silence, with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach nor to use authority over the man, but to be in silence” (1 Tim. ii. 11, 12). And in enumerating the qualifications of a bishop, St. Paul speaks of men only. Against certain early heretics who admitted women to the priesthood, see Tertullian, *De Præscr.*, cap. xli., and St. Epiphanius,

<sup>80</sup> Anglican Orders were declared “absolutely null and utterly void,” on account of defect of form in the rite, and defect of intention in the minister. “From [the Anglican rite] has been deliberately removed whatever sets forth the dignity and office of the priesthood in the Catholic rite. That form consequently cannot be considered apt or sufficient for the sacrament which omits what it ought essentially to signify. . . . As the sacrament of Order, and the true *sacerdotium* of Christ were eliminated from the Anglican rite, and hence the *sacerdotium* is in no wise conferred truly and validly in the Episcopal consecration of the same rite, for the like reason, therefore, the Episcopate can in no wise be truly and validly conferred by it; and this the more so because among the first duties of the Episcopate is that of ordaining ministers for the Holy Eucharist and sacrifice.” For the defect of intention, see *supra*, p. 157. On the whole question, see *A Vindication of the Bull Apostolica Cura*, by the Cardinal Archbishop and Bishops of the province of Westminster.

*Adv. Hæres.*, 79. The latter points out that if any woman could be capable of exercising the ministry, it was the Blessed Virgin: yet God conferred upon her no priestly power.<sup>81</sup>

2. "Baptism," says St. Thomas, "is the gate of the sacraments. Since Order is a sacrament, it therefore presupposes baptism. . . . The character impressed in baptism makes a man capable of receiving the other sacraments. Hence, he who has not received baptism cannot receive any of the other sacraments" (*Suppl.*, q. 35, a. 3).

3. That Order is invalid when conferred against the will of a person, follows from the general doctrine of intention on the part of the recipient of a sacrament. Pope Innocent III expressly states this in the case of the sacrament of Order (lib. iii., *Decret.*, tit. 42, c. 3, *Majores*; Denzinger, *Enchir.*, n. li.). There is a difficulty, however, with regard to the ordination of boys who have not reached the use of reason. The common opinion is that it is valid, but that those who have been so ordained are not bound by the duties of the clerical state (*e.g.* celibacy), unless they afterwards elect to remain in this state. See Bened. XIV, Instr. on the Coptic Rites.

III. The effects of the sacrament of Order are Grace and a Character.

1. Although this sacrament is primarily intended for the benefit of the Church at large, and not for that of the individual upon whom it is conferred, nevertheless it bestows upon him sanctifying grace, and therefore not only makes him capable of performing certain sacred duties, but also fits him for the worthy performance of them. "Neglect not the grace (χαρίσμα-τος) which was given thee by prophecy, with imposition of the hands of the priesthood" (1 Tim. iv. 14). "I admonish thee that thou stir up the grace of God (ἀναζωπυρέιν τὸ χάρισμα τοῦ θεοῦ) which is in thee by the imposition of my hands" (2 Tim. i. 6). "Just as," says St. Thomas, "sanctifying grace is necessary for the worthy reception of the sacraments, so also is it for the worthy administration of them. And, therefore, as in baptism, whereby a person is made capable of receiving the other sacraments, sanctifying grace is given, so also in the sacrament of Order, whereby a person is ordained for the administration of the other sacraments" (*Suppl.*, q. 35, a. 1). The Holy Ghost Himself is conferred by Ordination. "When He (Jesus) had said this, He breathed upon them (the Apostles), and said, Receive the Holy Ghost. Whose sins ye shall forgive," etc. (John xx. 22). "If any one shall say that by sacred ordination the Holy Ghost is not given, and that vainly therefore do the bishops say, *Receive ye the Holy Ghost* . . . let him be anathema" (Conc. Trid., sess. xxiii. can. 4).

2. On the character conferred by Order, see *supra*, p. 157. The Council of Trent condemns those who say "that a character is not imprinted by ordination, or that he who has once been a priest can become a layman" (sess. xxiii. can. 4). Such has ever been the doctrine of the Church. She has at all times refused to reordain those who have been ordained in heresy or schism, except when there has been any doubt of the validity of their former ordination. The Fourth Council of Carthage expressly forbade reordination; and St. Augustine, in his second book against Parmenian, and also in *De Gestis cum Emerito* (the bishop of the Donatists), strongly insists upon its unlawfulness. St. Athanasius, St. John Chrysostom, St. Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, and others were supplanted by intruding bishops who administered orders; but these ordinations were recognized when the rightful bishops were re-instated. Later on, however, we find that the orders conferred by intruders were sometimes declared invalid, notably in the case of the Antipope Constantine's ordinations, and again in those

<sup>81</sup>The blessing of an abbess is merely an ecclesiastical ceremony, conferring no sort of jurisdiction. On the tale of Pope Joan, see Döllinger, *Papstfabeln*.

of the heretic Photius.<sup>82</sup> The doubt continued (see Pet. Lomb., *Sent.* iv. dist. 24) until the question was discussed with great clearness by Robert Pullen, whose opinion as to the validity of heretical, intruded, and simoniacal ordinations was accepted by Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and Scotus. See Chardon, P. ii, ch. 6.

## § 17ξ THE DIFFERENT ORDERS

The so-called canons of the Fourth Council of Carthage mention eight different grades of Order: Bishop, Priest, Deacon, Sub-deacon, Acolyte, Exorcist, Lector, and Oſtarius (door-keeper). In connection with these, a word must be said on the ecclesiastical Tonsure.

According to the learned Père Morin, the cutting of the hair, as a distinct rite of initiation into the clerical state, does not date farther back than the end of the seventh century.<sup>83</sup> Before this, however, it formed part of the ceremony of conferring the lowest of the Orders, as it does at the present day in the Eastern Churches. For the history and the various forms of the Tonsure, see Chardon, Part i. ch. 3. The Orders themselves are divided into Major (Sub-diaconate, Diaconate, and Priesthood, including the Episcopate), and Minor (Oſtarius, Lector, Exorcist, and Acolyte). "If any one shall say that, besides the priesthood, there are not in the Catholic Church other orders, both major (*majores*) and minor . . . let him be anathema" (Council of Trent, sess. xxiii. can. 2).

I. "Whereas the ministry of so holy a priesthood is a Divine thing, to the end that it might be exercised in a more worthy manner and with greater veneration, it was suitable that in the most well-ordered settlement of the Church there should be several and diverse orders of ministers, to minister to the priesthood by virtue of their office; orders so distributed as that those already marked with the clerical tonsure should ascend through the lesser to the greater orders" (Council of Trent, sess. xxiii. ch. 2). Whether these Minor Orders are part of the sacrament, the Council does not say. The mediæval theologians, as a rule, hold the affirmative (St. Thom., *Suppl.*, q. 37, a. 2); at the present time the negative opinion is more common. That Christ instituted them cannot easily be proved; and, besides, the Eastern Church, at least in modern times, recognizes only one of them, viz. Lector. A bishop is the ordinary minister of them; but by the consent of the Sovereign Pontiff, a simple priest can confer them. "Henceforth," says the Council of Trent (sess. xxiii., *De Ref.*, cap. 10), "it shall not be lawful for abbots or for any other persons whatsoever . . . to confer the tonsure or minor orders on any one who is not a Regular subject to them." The Council therefore recognizes that these orders can be given by others than bishops. The rites by which they are conferred at the present day are almost exactly as described in the canons of the Fourth Council of Carthage, and consist of handing the various instruments with appropriate accompanying words.

II. In treating of the Sacred or Major Orders, we are at once confronted with the difficulty as to the position of the Sub-diaconate, which in the East is considered as a Minor Order.

1. The office of a Sub-deacon, as the name implies, is to assist the Deacon at the altar: to prepare the chalice and paten, to read the Epistle, to pour the water into the wine intended for the sacrifice, and to wash the sacred linen. The bishop confers the Order by handing to the recipient the empty chalice and paten, and saying to him, "See what ministry is delivered

<sup>82</sup> Concerning the latter, Pope Nicholas I says, "*Nihil habuit, nihil dedit, nisi forte damnationem habuit quam se sequentibus propinaverit,*" etc. ["He had nothing, he gave nothing, except perhaps he had damnation which he promised to those following him." —Ed.]

<sup>83</sup> See, however, Mabillon, in his preface to the Third Century of the Saints of the Benedictine Order.

to thee: Wherefore I admonish thee that thou so conduct thyself as to be able to please God.” Then the various vestments are placed upon him, and the book of the Epistles handed to him—all of which ceremonies are accompanied with appropriate words. This order is very ancient in the Church. St. Cornelius, who became Pope in the year 251, says, in his letter to Fabius of Antioch, that there were in his day sub-deacons in the Church of Rome; and St. Cyprian, who died in 258, himself ordained Optatus sub-deacon (*hypodiaconum*). The rite of ordination is described in the fifth canon of the Fourth Council of Carthage. The Council of Trent (sess. xxiii.), in its second chapter, says, “The sub-diaconate is classed among the greater orders by the Fathers and Councils.” Nevertheless, according to Chardon, it was not so classed as late as the end of the eleventh century (see *Hist. des Sacram.*, Pt. i, ch. 1, and the authorities there cited). Even if the Sub-diaconate is now looked upon as a sacred order (as indeed it must be, at least in the West, after the decision of Trent), it does not follow that it is necessarily a sacrament; for the Council, in enumerating the various members of the hierarchy, speaks only of “bishops, priests, and *ministers*,” thereby leaving the question an open one. St. Thomas holds it to be both sacred and a sacrament (*Suppl.*, q. 37, a. 3). In the Eastern Church it is still reckoned as a minor order. The ordinary minister is a bishop; nevertheless, there are many instances of priests conferring the sub-diaconate, *e.g.* chorepiscopi and various abbots. See the Synod of Meaux, A.D. 845, can. 44; and Pius V’s Bull, denying the right to the Abbot of Prémontré, but admitting that the Abbot of Citeaux enjoyed it.

2. The word “deacon” (διάκονος) means a minister or servant; but it has come to have a technical ecclesiastical meaning, and is now used to indicate one of the Sacred Orders of the Church. The functions of a deacon are to serve the priest at the altar, to sing the Gospel, to preach, and to baptize. The Order is conferred by the bishop imposing hands upon the recipient, and pronouncing appropriate prayers. The formula at present found in the Roman Pontifical, *Receive the Holy Ghost*, etc., is not older than the twelfth century. The diaconate is certainly a sacrament, for it is an efficacious outward sign (laying on of hands and prayer), of inward grace (the Holy Ghost Himself, Who is conferred by it). The Council of Trent condemns those who assert that “vainly therefore do the bishops say, *Receive ye the Holy Ghost*” (sess. xxiii. can. 4); and that “in the Catholic Church there is not a hierarchy by Divine ordination instituted, consisting of bishops, priests, and *ministers*” (can. 6). Hence deacons, at least, must be members of this divinely constituted hierarchy; and in this belief both the Eastern and Western Churches are agreed. The “seven” chosen in Acts vi. are generally recognized as the first “deacons.” They were ordained by the Apostles, who “praying, imposed hands upon them.” Although originally chosen for “serving tables,” we find them preaching and baptizing; and St. Paul requires deacons to “hold the mystery of the faith in a pure conscience” (1 Tim. iii. 9). St. Ignatius speaks of deacons as “ministers of the mysteries of Jesus Christ,” “for they are not ministers (διάκονοι) of meat and drink. but servants of the Church of God” (*Ad Trall.*, 2). See also St. Clement, 1 *Ad Cor.*, 42; St. Ignatius, *Ad Magnes.*, 2; Tertullian, *Præscr.*, c. 41, *De Bapt.*, c. 17; St. Augustine, *Ep.* 21, *ad Valer.*, 1. To the objection that the order was instituted by the Apostles, and not by Christ, we may reply, with St. Ignatius (*Ad Smyrn.*, 8), that Christ left the powers of the sacrament of Order to the Apostles to be transmitted by them entirely or in various degrees, and that they accordingly conferred upon “the seven” only a portion of these powers.

3. According to the Roman Pontifical, the functions of a Priest are “to offer (sacrifice), to bless, to preside (*præesse*), to preach, and to baptize.” He has also the power of forgiving sins,



and is the ordinary minister of Extreme Unction, in addition to the sacraments mentioned. The precise nature of his powers can be best studied by comparing them with those of a Bishop.

4. The functions of a Bishop are thus set forth by the Roman Pontifical: "A Bishop should judge, expound (*interpretari*), consecrate, ordain, offer, baptize, and confirm." According to the Council of Trent, "Bishops, who have succeeded to the place of the Apostles, principally belong to the hierarchical order; they are placed, as the same Apostle [St. Paul] says, *by the Holy Ghost, to rule the Church of God* (Acts xx. 28); they are superior to priests; they administer the sacrament of Confirmation; ordain the ministers of the Church; and they can perform very many other things, over which functions others of an inferior order have no power" (sess. xxiii. ch. 4, and can. 7).

(a) Although there are plausible grounds for holding that "bishop" and "presbyter" are synonymous in the New Testament, yet we have clear traces of a real distinction recognized between them in Apostolic times. St. James the Less was beyond doubt Bishop of Jerusalem, as is clear from the relations of St. Peter and St. Paul with him (Acts xii. 17; xv. 13 sqq; xxi. 18; Gal. i. 19), and from the belief universally existing as early as the middle of the second century. Moreover, St. Paul gives Titus (i. 5) power to ordain presbyters; and to Timothy (1 Tim. v. 19) he lays down instructions regarding the judgment of presbyters. Hence both Timothy and Titus were superior in office to these presbyters. An argument may also be drawn from the Apocalypse (i.–iii.), where the "Angels of the Churches" are plainly those officials to whom the care of each of these Churches or dioceses has been entrusted; in other words, they are the bishops of these dioceses.

(b) The Fathers in sub-apostolic times insist on the distinction between the office of bishop and the office of presbyter. St. Polycarp, the disciple of St. John, writes as a bishop, and distinguishes himself from his presbyters. "I exhort you," says St. Ignatius (*Ad Magnes.*, n. 6), "that ye study to do all things in a Divine unanimity—the bishop holding presidency in the place of God; and the presbyters in the place of the Apostles; and the deacons most dear to me entrusted with the service of Jesus Christ. . . . Be ye made one with the bishop, and with those who preside for a pattern and lesson of incorruption." See also *Ad Trall.*, nn. 2, 3, 7; *Ad Philad.*, n. 7; *Ad Smyrn.*, n. 8; *Ad Polycarp.* n. 6. St. Irenæus, speaking of Acts xx. 17 sqq., says, "For at Miletus, having convoked the bishops and the presbyters," etc.—thereby showing that he does not recognize the two as synonymous. "The degrees in the Church on earth of bishops, presbyters, deacons, are, in my opinion, imitations of the angelic glory, and of that dispensation which is said in Scripture to await all who, walking in the steps of the Apostles, live in perfect righteousness according to the Gospel" (Clem. Alex. *Strom.*, lib. vi. n. 13). See also Tertullian, *De Bapt.*, n. 17; Origen, *De Oratione*, n. 28; *Hom. ii., in Numer.*, n. 1, and many other places; St. Hippolytus, *De Charism.* We say nothing of later Fathers, for by the fourth century it is admitted as a settled maxim that bishops only could ordain; and Epiphanius goes so far as to say of Aerius, the presbyterian, "His doctrines were, beyond all human conception, replete with madness" (*Adv. Hæres.*, 75).<sup>84</sup>

Whether the Episcopate is a distinct order, or only an extension of the priesthood, has long been a disputed point among theologians. The Fathers seem to look upon it as a distinct order; but most of the great mediæval doctors are of the contrary opinion (Albertus Magnus,

<sup>84</sup> See the excellent art. BISHOP, in Addis and Arnold's *Catholic Dictionary*.

Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, in their commentaries on the fourth book of the *Sent.*, dist. xxiv.). The Council of Trent refrained from coming to any decision on the question. The canons and decrees on the hierarchy, however, point in the direction of the earlier view; and hence this opinion has once more become the prevailing one. See Perrone, *Præl. Theol., De Ordine*, cap. ii. n. 78.

On the relation of the bishops to the Sovereign Pontiff, see *supra*, p. 140, and also Vol. I.

On the whole of this chapter see St. Thomas, Supp. qq. xxxiv.–xl.; Chardon, *Hiſt. des Sacrements*; Morin, *De Sacris Ecclesiæ Ordinationibus*; De Augustinis, *De Rē Sacramentaria*, lib. iv.; Turmel, *Hiſt. de la Théol. Positive*, pp. 155, 250, 344, 466; Billot, *De Ecclesiæ Sacramentis*, tom. ii.; Ballerini, *Opus Théol. Morale*, vol. v.; Card. Gasparri, *De Sacra Ordinatione*; Atzberger, *Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik*, iv. p. 749.

## CHAPTER IX MATRIMONY

ON THE SIXTH DAY OF CREATION GOD FORMED man out of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and gave him a companion, Eve, whom He drew in a wondrous manner from the side of the sleeping Adam. By so doing, God willed that couple to be the source of the human race, which was to be propagated by successive generations; and, in order that His wise designs might be the better accomplished, He endowed the union of man and woman with the qualities of unity and perpetuity (cf. *supra*, §§ 78, 79). Christ Himself taught that, by its very institution, marriage should be between two only; that the two became one flesh, and that the marriage tie was so close that no man could loose it (Matt. xix. 5, 6). But the primitive perfection of marriage gradually became corrupted even among God's own chosen people. Moses permitted them, on account of the hardness of their heart, to give a bill of divorce (Deut. xxiv. 1). Among the Gentiles every sort of abomination prevailed, so that woman was degraded from being the man's companion to be his drudge or his toy, and children became the mere chattels of their parents. These evils, however, were not to be without a remedy. Jesus Christ, Who restored man's dignity and perfected the Mosaic law, took marriage under His especial care. He deigned to be present at the wedding feast at Cana, and made it the occasion of His first miracle. He reproved the Jews for their corrupt practices regarding marriage, and particularly forbade divorce. But He did far more. He raised matrimony to the dignity of a sacrament, thereby giving it the power to confer upon those who receive it the grace required by their state, and making it a figure of the union between Himself and His Church. "Husbands, love your wives," says St. Paul to the Ephesians, "as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it, that He might sanctify it. . . . Men ought to love their wives as their own bodies. . . . No man ever hateth his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth the Church; because we are members of His body, of His flesh, and His bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament (*μυστήριον*); but I speak in Christ and in the Church" (v. 25 sqq.).<sup>85</sup>

<sup>85</sup>See Leo XIII's Encyc. *Arcanum*, on Christian Marriage.

There are thus three stages in the history of marriage: marriage under the natural law; marriage under the Mosaic law; and marriage under the Christian dispensation. By the law of nature there was little restriction as to entry into the marriage state, but only death could dissolve it. Moses put limits to the competency of persons to marry (Lev. xviii.), but permitted divorce under certain circumstances. In neither of these two stages was marriage a sacrament. Christ restored the primitive prohibition of divorce, and made the marriage of Christians a sacrament. We are here concerned with this third stage.

Marriage may be considered as an act or as a state; in other words, either as a contract, or as a status arising therefrom. Natural marriage is a contract whereby a man and a woman are united for the purpose of generation and education of offspring. This contract, when between Christians, is a sacrament conferring grace upon those who are rightly disposed.

### § 150 CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE A TRUE SACRAMENT

The Council of Trent condemns those who hold that “Matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the law of the Gospel, instituted by Christ our Lord; but has been invented by men in the Church, and does not confer grace” (sess. xxiv. can. 1).

I. The chief text of Scripture in support of this doctrine is that already quoted from the Epistle to the Ephesians: “Let women be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord; because the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the Head of the Church. He is the saviour of his body. Therefore, as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let the wives be to their husbands in all things. Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it; that He might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life; that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish. So also ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself. For no man ever hated his own flesh; but nourisheth it and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth the Church: because we are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament (*μυστήριον*, Vulg., *sacramentum*): but I speak in Christ and in the Church (*εἰς Χριστὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν*)” (Eph. v. 22–32). The last words of this passage, as rendered in our version, would seem to decide the question. But reference to the original text, and to the use of the word *sacramentum* in the Vulgate itself, shows that this word alone cannot be relied on as an argument (see *supra*, p. 150). The proof, such as it is, is taken rather from the passage as a whole. The Apostle, speaking of Christian marriage, declares it to be a great sign of something sacred, viz. the union of Christ with His Church. Now, it is by sanctifying grace and by a continual influx of graces that this union takes place. A perfect representation of this union should therefore contain something corresponding with the graces bestowed by Christ upon His Spouse—should likewise confer upon the parties grace connected with their state. Besides, the due fulfilment of the obligations imposed upon Christian spouses requires supernatural aid.

Another passage of Scripture which may be quoted is St. John ii., where our Lord’s presence and conduct at the marriage feast are narrated. St. Cyril of Alexandria, commenting on this passage, says, “It was befitting that He Who was to renew the very nature of man, and to restore all nature to a better state, should bestow a blessing not only on those who had been already called into life, but should also prepare beforehand that grace for those

not yet born, and make their entrance into existence holy. . . . He, the delight and joy of all men, gave a dignity to marriage by His presence, that He might do away with the former shame and grief attached to child-birth" (*Lib. ii., In Joann.*). And St. Augustine: "The Lord came to the nuptials that conjugal chastity might be strengthened, and that the sacrament of marriage (*sacramentum nuptiarum*) might be manifested" (*Traçt. 9, in Joann., n. 2*). St. John Damascene, St. Epiphanius, and others interpret the passage in the same sense.

II. The Council of Trent, however, only says that St. Paul "alludes to," or "hints at (*innuit*)" the Catholic doctrine of marriage. The strongest proof is drawn from tradition.

1. The value of testimonies found in ancient rituals and books of administration of sacraments cannot be denied. Those used by the Greek Church, the Churches of the Copts, the Jacobites, and the Nestorians, not to speak of the ancient Latin rituals, all contain ceremonies and prayers implying the belief that matrimony is an efficacious sign of grace (see *Perpétuité de la Foi*, t. v. l. 6).

2. The following passages will serve as specimens of the doctrine of the Fathers: "This excellence (of matrimony) is threefold: faithfulness, offspring, the sacrament. In faithfulness it is required that neither should act in violation of the marriage tie; in the offspring, that it be received in love, fed with kindness, educated religiously; and in the sacrament, that the wedlock be not dissolved, and that neither, if divorced, be united to another, not even for the sake of offspring" (St. August., *De Genesi ad Lit.*, ix. c. vii, n. 12). "Throughout all nations and men, the excellence of wedlock is in the procreation of children, and in the faithfulness of chastity; but as regards the people of God, it is also in the holiness of the sacrament, through which holiness it is a crime, even for the party that is divorced, to marry another whilst the husband lives" (St. August., *De Bono Conjugali*, n. 32, al. 24) "There are in this matter two modes of life: one inferior and common—I mean matrimony; and the other angelic, and which cannot be surpassed—I mean virginity. He that chooses the worldly, matrimony, that is, is not to blame; but he receives not so great gifts; for some he will receive since he bears fruit thirty-fold. But whoso embraces a chaste state, and one that is above the world, although the road is, compared with the other, more rugged and difficult, yet has he more wonderful gifts, for he has produced a perfect fruit even an hundred-fold" (St. Athanasius, *Ep. ad Amunem*). "We know that God is the Lord and the guardian of marriage, Who suffers not another's bed to be defiled; and he that commits this crime sins against God, Whose law he violates, Whose grace he dissolves. And therefore, and for the very reason that he sins against God, he loses the fellowship of the heavenly sacrament (*sacramenti celestis amittit consortium*)" (St. Ambrose, *De Abraham*, c. 7).

To these various testimonies must be added all those which assert the sevenfold number of the sacraments, among which matrimony is included (see above, p. 158).

The doctrine concerning matrimony is a striking instance of development (§ 2c). Even so late as the middle of the thirteenth century, St. Thomas contents himself with saying that it was "more probable" that matrimony conferred grace. But the Second Council of Lyons, held in 1274, decided that matrimony was a sacrament (Denzinger, *Enchirid.*, lix.).

## § 1c1 THE NATURE OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY—MATTER AND FORM—MINISTER

Assuming that matrimony is a sacrament, we have now to consider wherein the sacrament consists. Some theologians have tried to make such a distinction between the contract and

the sacrament as to hold that the contract may exist, even between Christians, without the sacrament. According to this view the matter of the sacrament is the act of the parties (*i.e.* the contract), the form is the blessing, and the minister is the priest; hence a marriage contracted without the priest's blessing would be a true marriage, but no sacrament. The Catholic doctrine as laid down by Pius VI, and afterwards by Pius IX and Leo XIII, is that in the case of baptized persons the contract and the sacrament are identical; the one cannot exist without the other. Hence the blessing is not the form, nor is the priest the minister.

1. 1. It is plain from the foregoing section that Christ raised to the dignity of a sacrament that same marriage which God had instituted in the beginning. Now, this marriage was none other than a contract, and consequently it is the contract which constitutes the sacrament. Moreover, the sacrament of matrimony is a sign of the union between Christ and His Church, which union is typified by the contract itself.

2. The unanimous teaching of the mediæval theologians is in favour of the inseparableness of the contract and the sacrament. It will be enough to quote passages from the leaders of the two rival schools to show that, in spite of their many differences, they were at one in this matter. "The words expressing the marriage consent are the form of this sacrament, not the priest's blessing" (St. Thom., *Suppl.*, q. 42, a. 1). "The external acts and the words expressing consent, directly produce a sort of bond which is the sacrament of marriage" (*ibid.*, a. 3). "The sacrament of marriage has for its matter lawful persons, and for its form their consent. . . . For the essence of matrimony these two suffice: lawfulness in the persons, and unity in consent" (St. Bonav. *In 4 Sent.*, d. 28, a. 1, q. 5).

3. The definitions of the Councils are equally clear. "The seventh is the sacrament of matrimony, which is a sign of the union of Christ and the Church, according to the Apostle's saying, 'This is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and the Church.' The efficient cause of matrimony is properly (*regulariter*) the mutual consent by words at the same time expressed" (Council of Florence, *Decr. pro Armenis*). It is evident that these last words refer to matrimony as a sacrament, because the decree is an instruction regarding the sacraments. The Council of Trent (sess. xxiv.) says, "The first parent of the human race, under the influence of the Divine Spirit, pronounced the bond of matrimony perpetual and indissoluble when he said, 'This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh.' But that by this bond two only are united and joined together, our Lord taught more plainly, when rehearsing those last words as having been uttered by God, He said, 'Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh;' and straightway confirmed the firmness of that tie, proclaimed so long before by Adam, by these words, 'What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.' But the grace which might perfect that natural love, and confirm that indissoluble union, and sanctify the married, Christ Himself, the institutor and perfecter of the venerable sacraments, merited for us by His Passion. . . . Whereas therefore, matrimony, in the law of the Gospel, excelleth in grace, through Christ, the marriages of olden time; with reason have our holy Fathers, the Councils and the tradition of the Universal Church, always taught that it is to be counted among the sacraments of the new law." According to the Council, therefore, our Lord not only gave His approbation to matrimony as instituted in the beginning, but enriched it with the grace which He merited; consequently, the contract has been raised to the dignity of a sign conferring grace.

4. To the definitions of the councils the authoritative teaching of the Popes may be added.

“It is a dogma of the Faith,” says Pius VI (*Ep. at Episc. Motulensem*), “that matrimony which, before Christ’s coming, was only an indissoluble contract, has become, since His coming, one of the seven sacraments of the law of the Gospel [a sacrament] instituted by Christ our Lord, as the Council of Florence defined. . . . Hence it is that to the Church alone, which has the entire care of the sacraments, belongs all right and power of assigning the form to this contract which has been raised to the sublime dignity of a sacrament, and consequently of judging of the validity or invalidity of marriages.” “The distinction, or rather separation [between the contract and the sacrament], cannot be approved of; since it is clear that in Christian matrimony the contract is not separable from the sacrament, and consequently that a true and lawful contract cannot exist without being by that very fact a sacrament. For Christ our Lord endowed matrimony with the sacramental dignity; but matrimony is the contract itself, provided that the contract is rightly made [lawfully, *jure*]. . . . Therefore it is plain that every true marriage among Christians is in itself and by itself a sacrament; and that nothing is further from the truth than that the sacrament is a sort of added ornament or quality introduced from without, which may be detached from the contract at the discretion of man” (Leo XIII, Encyc. *Arcanum*).

II. From what has been said, it is evident that the contract is not the matter, and that the blessing is not the form. But it is by no means certain what the matter and form of matrimony really are. Since the Council of Florence all indeed agree, with some few exceptions, that the distinction of matter and form applies to this sacrament. We have already seen (p. 151) that the matter of a sacrament is the natural act which our Lord has raised to a supernatural dignity, while the form is that which differentiates the process or action, and makes it to be a sacrament. The common opinion regarding matrimony is that the offer is the matter, and the acceptance the form: in other words, the act of the promisor is the matter, and the act of the promisee the form. It is not easy to see how this view discriminates between sacramental and nonsacramental marriage. The following is suggested as one answer to the difficulty. Our Lord in instituting this sacrament acted on the same principle as in the others; He took a natural act and raised it to be something supernatural. But, instead of making the distinguishing element to consist of words, or the like, He placed it in the Christian character of the parties; in other words, He ordained that whenever the contract of marriage should be entered into by baptized persons, that contract should be a sacrament. To say that the form of matrimony is the fact of having been baptized, would sound strange. It may be better, therefore, to say that the contract considered as concerned with human beings is the matter; while considered as concerned with Christians (baptized) it is the form.<sup>86</sup>

III. If it be granted, as we have already shown, that marriage contracted between Christians without the priest’s blessing is a sacrament, it is clear that the parties themselves, and not the priest, are the ministers of the sacrament. As, however, a person cannot administer a sacrament to himself [except in the case of the Blessed Eucharist (see *supra*, § 197)], we must hold that the man administers to the woman, and the woman to the man. It should be noted, however, that a few of the most learned theologians have followed the celebrated Melchior Canus in holding that the priest is the minister. After the repeated declarations of the Popes as to the validity of clandestine marriages, we do not see how Canus’s opinion can be defended. Nay, the Council of Trent had already clearly spoken, at least in its disciplinary enactments:

<sup>86</sup> Compare Scotus’s view of the matter and form of Penance (*supra*, p. 120).

“Although it is not to be doubted that clandestine marriages, made with the free consent of the contracting parties, are valid (*rata*) and true marriages, so long as the Church hath not rendered them invalid; and, consequently, that those persons are justly to be condemned, as the Holy Synod doth condemn them with anathema, who deny that such marriages are true and valid . . . nevertheless the Holy Church of God hath, for reasons most just, at all times detested and prohibited such marriages” (sess. xxiv., *De Ref. Matr.*).

We have already seen that the chiefs of the two great mediæval schools of theology were at one concerning the nature of the sacrament of matrimony. They also agree that the priest is not the minister. “The priest’s blessing,” says St. Thomas, “is not required in matrimony as belonging to its essence” (*Suppl.*, q. 45, a. 5). And St. Bonaventure: “Marriage contracted clandestinely is truly received, but not with salutary effect, because it is against the Church’s command” (*In iv. Sent.*, d. 28, a. 5).

It may be objected that the Council of Trent distinctly enjoins that the priest shall say, “I join you together in matrimony,” which indicates that he is the minister. We answer that the teaching of the Council is clear from what has already been quoted. The words to be used by the priest merely mean that he, as the Church’s minister, declares the marriage to be valid and lawful, and confers upon it the blessing of God.

## § 152 THE RECIPIENT OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY—ITS UNITY AND INDISSOLUBILITY

I. All persons capable of entering into the natural contract of marriage are, if baptized, capable of receiving the sacrament of Matrimony. This rule, however, is subject to the laws of impediments, which will be dealt with in the next section. A lawful marriage between unbaptized persons is no sacrament. If, however, they are afterwards baptized, and then explicitly renew their consent, their marriage becomes a sacrament. Some theologians assert that this takes place even without any explicit renewal. There is a difficulty concerning the marriage of a baptized and an unbaptized person. The Church, as we shall see, makes such a marriage null and void. Sometimes, however, she allows it. Hence the question arises: does the baptized party in this case receive the sacrament? Theologians are divided in their opinions. The affirmative seems to us the better view. The contract is a true contract, and where there is a true contract, the sacrament must exist, unless there is something wanting on the part of the recipient or the minister. But here the baptized party is capable of being a recipient, and the unbaptized party is capable of being the minister, as in the case of the sacrament of Baptism.

II. Marriage, as originally instituted by God, was between one man and one woman. This is called monogamy. Opposed to it is polygamy, which may be the union of one man with several women (usually called polygamy, but more properly polygyny), or the union of one woman with several men (polyandry). Perfect monogamy implies complete unity of marriage, *i.e.* a union unbroken even by death. But in the ordinary use it does not exclude successive plurality of wives or husbands.

1. We need not here refer to the unlawfulness of polyandry, as natural law itself condemns it. Whether simultaneous polygamy is also forbidden by the law of nature is disputed among theologians. The difficulty arises from the practice of the Patriarchs, which is nowhere reprobated in Scripture. Some writers hold that plurality of wives was lawful until the Gospel

law was enacted. But the commoner view is that it was always contrary to the law of nature, and that a Divine dispensation was granted in the case of the Patriarchs. "Friendship," says St. Thomas, "consists in a sort of equality. If, therefore, while a woman may not have several husbands . . . a man might have several wives, there would not be a free, but a slavish friendship of the woman for the man. And this is proved by experience, for among men having several wives, the wives are as handmaids. Again, an intense friendship for many is impossible. . . . If, therefore, the wife has only one husband, and the husband several wives, there will not be an equal friendship on each side" (*Contra Gent.*, iii. 124). The Saint elsewhere explains that God could grant dispensations in this matter, because plurality of wives, although forbidden by the law of nature, was not opposed to the primary end of marriage, which is generation (*In iv. Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1).

2. Under the law of the Gospel, polygamy is strictly forbidden. The Council of Trent anathematizes those who say "that it is lawful for Christians to have several wives at the same time, and that this is prohibited by no Divine law" (sess. xxiv., *De Matrim.*, c. 2). This doctrine is plainly proved by the words of our Lord when consulted by the Pharisees concerning divorce: "Have ye not read that He Who made man from the beginning made them male and female? And He said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they two shall be in one flesh (εἰς σάρκα μίαν). Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder." When the Pharisees objected that Moses permitted divorce, our Lord appealed to the primitive institution of marriage, and declared that this was thenceforth to be observed; "Moses by reason of the hardness of your heart permitted you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so" (Matt. xix. 2-9). Now marriage, as originally instituted, was clearly monogamous—"male and female made He them;" "cleave to his wife;" "two in one flesh." Again, Christ taught that he who put away his wife and took another committed adultery. *A fortiori*, therefore, would it be adulterous to take another wife without putting the first away. Moreover, Christian marriage is a figure of the union between Christ and His bride, the Church, which is one (Eph. v. 22, 23).

We have no room for the many passages which might be quoted from the Fathers against plurality of wives. One or two will be enough. "It is not lawful for thee," says St. Ambrose, "to take a wife while thy wife is alive. To seek another while thou hast thine own, is the crime of adultery" (*lib. 1, De Abraham*, c. 7). And St. Augustine: "So much do the laws of marriage continue between them (the parties) while they live, that they who are separated are more united to each other than to those to whom they cleave. They would not be adulterers unless they continued to be spouses" (*De Nupt. et Concup.*, i. c. 10).

The history of the Roman Pontiffs shows how strenuously they have upheld the unity of marriage. But of this we shall speak presently.

3. Successive plurality of wives or husbands is not forbidden even under the Gospel law. "I say to the unmarried and to the widows: it is good for them if they so continue even as I. But if they do not contain themselves, let them marry; for it is better to marry than to be burnt" (1 Cor. vii. 8, 9). And further on: "A woman is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth; but if her husband die, she is at liberty; let her marry to whom she will, only in the Lord." The Apostle does not restrict his words to second marriages. He speaks indefinitely, and consequently the right has an indefinite extent. Nevertheless, in the Greek (Catholic) Church a third marriage is generally forbidden by ecclesiastical law.



III. Marriage, besides being one, is also indissoluble. To understand this rightly, some important distinctions must be made. Dissolution properly so-called is the breaking of the very bond of marriage so that the parties become free. Separation of bed or board, or both, does not involve dissolution of the bond. So, too, a declaration of nullity does not break the bond, but rather asserts that there has never been any bond at all. Again, we should carefully distinguish between (1) natural, *i.e.* non-sacramental marriage (*legitimum*); (2) consummated sacramental marriage (*ratum et consummatum*); and (3) unconsummated sacramental marriage (*ratum*). We shall now state the laws applying to each of these cases.

1. It is commonly held by Catholic theologians that by the law of nature marriage is indissoluble. "Marriage," says St. Thomas, "is intended by nature for the bringing up of children not merely for a time, but for their whole life. Wherefore, by the law of nature, parents lay up treasure for their children, and the children are their heirs. Therefore, since offspring is a good common to both husband and wife, their companionship should remain undivided, according to the dictate of the law of nature. And thus indissolubility of marriage belongs to the natural law" (*Suppl.*, q. 57, a. 1). And again: "Woman stands in need of man not only for the purposes of generation, but also for her own government, because man is wiser and stronger. Man takes woman into his companionship because she is required for generation; when, therefore, her comeliness and fruitfulness are at an end, she is prevented from being taken by another. If, then, a man, after taking a woman in the days of her youth, when she has comeliness and fruitfulness, could put her away when she grew old, he would be inflicting upon her an injury opposed to natural equity. In like manner it is clearly unbecoming for a wife to be able to put away her husband, since the wife is naturally subject to her husband as her ruler; for whoever is subject to another cannot quit that other's rule. It is therefore against natural order for the wife to leave her husband. If, then, the husband could leave his wife, there would be no equal companionship between them, but a sort of slavery on the part of the wife" (*Cont. Gent.* iii. 123). The other arguments based on reason need not be insisted on here.

Our Lord Himself taught the indissolubility of natural marriage. "And there came to Him the Pharisees, tempting Him, saying, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for any cause? Who, answering, said to them, Have ye not read that He Who made man from the beginning, made them male and female? And He said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and cleave to his wife, and they two shall be in one flesh. Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder" (Matt. xix. 3-6). From Adam's words, spoken under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and relating to primitive, natural marriage, our Lord infers the indissolubility of that same marriage. The passage which follows shows that this is the rightful interpretation. When the Pharisees objected, "Why, then, did Moses command to give a bill of divorce and to put away?" Our Lord answered, "Because Moses, by reason of the hardness of your heart, *permitted* you to put away your wives; but *in the beginning it was not so.*" Christ therefore insists that the power of putting away was only a permission granted on account of hardness of heart (*πρὸς τὴν σκληροκαρδίαν ὑμῶν*). He affirms that, apart from this permission, which was only given by the law of Moses, it is not lawful to put away, because to do so would be against the primitive and natural institution of marriage.

The Council of Trent understands this passage in the sense given. "The first parent of the human race, under the influence of the Divine Spirit, pronounced the bond of marriage

perpetual and indissoluble when he said, ‘This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they two shall be in one flesh.’ But that by this bond two only are united and joined together, our Lord taught more plainly, when rehearsing those last words as having been uttered by God, He said, ‘Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh;’ and straightway confirmed the firmness of that tie, proclaimed so long before by Adam in these words, ‘What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder’” (sess. xxiv., proem). Pius VI, quoting these words of the Council, continues, “It is therefore clear that marriage, even in the very state of nature, and certainly long before it was raised to the dignity of a sacrament, was divinely instituted in such a way that it carried with it a perpetual and indissoluble bond which could be broken by no civil law” (*Ep. ad Episc. Agriensem*, 1789).

Although natural marriage is in itself indissoluble, it can nevertheless be dissolved by God, its author. It was He who inspired Moses to allow the Hebrews to put away their wives. Even under the Gospel law He has made it lawful to break the bond of natural marriage under certain peculiar circumstances. Writing to the Corinthians, St. Paul says, “If any brother have a wife that believeth not, and she consent to dwell with him, let him not put her away. And if any woman have a husband that believeth not, and he consent to dwell with her, let her not put away her husband. . . . But if the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases. But God hath called us in peace” (1 Cor. vii. 12–15). That is to say, a Christian man or woman married to an unbeliever (*i.e.* not baptized) is not, in some cases, subject to a sort of slavery so as to be bound to live with the unbeliever, or to live apart in continence. If the unbeliever refuses to live with the Christian, the latter is not bound to go after the unbeliever, but may, after taking the proper steps, look upon himself or herself as free. Nay, more, even if the unbeliever is willing to live with the Christian, but with the intention of perverting or tempting the Christian, the latter is free in this case also. For the Apostle says that if the unbeliever consents, he should not be put away; hence, if he should not consent in the proper manner, we are to understand that he may be put away. Such is the interpretation given by St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, Peter Lombard, St. Thomas, and many others; and the practice of the faithful, approved by the Church, abundantly confirms it. “If one of the parties of an infidel marriage be converted to the Catholic Faith,” says Innocent III, “and the other party will not dwell with him (or her), or not without blasphemy of God’s name, or in order to tempt to mortal sin, the one who is quitted shall, if he please, marry again, and in this case we understand what the Apostle saith, ‘If the unbeliever depart, let him depart, for a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases;’ and the canon also in which it is said, ‘Contumely of the Creator dissolves matrimony in the case of him who is quitted’” (l. 4, *Decret.*, tit. 19, c. 7). Gregory XIII, St. Pius V, and Benedict XIV taught the lawfulness of these second marriages, and permitted them in practice.

2. Marriage between Christians is, as we have seen, always sacramental. This fact makes Christian marriage absolutely indissoluble.<sup>87</sup> The Council of Trent has condemned those who say “that on account of heresy, or irksome cohabitation, or the affected (designed) absence of one of the parties, the bond of marriage may be dissolved; . . . or that the Church hath erred in that she hath taught, and doth teach, in accordance with the doctrine of the Gospel and of the Apostles, that the bond of marriage cannot be dissolved on account of the adultery of

<sup>87</sup>See, however, *infra*, 3.

one of the married parties, and that both, or even the innocent one who gave not occasion to the adultery, cannot contract another marriage during the lifetime of the other, and that he is guilty of adultery who, having put away the adulteress, shall take another wife, as also she who, having put away the adulterer, shall take another husband” (sess. xxiv. cann. 5, 7).<sup>88</sup>

(a) “Whosoever,” says our Lord, “shall put away his wife and marry another, committeth adultery against her (ἐπ’ αὐτήν). And if the wife shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery” (Mark x. 11, 12). And St. Paul teaches that death alone can solve the marriage tie. “For the woman that hath an husband, whilst her husband liveth is bound to the law; but if her husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband. Therefore, whilst her husband liveth, she shall be called an adulteress if she be with another man; but if her husband be dead she is delivered from the law of her husband, so that she is not an adulteress if she be with another man” (Rom. vii. 2, 3). “To them that are married, not I, but the Lord commandeth, that the wife depart not from her husband. And if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband. And let not the husband put away his wife” (1 Cor. vii. 10, 11). He also compares Christian marriage with the indissoluble union between Christ and His Church (Eph. v. 24 sqq.).

(b) Tradition, both theoretical and practical, inculcates the same doctrine. St. Augustine may be taken as representing the Fathers. “Throughout all nations and men the excellence of wedlock is in the procreation of children, and in the faithfulness of chastity; but as regards the people of God, it is also in the holiness of the sacrament (*in sanctitate sacramenti*), through which holiness it is a crime, even for the party that is divorced, to marry another whilst the husband lives” (*De Bono Conjug.*, vi. n. 3; cf. *supra*, p. 202).

(c) “It must be allowed,” says Leo XIII (Encyc. *Arcanum*), “that the Catholic Church has been of the highest service to the well-being of all peoples by her constant defence of the sanctity and perpetuity of marriage. She deserves no small thanks for openly protesting against the civil laws which offended so grievously in this matter a century ago; for striking with anathema the Protestant heresy concerning divorce and putting away; condemning in many ways the dissolution of marriage common among the Greeks; for declaring null and void all marriages entered into on condition of future dissolution; and lastly, for rejecting, even in the early ages, the imperial laws in favour of divorce and putting away. And when the Roman Pontiffs withstood the most potent princes, who sought with threats to obtain the Church’s approval of their divorces, they fought not only for the safety of religion, but even for that of civilization. Future ages will admire the courageous documents published by Nicolas I against Lothair, by Urban II and Paschal II against Philip I of France, by Celestine III and Innocent III against Philip II of France, by Clement VII and Paul III against Henry VIII, and, lastly, by Pius VI, that brave and holy Pontiff, against Napoleon I, in the height of his prosperity and power.”

There is a well-known passage of Holy Scripture which is commonly quoted in favour of divorce: “Whosoever,” says our Lord, “shall put away his wife, *except it be for fornication*, and shall marry another, committeth adultery” (Matt. xix. 9). Catholic interpreters usually explain this difficult text by referring to Mark x. 11, 12; Luke xvi. 18; and 1 Cor. vii. 39, where divorce is absolutely forbidden. They hold, therefore, that the apparent exception given in

<sup>88</sup>The wording of can. 7 should be carefully noted. The condemnation is aimed directly at those who assert that the Church *has erred* in her teaching concerning divorce. This teaching is not itself defined, although of course it may be inferred from the canon.

St. Matthew must be explained so as not to clash with the absolute rule given in the other Evangelists and St. Paul. There is, however, much difference of opinion as to the exact meaning of the text. Some writers lay stress on the word *πορνεία*, which they take to mean fornication, and not adultery (*μοιχεία*). Hence, according to them, the sense is: whosoever shall put away his wife, *except she be a wife of fornication, i.e.* a mere concubine, etc. Others, likewise insisting that fornication is meant, hold that our Lord, speaking to Jews, told them that it was lawful for them to put away a wife who was found guilty of having sinned before marriage, because among them marriage with a virgin was alone looked upon as valid. Afterwards, when speaking to the disciples about marriage as it was to be among Christians, He forbade divorce under any circumstances. The common interpretation, however, allows that our Lord meant by *πορνεία* adultery, and that He spoke not merely of marriage under the Mosaic law; but it considers that He spoke not of divorce properly so-called, but of perpetual separation. The meaning would therefore be: Whosoever shall refuse to live with his wife altogether—which he may not do, except if she has committed adultery—himself commits adultery, *i.e.* becomes responsible for adultery on the part of his wife by exposing her to the danger of living with another. This interpretation may seem forced, but it may be proved from the context, and it has great patristic authority in its favour. The Pharisees asked our Lord whether it was lawful to put away one's wife. Our Lord answered that it was not lawful. They objected that Moses allowed it. Our Lord replied that Moses did so on account of the hardness of their heart, but that in the beginning it was not lawful. He then laid down the new law, restoring the primitive indissolubility. Now, if He allowed divorce, He would not have restored the primitive perfection of marriage, wherein what God had joined together no man could put asunder. Moreover, in the Sermon on the Mount our Lord had said, "Whosoever shall put away his wife, excepting the cause of fornication, maketh *her* to commit adultery" (Matt. v. 32). Some ancient authorities read, "Maketh *her* an adulteress" (in xix. 9, as well as here). That is to say, exposes her to the danger of adultery, and so becomes responsible for her sin. It should be noted, too, that our Lord does not say, "Whosoever shall put away his wife and shall marry another, except it be for fornication, committeth adultery," but "whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication," etc. And that both in v. 32 and xix. 9 He says absolutely, "He that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery." The following passages from three of the greatest Fathers will show that they held the unlawfulness of divorce even in case of adultery. "As long as the husband is alive, even though he be an adulterer, or sodomite, or covered with crimes, and be deserted by his wife for these enormities, he is still her husband, and she may not take another. It was not on his own authority that the Apostle so decreed, but, Christ speaking in him, he followed Christ's words, Who saith in the Gospel, 'Whosoever putteth away his wife, excepting the cause of fornication, maketh her an adulteress; and whosoever shall take her that is put away, is an adulterer.' Note the words, 'Whosoever hath taken her that is put away is an adulterer.' Whether she puts her husband away, or is put away by her husband, whoso shall take her is an adulterer" (St. Jerome, *Ep.*, 55), St. Augustine deals expressly with the question of divorce in two books, *De Conjugiis Adulterinis*. Pollentius, to whom the books were addressed, was of opinion that adultery was a lawful excuse for divorce. He asked why, if our Lord meant that divorce was never lawful, He did not say so simply. The Saint answered that our Lord wished to condemn the graver sin of divorce where there was no adultery, without, however, excusing divorce in the case of adultery. The words given in Mark x. 11, 12, and Luke xvi. 18, condemn both cases

absolutely. St. John Chrysostom, in his sermon "On the Bill of Divorce," insists strongly on indissolubility even in the case of adultery. "A woman is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth; and, therefore, even though he gives her a bill of divorce, even though she leaves the house and goes to another, she is bound by the law, and is an adulteress. . . . If [divorce] were good, [God] would not have made one man and one woman, but would have made two women for the one Adam, if He willed one to be put away and the other to be taken. But by the very formation [of our first parents] He made the law which I am now writing about. And what law is that? Let every man keep for ever that wife who first fell to his lot. This law is more ancient than the law of the bill of divorce," etc. (nn. 1, 2).

The passages quoted from the Fathers in favour of divorce are for the most part either mere repetitions of our Lord's words, as recorded by St. Matthew, and therefore capable of the same interpretation; or else are ambiguous, and may be understood to refer to separation rather than divorce. Civil laws favouring divorce, even when enacted by Christian princes, are of no weight as theological arguments.

3. The absolute indissolubility of the marriage bond applies only in the case of sacramental marriage which has been consummated. If the parties, although validly married, have not become one flesh, the marriage is capable of dissolution. The Council of Trent has defined that the solemn religious profession of one of the parties breaks the bond in such a case (sess. xxiv. can. 6). Long before the Council this law was recognized and acted upon. Many instances are mentioned by ecclesiastical writers in which the bridegroom left his bride intact and consecrated himself to God; and the practice is always highly extolled. Whether the Pope also had the power of dissolving these marriages, was formerly disputed among theologians; but it is now certain that he has the power. "There can be no further question," says Benedict XIV, "about the power of the Pope concerning dispensation in the case of unconsummated sacramental marriage; the affirmative is commonly held by theologians and canonists, and is acted upon in practice, as is well known" (*Question. Canon.*, 479).

### § 153 THE CHURCH'S CONTROL OVER MARRIAGE—IMPEDIMENTS

I. The relation between man and wife has such an important bearing upon the religious and civil welfare of the community, that marriage cannot be said to be a mere contract. There must be some restriction as to the parties competent to marry, and some regulation as to their mutual rights and duties, and as to the continuance of the relation. To whom should this control belong? The State claims it on the ground of the civil consequences of marriage. On the other hand, Christian marriage is a sacrament, and therefore, like all else that is sacred, belongs to the Catholic Church. Leo XIII (*Encyc. Arcanum*) teaches that Christ entrusted to the Church the entire control over Christian marriage. It is hers to limit, for wise reasons, the competency of certain persons to contract with each other, or at all. She has the right to decide whether error, or force, or fraud has annulled the contract. Above all, she is the guardian of the unity and perpetuity of the marriage bond. These powers she has always and everywhere exercised, not as derived from the consent of governments, but as given to her directly by her Divine Founder. When Christ condemned polygamy and divorce, He was not acting as the delegate of the Roman governor of Judæa, or of the tetrarch of Galilee. St. Paul's judgment on the incestuous Corinthian in no way assumed the tacit consent of Nero. The Councils of Arles, Chalcedon, and many others down to Trent, have all issued decrees concerning

marriage independently of emperors and kings. Nay, the three great imperial jurists, Honorius, Theodosius the Younger, and Justinian, acknowledged that in matters relating to marriage they were merely the guardians and defenders of the sacred canons. "Therefore," says Leo XIII, "rightly was it defined at the Council of Trent that the Church has the power of establishing diriment impediments of matrimony (sess. xxiv. can. 4), and that matrimonial cases belong to ecclesiastical judges (can. 12)."

Although the Pontiff teaches that Christ entrusted to the Church the entire control (*totam disciplinam*) of Christian marriage, he does not say that the State has nothing to do with marriage. On the contrary, he insists that the Church does not wish to interfere with the civil consequences of marriage. In her regulations she ever pays attention to circumstances of time, place, and character, and does her best for the public welfare. Her greatest desire is to be at peace with the State, seeing that so much good results when the two work together. It is worthy of note that a few great theologians and canonists have held that the State also has the power of establishing diriment impediments, but this opinion is now commonly rejected.

II. Just as civil contracts are subject to the laws of the State, in like manner the contract of marriage is governed by canon law. The chief laws concerning marriage are those treating of the capacity or incapacity of certain classes of persons to enter into the contract. The impediments are of two kinds: forbidding (*impedientia*), and diriment (*dirimentia*). The former render marriage unlawful; the latter make it null and void. Persons who marry under a forbidding impediment contract really and truly, but sin grievously thereby. When the impediment is diriment, those who attempt marriage not only sin grievously, but are not married at all. The full treatment of these impediments belongs to moral theology.

*Scholion.* Though Christian marriage is a sacrament, the Council of Trent has condemned those who hold "that the married state is higher than the state of virginity or of celibacy, and that it is not better and more blessed to remain in virginity or in celibacy than to be united in matrimony" (sess. xxiv. can. 10).

The teaching of the Council is based upon the words of St. Paul and of our Lord Himself. "He that is without a wife," says the Apostle, "is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God. But he that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife: and he is divided. And the unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may be holy both in body and spirit. But she that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband" (1 Cor. vii. 32-34). "There are eunuchs," says our Lord, "who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. He that can take, let him take it" (Matt. xix. 12; cf. Apoc. xiv. 3, 4). St. Thomas Aquinas has treated of virginity in his usual masterly fashion (*Contra Gent.*, iii. c. 136). The reader will there find a complete answer to the common objections against the unmarried state.

On matrimony see St. Thomas, Supp. qqi xli.-lxviii.; Sanchez, *De Sancto Matrimonii Sacramento*; De Augustinis, *op. cit.*, lib. iv.; Palmieri, *De Matrimonio Christiano*; Ballerini, *op. cit.*, vol. vi.; Card. Gasparri, *De Matrimonio*; Scheeben, *Mysterien*, p. 471; Atzberger, *op. cit.*, p. 769; Didon, *Indissolubilité et Divorce*; Turmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 157, 346, 469.

BOOK VIII  
THE LAST THINGS





**T**O COMPLETE OUR TASK, WE have now to see how man—created and elevated, fallen and redeemed—finally attains the end for which he was created by God. Death has already been spoken of (*supra*, p. 11). We shall here treat (1) of the Resurrection of the Body; (2) the Last Judgment; (3) Hell; (4) Purgatory; (5) Heaven. ¶ St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, iii. 1–63, iv. 79–97; *Summa Theol.*, Supp. qq. 69–100; 1a 2æ, qq. 1–5; Jungmann, *De Novissimis*; Billot, *De Novissimis*; Atzberger, *Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik*, iv. p. 801; *Die Christliche Eschatologie*; *Geschichte der Christl. Eschatologie*; Oxenham, *Catholic Eschatology*; Turmel, *Hist. de la Théologie Positive*, p. 179, 356, 485; Tournebize, *Opinions du Jour sur les Peines d’Outre-Tombe*.

### § 154 THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

The Fourth Lateran Council has defined that all men, whether elect or reprobate, “will rise again with their own bodies which they now bear about with them (*cum suis propriis resurgent corporibus quæ nunc gestant*)” (*c. Firmiter*). That is to say, at the Last Day the bodies of all mankind will be raised up again from the dead, and once more united to their souls, which of course have never ceased to live since their separation from the body. This doctrine of the resurrection of the body (*resurrectio carnis, resurrectio mortuorum, ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν*) is found expressed in numberless creeds and professions of faith from the earliest days of Christianity: e.g. in St. Irenæus (*Adv. Hæres.*, i. 10); Tertullian (*De Præscr.*, 13); Origen (*Periarch. præf.*, 5); in the Apostolic Constitutions (vii. 41); in the Apostles’, Nicene, and Athanasian Creeds; in the Creed of the Eleventh Council of Toledo (Denzinger, *Enchir.*, xxvi.); in the Creed of Leo IX, subscribed by Bishop Peter—still used at the consecration of bishops; the profession of faith subscribed by Michael Palæologus in the Second Council of Lyons (Denzinger, *l.c.*, lix.); and, finally, in the Creed of Pius IV.

I. 1. The Old Testament, as we should expect from its imperfect and preparatory character, speaks at first only vaguely, but afterwards with increasing definiteness, of the resurrection of the body. A Redeemer is to come Who will undo all the evil effects of Adam’s sin; Who will bestow upon men bodily immortality, and will restore to them the full enjoyment of the happiness lost in Paradise. “For I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth; and I shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see God, Whom I myself shall see, and my eyes shall behold, and not another; this hope is laid up in my bosom”<sup>89</sup> (Job xix. 25–27). Isaiah foretells that the Lord of Hosts “shall cast death down headlong for ever” (xxv. 8); “Thy dead men shall live, My slain shall rise again; awake and give praise, ye that dwell in the dust: for thy dew is the dew of the light. And the land of the giants thou shalt pull down into ruin [Heb., the earth shall cast forth the dead, or

<sup>89</sup>“We venture to give the following as an exact translation of the Hebrew, ‘I know that my avenger liveth, and at the last [*lit.* as the last one—i.e. to speak the last decisive word] he shall rise up on the dust. And after my skin has been thus destroyed [*lit.* which they have thus destroyed], and [away] from my flesh I shall see God, Whom I shall behold for myself, and mine eyes shall have seen [a preterite of confidence], and not another; my reins waste [with longing] in my breast.’ There are very strong grounds for believing that Job here asserts his expectation of immortality, and this interpretation is held by critics, such as Ewald and Dillmann, who cannot be suspected of dogmatic prejudice. The confident hope of immortality shines forth clearly just when Job’s desolation, when the absence of all human comfort is complete. The poem leads up naturally to this expression of confidence, There is a gradual advance from the doubts of ch. xiv. to the sublime prayer and trust of xvi. 18, *ad fin.* All this culminates in the passage before us; nor does Job fall back again to the depth of his former despair” (*Cath. Dictionary*, RESURRECTION OF THE BODY).

the shades] . . . the earth shall disclose her blood, and shall cover her slain no more” (xxvi. 19–21). Ezechiel’s vision of the resurrection of the dry bones (xxxvii.) refers, of course, in the first instance to the restoration of Israel; but the selection of such a figure is a proof of belief in a literal resurrection. “Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake: some unto life everlasting, and others unto reproach to see it always”<sup>87</sup> (Dan. xii. 2; cf. 12; Apoc. vi. 3; Ps. xv. 10). In the Second Book of Machabees, the martyr brothers comfort themselves amidst their torments with the hope and belief that those very members which they were losing for God’s sake will be again restored to them by Him. The third “quickly put forth his tongue, and courageously stretched out his hands, and said with confidence, These I have from heaven, but for the laws of God I now despise them, because I hope to receive them again from Him” (vii. 11; cf. 9, 14). This shows the belief prevalent among the people at that time; and Martha’s words, “I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day” (John xi. 24), prove the same for a later period. It should be mentioned that the resurrection of the dead is the thirteenth article of the Jewish Creed.

2. The doctrine of the resurrection was not only confirmed by our Lord (John v. 28 sqq., vi. 39 sqq.; xi. 25; Luke xiv. 14), but expressly defended by Him against the Sadducees, whose unbelief He attributed to their ignorance of the Scriptures and the power of God (Matt. xxii. 29; Luke xx. 37). It was preached by the Apostles as one of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity; e.g. by St. Paul at Athens (Acts xvii. 18, 31, 32), at Jerusalem (xxiii. 6), before Felix (xxiv. 15), before Agrippa (xxvi. 8); it is taught at great length in the Epistles (Rom. viii. 11; 1 Cor. vi. 14; xv. 12 sqq.; 2 Cor. iv. 14; v. 1 sqq.; Phil. iii. 21; 1 Thess. iv. 12–16; 2 Tim. ii. 11; Heb. vi. 2), and also in the Apocalypse (xx. 12 sqq.). Here we can quote only one of these passages: “If Christ be preached that He rose again from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen again; and if Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. . . . For by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead; and as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. . . . Behold, I tell you a mystery: we shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet; for the trumpet shall sound and the dead shall rise again incorruptible” (1 Cor. xv. 12 sqq.).

3. Where the teaching of Scripture is so abundant and so clear on a matter so repugnant to the prevailing pagan beliefs, we are not surprised to find it one of the commonest topics treated of by the Fathers. They had to defend it not only against those who denied immortality of any sort, but also against those who (like Plato), while firmly believing in the immortality of the soul, held that the body was nothing but the prison of the soul, and death was an escape from the bondage of matter. When “certain philosophers of the Epicureans and Stoics heard of the resurrection of the dead, some indeed mocked” (Acts xvii. 32). “No doctrine of the Christian faith,” says St. Augustine, “is so vehemently and so obstinately opposed as the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh” (*In Ps.*, lxxxviii., *Serm.*, ii. n. 5). The various sects of Gnostics and Manichæans, who looked upon all matter as evil, naturally denied the resurrection. So, too, did their followers, the Priscillianists, the Cathari, and Albigenses, We need hardly add that in our day the Rationalists, Materialists, and Pantheists are also opposed to the doctrine. See Justin Martyr, *Dial. cum Tryph.*, 80; Tatian, *Græc.*, 6; Origen, *In Levit.*,

<sup>87</sup>“Many” is frequently used in Scripture for “a great number,” and so for “all” (Isa. liii. 11, 12; Matt. xxvi. 28; Rom. v. 19; v. 18).

Hom. vi n. 10; Tertullian, *De Resurr. Carn.*, c. 1; St. Basil, *Ep.* cclxxi. n. 3; St. Ephræm, *De Resurr. Mort.*; St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xx. 20; Theodoret, *Hist. Eccl.*, i. 4, etc.

4. No real proof from reason can be adduced in favour of the resurrection; it is from revelation alone that we can prove the doctrine. Nevertheless, the Fathers commonly argue that man's position in the universe as linking together spirit and matter, his desire for complete and perfect happiness, the share which the body takes both in our good and evil deeds—that all of these, if they do not absolutely prove the resurrection, at least point to its fittingness. And they appeal to certain analogies found in revelation and in nature itself; e.g. Jonas in the whale's belly; the three children in the fiery furnace; Daniel in the lions' den; the carrying away of Henoah and Elias; the raising of the dead; the blossoming of Aaron's rod; the preservation of the garments of the Israelites in the desert; the grain of seed dying and springing up again; the egg; the seasons of the year; day succeeding day; and the mythical Phoenix. These form the subject of countless pictures in early Christian art. See Kraus, *Encycl. Archæol.*, art AUFERSTEHUNG; Northcote and Brownlow, *Roma Sotterranea*.

II. "Christ's resurrection," says St. Thomas, "is the cause and model of our resurrection (*causa efficiens et exemplaris*)" (3, q. 56, a. 1, ad 3). "Christ is risen from the dead, the first-fruits of them that sleep; for by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead" (1 Cor. xv. 20, 21).

1. The work of redemption was to undo the evil wrought by Adam's sin, and to restore the gifts originally bestowed upon mankind (Rom. v.). By sin death was brought into the world (Gen. 19); but Christ has triumphed over sin and death (1 Cor. xv. 54–57). "He was delivered up for our sins, and rose again for our justification" (Rom. iv. 25). "I am the Resurrection, and the Life," He said; "he that believeth in Me, although he be dead, shall live; and every one that liveth and believeth in Me shall not die for ever" (John xi. 25, 26). "Our bodies are the members of Christ" (1 Cor. vi. 15); "We are members of His body, of His flesh, of His bones" (Eph. v. 30). We have already pointed out that the preternatural gifts were not immediately restored to man by redemption; they are, however, kept in store for us, and are to be enjoyed by us in our resurrection.

2. "Christ will reform (*μετασχηματίσει*) the body of our lowness (*ταπεινώσεως*), made like to the body of His glory (*σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ*)" (Phil. iii, 21). "If we have been planted together in the likeness of His death, we shall be also in the likeness of His resurrection" (Rom. vi. 5). In accordance with the doctrine of 1 Cor. xv. and other passages of Holy Scripture, theologians teach that the risen bodies of the just, like Christ's risen body, will be endowed with four principal qualities (*notes*):

(a) Impassibility, including incorruptibility and immortality. Just as "Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more; death shall no more have dominion over Him" (Rom. vi. 9); so "they that shall be accounted worthy of that world, and of the resurrection from the dead . . . neither can they die any more" (Luke xx. 35, 36); "It is sown in corruption (*ἐν φθορᾷ*), it shall rise in incorruption (*ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ*)" (1 Cor. xv. 42); "God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more" (Apoc. xxi. 4).

(b) Brightness (*claritas*). As the face of Jesus at His Transfiguration shone like the sun, so "shall the just shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father" (Matt. xiii. 43; cf. Dan. xii. 3; Wisd. iii. 7); for the body "is sown in dishonour, it shall rise in glory (*ἐν δόξῃ*)" (1 Cor. xv. 43). According to the merits of each will be the brightness of each: "One is the glory of the sun,

another the glory of the moon, and another the glory of the stars, for star differeth from star in glory (δόξῃ)” (*ibid.* 41).

(c) Agility, *i.e.* the power of moving from place to place, so as to be immediately anywhere that we wish. Our Lord’s risen body appeared and disappeared at His will, and ascended into heaven when it pleased Him.

(d) Spirituality (*subtilitas*), by means of which the body becomes so completely subject to the soul, and participates to such an extent in the soul’s more perfect and purer life, that it becomes itself like to a spirit. “It is sown a natural body (σῶμα ψυχικόν), it shall rise a spiritual body (σῶμα πνευματικόν)” (1 Cor. xv. 44). This quality is generally explained in the special sense of subtilty or penetrability, that is, of being able to pass through material objects, just as our Lord’s risen body did. See St. Thomas, *Suppl.*, qq. 83–85.

III. The great difficulty against the resurrection of the body is as to how its identity is to be preserved. That we shall all rise again with the *same* bodies is of the very essence of the doctrine (Job xix. 25 sqq.; 2 Mach. vii. 11; Rom. viii. 11; 1 Cor. xv. 53; Tertullian, *Contr. Marcion*, v. 9; Origen, *Princip.*, ii. 10, 1; St. Ambrose, *Fid. Resurr.*, 87; St. Jerome, *Contr. Joan. Hieros.*, 33; St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xxii. cc. 19, 20; *Serm.* ccxiv. 12; ccxxxv. 4; ccxliii. 3; cclvi. 2, etc.). Nevertheless, the particles of the body are continually passing away, and being replaced by others; and the particles of one human body may enter into the composition of other human bodies.<sup>8c</sup> We must not, therefore, press too far the material identity of the earthly and the risen body. Some theologians, following St. Augustine, have thought it sufficient if any of the particles which at any time formed part of the earthly body are preserved. Others have not required even so much as this. We can not here enter into the discussion. See Jungmann, *De Novissimis*, c. iii. a. 2; Atzberger, *op. cit.*, p. 916.

## § 125 THE LAST, OR GENERAL JUDGMENT

We have seen that though “God wills all men to be saved,” and though Christ died for all, yet as a fact some will be saved and some will be lost. The decision of their eternal fate is given when their course is run: in the case of the individual, at his death; in the case of the human race as a whole, at the end of time. This latter, which is called the Last, or General, Judgment, is the one which concerns us here.

I. Mankind in the sight of God is not simply a number of individuals, but a great whole: one great family, having the same origin, involved in the same ruin, rescued by the same Redeemer. Although the Creator wills and promotes the good of every single creature, yet each is subservient to the good of the whole. Moreover, every man’s action is not isolated, but influences and is influenced by that of his fellow-men, whether past, present, or future. God “reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly;” nevertheless, to us who cannot contemplate the whole, “His ways are unsearchable” (Rom. xii. 33). A day, however, will come, “the day of the Lord” (Joel ii. 31), when all will be made clear, and His ways will be justified in the sight of all mankind (St. Thomas, 3, q. 59, a. 5).

1. In the Old Testament the Prophets speak of a great judgment which is to take place in the last days (Isa. lxvi. 15 sqq.; Joel ii. 29 sqq.; iii. 2 sqq.; Mal. iv. 1; Soph. i. 14 sqq.). From them the Jews gathered their notion of a glorious and mighty Messiah; and hence they rejected our Lord, Who came to them in poverty and in weakness. But He, referring to these very

<sup>8c</sup>See Hamlet’s speech in the graveyard.

prophecies, foretold His Second Coming in great power and majesty to judge the living and dead (Matt. xiii. 41; xix. 28; xxiv. 27 sqq.; xxv. 31 sqq.; Mark xiii. 24 sqq.; Luke xxi. 25 sqq.). The Apostles repeatedly preach this coming of Christ as an exhortation to a holy life, and as a consolation in the midst of sorrows and trials: *e.g.* St. Peter at the conversion of Cornelius (Acts x. 42); St. Paul at Athens (*ibid.* xvii. 31), and in his Epistles (Rom. ii. 5 sqq.; xiv. 10; 1 Cor. iv. 5; 2 Cor. v. 10; 2 Tim. iv. 1; 2 Thess. i. 5 sqq.); and St. James (v. 7 sqq.).<sup>90</sup>

2. In all the early creeds belief in the General Judgment is professed, usually in connection with our Lord's second coming. "Sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty; from thence He shall come to judge the living and the dead" (Apostles' Creed). "And He shall come again with glory to judge the living and the dead" (Nicene Creed). "He sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty; from whence He shall come to judge the living and the dead. At Whose coming all men shall rise again (*resurgere habent*) with their bodies, and shall give an account of their works" (Athanasian Creed).

II. Having thus established the fact of a future General Judgment, we turn now to the various circumstances and details connected with it.

1. The time of Christ's second coming has not been made known to us: "Of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father" (Mark xiii. 32). Hence our Lord continually warns us to be on the watch, so as not to be taken unawares: He will come like a thief in the night (Matt. xxiv. 42); "in a day that [man] hopeth not, and at an hour he knoweth not" (*ibid.* 50). "Take heed to yourselves lest . . . that day come upon you suddenly; for as a snare shall it come" (Luke xxi. 34, 35); "Watch ye therefore (for you know not when the Lord of the house cometh; at even, or at midnight, or at the cock—crowing, or in the morning): lest coming on a sudden He find you sleeping; and what I say to you I say to all: Watch" (Mark xiii. 35–37). The Apostles seem to have expected their Master's return almost immediately: "The end of all is at hand; be prudent, therefore, and watch in prayers" (1 Pet. iv. 7); "The coming of the Lord is at hand (ἡ παρουσία τοῦ Κυρίου ἤγγικεν); . . . behold, the Judge standeth at the door" (James v. 8, 9); "Little children, it is the last hour (ἔσχατη ὥρα)" (1 John ii. 18). On the other hand, St. Paul begs the Thessalonians not to be alarmed by those who speak "as if the day of the Lord were at hand (ὡς ὅτι ἐνέσθηκεν ἡ ἡμέρα τοῦ Κυρίου)" (2 Thess. ii. 2; cf. 2 Pet. iii. 8 sqq.). Nor is the uncertainty removed by the various signs which are to announce the approach of the Last Day. "Wars, and rumours of wars," "pestilences, and famines, and earthquakes in places" (Matt. xxiv. 6, 7) are unhappily common enough; "the signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars" (Luke xxi. 24), are the accompaniments rather than the forerunners of the coming; the universal spreading of the Gospel (Matt. xxiv. 14) and the conversion of the Jews (Rom. xi. 26) are not sufficiently definite; while the coming of Antichrist and the return of Enoch and Elias are themselves full of mystery. Hence, even some of the Fathers (*e.g.* St. Gregory the Great, *Hom.* i., *in Evang.*) and other Saints (*e.g.* St. Vincent Ferrer) have mistaken the date of the Last Day.

2. The place in which the Judgment will be held is here on earth; for all the various texts and creeds speak of a coming or return to where our Lord was before. We must not, however,

<sup>90</sup>This second "coming (παρουσία, *adventus*)" (Matt. xxiv. 2), is also called "appearance (ἐπιφάνεια, *Vulg. adventus*)" (1 Tim. vi. 14); "the appearing of His kingdom (ἐπιφάνεια καὶ βασιλεία, *Vulg. adventus et regnum, a hendiadys*)" (2 Tim. iv. 1); "the appearing of His glory (ἐπιφάνεια τῆς δόξης, *adventus gloriæ*)" (Tit. ii. 14); "the appearing of His presence (ἐπιφάνεια τῆς παρουσίας, *illustratio adventus*)" (2 Thess. ii. 8); "revelation (ἀποκαλύψις)" (*ibid.*, i. 7); "revelation of His glory (ἀποκαλύψις τῆς δόξης)" (1 Pet. iv. 13); "appearance (φάνερωσις)" (Col. iii. 4); and also "the kingdom of God" (Luke xxi. 31).

take this to mean simply the solid earth on which we stand: "They shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven" (Matt. xxiv. 39); "We who are alive, who are left, shall be caught up together with Christ into the air" (1 Thess. iv. 16). The valley of Josaphat has been mentioned by some as the exact spot, by reason of the prophecy, "I will gather together all the nations, and will bring them down into the valley of Josaphat" (Joel iii. 2); but these words can have only a remote reference to the Last Judgment. The neighbourhood of Jerusalem, however, where our Lord suffered, and whence He ascended into heaven, would seem to be a fitting place for His return and His final triumph.

3. The Judge will be our Lord Jesus Christ in His human nature, as the Son of Man. "Neither doth the Father judge any man; but hath given all judgment to the Son . . . and He hath given Him power to do judgment because He is the Son of Man" (John v. 22, 27; Matt. xxiv. 30; xxv. 31; Luke xxi. 27). His second coming will be the completion of the work of the Incarnation. Then it is that the prophecies which speak of His power and glory and triumph will be fulfilled. At His first coming "He humbled Himself, taking the form of a servant;" His Divinity was hidden; He came to be judged, to suffer, and to die; but at His return He will come with great power and majesty; His Divinity will shine forth in His humanity; He will come to judge the living and dead, to triumph over His enemies, and bestow eternal reward on the faithful. "This Jesus, who is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come, as you have seen Him going into heaven (οὕτως ἐλεύσεται ὃν τρόπον ἑθεάσασθε αὐτὸν πορευόμενον εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν)" (Acts i. 11).

This office of Judge, which properly belongs to our Lord, He will to some extent communicate to the Apostles and other Saints (Matt. xix. 28; 1 Cor. vi. 2 sqq.).

4. All mankind, both good and bad; those who shall be alive at the Last Day, as well as those who shall have died, will be judged: "We shall all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ" (Rom. xiv. 10; 2 Cor. v. 10; 2 Thess. iv. 14 sqq.); "The hour cometh wherein all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that have done good things shall come forth unto the resurrection of life; but they that have done evil unto the resurrection of judgment" (John v. 28, 29). When it is said, "Judge not, that ye may not be judged" (Matt. vii. 7), judgment here and in similar passages (John iii. 18) is clearly meant in the sense of condemnation (cf. John xvii. 11). St. Paul says that "we shall judge angels" (1 Cor. vi. 3); and of the fallen angels it is said that "God delivered them drawn down by infernal ropes to the lower hell to be reserved unto judgment" (2 Pet. ii. 4); or, as St. Jude says (6), "unto the judgment of the great day." We may believe that the Angels, good and bad, will be judged either on account of their relations with mankind, or because they are subject to Him to Whom "all power is given in heaven and on earth," Whom all the angels of God are to adore (Heb. i. 6), in Whose Name "every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth" (Phil. ii. 10).

5. Christ will judge men according as they have believed in Him, and have kept His commandments. "Whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting" (John iii. 16); "He who heareth My word, and believeth Him that sent Me, hath life everlasting" (*ibid.* v. 24); "The Son of Man shall come in the glory of His Father with His angels, and then will He render to every one according to his works" (Matt. xvi. 27; cf. xxv. 31-46; 2 Cor. v. 10). Every deed, "every idle word that men shall speak" (Matt. xii. 36), will be revealed before the eyes of all: "The Lord will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts" (1 Cor. iv. 5). This manifestation is described by St. John

in the words of the Apocalypse: "I saw the dead, great and small, standing in the presence of the throne, and the books were opened; and another book was opened, which is the book of life; and the dead were judged, every one according to their works" (xx. 12). And not only the works of men, but the works of God also, will be manifested on that day: the acts of His infinite mercy; the hidden workings of His justice; the unsearchable ways of His providence, so that He may be justified in the sight of all. "What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter" (John xiii. 7).

6. When "all the nations shall be gathered together before Him, the Son of Man shall separate them one from another, as the shepherd separateth the sheep from the goats; and He shall set the sheep on His right hand, and the goats on His left" (Matt. xxv. 32, 33; cf. xiii. 24-43, 48). Then will follow the final sentence of reward or condemnation:

"Come,"	"Depart from Me,"
"Ye blessed of My Father,"	"Ye cursed,"
"Possess you the kingdom"	"Into everlasting fire"
"Prepared for you from the foundation of the world."	"Prepared for the devil and his angels."

"And these shall go into everlasting punishment, but the just into life everlasting" (Matt. xxv. 34, 41, 46). See St. Thomas, 3, q. 59, and *Suppl.*, qq. 89, 90, and the commentators thereon; Freiburg, *Kirchenlexikon*, art. GÖTTLICHES GERICHT.

## § 166 HELL

"The everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels," to which the wicked will be condemned, is called "Hell (Ἅδης, ἄδης, γέεννα, *infernus*)."<sup>91</sup> We must, however, bear in mind that these words are sometimes used in Scripture to mean merely the grave, or the unseen world generally (e.g. Gen. xxxvii. 35; xlii. 38; Acts ii. 27, 31; Apoc. xx. 13; cf. Job x. 21, 22). It is from the context that we can ascertain whether the abode of the damned is referred to. We have already said something on this question when treating of our Lord's descent into Hell.

I. That the wicked will be punished after death is acknowledged by all who maintain the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. God is holy, and therefore hates sin; He is just, and therefore claims satisfaction for the offences committed against Him; He is wise, and therefore requires punishment as a means of restoring the moral order.<sup>92</sup> Inasmuch as sin does not receive its due punishment in this world, it must do so in the other. Hence the traditions of all nations speak of some sort of hell. It is from Revelation, however, that we derive our chief information about the fate of the damned. "The Lord Almighty will take revenge on them, in the day of judgment He will visit them; for He will give fire and worms into their flesh, that they may burn and feel for ever" (Judith xvi. 21). "Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake: some unto life everlasting, and others unto reproach to see it always" (Dan. xii. 2; see also Isaias xxxiii. 14; lxvi. 24; Wisd. iv. 19). In the New Testament mention is made over and over again of "Hell," "Hellfire," "everlasting fire," "the fiery furnace," where there "shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth" (Matt. v. 22; vii. 13; x. 28; xiii. 42; xxv. 41, etc.).

<sup>91</sup>Our English word "Hell" comes to us from the Anglo-Saxon *Hel*, originally "a hidden place."

<sup>92</sup>"Giustizia mosse il mio alto Fattore: / Fecemi la divina potestate, / La somma Sapienza e il primo Amore." Dante, *Inferno*, Cant. iii.



The Fathers, from the very earliest times, all agree in teaching the real existence of Hell, and prove it both from Holy Scripture and reason (see St. Justin M., *Apol.*, ii. c. 9; Athenagoras, *De Res Mort.*, c. xix.; St. Ignatius, *Ad Eph.*, c. xvi.; Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.*, i. c. 26; St. John Chrysoſt., *Hom.* iv., *De Fato et Provid.*). The most important decisions of the Church on the subject are the profession of faith made in the Second Council of Lyons (1274), (repeated in the Decree of Union in the Council of Florence, 1439): “The souls of those who depart in mortal sin, or only with original sin, go down immediately into hell, to be punished, however, by different torments (*mox in infernum descendere, pœnis tamen disparibus puniendas*);” and the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), that the wicked “shall receive everlasting punishment (*pœnam perpetuam*) with the devil“ (cap. *Firmiter*). See also the Council of Trent, sess. vi. c. 14; sess. xiv. can. 5.

II. Putting aside as comparatively unimportant the question where Hell is,<sup>93</sup> we have now to consider the nature and duration of the torments of the damned.

1. As sin is a turning away from God and a turning towards creatures (*aversio a Deo, conversio ad creaturam*), a twofold punishment is suffered by the sinner: one privative, the other positive.

(a) The pain (or punishment) of loss (*pœna damni*) consists in the privation of the highest good to which man is destined, viz. God Himself, and the enjoyment of His blessed vision. “Depart from Me, ye cursed.” “I know you not whence you are; depart from Me, all ye workers of iniquity” (Matt. xxv. 41; Luke xiii. 27; cf. 1 Cor. vi. 9; Apoc. xxii. 15). Theologians rightly look upon this as the most dreadful of all the punishments of Hell; it is the utter blighting of one’s existence; nothing can be worse than to realize that one has lost for ever by his own fault the Greatest of all Goods, for which he was made, and which he might so easily have attained. It is “so great a punishment that no torments known to us can be compared to it” (St. Augustine, *Enchirid.*, c. 112; see also St. John Chrysoſtom, *Ad Theodos. Laps.*, i. nn. 10, 12).

(b) The positive punishment is called the pain (or punishment) of sense (*pœna sensus*). It embraces all the torments not comprehended under the pain of loss, and is so called because it produces sensible suffering, and is produced chiefly by a sensible object, viz. fire. That there is a fire of some sort in hell is taught in numberless passages of Holy Scripture (*e.g.* Matt. xiii. 30–50; xviii. 8; xxv. 41; Mark ix. 42 sqq.; 2 Thess. i. 8; Heb. x. 27; Apoc. xviii. 8; xix. 20; xx. 9, sqq., etc.). The question is whether this “fire” is to be understood in the metaphorical sense of spiritual torments, such as anguish of conscience, etc., as Origen (*De Princ.*, ii. 4 sqq.), St. Ambrose (*In Luc.*, xiv.), Theophylact (*In Marc.*, ix.), Catharinus, and some others maintain; or in the strict sense of material fire. This latter opinion is the common teaching of the Fathers and theologians, though not defined by the Church (Suarez, *De Angelis*, l. viii. c. 12; Petavius, *De Angelis*, l. iii. c. 5); and is supported by the various expressions used in the Sacred Writings when hell is spoken of: *e.g.* “the furnace of fire” (Matt. xiii. 42); “the bottomless pit” (Apoc. ix. 1); “the pool of fire and brimstone” (*ibid.* xx. 9); “the rage of fire shall consume,” etc. (Heb. x. 27); “I am tormented in this flame” (Luke xvi. 24); “a flame of

<sup>93</sup>Many passages both in the Old and New Testaments seem to indicate that Hell is somewhere under the earth (Num. xvi. 31 sqq.; 1 Kings xxviii. 13 sqq.; Eccclus. xxiv. 43; xlvi. 23; Matt. xii. 40; Eph. iv. 9; Phil. ii. 10; Apoc. v. 3; xii. 9). Such, too, is the common teaching of the Fathers and theologians (see St. Thomas, *Suppl.*, q. 97. a. 7; Suarez, *De Angelis*, lib. viii. c. 16, n. 17 sqq.). But St. Augustine’s words should be borne in mind: “In what part of the world (*mundi*, the universe) Hell is, I think no man knows, but He to Whom the ‘Spirit of God hath revealed it” (*De Civ. Dei*, lib. xv. cap. 16).



fire yielding vengeance to them who know not God, and who obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ” (2 Thess. i. 8): “the fire is not extinguished, for every one shall be salted with fire” (Mark ix. 48). How pure spirits (the devils) and disembodied spirits (the souls of the wicked before the resurrection of the body) can be affected by a material substance is beyond our comprehension; but the fact is not therefore to be denied (see St. Thomas, *In iv. Sent.*, dist. 44, q. 3, a. 2; *Suppl.*, q. 70, a. 3; *Contra Gent.*, iv. 90; Suarez, *De Angelis*, lib. viii. c. 14, n. 46). Besides the various torments arising from the action of fire, the damned suffer the pangs of remorse; “their worm (σκώληξ) dieth not” (Mark ix. 43, 45, 47); their intellects are darkened, their wills are impenitent, and the companionship of the devils and other lost souls adds to their misery. After the resurrection their bodies will likewise be tormented, as having been the partakers of their sins (St. Thomas, *Suppl.*, (q. 98; *Contra Gentes*, l. iv. c. 89).

2. The various passages of Scripture already quoted clearly teach the eternity of the pains of Hell. The argument does not depend simply upon the meaning of the word “everlasting” (*aternus, αἰώνιος*);<sup>94</sup> it is from the context, and also from other expressions, that we gather that the punishment is to have no end. “Their worm dieth not, and their fire is not extinguished (οὐ σβέννυται)” (Mark ix. 44); “It is better for thee to enter lame into life everlasting than having two feet to be cast into the hell of unquenchable fire (εἰς τὴν γέενναν εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἄσβεστον)” (*ibid.* 45). “Life everlasting” is opposed to “everlasting punishment” (Matt. xxv. 41); and as the one has no end, so also the other. Moreover the wicked are said, over and over again, to be absolutely excluded from the kingdom of God: “He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin” (Mark iii. 29; Matt. xii. 32). “Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers . . . shall possess the kingdom of God” (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10); “It were better for him if that man had not been born” (Matt. xxvi. 24); “Not every one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven” (Matt. vii. 21); “I never knew you; depart from Me, you that work iniquity” (*ibid.* 23); “There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, when you shall see Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and all the prophets in the kingdom of God, and you yourselves thrust out” (Luke xiii. 28); “The pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beast and the false prophet shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever (εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰῶνων)” (Apoc. xx. 9, 10).

Bearing these texts in mind, and remembering that a judge’s final sentence should be clear, we are forced to interpret our Lord’s words, “Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire,” as meaning a punishment that will have no end. “If Christ *had* intended to teach the doctrine of eternal punishment, could He possibly have taught it in plainer or more direct terms? If He did *not* intend to teach it, could He possibly have chosen language more certain, *à priori*, to mislead, as the unbroken experience of eighteen centuries proves, *à posteriori*, that it always has misled, the immense multitude of His disciples?”<sup>95</sup>

The teaching of the Fathers on the eternity of Hell is almost unanimous. St. Clement of Rome, St. Justin Martyr, Theophilus, Tertullian, Minucius Felix, St. Irenæus (*Contra*

<sup>94</sup> “The word αἰώνιος (eternal) is used no less than seventy-one times in the New Testament. In twenty-four of these cases, twenty-three of which occur in the writings of St. John, it is an epithet of ζωὴ (life); in nine other places it is applied to the ‘redemption,’ ‘salvation,’ ‘glory,’ ‘abode,’ ‘inheritance,’ or ‘consolation’ reserved for the blessed; in seven to the ‘fire,’ ‘judgment,’ ‘punishment,’ or ‘destruction’ of the impenitent. In two places only (Philemon. 15; Jude 7) is it even fairly arguable that it *may* (not *must*) have a figurative or indefinite meaning, short of the full sense of everlasting: but both are denuded of all but a merely rhetorical force by so explaining it” (Oxenham, *Eschatology*, p. 136).

<sup>95</sup> Oxenham, *op. cit.*, 124. Compare also the argument for the Real Presence, *supra*, p. 173.

*Hær.*, iv. 28), St. Cyprian (*Ad Demetr.*, 24, 25), and Hippolytus—to mention only the early Fathers—all speak of “eternal punishments,” “unquenchable fire,” “eternal fire,” “torments without end” (see Petavius, *De Angelis*, lib. iii. c. 8). The great Origen, it is true, held that all men, and even the devils, would be saved at last (*De Princ.*, i. 6; *In Josu.*, Hom. viii): and his teaching to some extent influenced the opinions of St. Gregory of Nyssa (*Or. Cat.*, 26), St. Gregory of Nazianzum, St. Ambrose, and St. Jerome (*In Is.*, xiv. 20), see Petavius (*l.c.*, cap. 7).<sup>96</sup> But the long catena of passages quoted by Petavius (*l.c.*) proves that these were merely exceptions to the general teaching. Origen’s views were condemned by the Fifth Ecumenical Council (553), which brands the doctrine of restoration as monstrous (τερατώδη ἀποκατάστασις) (can. i.). His name also figures in the eleventh anathema, though here no mention is made of any particular error (see the question discussed in Hefele, *Hist. of the Councils*, ii. 898). “Which faith,” says the Athanasian Creed, “except every one do keep entire and inviolate, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly. . . . They that have done good shall go into life everlasting; and they that have done evil, into everlasting fire. This is the Catholic faith.” The Fourth Lateran Council (c. *Firmiter*) and the Council of Trent (sess. vi. c. 14; sess. xiv. can. 5) speak of “everlasting punishment” (*pœna perpetua*), “eternal punishment” (*pœna æterna*), and “eternal damnation” (*damnatio æterna*).

It may be objected that a doctrine which seems opposed to the goodness and mercy, and even justice of God, cannot be contained in Holy Scripture, and that therefore these passages cannot be taken to mean that the punishments of the damned will be endless; especially as the Scriptures distinctly teach that God “will not always be angry, nor will He threaten for ever” (Ps. cii. 9), and they also speak of a “restitution of all things (ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων)” (Acts iii. 21); “when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all” (1 Cor. xv. 28). We readily acknowledge the difficulty of reconciling the eternity of Hell with the existence of an infinitely merciful God; but the doctrine is taught so distinctly, that we have to accept it just like other doctrines which we cannot understand. “What shall we say, then? Is there injustice with God? God forbid” (Rom. ix. 14). We must, of course, put aside all exaggerated notions as to the numbers of the lost.<sup>97</sup> We cannot believe that God, “Who will have all men to be saved” (1 Tim. ii. 4), will condemn any one who has not deliberately rejected Him. The difficulty about the salvation of those who are outside the Church has already been dealt with (*supra*, p. 163; and vol. i.); and the fate of unbaptized children will be considered presently. It is, however, the belief in Purgatory which is of the greatest help to a belief in Hell. If we admit that after this life the imperfect will suffer punishments which will have an end, we can more readily believe that the hardened sinners will be for ever cast out of God’s sight. It is surely noteworthy that the Protestants, who began by rejecting Purgatory “as a fond thing vainly invented, and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the Word of God,” should now be giving up their belief in Hell, and taking refuge in some sort

<sup>96</sup>St. Gregory of Nazianzum hoped that sinners would not be punished for ever; St. Jerome that at least sinners who were Catholics would not be so punished. St. Ambrose’s opinion was that men—not devils—may be purified and restored even after condemnation at the judgment.

<sup>97</sup>As to the vast numbers of the saved, we have the testimony of St. John: “I saw a great multitude which no man could number, of all nations, and tribes, and peoples, and tongues, standing before the throne and in the sight of the Lamb, clothed with white robes and palms in their hands” (Apoc. v. 9). The whole question is discussed in Faber’s *Creator and Creature*.

of Purgatory, and appealing to the Scriptures in proof of its existence.<sup>98</sup>

*Scholion.* Besides Hell, properly so called, there are other abodes of the departed which sometimes are called by that name. The just who died before Christ's ascension into Heaven were unable to enter that place of bliss. "All these being approved by the testimony of faith, received not the promise" (Heb. xi. 39). They were detained in "Limbo," so called because it was believed to be on the border or fringe (*limbus*) of Hell. They suffered no torments, except that of hope delayed. Hence their abode was also called "Paradise" (Luke xxiii. 43), and "Abraham's bosom" (*ibid.* xvi. 23). This "Limbo of the Fathers," which no longer has any existence, must be distinguished from the "Limbo of the children" (*limbus puerorum*), where unbaptized infants are detained (*supra*, § 118).

## § 157 PURGATORY

Those who depart this life in a state of grace are not always fit to enter at once into the Beatific Vision. They may be burdened with venial sin; or, though entirely free from any kind of sin, they may still have not fully paid the debt of temporal punishment due for their forgiven sins. Such souls must be cleansed from their sins, or must undergo this temporal punishment. The abode or condition in which this takes place, is what is meant by Purgatory. It is therefore a sort of middle state between Heaven and Hell; but the souls who are there are really saved, and will infallibly enter Heaven as soon as they are fitted for that happy consummation. They can no longer merit or sin; they cannot properly satisfy God by meriting—they can only make some sort of satisfaction by suffering. On the other hand, the faithful who are still on earth can help them by their prayers and good works, and for this purpose nothing is so efficacious as the Mass. The Council of Trent, in dealing with the subject, confines itself to the definition of these two points: "that there is a Purgatory, and that the souls there detained are helped by the suffrages of the faithful, but chiefly by the acceptable sacrifice of the altar" (sess. xxv.; cf. sess. vi. can. 30; sess. xxii. chap. 2, can. 3; and also the decree of union in the Council of Florence, Denzinger's *Enchir.*, lxxiii.). The Council adds a warning which has not always been sufficiently borne in mind by spiritual writers and preachers: "Let the more difficult and subtle questions which tend not to edification, and from which, for the most part, there is no increase of piety, be excluded from popular discourses before the uninstructed people. In like manner, such things as are uncertain, or which labour under an appearance of error, let them (the bishops) not allow to be made public and treated of; while those things which tend to a certain kind of curiosity or superstition, or which savour of filthy lucre, let them prohibit as scandals and stumbling-blocks of the faithful." Before proceeding to the proof of the doctrine defined by the Council, we observe that the two points hang very much together; prayer for the dead implying that the souls could benefit thereby, and so implying the existence of a middle and temporary state.

<sup>98</sup>As to the possibility of some alleviation in the torments of the damned, we content ourselves with quoting the words of Petavius: "*De hac damnatorum saltem hominum respiratione, nihil adhuc certi decretum est ab Ecclesia Catholica: ut propterea non temere, tanquam absurda, sit explodenda sanctissimorum Patrum hæc opinio: quamvis a communi sensu Catholicorum hoc tempore sit aliena*" (*De Angelis*, fin.). See Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, note iii. ["About this respiration of the damned men, at least, nothing is certainly decreed by the Catholic Church; so, for this reason, this opinion of the most holy Fathers should not be rashly driven off, as if it were absurd, although it is against the common understand of Catholics at this time." —Ed.]

I. The strongest proof of the existence of Purgatory is undoubtedly to be found in tradition and the general principles of theology; but Holy Scripture is not wanting in indications that there is a place of purgation after death.

1. “And making a gathering, (Judas) sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem for sacrifice to be offered for the sins of the dead, thinking well and religiously concerning the resurrection (for if he had not hoped that they that were slain should rise again, it would have seemed superfluous and vain to pray for the dead); and because he considered that they who had fallen asleep with godliness had great grace laid up for them. It is therefore a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sin” (2 Machabees xiii. 43–46). In these words is clearly expressed the belief in a middle state, in which the departed can benefit by the prayers and good works of those who are still here on earth. The Jews here spoken of had been slain while fighting in God’s cause, but they had been guilty of taking and concealing the idols of the enemy, and had fallen with this sin upon their souls.<sup>99</sup>

The Fathers also appeal to Tob. iv. 18, Eccclus. vii. 37, and Ps. lxxv. 12, as indications of the doctrine of Purgatory. Our Lord tells us that the sin against the Holy Ghost “shall not be forgiven neither in this world nor in the world to come (οὐτε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι οὐτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι)” (Matt. xii. 32); whence we infer that as some sins will be forgiven hereafter, there must be a state or place of purification for some souls which depart this life in sin. Again, His words concerning the prison, “Thou shalt not go out from thence till thou repay the last farthing” (Matt. v. 26), are taken by some of the Fathers as referring to Purgatory (St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, l. xxi. c. 24, n. 2; St. Gregory the Great, *Dial.*, l. iv. c. 39; St. Bernard, *Hom.* lxvi., *In Cant.*; Tertullian, *De Anima*, c. xxxv.; St. Cyprian, *Epist.*, lv. al. lii., *Ad Anton.*; St. Jerome, *In cap. v., Matt.*; cf. Bellarmine, *De Purgat.*, l. i. c. 7; Suarez, *In 3 Part.*, disp. 45, sect. 1).<sup>9c</sup> According to Bellarmine (*l.c.*, cap. 5), the well-known passage of St. Paul (1 Cor. iii. 13–15) is held by the common consent of the Fathers and theologians to refer to Purgatory.<sup>9c</sup> “Every man’s work shall be manifest: for the day of the Lord shall declare it, because it shall be revealed in fire; and the fire shall try every man’s work, of what sort it is. If any man’s work abide which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward. If any man’s work burn, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by Fire (οὐτως δὲ ὡς διὰ πυρός).” For an adequate interpretation of this most obscure passage, we must refer the reader to Estius (*in loc.*) or Bellarmine (*loc. cit.*). Other New Testament texts sometimes appealed to are Matt. v. 22; Luke xvi. 9; 1 Cor. xv. 29; Phil. ii. 10.

2. If we turn to tradition, the proofs both from Eastern as well as Western Fathers and Liturgies are overwhelming. “We make on one day every year oblations for the dead, as for

<sup>99</sup>Even Protestants, who reject the books of Machabees as uncanonical, must admit that we have here an historical proof of the belief of the Jews—priests, rulers, and people—in a state of purgation after death, and in the efficacy of prayers and good works for those who are detained there. Weber (*Alt-synag. Paläst. Theol.*, p. 326, seq.) thus sums up the Rabbinic doctrine: “Only a few are sure of [immediate] entrance into heaven; the majority are at their death still not ripe for heaven, and yet will not be absolutely excluded from it. Accordingly, we are referred to a middle state, a stage between death and eternal life, which serves for the final perfecting” (quoted in *Cath. Dictionary*, art. PURGATORY).

<sup>9c</sup>Elsewhere St. Augustine takes the passage to refer to Hell (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, l. i. c. ii). Hence Maldonatus (*in loc.*): “When Christ says that we shall not go out from thence until we have paid the last farthing, He does not mean, as Augustine observes, that we shall go out later on, but that we shall never go out; because those who are in hell, as they owe infinite pains for every mortal sin, go on paying for ever, but never pay off.”

<sup>9c</sup>St. Chrysostom, however, takes it as referring to Hell, while St. Augustine (*Enchirid.*, n. 68, and elsewhere) and St. Gregory the Great (*Dial.*, lib. iv. c. 39) refer it to afflictions here on earth.

their birthdays (*oblaciones pro defunctis, pro natalitiis annua die facimus*)” (Tertullian, *De Corona Milit.*, cap. 3). “The faithful widow,” he also says, “prays for the soul of her husband, and begs for him in the interim refreshment, and in the first resurrection companionship, and offers on the anniversary days of his death (*et pro anima ejus orat, et refrigerium interim adpostulat ei, et in prima resurrectione consortium, et offert annuis diebus dormitionis ejus*)” (*De Monogam.*, n. 10). St. Cyprian says that if a priest disobeys certain laws of the Church (which he mentions), “there should be no oblation for him, nor sacrifice be celebrated on his falling asleep (*nec sacrificium pro ejus dormitione celebraretur*)” (*Ep.*, lxvi., *ad Clerum et Plebem Furnis*; cf. *Ep.*, xxxiv., *De Celerino*; *Ep.*, xxxvii., *ad Clerum*; *Ep.*, lii. *ad Antonianum*). “Give perfect rest to Thy servant Theodosius, that rest which Thou hast prepared for Thy saints (*Da requiem perfectam servo tuo Theodosio, requiem illam quam preparasti sanctis tuis*); may his soul return thither whence it descended . . . I loved him, and therefore will I follow him, even unto the land of the living; nor will I leave him until by tears and prayers I shall lead him whither his merits summon him, unto the holy mountain of the Lord” (St. Ambrose, *De Obitu Theodosii*, 36, 37). “They who come not,” he says elsewhere (*Enarr.*, in Ps. i. n. 54), “unto the first resurrection, but are reserved unto the second, these shall burn until they shall complete the time between the first and the second resurrection; or if they shall not have completed it, they shall remain longer in punishment.” In a letter of consolation to Pammachius, on the death of his wife Paulina, St. Jerome says, “Other husbands strew violets, roses . . . on the graves of their wives, and soothe with these offices the sorrow of their hearts; our Pammachius bedews the hallowed dust and venerable remains of Paulina with balsams of alms. With these pigments and sweet odours does he refresh her slumbering ashes, knowing that it is written, that as water quenqueth fire, so do alms extinguish sin” (*Ep.*, lxvi.). Many extracts might be given from St. Augustine’s writings bearing on this subject. “‘Lay,’ she says [his dying mother, St. Monica], ‘this body anywhere; let not the care of it anyway disturb you; this only I ask of you, that you would remember me at the altar of the Lord wherever you be (*tantum illud vos rogo, ut ad Domini altare memineritis mei ubi fueritis*).’ . . . Neither in those prayers which we poured forth unto thee, when the sacrifice of our ransom was offered for her (*cum offeretur pro ea sacrificium pretii nostri*), the corpse being placed by the graveside before being deposited therein, as the custom there is, not even in those prayers did I weep” (*Confess.*, lib. ix. 27, 32). Writing against those who taught that God would in the end, at the request of His Saints, pardon all men; and having stated that the Church never prays for the lost souls and evil spirits, he adds, “For either the prayer of the Church or of some pious persons is heard in behalf of certain of the departed, but it is in behalf of those whose life, after they had been regenerated in Christ, was not so bad whilst they were in the body as to be accounted not worthy of such a mercy, nor so good as to be found not to need such mercy. So also, after the resurrection of the dead has taken place, there will not be wanting those to whom, after the pains which the spirits of the dead endure, will be granted the mercy that they be not cast into everlasting fire. For it would not be said with truth of some, that it shall not be forgiven them, neither in this world nor in the world to come, unless there were some to whom, though not in this, yet in the (world) to come, remission shall be granted” (*De Civ. Dei*, xxi. c. 24; cf. xx. cc. 9, 25, 26; xxi. cc. 13, 16; *De Haresibus*, n. 53).

In the Eastern Church, we find Clement of Alexandria speaking of the fire which sanctifies the sinful souls (*ἀγιάζειν τὸ πῦρ . . . τὰς ἀμαρτωλοὺς ψυχὰς πῦρ*), and distinguishing between “the all-devouring fire” and “the discriminating fire which pervades the soul which passes

through the fire (τὸ φρόνιμον λέγοντες, τὸ δεικνύμενον διὰ ψυχῆς τῆς διερχομένης τὸ πῦρ)” (*Strom.*, vii. n. 6; *ibid.*, n. 12; vi. n. 14). “We also,” says St. Cyril of Jerusalem, “commemorate those who have fallen asleep before us, first patriarchs, prophets, apostles, that God by their prayers and intercessions would receive our petition; then also on behalf of the holy Fathers and bishops who have fallen asleep before us, and of all, in short, who have already fallen asleep from amongst us, believing that it will be a very great assistance to the souls for which the supplication is put up, while the holy and most awful sacrifice lies to open view (μεγίστην ὄνησιν πιστεύοντες ἔσεσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡ δέησις ἀναφέρεται, τῆς ἀγίας καὶ φρικτοδυστάτης προκειμένης θυσίας)” (*Catech. Mystag.*, v. n. 9). “I now wish, brethren,” says St. Ephraem in his Testament (tom. ii. Gr., p. 231), “to forewarn and exhort you that after my departure you make a commemoration of me, according to custom in your prayers . . . Do not, I beseech you, bury me with perfumes . . . Give them not to me, but to God; but me that was conceived in sorrows, bury with lamentations; and instead of a sweet odour and perfumes, assist me, I entreat you with your prayers, always remembering me in them. . . . And in your prayers vouchsafe to make the customary oblations for my shortcomings; and when I shall have completed the thirtieth day, make a commemoration of me; for the dead are benefited in oblations of commemoration by the living saints.” “It is not fitting that he who has lived to so great an extent in forbidden evils, and he who has been engaged in moderate transgressions should be equally afflicted in the sentence passed on their evil state; but that, according to the quantity of that matter, the painful fire be either for a longer or a shorter time enkindled, according as there may be wherewith to feed it” (St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Anim. et Resurr.*<sup>20</sup>). St. Epiphanius, writing against the heretic Aetius, maintains that prayer benefits the departed, and that the practice of praying for them has been handed down to the Church by the ancient Fathers (*Adv. Hæres.*, lxxv). “Not in vain,” says St. John Chrysostom, “are oblations made on behalf of the departed; not in vain supplications; not in vain alms (οὐκ εἰκῆ προσφοραὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀπελθόντων γίνονται, οὐκ εἰκῆ ἱκετηρίαί, οὐκ εἰκῆ ἐλεημοσύναι). All these things has the Spirit ordained, wishing us to be aided by each other,” etc. (*In Act. Apost.*, Hom., xxi. n. 4; cf. *In Matt. Hom.*, xxxi., n. 4; *Hom.*, xxviii. n. 3; *In Ep. i.*, *ad Cor. Hom.*, xli. nn. 4, 5; *In Ep. ad Philipp. Hom.*, iii. n. 4).

All the ancient Liturgies, without exception, contain prayers and mementos for the dead. (See *Faith of Catholics*, vol. iii. pp 201–205).

3. The existence of Purgatory is also a consequence of two recognized theological principles. The first of these is the distinction between mortal sin and venial sin (see *supra*, § 110); the other is the distinction between the guilt of mortal sin and the temporal punishment due even after the guilt has been forgiven (p. 175). As we have already pointed out at the beginning of this section, persons dying with venial sin on their souls, or who have not fully paid their debt of temporal punishment, cannot at once enter Heaven (Apoc. xxi. 27), and yet do not deserve Hell. Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile the holiness and mercy and justice of God without maintaining a place of purgation after death.

II. What is the precise nature of the punishment suffered by the souls in Purgatory has not been defined by the Church. Theologians, following the analogy of the doctrine of Hell, have taught that the souls undergo both a pain of loss and a pain of sense. They are, indeed, certain of their salvation, but they suffer from an intense longing to enjoy that Highest Good,

<sup>20</sup>This work has been suspected of having been interpolated by the Origenists.

which now they appreciate in a way which they could never do while here below (Lessius, *De Perfect. Divin.*, xiii. c. 18). It is also commonly held, at least in the Western Church, that the pain of sense is caused by fire. The text, "He himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire," has been interpreted by many of the Fathers and theologians, both Eastern and Western, as referring to a material fire in Purgatory. See St. Thomas, *In iv. Sent.*, dist. 21, q. 1, a. 1; St. Bonaventure, *Brevil.*, vii. 2; Bellarmine, *De Purgat.*, i. c. 5, and ii. c. 11; Suarez, *In iii. p.* 3, disp. 46, sect. 2, n. 12). It should be noted, however, that at the Council of Florence the question was left an open one, whether the souls suffer from fire, or darkness, or storm.

## § 148 HEAVEN

The Happiness of Heaven, being the original purpose for which man was created and elevated—"the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world"—has already been described in Book III, Part ii, especially § 49.

When the twofold sentence of reward and condemnation has been executed, mankind will fulfil their end and object: the happiness of the blessed being the complete manifestation of God's infinite goodness and mercy, while the punishment of the damned is the manifestation of His justice.

"Afterwards the end, when He (Christ) shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father; when He shall have brought to nought all principality and power and virtue (*δύναμιν*, might) . . . and when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all" (1 Cor. xv. 24, 28).

O THE DEPTH OF THE RICHES OF THE WISDOM  
AND OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD!  
HOW INCOMPREHENSIBLE ARE HIS JUDGMENTS  
AND HOW UNSEARCHABLE HIS WAYS!  
OF HIM AND BY HIM AND UNTO HIM ARE ALL THINGS  
TO HIM BE GLORY FOR EVER!  
AMEN.





## APPENDIX A

### NOTES ON THE TEXT

**T**HIS REMARKABLE, accessible, and well-written English manual was last published in its third edition in 1130 (1908.), in England by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. in London, and in the United States by Benziger Brothers. Since then, to my knowledge, it has had no further distribution; which is a shame, as it's a very thorough yet readily accessible text concerning Catholic dogmatic theology.

We've made very few changes in presenting it republished to the world; those we have made are enumerated below. Mostly these are corrections of typographical errors, or updating punctuation and general typography to conform with modern standards. Even this latter has not always been done; for example, the original forms of Biblical references (romanettes for chapters, followed by a period and comma, followed by the verse number in Hindu-Arabic) has been retained.

The common punctuation construction “:—” has been eliminated, replaced with a simple “:” in accordance with modern practice. Indeed, all punctuation used in combination with a dash, such as “.—” and “,—”, has been simplified to use only the dash or the other punctuation, whichever seemed appropriate.

Through, “retractation” was replaced with its modern form, “retraction.”

On page 27, we have removed the semicolon after “only Son of God the Father”, as it didn't seem appropriate there.

On page 45, we have added a colon after “founds the union on this”.

On page 59, we have added the Oxford comma after “contrition.”

On page 72, we have changed “conform” to “conformed,” as was evidently the intention.

On page 99, we have corrected the citation to John xviii. 37, which was erroneously cited as John xviii. 37.

On page 73, we have corrected “matter of history and tradition” to “matters of tradition”.

On page 117, we have replaced the abbreviation “A.S.” (“Anglo-Saxon”) with the phrase “Old English”, as linguists generally agree this to be a more correct term.

On page 128, in footnote 20, we have correct “stedfaßtness” to “steadfastness.”

On page 171, I have added a parenthesis inadvertently omitted before “John iii.”.

On page 191, I have removed the closing parenthesis finishing paragraph IV, as there was no opening parenthesis to go with it.

On page 173, I have corrected “A the Council of Trent observes” to “As the Council of Trent observes.”

On page 175, I have surrounded the citation from 2 Paral. with quotation marks; in the original, it began with a set but did not end with one.

On page 160, I have added the opening parenthesis for the citation to St. Thomas.

On page 164, I have inverted the parenthesis and closing quotation mark at the end of the Greek quotations.

On page 166, I have moved the period before the footnote to *outside* the parentheses.

On page 203, I have removed a spurious period between “Leo” and “XIII.”

On page 209, I have added a missing closing mark for the quotation of St. Augustine.

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## APPENDIX B

### A GUIDE TO THE GREEK

THE AUTHORS OF THIS REMARKABLE text included a great deal of Greek, and a smattering of Hebrew, text. Unfortunately, to the layman this will likely appear to be simply squiggles. To avoid this situation, this short guide to the Greek alphabet is offered. The Hebrew is sparse enough that it can safely be analyzed without pronunciation.

Linguists will *not* be happy with the guide below, and with some good reason; however, it's important to note that this is merely a guide for non-Greek-speakers to be able to follow this text, not an explanation of the Greek alphabet for Greek students. This guide will suffice for that purpose.

A	α	As the “a” in <i>father</i>
B	β	As the “b” in <i>boy</i>
Γ	γ	Always as the “g” in <i>gift</i> ; never as the “g” in “gem”
Δ	δ	As the “d” in <i>deed</i>
E	ε	As the “e” in <i>gem</i>
Z	ζ	As the “dz” in <i>adze</i>
H	η	As the “ay” in <i>day</i>
Θ	θ	As the “th” in <i>thin</i>
I	ι	As the “i” in <i>tin</i>
K	κ	As the “k” in <i>kit</i>
Λ	λ	As the “l” in <i>lamb</i>
M	μ	As the “m” in <i>men</i>
N	ν	As the “n” in <i>men</i>
Ξ	ξ	As the “x” in <i>box</i>
O	ο	As the “o” in <i>off</i>
Π	π	As the “p” in <i>pop</i>
P	ρ	As the “r” in <i>rap</i>
Σ	σ, ς	As the “s” in <i>sass</i> ; “σ” comes in the beginning or middle of a word, while “ς” comes at the end
T	τ	As the “t” in <i>tap</i>
Υ	υ	As the “u” in <i>put</i>
Φ	φ	As the “f” in <i>fat</i>
X	χ	As the “ch” in <i>Bach</i>
Ψ	ψ	As the “ps” in <i>hops</i>
Ω	ω	As the “o” in <i>hope</i>

This is called the *Erasmian* pronunciation, after Erasmus of Rotterdam, who was a big part (along with St. Thomas More) of revitalizing the learning of Greek in Europe. It's pretty standard among users of New Testament and Patristic Greek, at least in the West, and using this pronunciation will make the reader understood.



## COLOPHON

This document was set in  $\tau/10$  EB Garamond, using Lua $\LaTeX$  and the `fontspec` package. Hebrew is typeset in  $\tau/10$  with the `Symbola` font, and Syriac in  $\tau/10$  in the `Beth Mardutho Edessa` font. It was built on two systems, both running Devuan GNU/Linux, and in addition to the above works, it uses the `geometry`; `graphicx`; `xellipsis`; `parcolumns`; `lettrine`; `colophon`; `babel`; `dozenal`; `clrdblpg`; `pdfx`; `microtype`; `poetry`; `paralist`; `longtable`; `hyperref`; and `bookmark` packages.

All are free and open-source software.